Jones v. Sevier et al

Filing 6

OPINION AND ORDER re 2 Pro Se Complaint GRANTING Frank Scott Jones leave to proceed against Mrs. Watts in her individual capacity for denying him good-time credit for participating in the therapeutic program because he complained about his injur y. DISMISSES all other claims. DISMISSES Mr. Sevier. DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service to issue and serve process on Mrs. Watts with a copy of this order and the complaint as requiredby 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and ORDERS, pur suant to 42 U.S.C. §1997e(g)(2), that Mrs. Watts respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 02/21/2018. (sct)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
FRANK SCOTT JONES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MR. SEVIER and MRS. WATTS,
Defendants.

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OPINION AND ORDER
Frank Scott Jones, a prisoner without a lawyer, alleges Mr. Sevier and Mrs. Watts
were deliberately indifferent to an inhumane condition of confinement in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Additionally, he alleges Watts retaliated against him because
of his speech in violation of the First Amendment. “A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss
it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Jones, an inmate at the Westville Correctional Facility, alleges he tripped over a
guitar case and another piece of musical equipment while participating in the prison’s
therapeutic program on October 7, 2016. As a result, he broke his ankle and underwent

surgery, during which two metal plates and a rod were inserted into his leg. He alleges
the music room is “a dangerous place, equipment always falling, and laying around.”
ECF 2 at 2. He alleges neither Warden Sevier or Watts, who ran the therapeutic
program, kept the music room clear.
After his injury, Jones spent time in the prison’s infirmary and could not
participate in the therapeutic program. He alleges Watts told him he would not receive
good-time credit for the program because he complained too much about having
broken his ankle. However, he alleges she allowed two other inmates to receive goodtime credits despite spending time in the infirmary while enrolled in the therapeutic
program.
The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials “must provide humane
conditions of confinement . . . and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the
safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)). However, a prison official is liable under the Eighth
Amendment only if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.” Id. at 837. Conditions of confinement must be severe to support an Eighth
Amendment claim; “the prison officials’ act or omission must result in the denial of ‘the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 834. The Eighth Amendment only
protects prisoners from conditions that exceed “contemporary bounds of decency of a
mature, civilized society.” Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1579 (7th Cir. 1994). In other
words, “[a]n objectively sufficiently serious risk is one that society considers so grave
that to expose any unwilling individual to it would offend contemporary standards of
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decency.” Christopher v. Buss, 384 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Here, exposing Jones to a cluttered, disorganized music room was
not an objectively serious risk which offends contemporary standards of decency.
Therefore these claims must be dismissed.
Jones also alleges Watts retaliated against him for exercising his First
Amendment rights by denying him good-time credits for his participation in the
therapeutic program because he complained about breaking his ankle. To state a claim
of First Amendment retaliation, the plaintiff must plead three elements: (1) the plaintiff
engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation
that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First
Amendment activity was “at least a motivating factor” in the Defendant’s decision to
take retaliatory action. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Woodruff
v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008)). Here, the complaint states a retaliation claim
because it alleges Jones engaged in protected activity by complaining about his injury;
Watts denied him good-time credit because he complained; and the loss of good-time
credit would likely deter future complaints about injuries sustained at the prison.
Although prisoners have no liberty or property interest in unearned good-time credits,
see Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 274 (7th Cir. 1996), this is irrelevant to analysis of a
First Amendment retaliation claim. See DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“[I]f prison officials were to allocate T.V. time, visitation privileges, prison jobs, or any
of the other privileges prisoners enjoy, on an otherwise illegal or discriminatory basis,

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their actions would be unconstitutional even though such privileges do not constitute
liberty or property interests.”).
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Frank Scott Jones leave to proceed against Mrs. Watts in her
individual capacity for denying him good-time credit for participating in the
therapeutic program because he complained about his injury;
(2) DISMISSES all other claims;
(3) DISMISSES Mr. Sevier;
(4) DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service to issue and serve
process on Mrs. Watts with a copy of this order and the complaint (ECF 2) as required
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
(5) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1997e(g)(2), that Mrs. Watts respond, as
provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to
the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening
order.
SO ORDERED on February 21, 2018.

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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