Freeman v Carter et al
Filing
341
OPINION AND ORDER: The court DENIES Vernell Freemans motion for summary judgment 334 ; GRANTS the state defendants' motion for summary judgment 336 ; DISMISSES Lt. Snow and Unit Team Manager Angle from this action; and REMINDS the parties this case is now proceeding only on Mr. Freeman's remaining claims outlined in this order. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 05/08/2024. (jdb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
VERNELL FREEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAUSE NO. 3:20-CV-631-JD-MGG
NATHANAEL D. ANGLE, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Vernell Freeman, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding in this case on three
claims. First, he is proceeding “against NP Kimberly Myers in her individual capacity
for compensatory and punitive damages for continuing Mr. Freeman on a medication
containing a blood thinner after he suffered a head injury on August 30, 2018, and after
a CT scan revealed a subdural hematoma on his brain on June 8, 2018, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment[.]” ECF 242 at 10. Second, he is proceeding “against Dr. Noe
Marandet in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for
continuing Mr. Freeman on a medication containing a blood thinner after a CT scan
revealed a subdural hematoma on his brain on June 8, 2018, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment[.]” Id. Third, he is proceeding “against Lt. Joshua Snow and Unit Team
Manager Nathanael Angle in their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive
damages for gratuitously inflicting pain by removing the towel from his head on July
18, 2018, in violation of the Eighth Amendment[.]” Id. at 11.
Freeman filed a motion for summary judgment against Lt. Snow and Unit Team
Manager Angle (the “state defendants”), and the state defendants filed a response. ECF
334, ECF 340. The state defendants then filed a cross motion for summary judgment.
ECF 336. 1 With the motion, the state defendants provided Freeman the notice required
by N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(a)(4). ECF 339. Attached to the notice was a copy of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56 and Northern District of Indiana Local Rule 56-1.
Pursuant to Local Rule 56-1(b), a party opposing a summary judgment motion
must, within 28 days after the movant serves the motion, separately file (1) a response
brief; and (2) a Response to Statement of Material Facts, which includes a citation to
evidence supporting each dispute of fact. This deadline passed over a month ago, but
Freeman has not responded. Therefore the court will now rule on both pending
summary judgment motions.
Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the
evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could [find] for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To determine whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Heft v.
Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003). However, a party opposing a properly
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The medical defendants have not yet moved for summary judgment.
2
supported summary judgment motion may not rely merely on allegations or denials in
its own pleading, but rather must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she
contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th
Cir. 2010).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain” on prisoners. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). In order to survive
summary judgment, a plaintiff must put forth evidence that “support[s] a reliable inference
of wantonness in the infliction of pain.” Id. at 322. The core requirement for an excessive
force claim is that the defendant “used force not in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hendrickson v. Cooper,
589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009). In determining whether the intent was malicious,
relevant factors include how much force was needed versus how much was actually
used; the extent of injury inflicted; whether the force was needed because of a risk to
someone’s safety; and whether the officers made efforts to limit the severity of the force.
McCottrell v. White, 933 F.3d 651, 663 (7th Cir. 2019). “From such considerations
inferences may be drawn as to whether the use of force could plausibly have been
thought necessary, or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified
infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.” Id. (citing
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).
The parties do not dispute the relevant facts. Specifically, Freeman provides an
affidavit, in which he attests to the following facts: On June 8, 2018, Freeman received a
CT scan which showed he had a small subdural hematoma on his brain due to a fall
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from a top bunk. ECF 335 at 1. On July 17, 2018, Freeman was seen by a nurse because
his head was hurting and he couldn’t see out of his right eye. Id. at 2. Later that day,
Freeman experienced symptoms consistent with a seizure. Id. On July 18, 2018, Freeman
was allowed by nurses to lay on a mattress in the nurses’ station and was given a towel
to place over his eyes because he was sensitive to light. Id. While Freeman was lying in
the nurses’ station with a towel over his eyes, Unit Team Manager Angle and Lt. Snow
came up to him, asked him if he was on drugs, and removed the towel from his eyes,
which caused him pain due to his light sensitivity. Id. at 2-3.
Unit Team Manager Angle and Lt. Snow filed affidavits, in which they attest to
the following facts: On July 18, 2018, an ID count was called which required prison staff
to check each inmate’s ID to ensure it matched his face. ECF 336-2 at 3. While
performing the ID count, Unit Team Manager Angle and Lt. Snow went to the infirmary
to check the inmate’s IDs. Id. When they arrived at the infirmary, they observed
Freeman lying on the floor with a towel covering his face. Id. Neither defendant knew
why Freeman had the towel on his face. Id; ECF 336-3 at 3. Lt. Snow asked Freeman if
he was under the influence of drugs. ECF 336-3 at 3. Unit Team Manager Angle asked
Freeman to remove the towel so they could confirm his identity. ECF 336-2 at 3.
Freeman refused and asked “who are you to tell me what to do.” Id. at 3. Unit Team
Manager Angle advised Freeman he was a Casework Manager and gave him a direct
order to remove the towel from his face, but Freeman again refused. Id. Unit Team
Manager Angle then walked over to Freeman, pulled the towel away from his face, and
confirmed his face matched his ID. Id. Unit Team Manager Angle only touched the
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towel, and did not physically touch Freeman’s body. Id. Once the ID check was
complete, Unit Team Manager Angle returned the towel to Freeman and walked away.
Id. at 4. Because neither party disputes these facts, the court accepts them as
undisputed.
Freeman argues summary judgment is warranted in his favor because the state
defendants maliciously removed the towel from his face without adequately assessing
the situation. ECF 334 at 3-4. Specifically, he argues that if the state defendants had
asked medical staff about his condition before removing the towel, medical staff would
have informed them he had a small subdural hematoma, had possibly suffered a
seizure, had extreme light sensitivity, and was permitted to place a towel over his eyes
to lessen the pain. Id. at 3.
The state defendants argue summary judgment is warranted in their favor
because they had no desire or intention to harm Freeman and didn’t know removing
the towel would cause him any pain. ECF 337 at 5-6. Specifically, both state defendants
attest they were not familiar with Freeman’s medical issues, did not know why he was
in the infirmary that day, had no reason to believe removing the towel from his face
would cause him pain, and had no reason or desire to harm him. ECF 336-2 at 4; ECF
336-3 at 3.
Here, there is no evidence by which any reasonable jury could conclude the state
defendants removed the towel from Freeman’s face “maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.” Specifically, the state defendants provide undisputed evidence they
removed the towel as part of their normal duties to maintain order in the prison, as it is
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undisputed they: (1) were performing an ID check when they came upon Freeman lying
in the infirmary with a towel over his face; (2) ordered Freeman to remove the towel so
they could check his ID, and he refused the orders; and (3) physically removed the
towel from Freeman’s face without making contact with his body, confirmed his ID,
and returned the towel. Considering the factors laid out in McCottrell, the state
defendants used only as much force as was necessary to check Freeman’s ID, and
limited the severity of the force by immediately returning the towel and avoiding
physical contact with his body. The record contains no evidence supporting “a reliable
inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain,” particularly where there is no
evidence either defendant had any reason to know removing the towel would cause
Freeman pain. Freeman argues they should have asked medical staff about his
condition before removing the towel, but he provides no evidence their failure to do so
shows they intended to cause him harm. Moreover, Freeman had several opportunities
to inform the defendants of his light sensitivity, but there is no evidence he did so.
Because the undisputed facts show the state defendants removed the towel as part of
their duties and had no reason to know it would cause Freeman pain, no reasonable
jury could conclude they removed the towel “maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.” See Hendrickson, 589 F.3d at 890. Summary judgment is therefore warranted in
their favor.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) DENIES Vernell Freeman’s motion for summary judgment (ECF 334);
(2) GRANTS the state defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF 336);
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(3) DISMISSES Lt. Snow and Unit Team Manager Angle from this action; and
(4) REMINDS the parties this case is now proceeding only on Mr. Freeman’s
remaining claims:
a. against NP Kimberly Myers in her individual capacity for
compensatory and punitive damages for continuing Mr. Freeman on a
medication containing a blood thinner after he suffered a head injury
on August 30, 2018, and after a CT scan revealed a subdural hematoma
on his brain on June 8, 2018, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
and
b. against Dr. Noe Marandet in his individual capacity for compensatory
and punitive damages for continuing Mr. Freeman on a medication
containing a blood thinner after a CT scan revealed a subdural
hematoma on his brain on June 8, 2018, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
SO ORDERED on May 8, 2024
/s/JON E. DEGUILIO
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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