Chambers v. Carty et al

Filing 7

OPINION AND ORDER: The court GRANTS Jerry Chambers leave to proceed against Lt. Trisha Carty and Sgt. Corissa Haas in their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for spraying him with mace on January 23, 2022, in retaliation for flooding his cell rather than to maintain or restore discipline in violation of the Eighth Amendment; DISMISSES all other claims; DISMISSES Tristan Keller; DIRECTS the clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service from ( and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to serve process on) Lt. Trisha Carty and Sgt. Corissa Haas at the Indiana Department of Correction, with a copy of this order and the complaint 1 ; ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction t o provide the full name, date of birth, and last known home address of any defendant who does not waive service if it has such information; and ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Lt. Trisha Carty and Sgt. Corissa Haas to respond, as provi ded for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Chief Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 05/09/2022. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (jdb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JERRY CHAMBERS,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAUSE NO. 3:22-CV-192-JD-MGG

TRISHA CARTY, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Jerry Chambers, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint. ECF 1. “A
document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the
merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
Chambers relates that on January 22, 2022, he flooded his cell. He alleges that the
next morning, Lt. Trisha Carty and Sgt. Corissa Haas came to his cell and sprayed him
with a powerful mace for no reason other than retaliation for flooding his cell the day
before. Then, he says, he was not given a decontamination shower, but was stripped
and put in a cold cell for 6 hours before being returned to his original cell, which had
not been cleaned after the mace was used.

The “core requirement” for an excessive force claim is that the defendant “used
force not in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.” Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009).
Several factors guide the inquiry of whether an officer’s use of force was legitimate or
malicious, including the need for an application of force, the amount of force used, and
the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner. Id. Giving Chambers the benefit of the
inferences to which he is entitled at this stage of the case, his allegations state an Eighth
Amendment claim against Lt. Carty and Sgt. Haas.
Chambers’ remaining allegations are too vague to state a claim. He alleges that
sometime after he was returned to his cell, he had several seizures. When the seizures
ended, he hit the medical button and told Sgt. Haas that he needed medical help, but
she refused get him help. Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to
adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability, a
prisoner must satisfy both an objective and subjective component by showing: (1) his
medical need was objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate
indifference to that medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A medical need is “serious” if
it is one that a physician has diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). On the subjective prong, the
plaintiff must establish the defendant “acted in an intentional or criminally reckless
manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of
being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even
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though he could have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). Here, Chambers does not
detail what he told Sgt. Haas about his medical condition or explain why he needed
immediate medical attention. Thus, there is no basis to conclude that she had the
subjective awareness of a serious medical need required for liability under § 1983.
Similarly, Chambers alleges Officer Tristan Keller was somehow involved when
he was placed in the cold cell, but he does not specify what Officer Keller did or did not
do. This does not allow the court to determine whether the complaint states a plausible
claim against Officer Keller, nor does it give Officer Keller sufficient notice of any claim
against him. A plaintiff must provide “enough detail to give the defendant fair notice of
what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests . . ..” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526
F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). The complaint here is missing
factual content linking Officer Keller to any alleged constitutional violation.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Jerry Chambers leave to proceed against Lt. Trisha Carty and
Sgt. Corissa Haas in their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages
for spraying him with mace on January 23, 2022, in retaliation for flooding his cell
rather than to maintain or restore discipline in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(2) DISMISSES all other claims;
(3) DISMISSES Tristan Keller;
(4) DIRECTS the clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service
from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to serve process on)
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Lt. Trisha Carty and Sgt. Corissa Haas at the Indiana Department of Correction, with a
copy of this order and the complaint (ECF 1);
(5) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the full name, date
of birth, and last known home address of any defendant who does not waive service if
it has such information; and
(6) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Lt. Trisha Carty and Sgt. Corissa
Haas to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind.
L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed
in this screening order.
SO ORDERED on May 9, 2022
/s/JON E. DEGUILIO
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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