Reed v. Warden
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: Blade J. Reed's petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 10/28/19. (Copy mailed to pro se party - certified # 7003 1680 0005 6489 9648). (nal)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
BLADE J. REED,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN,
Respondent.
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CAUSE NO. 3:18-CV-389-JD-MGG
OPINION AND ORDER
Blade J. Reed, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a habeas corpus petition
challenging a disciplinary hearing (CIC 16-10-322) where a Disciplinary Hearing Officer
(“DHO”) found him guilty of threatening a prison officer in violation of Indiana
Department of Correction (IDOC) policy B-213. ECF 1 at 1. As a result, Reed was
sanctioned with the loss of 90 days earned credit time. Id. The Warden has filed the
administrative record and Reed has filed a traverse. Thus this case is fully briefed.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees prisoners certain procedural due
process rights in prison disciplinary hearings: (1) advance written notice of the charges;
(2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to
call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense, when consistent with
institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder
of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974). To satisfy due process, there must also be “some evidence” in the record
to support the guilty finding. Superintendent, Mass Corr Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455
(1985).
In the context of a prison disciplinary hearing, “the relevant question is whether
there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. “In reviewing a decision for some evidence,
courts are not required to conduct an examination of the entire record, independently
assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison
disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.”
McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted).
[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the support
of some evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard, requiring no
more than a modicum of evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long
as the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the
disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary. Although
some evidence is not much, it still must point to the accused’s guilt. It is
not our province to assess the comparative weight of the evidence
underlying the disciplinary board’s decision.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks, citations,
parenthesis, and ellipsis omitted).
In this case, Reed was found guilty of violating IDOC offense B-213, which
prohibits an inmate from engaging in threatening conduct. The rule delineates three
types of inmate conduct that are considered to be threatening. The relevant conduct and
the one Reed was charged with prohibits an inmate from “[c]ommunicating to another
person a plan to physically harm, harass or intimidate that person or someone else.”
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Indiana Department of Correction, Adult Disciplinary Process: Appendix I. See
http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_6-1-2015(1).pdf.
Officer M. Miller wrote a conduct report charging Reed as follows:
On 10/26/2016 at approximately 8:36 AM, I Officer M. Miller was
performing a DHB screening of Offender Reed, Blade 196682 15B-2B. After
the screening Offender Reed was upset at the conduct report he had
received. As he was walking toward the gate to be placed back in the
seating area of DHB, Offender Reed then stated “Who wrote this shit,
cause I’m about to beat a bitch’s ass”. This statement was directed toward
Investigator J. Poer, who was the author of the report. Sgt. J. Kelley was
then called to escort Offender Reed to ARH. Offender Reed was in clear
violation of a code 213 “Threatening another with bodily harm”.
ECF 6-1 at 1.
On November 18, 2016, a DHO found Reed guilty of engaging in threatening
conduct. ECF 1-2 at 7. Reed challenged the conviction in Reed v. Warden, 3:17-CV-724
(N.D. Ind. filed Sept. 20, 2017). On February 18, 2018, IDOC vacated the guilty finding
and sanctions and ordered a rehearing. ECF 1-2 at 31-37. The court dismissed the
petition and entered judgment on March 20, 2018. ECF 1-2 at 38-40.
On February 27, 2018, Reed was re-notified of the B-213 charge when he was
served with the conduct and screening reports. ECF 6-1 at 1; 6-2 at 1. Reed did not
request any witnesses but he did request video of the DHB area for October 21, 2016
and October 26, 2016. ECF 6-2 at 1. He also asked for the assistance of a lay advocate
and one was provided for him. ECF 6-2 at 1; 6-3 at 1. On March 1, 2018, prison officials
determined that video of the incident had never been recorded because the camera
systems did not go back to 2016. ECF 6-4 at 1.
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Reed’s rehearing was held on March 2, 2018. ECF 6-5 at 1. The DHO recorded the
following statement: “[O]ffender states date of report written is [five] days before the
conduct [report]. At no point did [he] say anything about a conduct report [and]
Inves[tigator] Poer[’s] . . . statement is only based on speculation.” Id. Reed also
provided the DHO with a written statement. ECF 6-6 at 1-4. On the basis of the conduct
report and Reed’s statements, the DHO found him guilty of violating offense B-213 and
sanctioned him with the loss of 90 days earned credit time. ECF 6-5 at 1.
In his petition, Reed argues there are three grounds which entitle him to habeas
corpus relief. ECF 1 at 2-3. In one ground, Reed asserts his due process rights were
violated because there was insufficient evidence of his guilt. ECF 1 at 2. In assessing the
sufficiency of the evidence, a conduct report alone can be enough to support a finding
of guilt. McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786. Such is the case here. In the conduct report, Officer
Miller documented that, on October 26, 2016, Reed became upset after she screened
him regarding Investigator Poer’s conduct report. ECF 6-1 at 1. As he was walking
toward the gate to be placed back in the DHB seating area, he stated “[w]ho wrote this
shit, cause I’m about to beat a bitch’s ass.” Id. Given Officer Miller’s conduct report
memorializing Reed’s threatening statement, which was directed toward Investigator
Poer, there was more than “some evidence” to support the DHO’s finding that Reed
was guilty of violating offense B-213.
Nevertheless, Reed argues there was insufficient evidence for the DHO to find
him guilty. In this regard, he denies the allegations in the conduct report and presses
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the court to believe his version of the incident—and not Officer Miller’s account of the
events in this case. Id. Here, Reed claims it was erroneous for Officer Miller to infer that
his threatening statement pertained to the conduct report or Investigator Poer when he,
in fact, was simply directing his statement to another individual in the DHB waiting
area. ECF 6-6 at 3-4. In other words, he claims Officer Miller speculated about the fact
he was “upset about another conduct [report]” when she could not have known what
he was thinking or feeling. Id. at 4.
But here Reed is simply inviting the court to reweigh the evidence to gain a
favorable outcome. However, the court is not “required to conduct an examination of
the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence.”
McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786. Rather, it is the court’s role to determine if the hearing
officer’s decision to revoke good time credits has some factual basis. Id. Because the
DHO considered the salient evidence, there was no violation of Reed’s due process
rights. Hill, 472 U.S. at 456-57 (“the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in
the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”). In
other words, the DHO’s finding that Reed violated offense B-213 was neither arbitrary
nor unreasonable in this case given the timing and context of his statement to Officer
Miller. Thus, this ground does not identify a basis for habeas corpus relief.
In another ground, Reed asserts the DHO violated his Fourteenth Amendment
and Eighth Amendment rights because he did not consider his mental health when
assessing his guilt. ECF 1 at 2. He first claims that the DHO’s failure to account for his
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mental health violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair and impartial hearing
before an impartial decision-maker. Id. In the prison disciplinary context, adjudicators
are “entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity,” and “the constitutional
standard for improper bias is high.” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003).
Due process prohibits a prison official who was personally and substantially involved
in the underlying incident from acting as a decision-maker in the case. Id. However, due
process is not violated simply because the DHO knew the inmate, presided over a prior
disciplinary case, or had some limited involvement in the events underlying the charge.
Id.
The court’s review of the record shows there is no evidence to support Reed’s
contention that the DHO was biased against him or that he did not have an impartial
hearing. Here, Reed maintains that he was subjected to an unfair hearing because the
DHO did not take into account his mental health and because of the DHO’s “attitude,
behavior, and statements” at the hearing. ECF 1 at 2. However, Reed did not present
any evidence of his mental health concerns at the hearing. ECF 6-5 at 1. And he has
neither alleged nor produced evidence that shows the DHO was directly or otherwise
substantially involved in the factual events underlying the disciplinary charges, or the
investigation of the incident. Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666. The fact the DHO relied on the
credibility of Officer Miller’s conduct report and discredited Reed’s version of the
incident does not establish that the DHO was biased against Reed. Thus, Reed has not
establish that the DHO was partial or biased against him during the proceedings.
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Reed next claims that the DHO violated his Eighth Amendment right against
cruel and unusual punishment when he failed to account for his mental health. ECF 1 at
2. However, because Eighth Amendment claims do not affect the fact or length of
Reed’s custody, they cannot be remedied in a habeas corpus petition pursuant to
Section 2254. Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, his Eighth
Amendment claim fails.
Reed further avers that the DHO violated prison policy when he assessed his
guilty without considering his mental health. However, habeas corpus relief can only be
granted for “violation[s] of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a). Failure to follow policy is not a constitutional violation. Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (“state-law violations provide no basis for federal habeas
relief”) and Keller v. Donahue, 271 F. App’x 531, 532 (7th Cir. 2008) (inmate’s claim that
prison did not follow internal policies had “no bearing on his right to due process”). In
other words, Reed’s claim that the DHO violated prison policy cannot be remedied in a
habeas corpus petition. In sum, this ground does not state a basis for granting habeas
corpus relief either.1
In his final ground, Reed complains that his due process rights were violated
because the conduct report was written on October 21, 2016—five days before the
1
Reed also claims that, during the screening process, his constitutional rights and IDOC policy
were violated because his mental health was not considered. ECF 1 at 2. However, as discussed, Reed
never raised the issue of his mental health or how any alleged errors in the screening process violated his
constitutional rights or IDOC policy.
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incident occurred on October 26, 2016. ECF 1 at 2. However, this mistake appears to be a
typographical error regarding the correct date of the incident. Reed has not explained
how this typographical error actually harmed his defense or that it had a substantial or
injurious effect on the outcome of his proceeding. In other words, he has not shown
how writing the wrong date on the conduct report deprived him of his due process
rights and amounted to anything more than harmless error. See Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d
674, 678 (7th Cir. 2003). Therefore, this third ground does not identify a basis for
granting habeas corpus relief.2
If Reed wants to appeal this order, he does not need a certificate of appealability
because he is challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. See Evans v. Circuit Court,
569 F.3d 665, 666 (7th Cir. 2009). However, he may not proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal because pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) an appeal in this case could not be
taken in good faith.
For these reasons, Blade J. Reed’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED on October 28, 2019
/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2
Reed asserts his rehearing was unfair and violated IDOC policy because it was longer than the
original hearing and more sanctions were imposed. However, because his allegations are premised on
violations of IDOC policy, he has not established a violation of his due process rights. Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (“state-law violations provide no basis for federal habeas relief.”)
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