Dickson v. Quality Medical et al

Filing 4

OPINION AND ORDER: The court GRANTS Michael Dickson leave to proceed against Mary Loftus in her individual capacity for compensatory damages for the delay in providing medical care from September 5, 2019, to November 29, 2019, in violation of the Fou rteenth Amendment; DISMISSES all other claims; DISMISSES Quality Medical; ORDERS Quality Correctional Care to provide the United States Marshals Service with the full name, date of birth, social security number, last employment date, work location, a nd last known home address of Mary Loftus, if necessary and if it has such information; DIRECTS the clerk to send the United States Marshals Service the necessary copies of this order, the complaint 1 , summons, and USM-285 forms (with blank address es) to serve Mary Loftus; DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service to personally serve MaryLoftus; DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service to file, by 3/11/2021, proof of service or a detailed report on what efforts were taken if service is unsu ccessful; and ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Mary Loftus to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 1/8/2021. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (cc: USMS) (bas) Modified on 1/8/2021 (bas).

USDC IN/ND case 3:20-cv-00021-PPS-MGG document 4 filed 01/08/21 page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
MICHAEL DICKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAUSE NO. 3:20-CV-21-PPS-MGG

QUALITY MEDICAL, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Michael Dickson, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed this lawsuit alleging he was
denied constitutionally adequate medical treatment at the Marshall County Jail. ECF 1.
Dickson’s complaint concerns the treatment he received for hernia and kidney issues
beginning in September 2019. Id. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,
and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, I must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In his complaint, Dickson lays out the course of events surrounding his medical
issues. He alleges that he filled out a medical request form and was seen by Mary Loftus
on September 5, 2019. Id. at ¶ 2. Then, from September 6-15, he says he continued to
have ongoing complications urinating and having bowel movements, but his repeated

USDC IN/ND case 3:20-cv-00021-PPS-MGG document 4 filed 01/08/21 page 2 of 5

requests to see Loftus went unheeded. Id. at ¶ 4. On September 15, he filled out another
medical request form and saw Loftus the next day. Id. at ¶ 5. She told him a doctor
would see him the following day. Id.
According to the complaint, when Dickson saw the doctor on September 17, the
doctor instructed Loftus to contact Dickson’s surgeon for an appointment. ECF 1 at ¶ 6.
But, Dickson says, it took Loftus two months to schedule the appointment, only doing
so after he submitted another medical request form on November 15. Id. at ¶ 7.
Dickson alleges he was placed on stool softeners from November 16-22. ECF 1 at
¶ 8. A few days after the stool softeners were discontinued, he says he suffered from
extreme constipation and kidney pain and was put in medical isolation at the jail from
November 27-29. Id. While there, he claims he was vomiting and could not urinate or
have bowel movements, but Loftus would not take him to the hospital. Id. He states that
he was put back on stool softeners on November 29 and has since seen his surgeon and
has undergone testing. Id. at ¶ 9.
Dickson was a pretrial detainee when the events occurred, and so his claims are
analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on conditions of confinement
that amount to punishment. Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821-22 (7th Cir. 2019).
“[M]edical-care claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment
are subject only to the objective unreasonableness inquiry identified in Kingsley [v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015)].” Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir.
2018). The first consideration is “whether the medical defendants acted purposefully,
knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly when they considered the consequences of their
2

USDC IN/ND case 3:20-cv-00021-PPS-MGG document 4 filed 01/08/21 page 3 of 5

handling of plaintiff’s case.” McCann v. Ogle Cnty., 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018)
(quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). Then, the court considers “whether
the challenged conduct was objectively reasonable,” based on the totality of the facts
and circumstances. Id.
The alleged facts show Dickson has plausibly alleged a claim for delay in
receiving medical care. A delay in treatment may be objectively unreasonable “if the
delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain.” McGowan v.
Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (analyzing a deliberate indifference claim under
the Eighth Amendment). “[T]he length of delay that is tolerable depends on the
seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing treatment.” Id. Furthermore, it is
not enough to provide some medical care if “the treatment rendered [is] so blatantly
inappropriate that it can support an inference of intentional mistreatment” or objective
unreasonableness. Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 723 (7th Cir. 2017). Here, Dickson has
plausibly alleged that his urinary and bowel difficulties were sufficiently serious that
the delay in treating him could be objectively unreasonable.
Dickson also names Quality Medical as a defendant. The complaint, however,
does not link Quality Medical to any of the alleged wrongdoing, except as the employer
of the jail’s medical staff. Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability,
which holds an employer liable for the actions of its employees without any
wrongdoing on the part of the employer. Glisson v. Ind. Dep’t of Corrs., 849 F.3d 372, 37879 (7th Cir. 2017). Therefore, Quality Medical will be dismissed.

3

USDC IN/ND case 3:20-cv-00021-PPS-MGG document 4 filed 01/08/21 page 4 of 5

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the court is required to serve Mary Loftus
because Dickson is proceeding in forma pauperis. Normally, the court would direct the
clerk to request waiver of service. However, that has not been successful with Loftus
and the United States Marshals Service is currently attempting to personally serve her
in other cases. See Glassman v. Hassell, 3:19-cv-1160-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind. filed Dec. 8,
2020); Misener v. Quality Correctional Care, 3:20-cv-335-JD-MGG (N.D. Ind. filed Dec. 8,
2020), Wise v. Quality Correctional Care, 3:20-cv-340-JD-MGG (N.D. Ind. filed Dec. 8,
2020); Campbell v. Hassell, 3:20-cv-852-JD-MGG (N.D. Ind. filed Dec. 8, 2020). Therefore,
the Marshals Service will be directed to personally serve her in this case also.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Michael Dickson leave to proceed against Mary Loftus in her
individual capacity for compensatory damages for the delay in providing medical care
from September 5, 2019, to November 29, 2019, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment;
(2) DISMISSES all other claims;
(3) DISMISSES Quality Medical;
(4) ORDERS Quality Correctional Care to provide the United States Marshals
Service with the full name, date of birth, social security number, last employment date,
work location, and last known home address of Mary Loftus, if necessary and if it has
such information;

4

USDC IN/ND case 3:20-cv-00021-PPS-MGG document 4 filed 01/08/21 page 5 of 5

(5) DIRECTS the clerk to send the United States Marshals Service the necessary
copies of this order, the complaint (ECF 1), summons, and USM-285 forms (with blank
addresses) to serve Mary Loftus;
(6) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service to personally serve Mary
Loftus;
(7) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service to file, by March 11, 2021, proof
of service or a detailed report on what efforts were taken if service is unsuccessful; and
(8) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Mary Loftus to respond, as
provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to
the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening
order.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: January 8, 2021.
/s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5