Shriberg v. Cuckler, MD et al
Filing
44
OPINION AND ORDER: Directing dismissal of counts 1, 2, 3, 8, 10 of the plaintiffs' amended complaint. DENYING 17 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply; GRANTING 9 MOTION to Dismiss. Defendants Alabama Medical Consultants Inc and Johhn Cuckler, MD dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff may amend the fraud and misrepresentation claims in their complaint, if they so wish, by 3/27/2019. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 3/27/19. (jld)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
IN RE: BIOMET M2a MAGNUM HIP
IMPLANT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION (MDL 2391)
This Document Relates to:
MOORE v. BIOMET, INC. et al
SHRIBERG v. BIOMET, INC. et al
YOUNG v. BIOMET, INC. et al
THOMAS v. BIOMET, INC. et al
KASKAN v. BIOMET, INC. et al
BRADY v. BIOMET, INC., et. al.
EASTERLING v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
HAYDEN v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
WALCH v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
ANDREWS v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
CONNOR v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
FITZGERALD v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
FOWLER v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
FRANZESE v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
KELLEY v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
BAYE v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
ANDERSON v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
ALEXANDER v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
GIFT v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
MOORE v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
STONE v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
ROBINSON v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
HOWELL v. BIOMET, INC., et. al
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CAUSE NO. 3:12-MD-2391
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
CAUSE
NO. 3:18-CV-258
NO. 3:18-CV-259
NO. 3:18-CV-260
NO. 3:18-CV-468
NO. 3:18-CV-469
NO. 3:18-CV-672
NO. 3:18-CV-675
NO. 3:18-CV-678
NO. 3:18-CV-679
NO. 3:18-CV-680
NO. 3:18-CV-683
NO. 3:18-CV-684
NO. 3:18-CV-685
NO. 3:18-CV-686
NO. 3:18-CV-691
NO. 3:18-CV-696
NO. 3:18-CV-698
NO. 3:18-CV-711
NO. 3:18-CV-713
NO. 3:18-CV-714
NO. 3:18-CV-715
NO. 3:18-CV-716
NO. 3:18-CV-717
OPINION AND ORDER
These 23 cases are part of a docket (MDL-2391) established by the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. The cases were filed directly into this MDL
docket pursuant to case management orders I entered in 2013 and 2016. Cases
1
in this docket primarily assert personal injury claims by people who received
Biomet’s M2 a Magnum Hip replacement implants, which the plaintiffs contend
are unreasonably dangerous. The plaintiffs in these 23 cases have sued parties
I will refer to simply as “Biomet”: Biomet, Inc., Biomet Orthopedics, LLC, Biomet
US Reconstruction, LLC, Biomet Manufacturing, LLC and, in some of the cases,
Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. Each plaintiff also sued Dr. John Cuckler and
Alabama Medical Consultants, Inc., whom I refer to as “the Cuckler defendants.”
This order disposes of 41 motions to dismiss in which all briefs allowed by
the district rules have been filed.
In 18 of these cases (all but Moore, Schriberg, Young, Thomas, and
Kaskan), the plaintiffs raise claims of fraud in addition to their personal injury
claims. The laws of the states of Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas,
and Wisconsin provide the rules of decision in those 18 cases. Insofar as today’s
fraud issues are concerned, there is no meaningful difference among the laws of
those states. All of the defendants moved to dismiss the fraud claims for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In all 23 cases, the Cuckler defendants also moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. I granted similar motions in 2018 and denied the plaintiffs’
2
motions to vacate those dismissals based on the same arguments asserted in
these cases.1 My reasoning applies equally here.
The
plaintiffs
live
in
Arkansas,
California,
Illinois,
Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin. The same law firm filed all
23 of these cases.
The plaintiffs in Moore, Shriberg, and Young moved to file sur-replies
relating to the motions to dismiss the Cuckler defendants. Extending the briefing
in any multidistrict litigation proceeding runs the risk of delay for scores – at
times, thousands – of cases, so I think it better to decide issues on the briefs
allowed by the district rules.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In the usual course of things, these plaintiffs would have filed these
complaints in their home states (where they say this court should transfer the
cases when their time in the MDL docket is over) and the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation would have centralized the cases in the Northern District
of Indiana. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407. The plaintiffs filed their cases here only because
I authorized direct filing as a “procedural mechanism” to increase efficiency and
conserve resources. See Wahl v. General Electric Co., 786 F.3d 491, 498 (6th
1
See Eide v. Cuckler et al., 3:17-cv-955 [Doc. Nos. 18 and 48]; Smith v. Cuckler et al.,
3:17-cv-956, [Doc. Nos. 18 and 51]; and McLevis v. Cuckler et al., 3:17-cv-957 [Doc.
Nos. 18 and 56]. Today’s plaintiffs are represented by the same attorneys, so their
familiarity with those orders is presumed.
3
Cir. 2015); In re Watson Fentanyl Patch Prods. Liab. Litig., 977 F. Supp. 2d 885,
888 (N.D. Ill. 2013). These dismissal motions, then, look to whether district
courts in the plaintiffs’ home states would have jurisdiction over the Cuckler
defendants. See Kalama v. Matson Navigation Co., Inc., 875 F.3d 297, 302 (6th
Cir. 2017) (motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction “required the
[MDL court in] the E.D. of Pennsylvania to decide whether the N.D. of Ohio – the
transferor court that would eventually oversee trials in the [] cases – could
exercise personal jurisdiction over the [] defendants”); In re Testosterone
Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig., 136 F. Supp. 3d 968, 973 (N.D. Ill.
2015) (“In an MDL proceeding, the MDL court [] has jurisdiction...if the
originating, transferor courts would have jurisdiction.”).
The Cuckler defendants moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for
lack of personal jurisdiction. Once such a motion is made, the plaintiff bears the
burden of showing the existence of personal jurisdiction. Purdue Research
Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003).
Discussion of personal jurisdiction ordinarily looks for minimum contacts
between the defendant and the forum court, see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980), for offense to traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice, see International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945), for constant and pervasive affiliations between the defendant
and the forum state that would give rise to general jurisdiction, see Daimler AG
v, Bauman, and whether the plaintiff’s injuries relate to otherwise insufficient
4
contacts between the defendant and the forum state. See Burger King v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-478 (1985). But the plaintiffs’ arguments lead in
a different direction.
The plaintiffs don’t seem to disagree with the Cuckler defendants’ factual
assertions that Dr. Cuckler and Alabama Medical Consultants were citizens of
Alabama or Florida at every important time, and that neither of the Cuckler
defendants themselves has had anything more than sub-minimal contacts with
the home states of any of the plaintiffs. Instead, the plaintiffs rely on agreements
their lawyers had with the Cuckler defendants in other cases and on the Cuckler
defendants’ relationship to the Biomet defendants.
In 2016, these parties and their law firms found themselves addressing
dismissal motions in the Collier County, Florida, Circuit Court, based on forum
non conveniens grounds. The plaintiffs explain (the Biomet defendants don’t
entirely agree) the parties agreed to use the case brought by Scott Eanes as
something of a bellwether; they would apply the court’s ruling in Mr. Eanes’s
case to the other twelve Collier County cases in which dismissal motions were
pending. The Biomet defendants told the Florida judge that Mr. Eanes could file
directly into the MDL docket, or in Indiana – Biomet’s home state – or in Mr.
Eanes’s home state of Texas. The Collier County court granted the dismissal
motion, noting those three alternatives were open to Mr. Eanes. The plaintiffs
also note in passing that there are twelve cases in this MDL docket in which the
Cuckler defendants haven’t moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
5
The plaintiffs view the Cuckler defendants’ concession in the Collier
County cases as consent to be sued in a plaintiffs’ home state, whatever state
that might be. The plaintiffs cite no authority for that argument, and I can't
imagine what rule of law any such authority might support. In essence, the
plaintiffs argue that because the Cuckler defendants agreed that Scott Eanes
could sue them in his home state, they must be found to have consented to be
sued in any state of the union in which a plaintiff was a citizen. Such a rule
might arise from the plaintiffs all being represented by the same law firm, but
it’s not intuitively clear why that should be. Perhaps such a rule would be limited
to cases in which plaintiffs bring claims similar to what Mr. Eanes alleged in
Collier County, Florida, but again, it's not clear why that should affect someone
else’s right to sue the Cuckler defendants in some other state.
The law in these cases is what logic suggests: “[a] party’s consent to
jurisdiction in one case...extends to that case alone.”
Klinghoffer v. S.N.C.
Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 50 n.5 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Torrent
Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. Daiichi Sankyo, Inc., 2016 WL 3976992, *3-4 (N.D. Ill.
2016) (a defendant’s consent to a district court exercising personal jurisdiction
for a first litigation does not extend to other litigations, even where there may be
overlapping subject matter). There’s no evidence to suggest that the Cuckler
defendants ever consented to being sued in the plaintiffs’ home states in these
cases, or that they made any representations to the contrary to plaintiffs’
counsel.
6
In their second argument, the plaintiffs contend that the Cuckler
defendants are subject to suit in the plaintiffs’ home states, not because of the
Cuckler defendants’ individual contacts with those states, but because of
Biomet’s contacts. The plaintiffs point to the “stream of commerce” theory of
minimum contacts as discussed in In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip
Implant Product Liability Litigation, 888 F.3d 753 (5th Cir. 2018). As the court
of appeals explained, “That doctrine recognizes that a defendant may purposely
avail itself of the protection of a state’s laws—and thereby will subject itself to
personal jurisdiction—'by sending its goods rather than its agents’ into the
forum.” 888 F.3d at 778 (quoting J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564
U.S. 873, 882 (2011)). The DePuy Orthopaedics court held that DePuy’s
corporate parent, Johnson & Johnson, was involved in the design, marketing,
sale and financing of the Pinnacle metal-on-metal hip implant to such an extent
that the courts of Texas, where the plaintiff had received the implant, had
personal jurisdiction over Johnson & Johnson. Id. at 780. I assume, solely for
purposes of today’s ruling, that the “stream of commerce” theory reflects current
law. But see Wilson v. Nouvag GmbH, 2018 WL 1565602, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 30, 2018).
But Johnson & Johnson’s role in the Pinnacle hip dwarfs the Cuckler
defendants’ roles in the Biomet M2a hip implants. Johnson & Johnson had
merged subsidiary corporations, assembled design teams from multiple
subsidiaries, transferred a patent to DePuy, edited and approved DePuy’s
advertising and public statements, paid for promotional activities, set up its own
7
website and conducted a national satellite telecast promoting the product, called
the product its own, and put its own logo on the packaging.
In contrast, the plaintiffs allege that the Cuckler defendants helped design,
market, test, and promote the Biomet hip, helped train surgeons to implant the
device, and helped design tools to be used for implementation. The Cuckler
defendants have, the plaintiffs allege, made millions of dollars in royalties from
the Biomet M2a hip. But they are entirely separate from the Biomet defendants:
neither owns or controls the other. The Cuckler defendants didn’t control the
marketing, sale, or distribution of the Biomet hip, and unlike Johnson &
Johnson, the Cuckler defendants did not themselves place, or fund the
placement of, the Biomet M2a hip system into the stream of commerce.
The Cuckler defendants have too few contacts with the plaintiffs’ home
states for personal jurisdiction to attach in those states, under either a general
jurisdiction theory or a “stream of commerce” specific jurisdiction theory. They
are entitled to dismissal of the complaints insofar as they are sued. Of course,
this ruling doesn’t affect any plaintiff’s right to refile in a court that has personal
jurisdiction over the Cuckler defendants.
SUFFICIENCY OF FRAUD ALLEGATIONS
Last October, Biomet moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended complaints
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. These complaints
allege several product liability and fraud-based claims against the defendants.
8
Biomet argues that these 18 complaints don’t plead the circumstances of alleged
fraud with requisite particularity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 9(b).
Each of these plaintiffs was implanted with a Biomet’s M2a metal-on-metal
hip implant, and each was subject to later revision surgery. In the summer of
2018, these plaintiffs sued Biomet, Dr. Cuckler, and Alabama Medical
Consultants. The original complaints included fraud and misrepresentationbased claims. Amended complaints filed in the fall of 2018 added more claims of
fraud and fraudulent concealment. Each plaintiff alleges a) fraud (counts 1 and
2), b) fraudulent concealment (count 3), c) misrepresentation (count 8), and d)
information negligently supplied for the guidance of others (count 10). The
Cuckler defendants joined in the dismissal motions, but needn’t be mentioned
any further in this opinion in light of my personal jurisdiction ruling.
The claims involve several different alleged shortcomings. The plaintiffs
say Biomet engaged in inadequate testing and a false marketing scheme that
included misrepresentations and factual omissions. They also allege that the
false marketing scheme extended to the misrepresentation or omissions as to the
benefits of Biomet’s M2a metal-on-metal hip implants, misrepresentations or
omissions made to the medical community on the clinical efficacy of the
implants, and the misrepresentation or omissions as to clinical information
about heavy metal poisoning caused by the implants. Biomet moves to dismiss
the fraud and misrepresentation claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing
9
that the claims fail to fulfil the pleading requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)
and 9(b).
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss a claim that “fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (interpreting
the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d
720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Fraud and misrepresentation claims must not only meet the pleading
standard under Rule 8(a), but must also fulfill the heightened standard under
Rule 9(b), which requires the complaint to “state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). This rule applies not only
to express fraud claims but to those claims “sounding in fraud,” meaning any
claim “premised upon a course of fraudulent conduct.” Borsellino v. Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2007). The circumstances
constituting fraud must articulate the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the
10
claimed conduct. Rocha v. Rudd, 826 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2016). The claim
must state “the identity of the person making the misrepresentation, the time,
place, and content of the misrepresentation, and the method by which the
misrepresentation was communicated.” Rocha v. Rudd, 826 F.3d at 911 (quoting
Uni*Quality Inc. v. Infotronx, Inc., 973 F.2d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1992)). A court
considering whether a claim fulfils the requirements under Rules 8(a) and 9(b)
accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Doe v. Vill. of Arlington
Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 2015).
Courts siting in diversity apply “choice-of-law rules used by the state in
which the federal district court where the case was filed.” NewSpin Sports, LLC
v. Arrow Elecs., Inc., 910 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2018); Wigod v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 574, 569 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that plaintiff adequately
pleaded reasonable reliance as applied to her common law fraudulent
misrepresentation claim); Tricontinental Indus. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP,
475 F.3d 824, 833-834 (7th Cir. 2007) (determining that common law applied
regarding plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim); see also Midwest Grain
Prods. Of Ill., Inc. v. Productization, Inc., 228 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 2000).
Neither side contends that a choice of laws analysis leads to the law of any but
the state in which the devices were implanted. Since these fraud and
misrepresentation claims arise under state common law, I must look to the
specific laws of each relevant state to determine the essential elements of the
11
claims.2 None of the parties contends there is a difference between the laws that
might be found to apply. To prevail on the fraud and misrepresentation claims,
a plaintiff must adequately allege, among other things, that Biomet: perpetrated
a fraud; frequently misrepresented or fraudulently concealed certain information
for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to act or not act; and that the plaintiff
justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation.3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
525.
Without an allegation of reliance, no plaintiff can adequately allege facts
to show that Biomet engaged in fraudulent conduct. These amended complaints
don’t adequately plead facts showing how the alleged misrepresentations
reached them or their physicians. Nor do they offer, with requisite particularity,
the content of the alleged misrepresentations or how these misrepresentations
2
The essential elements to prove fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent
concealment, and negligent misrepresentation are all based on individual state law.
Controlling law would be specific to the state where each device was implanted. Each
of these states follow the reliance requirement articulated in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts and are substantively identical. The specific jurisdictions in which plaintiffs’
devices were implanted, and relevant legal authority for each fraud and
misrepresentation claims, are: Arkansas, Ultracuts Ltd. V. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 33
S.W.3d 128, 135 (Ark. 2000); Indiana, Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1289 (Ind.
1996); Kansas, Alires v. McGehee, 85 P.3d 1191, 1195 (Kan. 2004); Maryland, Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Albright, 71 A.3d 30, 49 (Md. 2013); Massachusetts, Masingill v. EMC
Corp., 870 N.E.2d 81, 88 (Mass. 2007); New York, Pasternack v. Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings, 59 N.E.3d 485, 491 (N.Y. 2016) North Carolina, Forbis v. Neal, 649 S.E.2d
382, 387 (N.C. 2007); Oklahoma, Silk v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 760 P.2d 174, 176177 (Okla. 1988); South Carolina, Mut. Sav. & Loan Asso. V. McKenzie, 366 S.E.2d
423, 425 (S.C. 1980); Texas, Grant Thornton LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund, 314
S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tex. 2010); and Wisconsin, Bank of Sun Prairie v. Esser, 456
N.W.2d 585, 588-589 (Wis. 1990).
The plaintiffs also allege that Biomet negligently supplied certain information for the
guidance of others (count 10). Since justifiable reliance is an element of this claim, I
addressed it in the opinion’s reliance section. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552.
3
12
affected their medical care and treatment. Rocha v. Rudd, 826 F.3d 905, 909
(7th Cir. 2016) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires “the identity of the person making
the misrepresentation, the time, place, and content of the misrepresentation,
and the method by which the misrepresentation was communicated to the
plaintiff.”); see also United States ex rel. Grenadyor v. Ukranian Vill. Pharm.,
Inc., 772 F.3d 1102, 1106 (7th Cir. 2014) (same); Massuda v. Panda Express,
Inc., 759 F.3d 779, 783-784 (7th Cir. 2014).
The plaintiffs argue that reliance needn’t be pleaded with particularity
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). They point to Midwest Comm. Banking Co. v. Elkhart
City Ctr., 4 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 1993) and In re Testosterone Replacement
Therapy Prods. Liab. (“Testosterone”), 159 F. Supp. 3d 898, 921, n.5 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 3, 2016) to support their proposition. Midwest Comm. Banking Co., while
on point, pre-dates more recent and persuasive opportunities the court has of
appeals has had to analyze the reliance issue. Massuda v. Panda Express, Inc.,
759 F.3d at 783-784 (suit was properly dismissed with prejudice when plaintiff
failed to plead with specificity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) that her reliance on
defendant’s alleged fraudulent statements); Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673
F.3d at 569 (determining that plaintiff pleaded with particularity under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(b) her reliance on defendant’s alleged statements). The In re
Testosterone court explicitly acknowledged that justifiable reliance is an element
of common law fraud, In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy, 159 F. Supp. 3d
at 927 (“Defendants also argue that plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege
justifiable reliance, an element of both fraud and negligent misrepresentation
13
claims under Ohio law.”), but declined to dismiss on that ground because Ohio
cases seem to approach the issue at the summary judgment stage rather than
on a motion to dismiss. Ohio doesn’t provide the rule of decision in any of these
cases, so I needn’t dig deeper into why the In re Testosterone court thought the
issue premature.
The plaintiffs’ reliance allegations also fall short of the Rule 8(a) pleading
standard, which requires something more than a “threadbare” pleading. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Alleging that a plaintiff and that plaintiff’s physician relied on certain
representation and misrepresentations, without providing further details,
represents nothing more than “mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
566 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). That’s
not to say that plaintiff’s complaint must contain detailed factual allegations of
reliance – all it needs is to contain allegations adequate “enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. These amended complaints don’t do that.
Reliance is an essential element of these fraud claims and their claim of
negligently supplied information. The plaintiffs don’t successfully allege reliance
under Rules 8(a) and 9(b) and so don’t adequately plead their fraud and
misrepresentation claims with specificity. For the same reasons, the plaintiffs’
claims of negligently supplied information aren’t adequately pleaded under Rule
8.
14
Even aside from the reliance issue, the amended complaints don’t
adequately plead facts sufficient to fulfill the heightened pleading standard of
Rule 9(b) regarding their claims of fraud, fraudulent concealment, and
fraudulent misrepresentation. A complaint must adequately plead the “who,
what, when, where, and how” of Biomet’s alleged fraud to fulfil Rule 9(b)’s
particularity requirement. Rocha v. Rudd, 826 F.3d at 911.
The plaintiffs first allege that Biomet spread false information about its
experience with metal on metal hip implants and said that, in its experience,
there hadn’t been any instances of heavy metal poisoning. Those allegations rely
on a number of statements but don’t identify who at Biomet made or cited these
statements, when or where the statements were made or cited, or how these
statements came to the attention of any plaintiff or that plaintiff’s physician.
Simply stating that Biomet made certain statements or publications, without
more, doesn’t fulfill the pleading requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). United
States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2009)
(determining that, in order to adeptly plead fraud with particularity, a plaintiff
must state the “who, what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph of any
newspaper story.”); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990)
(“Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires the plaintiff to state with particularity any
circumstances constituting fraud. Although states of mind may be pleaded
generally, the circumstances must be pleaded in detail.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
15
The plaintiffs also allege that Biomet was fully aware that the associated
wear of their metal-on-metal implants were more toxic than other implants but
that Biomet marketed the implant by claiming it produced less wear than other
implants. But the complaints only refer to two marketing materials and
characterize the materials in a conclusory fashion. The amended complaints
don’t identify how or when any plaintiff or physician received the marketing
material. Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 737-734 (7th
Cir. 2012) (finding that plaintiff’s general statements on allegedly fraudulent
marketing materials were conclusory because such statements did not identify
“the person making the misrepresentation, the time, place, and content of the
misrepresentation, and the method by which the misrepresentation was
communicated.”); Ackerman v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469 (7th
Cir. 1999) (“[Rule 9(b)] requires the plaintiff to conduct a pre-complaint
investigation in sufficient depth to assure that the charge of fraud is responsible
and supported.”).
Perhaps most critically, the amended complaints don’t specify to which
defendant each instance of alleged fraud should be attributed. Instead, the
plaintiffs “lump[ ] together” multiple defendants. Rocha v. Rudd, 826 F.3d at 911
(finding that plaintiffs didn’t adequately allege fraud when they failed to “inform
each defendant as to the nature of his alleged participation in the fraud.”);
Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 950 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that
plaintiff’s failure to identify who specifically made the alleged misrepresentations
warranted dismissal). Group pleading has been expressly rejected as applied to
16
fraud claims. Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[t]he appellants
fail to satisfy the 9(b) standard: their complaint is bereft of any detail concerning
who was involved in each allegedly fraudulent activity, how the alleged fraud was
perpetrated, or when the allegedly fraudulent statements were made. Rather, the
complaint lumps all the defendants together and does not specify who was
involved in what activity.”); Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Servs., 20 F.3d
771, 778 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[w]e […] have rejected complaints that have "lumped
together" multiple defendants.”).
Taken together, the plaintiffs’ amended complaints don’t adequately plead
facts to support a cognizable claim of fraud, fraudulent concealment, or negligent
misrepresentation. They don’t adequately allege reliance on misrepresentations,
and don’t plead the fraud and fraud-related claims with the request particularity
required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
This order directs dismissal of counts 1, 2, 3, 8, 10 of the plaintiffs’
amended complaints. The plaintiffs may amend the fraud and misrepresentation
claims in their complaints, if they wish to do so, by March 27, 2019.
ORDERS
This order disposes of the following motions:
In 3:18cv258, Sharon Moore v. John Cuckler, et al., the plaintiff’s
motion to file a sur-reply [Doc. 16] is DENIED, and the Cuckler defendants’
17
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No. 9] is
GRANTED.
In 3:18cv259, Marjorie Shriberg v. John Cuckler, et al., the plaintiff’s
motion to file a sur-reply [Doc. No. 17] is DENIED, and the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No. 9]
is GRANTED.
In 3:18cv260, Don Young v. John Cuckler, et al., the plaintiff’s
motion to file a sur-reply [Doc. No. 17] is DENIED, and the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
12] is GRANTED.
In 3:18cv468, Marilyn Thomas v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
10] is GRANTED.
In 3:18cv469, Thomas Kaskan v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
10] is GRANTED.
In 3:18cv672, Elaine Brady v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler defendants’
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No. 19] is
GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s fraud and
misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts 1, 2, 3, 8,
10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may amend the
18
fraud and misrepresentation claims in her complaint, if she wishes to do
so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv675, Kaye Easterling v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
19] is GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
fraud and misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts
1, 2, 3, 8, 10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may
amend the fraud and misrepresentation claims in her complaint, if she
wishes to do so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv678, Michael Hayden v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
19] is GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
fraud and misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts
1, 2, 3, 8, 10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may
amend the fraud and misrepresentation claims in his complaint, if he
wishes to do so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv679, Deanna Walch v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
19] is GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
fraud and misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts
1, 2, 3, 8, 10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may
19
amend the fraud and misrepresentation claims in her complaint, if she
wishes to do so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv680, Judy Andrews v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
19] is GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
fraud and misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts
1, 2, 3, 8, 10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may
amend the fraud and misrepresentation claims in her complaint, if she
wishes to do so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv683, Linda Connor v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
19] is GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
fraud and misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts
1, 2, 3, 8, 10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may
amend the fraud and misrepresentation claims in her complaint, if she
wishes to do so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv684, Evelyn Fitzgerald v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
19] is GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
fraud and misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts
1, 2, 3, 8, 10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may
20
amend the fraud and misrepresentation claims in her complaint, if she
wishes to do so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv685, Edward Fowler v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
19] is GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
fraud and misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts
1, 2, 3, 8, 10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may
amend the fraud and misrepresentation claims in his complaint, if he
wishes to do so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv686, Beth Franzese v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
19] is GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
fraud and misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts
1, 2, 3, 8, 10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may
amend the fraud and misrepresentation claims in her complaint, if she
wishes to do so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv691, John Keeley v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler defendants’
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No. 19] is
GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s fraud and
misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts 1, 2, 3, 8,
10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may amend the
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fraud and misrepresentation claims in her complaint, if she wishes to do
so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv696, Linda Baye v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler defendants’
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No. 19] is
GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s fraud and
misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts 1, 2, 3, 8,
10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may amend the
fraud and misrepresentation claims in her complaint, if she wishes to do
so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv698, Dorothy Anderson v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
19] is GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
fraud and misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts
1, 2, 3, 8, 10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may
amend the fraud and misrepresentation claims in her complaint, if she
wishes to do so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv711, Kenneth Alexander v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
19] is GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
fraud and misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts
1, 2, 3, 8, 10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may
22
amend the fraud and misrepresentation claims in his complaint, if he
wishes to do so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv713, Shirley Gift v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler defendants’
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No. 19] is
GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s fraud and
misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. The plaintiff may
amend the fraud and misrepresentation claims in her complaint, if she
wishes to do so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv714, Anson Moore v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler defendants’
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No. 19] is
GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s fraud and
misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts 1, 2, 3, 8,
10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may amend the
fraud and misrepresentation claims in his complaint, if he wishes to do so,
by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv715, Keara Stone v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler defendants’
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No. 19] is
GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s fraud and
misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts 1, 2, 3, 8,
10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may amend the
fraud and misrepresentation claims in her complaint, if she wishes to do
so, by March 27, 2019.
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In 3:18cv716, Patricia J. Robinson v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
19] is GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
fraud and misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts
1, 2, 3, 8, 10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may
amend the fraud and misrepresentation claims in her complaint, if she
wishes to do so, by March 27, 2019.
In 3:18cv717, Christine Howell v. Biomet, et al., the Cuckler
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [Doc. No.
19] is GRANTED, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
fraud and misrepresentations claims [Doc. No. 21] is GRANTED. Counts
1, 2, 3, 8, 10 of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. The plaintiff may
amend the fraud and misrepresentation claims in her complaint, if she
wishes to do so, by March 27, 2019.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: March 7, 2019
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge, United States District Court
Northern District of Indiana
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