Anderson v. USA

Filing 1

OPINION AND ORDER: The court GRANTS Mr. Andersons motion to vacate sentence under § 2255. [Doc. 49]. The court reaffirms the resentencing deadlines earlier set by the court. [Doc. 63, 64]. Mr. Anderson shall remain in custody pending his resentencing. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 12/14/2022. (rmc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JASON ANDERSON
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondent.

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Case No. 3:17-CR-63 RLM-MGG
(Arising from 3:22-CV-481-RLM)

OPINION AND ORDER
Jason Anderson is serving a 180-month term of imprisonment for one
count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The
court imposed a 180-month term of imprisonment because Mr. Anderson’s
criminal history included three convictions for serious drug offenses, so a 180month term of imprisonment was mandatory. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Mr.
Anderson moves to vacate his sentence, arguing that he didn’t have three serious
drug offenses, so a mandatory minimum under § 924(e)(1) was unlawful.
A prisoner in federal custody may move to vacate a sentence if the sentence
was “imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2255(a). Mr. Anderson advances two arguments. First, he argues that
two of the three convictions were really a single offense because they weren’t
committed “on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). One
offense was committed on September 21, 2000, and another was committed on
September 22, 2000. This is an argument that this court rejected at sentencing
and that the court of appeals rejected on direct appeal. Mr. Anderson renews
this argument in light of Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022). The

Court in Wooden v. United States held that the petitioner’s crimes of conviction
weren’t committed on separate occasions because they were part of a single
criminal episode despite happening at distinct points in time. Id. at 1067. Mr.
Anderson argues his September 2000 convictions must be reexamined.
Mr. Anderson’s second argument is that his prior convictions aren’t
serious drug offenses under § 924(e)(1) because the state statutes governing his
convictions are broader than the federal statute. A state crime can’t qualify as
an Armed Career Criminal Act predicate if its elements are broader than a listed
generic offense (like a “serious drug offense”). Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S.
500, 509 (2016). Mr. Anderson’s first and second convictions are for dealing
cocaine in violation of Indiana law. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (1998). His third
conviction is for possession with intent to deliver between 15 and 100 grams of
cocaine in violation of Illinois law. See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 570/401(a)(2)(A)
(2004). Both Indiana and Illinois define cocaine to include cocaine’s positional
isomers. Ind. Code § 35-48-1-7; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 570/206(b)(4). Federal law
doesn’t define cocaine to include cocaine’s positional isomers. 21 U.S.C. § 812
Schedule II(a)(4); 21 U.S.C. § 802(14). Mr. Anderson argues that the inclusion of
positional isomers in the state definition and the exclusion of positional isomers
from the federal definition shows that his state offenses aren’t serious drug
offenses for purposes of sentencing.
Mr. Anderson’s motion to vacate appears to be untimely, 28 U.S.C. 2255(f),
but the government expressly waived the statute of limitations. See United States
v. Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (statute of limitations under §
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2255 is waivable). The government agrees with Mr. Anderson’s overbreadth
argument, so concurs that he should be resentenced. The government
acknowledges that the Indiana and Illinois convictions aren’t “serious drug
offense[s]” because they depend on definitions of cocaine that are broader than
the federal definition of cocaine. See United States v. De La Torre, 940 F.3d 938,
952 (7th Cir. 2019) (Indiana law); United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, 650 (7th
Cir. 2020) (Illinois law). The government disagrees with Mr. Anderson as to
whether his two Indiana convictions were committed on separate occasions but
contends the court need not reach that issue because the overbreadth issue is
enough to grant Mr. Anderson the relief he seeks.
Mr. Anderson’s state convictions don’t constitute serious drug offenses for
purposes of sentencing because those state convictions were for state offenses
defined more broadly than their federal counterpart. Without three “serious drug
offenses,” Mr. Anderson wouldn’t be subject to a 180-month mandatory
minimum sentence under § 924(e)(1). The government waives the statute of
limitations. Accordingly, the court GRANTS Mr. Anderson’s motion to vacate
sentence under § 2255. [Doc. 49]. The court reaffirms the resentencing deadlines
earlier set by the court. [Doc. 63, 64]. Mr. Anderson shall remain in custody
pending his resentencing.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:

December 14, 2022

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge, United States District Court
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