Frantz v. Wexford of Indiana LLC et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 17 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Aramark Correctional Services, LLC. The federal claims are dismissed without prejudice, though the state claims remain pending. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 11/7/18. (mlc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
DIANA FRANTZ, as personal
representative of the wrongful death
estate of Harrison Henry Shepherd
Plaintiff,
v.
WEXFORD OF INDIANA, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:18-CV-290 JD
OPINION AND ORDER
Harrison Henry Shepherd died while incarcerated in the Indiana Department of
Correction. His mother, as personal representative of his estate, alleges that he died after being
exposed to unspecified substances that were illegally trafficked into the facility. She asserts
claims under federal and state law against the State of Indiana; Wexford of Indiana, LLC, the
prison’s medical services provider; and Aramark Correctional Services, LLC, its food service
provider. As to Aramark, she alleges that one of its employees distributed the substances or
participated in the chain of distribution, and that Aramark is liable for that conduct either
vicariously (under the state claims) or because of a policy, practice, or failure to train that gave
rise to the injury (under the federal claims). Aramark moved to dismiss the claims against it,
arguing that the complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted. For the
following reasons, the Court grants the motion to dismiss as to the federal claims but denies the
motion as to the state claims.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken as true for the purposes of assessing the motion to dismiss.
In March 2013, Mr. Shepherd was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Indiana
Department of Correction. Mr. Shepherd had been previously convicted for unlawful possession
of illegal drugs. In April 2015, while still in custody, Mr. Shepherd was transferred to the Miami
Correctional Facility in Indiana. There, he entered or sought to enter the Clean Lifestyle is
Freedom Forever, a drug rehabilitation program. However, in August 2015, Mr. Shepherd was
transferred to a different section of the prison where he had little or no access to recovery
services.
On April 1, 2017, Mr. Shepherd was found in his cell unresponsive, covered in blood,
and convulsing in seizures. The complaint alleges that Mr. Shepherd had been exposed to a lethal
substance that had been distributed through an illegal market. The complaint further alleges that,
after his exposure, Mr. Shepherd was in distress for at least an hour before receiving emergency
services, and that there were then delays in getting him out of the prison to be treated at a
hospital. Mr. Shepherd could not be revived, and he passed away.
Aramark is a private corporation that has a contract with the State of Indiana to provide
food and meal delivery and preparation services within the prison. The complaint alleges that
employees of Aramark “knowingly distributed and/or knowingly participated in the chain of
distribution of illegal substances to which [Mr. Shepherd] was exposed.” [DE 3 ¶ 21]. It also
alleges that Aramark “maintained a wrongful policy, practice, custom, or procedure of providing
and distributing illegal substances to prisoners and/or failed to adequately train and supervise
employees so as to not wrongfully provide and distribute illegal substances to prisoners.” Id.
¶ 7(b).
Following Mr. Shepherd’s death, his mother Diana Frantz was appointed as the personal
representative of his estate. She filed a complaint against Aramark and two other defendants in
Miami Superior Court. As to Aramark, the complaint first asserts claims under federal law,
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seeking to hold Aramark liable for constitutional violations. The complaint also asserts claims
under state law, seeking to hold Aramark vicariously liable for claims including wrongful death,
tortious interference with familial relationship, and negligence. Aramark removed the case to
federal court, and then moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts the factual allegations as true, and draws all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143,
1146 (7th Cir. 2010). A complaint must contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That statement must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and raise a right to relief above the speculative
level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). However, a plaintiff’s claim need
only be plausible, not probable. Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930,
935 (7th Cir. 2012). Evaluating whether a plaintiff’s claim is sufficiently plausible to survive a
motion to dismiss is “‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.’” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
III. DISCUSSION
Ms. Frantz’s complaint asserts claims against Aramark under federal law and state law.
The foundation for each of the claims is that Aramark is responsible for Mr. Shepherd being
exposed to the substance that caused his death. Aramark moves to dismiss all of the claims for
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failure to state a claim. The Court concludes that Ms. Frantz failed to plausibly allege a basis to
hold Aramark liable under federal law, but that Aramark has not identified a basis for dismissing
the state claims.
A.
Federal Claims
Ms. Frantz first asserts federal claims under § 1983, alleging that Aramark violated Mr.
Shepherd’s1 constitutional rights because it was responsible, at least in part, for his exposure to
the substance that caused his death. Aramark offers multiple arguments in support of dismissal,
but the Court need only address one, which is that the complaint fails to allege a basis on which
Aramark can be held liable for any violation under Monell.
Section 1983 provides a private right of action against persons acting under color of state
law who deprive individuals of rights secured by the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However,
§ 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir.
2014). A defendant is liable under § 1983 only when the defendant itself is responsible for the
violation, so a corporation is liable only when the violation was caused by an unconstitutional
policy or custom of the corporation itself. Shields, 746 F.3d at 789. Therefore, to maintain an
action against a private corporation under § 1983, the plaintiff must plead:
(1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a
widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express
municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage
with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused
by a person with final policymaking authority.
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Though the complaint indicates that Ms. Frantz is bringing this suit on behalf of Mr.
Shepherd’s estate in her capacity as its personal representative, it also suggests that Ms. Frantz is
alleging a violation of her own rights—that by causing Mr. Shepherd’s death, the defendants also
terminated her familial relationship. Though that claim would be dubious on its merits, Russ v.
Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir. 2005), it would fail against Aramark for the same reasons
under Monell.
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McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted);
Johnson v. Cook Cty., 526 F. App’x 692 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
Ms. Frantz focuses on the second of those methods,2 arguing that Aramark has a
widespread practice of distributing illegal substances within the prison and of failing to train its
employees not to do so. In the absence of an express policy, a plaintiff can state a claim under
Monell by alleging a widespread practice that, although unwritten, is so entrenched and wellknown as to carry the force of policy. McTigue, 60 F.3d at 382; see also Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir. 2012). A corporation’s failure to train its employees can
also constitute a corporate policy if “the failure to train reflects a conscious choice among
alternatives that evinces a deliberate indifference to the rights of the individuals with whom those
employees will interact.” Rice, 675 F.3d at 675.
The complaint, however, fails to plausibly allege that Aramark is liable for Mr.
Shepherd’s injury on either of those bases. Most of the complaint is directed towards Ms.
Frantz’s claims against the State and Wexford, as it details the course of Mr. Shepherd’s
incarceration, his exposure to an unknown substance through unspecified means, his reaction and
the medical treatment that he received thereafter, and his death. The complaint contains only two
allegations implicating Aramark. First, the complaint alleges that, “By information and belief,
employees of Defendants Aramark and State knowingly distributed and/or knowingly
participated in the chain of distribution of illegal substances to which [Mr. Shepherd] was
exposed.” [DE 3 ¶ 21]. And second—the only allegation in the complaint in support of Monell
liability—the complaint alleges that Aramark “at all times material maintained a wrongful
2
Though the complaint uses the word “policy,” Ms. Frantz’s brief clarifies that she is not
alleging an express policy. [DE 22 p. 16].
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policy, practice, custom, or procedure of providing and distributing illegal substances to
prisoners and/or failed to adequately train and supervise employees so as to not wrongfully
provide and distribute illegal substances to prisoners.” Id. ¶ 7(b).3
There is no heightened pleading standard for Monell claims, Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993), but a complaint must still
include enough detail to make the claim plausible and to give the defendant fair notice of what
conduct is complained of. McCauley, 671 F.3d at 618; McTigue, 60 F.3d at 382–83; see Brooks
v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). These barebones, formulaic allegations do not meet
that standard. Though the complaint alleges the legal conclusion that Aramark maintained a
wrongful policy or practice, it never supplies any details about what actions attributable to the
corporation give rise to such a policy or practice. Nor does it identify any training that Aramark
provides or any defect in that training that could be responsible for any violation. As the Seventh
Circuit explained in McTigue, “Boilerplate allegations of a municipal policy, entirely lacking in
any factual support that a municipal policy does exist, are insufficient. The absence of any facts
at all to support plaintiff’s claim renders the allegations mere legal conclusions of section 1983
liability devoid of any well-pleaded facts.” 60 F.3d at 382–83 (quoting Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo
Cty. Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 1994) (alterations omitted)). That is the case here, as
the complaint offers a conclusory allegation that a widespread policy exists but no well-pleaded
facts to support it. The complaint is also vague as to what role any Aramark employee played in
Mr. Shepherd coming into contact with the substance. The combination of those factors deprives
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The complaint later repeats that allegation in asserting the federal claims, alleging that Aramark
caused the violations “through policy, practice, custom, or procedure, or failure to train or
supervise,” [DE 3 ¶¶ 39, 42], though those allegations are even more barebones and conclusory.
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Aramark of the notice to which it is entitled as to what it did to violate Mr. Shepherd’s rights,
and means that the complaint fails to plausibly allege a claim under Monell.
The Court therefore grants the motion to dismiss the federal claims. The Court dismisses
those claims without prejudice to Ms. Frantz attempting to cure these deficiencies in an amended
complaint.
B.
State Claims
Aramark also moves to dismiss the claims brought under state law, which seek to hold
Aramark vicariously liable for its employee’s role in Mr. Shepherd’s exposure to the substance.
Aramark’s sole argument as to these claims is that Ms. Frantz did not plausibly plead causation
because she did not identify the particular substance that Mr. Shepherd was exposed to that
caused his death.4 There is no reason that the complaint needs to include such a detail, though.
The complaint alleges that Mr. Shepherd was exposed to an illegal substance that was distributed
within the prison, and that after his exposure he began to vomit and convulse, became
unresponsive, and died. That suffices at this stage to allege that the substance caused his death.
The identity of that substance can be a subject of discovery, but the complaint does not fail to
state a claim merely because it does not identify the substance. The Court therefore denies the
motion to dismiss as to the state claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Aramark’s motion to dismiss [DE 17] in part and DENIES the
motion in part. The federal claims are dismissed without prejudice, though the state claims
remain pending.
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Aramark also argues in passing in its reply brief that the complaint fails to allege factual
support for some of the specific state claims, but that argument is waived for being raised for the
first time in a reply.
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SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: November 7, 2018
/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court
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