Wilson v. Marthakis et al

Filing 97

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 84 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendant Ron Neal. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 2/4/2020. (Copy mailed to pro se party by certified mail 7019 0700 0000 3512 4375)(bas)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
GEORGE W. WILSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAUSE NO. 3:18-CV-449-JD-MGG

RON NEAL,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
George W. Wilson, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding against Warden
Ron Neal for compensatory damages for allegedly denying him access to the recreation
room and shower area because of his disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act.
(ECF 3.) On May 31, 2019, Warden Neal filed the instant motion for summary judgment
asserting there are no genuine issues of material fact to support Wilson’s claim. (ECF
84.) The summary judgment motion was accompanied by a notice as required by N.D.
Ind. L.R. 56-1(f), which informed Wilson of the importance of responding. (ECF 86.) On
July 3, 2019, Wilson filed a response to the motion for summary judgment. (ECF 89.)
Warden Neal filed his reply on July 17, 2019. (ECF 90.)

FACTS
Wilson is currently housed at the Indiana State Prison (“ISP”) and is diagnosed
with chronic osteoarthritis in his ankles, knees, lower back, neck, shoulders, right wrist,
and most of his fingers. (ECF 85-2 at 6, 8.) As a result of his diagnosis, he was prescribed

a cane; however, he was not given a handicapped cell and he never requested one. 1 (Id.
at 12, 13.) Wilson was given a “flag pass,” which meant he was placed in a cell on the
lower range of the prison. (Id. at 12.) He was prescribed a shower chair, and a doctor
also assigned him a wheelchair. (Id. at 13-14, 16-18.)
On June 5, 2018, Wilson was placed in administrative segregation for 30 days
after he was found guilty of battering a fellow inmate. (Id. at 20-21.) In investigating the
battery, prison staff viewed a security video which showed Wilson running up a flight
of stairs and assaulting an inmate. (Id.) The sole reason Wilson was placed in
administrative segregation was because a hearing officer found him guilty of battery.
(Id. at 21; ECF 85-6 at 1.)
On the same day, Dr. Nancy Marthakis, an ISP doctor, determined that Wilson
no longer needed a wheelchair because he “was witnessed on camera by custody
getting out of his wheelchair and running up several flights of stairs without difficulty.”
(ECF 85-3 at 1.) This was the sole reason Dr. Marthakis discontinued his medical order
for his wheelchair. (ECF 85-2 at 23, 25.) He, however, continued to use a cane and had a
flag pass. (Id. at 25.) Prior to Dr. Marthakis’s decision to discontinue his wheelchair, a
physical therapist had also recommended that Wilson use a wheelchair for long
distances, and a cane for short distances. (Id. at 32-33.)

1 From 1992 through 2013, Wilson was housed at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. (ECF 85-2
at 6.) While housed at that facility, a doctor assigned him a handicapped cell because of his advanced
osteoarthritis. (Id. at 10.)

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After being transferred to administrative segregation, Wilson was housed in a
cell on the first floor of the prison. (ECF 85-5 at ¶ 6.) The fixtures in his room were
arranged in such a way as to allow him to use the sink for grooming while he was
seated on his bed. (Id.) Wilson was able to move directly from the bed onto the toilet
without standing or walking by using his upper body for support. (Id.) He was not
permitted to have a chair that was not attached to the floor or wall because it posed a
security risk. (Id. at ¶ 7.) It could be used to assault prison staff or other inmates. (Id.)
Thus, during this 30-day period, Wilson was no longer allowed to use the prison’s
chairs in the shower. (ECF 85-2 at 27-28.)
Wilson wrote two letters to Warden Neal during the time he was housed in
administrative segregation. (Id. at 34.) Specifically, he told Warden Neal that he “hadn’t
showered, and [he] needed a wheelchair to go to the shower, to go out to rec[reation] to
call [his] family. [And he] needed a wheelchair to go to medical.” (Id.) Warden Neal
responded to Wilson on June 27, 2018, stating:
After checking into the issues within your letter, I find that Dr. Marthakis
is indeed the authority who removed the wheelchair from you, which is
certainly a medical decision.
As the Warden of the Indiana State Prison, I do not make medical
decisions nor am I trained to do so. Dr. Marthakis has documented that
you can walk and do not have a need for a wheelchair. However, I have
asked medical [to reassess] your situation.
(ECF 85-7 at 1.) On July 2, 2018, Wilson was released from the administrative
segregation unit. (ECF 85-2 at 47.) After his release, he was given a chair to use
for his showers, but he was not given a wheelchair. (Id. at 48-49.)

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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The party seeking summary judgment “bears
the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and
identifying” the evidence which “demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Substantive law
determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion
by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or show “that the materials
cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The court will
not “make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to
draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770
(7th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits or a
vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920
(7th Cir. 1994). Instead, the court’s sole task in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment is “to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material

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dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Payne, 337 F.3d at 770. If a reasonable fact finder
could find in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment may not be granted. Id.
Nevertheless, a party opposing summary judgment may not rely on allegations or
denials in his own pleading, but rather must “marshal and present the court with the
evidence []he contends will prove h[is] case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d
651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010).

ANALYSIS
Warden Neal moves for summary judgment asserting there is no evidence to
support Wilson’s claims that he was denied access to the recreation room, shower area,
or a wheelchair because of his disability. (ECF 85 at 7.) Warden Neal states that the sole
reason Wilson was placed in administrative segregation and medical staff discontinued
his wheelchair order was because he was observed on video running up a flight of stairs
and battering another inmate. (Id.) Warden Neal further explains that he was provided
with reasonable accommodations during his 30-day term of administrative segregation
because he was given a cell on the first floor of the prison and it was arranged in such a
way that he could utilize the toilet and sink without standing or walking. (Id.) And he
also continued to have the use of a cane. (Id.) In sum, Warden Neal asserts that Wilson
has failed to produce any evidence that he was denied access to a program or activity
because of his disability while he was housed in administrative segregaton. (Id.)
To state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show: “(1) he is a
qualified person (2) with a disability and (3) the Department of Corrections denied him
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access to a program or activity because of his disability.” Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684
F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). For purposes of summary judgment, Warden Neal does
not dispute that Wilson is a qualified individual with a disability.
The court agrees with Warden Neal and finds that Wilson has failed to produce
any evidence that shows he was denied access to a program or activity because of his
disability. In this case, the record establishes that Wilson was placed in administrative
segregation for 30 days after a hearing officer found him guilty of battery. (ECF 85-2 at
20-21; ECF 85-6 at 1.) The investigation of the incident showed Wilson on prison
security video running up a flight of stairs to assault another inmate. (ECF 85-2 at 2021.) At his deposition, Wilson admitted that the sole reason for his placement in the
segregated housing unit was because he battered the inmate. (Id. at 21.) Dr. Marthakis
then discontinued Wilson’s wheelchair order because he “was witnessed on a camera
by custody getting out of his wheelchair and running up several flights of stairs without
difficulty.” (ECF 85-3 at 1.) At his deposition, Wilson admitted that this was the sole
reason Dr. Marthakis discontinued his wheelchair. (ECF 85-2 at 23.) And Wilson
admitted that Warden Neal had no reason to doubt Dr. Marthakis’s medical decision to
discontinue his wheelchair. (Id. at 41.) Furthermore, the record shows that Wilson was
not permitted to bring chairs in the shower area because of the prison’s safety and
security rules. (ECF 85-5 at ¶ 7.)
In Banks v. Patton, 743 Fed. Appx. 690 (7th Cir. 2018), the Seventh Circuit looked
at facts similar to those in this case. The plaintiff in Banks entered jail immediately
following amputation of his left arm and continued to have complications from the
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amputation. Id. at 692. He requested a handicapped-accessible cell; however, he was not
given one due to safety and security concerns. Id. The plaintiff also submitted requests
for a wheelchair and to be moved closer to the shower area but those were denied. Id. at
692-93. However, despite his medical issues, he received a number of disciplinary
actions for his behavior. Id. at 692.
In considering the evidence, the Seventh Circuit “could not conclude that the jail
withheld [a handicapped accessible cell] ‘by reason’ of [the plaintiff’s] disability, and
not for a generally applicable reason.” Id. at 697. Specifically, the court reasoned that the
jail “showed that grab bars and handrails present safety risks, including the risk of
using them to commit suicide (something to which the maximum-security population
already is more susceptible).” Id. And, “despite his amputation, [the plaintiff] continued
to pose a disciplinary challenge . . . . elevating security concerns” and “a doctor opined
that [the plaintiff] did not require a wheelchair, despite his request.” Id. In sum, the
court held that “[s]ecurity concerns and medical opinions, specific to the offender, are
neutral reasons for declining accommodations.” Id. Thus, the plaintiff failed to show
that the denial of any accommodation was “by reason of” his disability.
In sum, Wilson has failed to show that he was denied access to a program or
activity because of his disability. Rather, the evidence establishes that only neutral
reasons exist—Wilson was placed in administrative segregation following disciplinary
action and a prison doctor determined that his wheelchair was no longer medically
necessary because he was able to walk. Thus, the denial of access to a program or
activity—the recreation room and shower area—was for reasons other than Wilson’s
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status as an individual with a disability. Novak v. Bd. of Trustees of S. Illinois Univ., 777
F.3d 966, 974 (7th Cir. 2015) (the defendant “is entitled to summary judgment unless the
claimant can present sufficient evidence that the [defendant’s] proffered reason is a
pretext for discrimination.”) 2
For these reasons, the court GRANTS Warden Neal’s motion for summary
judgment (ECF 84). This case is DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED on February 4, 2020
/s/JON E. DEGUILIO
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

To the extent Wilson asserts he was not provided with adequate medical care, he was not given
leave to proceed on this claim. (ECF 3 at 5; ECF 89 at 10-11.)
2

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