Huff v. Tabler

Filing 4

OPINION AND ORDER re 1 Pro Se Complaint, GRANTING Michael Huff leave to proceed on a claim against Stephen Tabler for retaliating against Huff in violation of the First Amendment by transferring him to another jail;Michael Allen Huff is GRANTED leave to proceed on a claim against StephenTabler for punishing Huff in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by transferring him to another jail; all other claims are DISMISSED; The clerk and the United States Marshals Service are DIRECTED to issue and serve process on Stephen Tabler at the Pulaski County Jail with a copy of this order andthe complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and Stephen Tabler is ORDERED, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), to respond, as provided by th e Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10.1, only to the claims for which Michael Allen Huff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. SO ORDERED on March 1, 2018. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 3/1/18. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(mlc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
MICHAEL ALLEN HUFF,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAUSE NO.: 3:18-CV-121-PPS-MGG

STEPHEN TABLER,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Michael Allen Huff, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint against
Stephen Tabler, the jail commander at the Pulaski County Jail. “A document filed pro se
is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, I must
review the complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. “In
order to state a claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants
deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under
color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).
Huff alleges that he complained to Tabler that he did not receive a timely
disciplinary hearing. On August 23, 2016, without warning and for no apparent reason,
Tabler transferred Huff from the Pulaski County Jail to the Starke County Jail. The
conditions at the Starke County Jail were more severe; there, Huff was deprived of

recreation for days at a time, was assaulted by other inmates, and maced by the jail
officials. The food was also inferior, and he did not know anybody. Because he was
unable to contact his family and attorney, the transfer also resulted in the loss of visits,
mail, and money deposits and interfered with his pending legal matters.
Huff alleges that Tabler transferred him in retaliation for complaining about the
timing of his disciplinary hearing. “To prevail on his First Amendment retaliation
claim, [a plaintiff] must show that (1) he engaged in activity protected by the First
Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment
activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating
factor in the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.” Gomez v. Randle, 680
F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted). A plaintiff “must
allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.” Cain v.
Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988); Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir.
2002). Giving Huff the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he states a claim of
First Amendment retaliation against Tabler.
Huff also alleges that the transfer violated his right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment and his right to due process. Because Huff is a pretrial detainee
rather than a convicted prisoner, “we assess [his] claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment instead of the Eighth Amendment.” Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cty.,
850 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
prohibits holding pretrial detainees in conditions that amount to punishment.” Id. “A
pretrial condition can amount to punishment in two ways: first, if it is imposed for the

purpose of punishment, or second, if the condition is not reasonably related to a
legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the
purpose of the government action is punishment.” Id. A pretrial detainee can “prevail
by providing only objective evidence that the challenged governmental action is not
rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation
to that purpose.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). The complaint
plausibly implies that the transfer to the Starke County Jail amounts to punishment.
Huff thus states a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against Tabler.
Accordingly:
(1) Michael Allen Huff is GRANTED leave to proceed on a claim against Stephen
Tabler for retaliating against Huff in violation of the First Amendment by transferring
him to another jail;
(2) Michael Allen Huff is GRANTED leave to proceed on a claim against Stephen
Tabler for punishing Huff in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by transferring
him to another jail;
(3) all other claims are DISMISSED;
(4) the clerk and the United States Marshals Service are DIRECTED to issue and
serve process on Stephen Tabler at the Pulaski County Jail with a copy of this order and
the complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
(5) Stephen Tabler is ORDERED, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), to respond,
as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10.1, only to the

claims for which Michael Allen Huff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening
order.
SO ORDERED on March 1, 2018.
s/ Philip P. Simon
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT