Payton v. Warden
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: The Court DENIES the petition pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4; WAIVES the filing fee; DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment and to close this case; and DENIES Andre Payton leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 3/21/19. (Copy mailed to pro se party via certified mail, receipt no. 7018 0360 0001 4183 9351)(ksp)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
ANDRE PAYTON,
Petitioner,
v.
CAUSE NO.: 3:18-CV-273-RLM-MGG
WARDEN,
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Andre Payton, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a habeas corpus petition
challenging the disciplinary decision at the Indiana State Prison in which a
disciplinary hearing officer found him guilty of inciting a riot in violation of the
Indiana Department of Correction Offense A-103. Mr. Payton was sentenced with
a loss of 180 days of earned credit time and a demotion from Credit Class 1 to
Credit Class 2. Under Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4, the court must
dismiss the petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached
exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.”
Mr. Payton argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the hearing
officer did not find in his favor despite being presented with the surveillance
video recording and the exculpatory witness statements from Lieutenant
Gillespie and Lieutenant Watson. Under departmental regulations, inciting a riot
is defined as:
Encouraging, directing, commanding, coercing, or signaling one or
more other persons to participate in a disturbance to facility order
caused by a group of two (2) or more offenders which creates a risk
of injury to persons or property or participating in such a
disturbance or remaining in a group where some members of the
group are participating in such a disturbance.
The administrative record included a disciplinary report, stating that, on
February 4, 2018, Lieutenant McCormick arrived at Mr. Payton’s cellhouse, and
several offenders refused to return to their cells because the electricity wasn’t
working. Mr. Payton approached Lieutenant McCormick and said he wanted
guarantees about showers and electricity or he would instruct the other inmates
not to return to their cells. Lieutenant McCormick said that he couldn’t
guarantee electricity because he had no control over that but that he would
discuss showers with the captain. Mr. Payton responded that he wouldn’t tell
the other inmates to return to their cells without a guarantee. After Mr. Payton
spoke with Lieutenant Gillespie and Lieutenant Watson, he relented, went to his
cell, and told other inmates to do the same. Four other correctional officers
submitted written statements corroborating the disciplinary report.
The administrative record also included a summary of the video recording,
which indicated merely that Mr. Payton spoke with Lieutenant McCormick at the
relevant time. Further, Lieutenant Gillespie and Lieutenant Watson provided
written statements that contradicted the disciplinary report, describing Mr.
Payton’s statements as an effort to mediate between inmates and staff.
To satisfy due process, there must be “some evidence” to support the
hearing officer’s decision. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,
455 (1985). “In reviewing a decision for some evidence, courts are not required
to conduct an examination of the entire record, independently assess witness
credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison
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disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.”
McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999).
[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the
support of some evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard,
requiring no more than a modicum of evidence. Even meager proof
will suffice, so long as the record is not so devoid of evidence that
the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or
otherwise arbitrary. Although some evidence is not much, it still
must point to the accused’s guilt. It is not our province to assess
the comparative weight of the evidence underlying the disciplinary
board’s decision.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000). Mr. Payton asks the court
to reweigh the evidence, something the court can’t do. The written statements of
five officers support the charge of inciting a riot, which qualifies as some
evidence. As a result, the claim that the hearing officer didn’t credit the evidence
in Mr. Payton’s favor provides no basis for habeas relief.
Mr. Payton also argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the
hearing officer considered witness statements without providing giving Mr.
Payton advance notice of these witnesses. “Prison disciplinary proceedings are
not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant
in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556
(1974). While the right to procedural due process gives Mr. Payton certain
enumerated procedural rights for disciplinary proceedings, the right to advance
notice of witnesses isn’t included among them. See id. at 563-566; White v. Ind.
Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 768 (7th Cir. 2001) (warning against adding additional
due process protections beyond those provided by Wolff). As a result, the claim
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that the hearing officer considered witnesses statements without prior notice is
not a basis for habeas relief.
Next, Mr. Payton argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because he
didn’t get advance notice of the disciplinary hearing date. He says he was told
that his hearing would be no later than February 7, but that he was brought to
a hearing on February 14, without any notice that the hearing would be held
that day.
[W]ritten notice of the charges must be given to the disciplinaryaction defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable
him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense. At least a brief
period of time after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be
allowed to the inmate to prepare for the appearance before the
[disciplinary hearing officer].
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 564. Stated otherwise, procedural due process
didn’t require that Mr. Payton receive notice of the hearing date twenty-four
hours in advance but instead required that he receive notice of the charges at
least twenty-four hours before the hearing so that he could prepare his defense.
The screening report demonstrates that Mr. Payton received adequate notice of
the charges and getting additional time to prepare his defense doesn’t entitle him
to habeas relief.
Because it’s clear from the petition and attached exhibits that Mr. Payton
isn’t entitled to habeas relief, the petition is denied. If Mr. Payton wants to appeal
this decision, he doesn’t need a certificate of appealability because he is
challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. See Evans v. Circuit Court, 569
F.3d 665, 666 (7th Cir. 2009). However, he may not proceed in forma pauperis
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on appeal because the court finds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an
appeal in this case could not be taken in good faith.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) DENIES the petition pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus
Rule 4;
(2) WAIVES the filing fee;
(3) DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment and to close this case; and
(4) DENIES Andre Payton leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal.
SO ORDERED on March 21, 2019
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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