Stinnett v. Warden

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court DENIES 19 Motion for Subpoena; DENIES 2 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment and close this case; and DENIES Jovan Stinnett leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael G Gotsch, Sr on 11/18/2022. (ash)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JOVAN STINNETT,
Petitioner,
v.

CAUSE NO. 3:22-CV-616-MGG

WARDEN,
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Jovan Stinnett, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a habeas corpus petition
challenging the disciplinary decision (STP-22-2-04) at the Heritage Trail Correctional
Facility in which a disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) found him guilty of battery on
staff in violation of Indiana Department of Correction Offense 117. Following a hearing,
he was sanctioned with a loss of two thousand days earned credit time and a two-step
demotion in credit class.
Stinnett argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the conduct report and
the video recording summary did not mention that the sergeant used mace on him, and
Stinnett believes that this omission was unfair. It appears that Stinnett is arguing that
the use of mace was a material fact that should have been disclosed to him. “[A]n
inmate is entitled to disclosure of material, exculpatory evidence in prison disciplinary
hearings unless such disclosure would unduly threaten institutional concerns.” Piggie v.
Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2003).

To start, the administrative record contains a video recording summary that
indicates that, after Stinnett punched the sergeant, the sergeant “remove[d] his OC from
his holster and [Stinnett} then stops striking and flees from the immediate area.” ECF
10-8. The video recording summary thus mentions that the sergeant used mace on
Stinnett. Further, even if the administrative record did not mention the use of mace, it is
unclear how this fact is material or exculpatory. The use of mace does not undermine
the evidence that Stinnett punched the sergeant. The disciplinary policy also does not
allow inmates to assert self-defense as a defense to disciplinary charges (ECF 10-11; ECF
10-12), and, even if it did, the video recording (ECF 15) shows that Stinnett punched the
sergeant before the sergeant used or threatened to use force against him. Therefore, this
claim is not a basis for habeas relief.
Stinnett argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because he did not receive an
opportunity to review the conduct report. To satisfy procedural due process, “written
notice of the charges must be given to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to
inform him of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a
defense.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974). The Warden concedes that
Stinnett did not receive a copy of the conduct report prior to the hearing, but, according
to Stinnett on administrative appeal, the screening officer notified him of the charges by
reading the conduct report to him. ECF 10-8. Further, the administrative record reflects
that Stinnett received a copy of the video recording summary, which substantially
resembled the fact allegations in the conduct report. ECF 10-1; ECF 10-8. Additionally,
Stinnett does not explain how the lack of conduct report prejudiced him. To the
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contrary, it appears that Stinnett fully understood the charges against him. The record
reflects that, at screening, Stinnett requested the video recording where the incident
occurred and that, at the hearing, he said that he was not guilty of battery because he
felt scared and threatened by the sergeant. ECF 10-2; ECF 10-7. Therefore, this claim is
not a basis for habeas relief.
Stinnett argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because he did not receive an
opportunity to review the evidence used against him. “[T]he inmate facing disciplinary
proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence.”
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). However, “[p]rison officials must have the
necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits and to refuse to call
witnesses that may create a risk of reprisal or undermine authority, as well as to limit
access to other inmates to collect statements or to compile other documentary
evidence.” Id. Prison officials may also prevent an inmate from reviewing material,
exculpatory evidence if its disclosure would present a risk to the security of the facility
and the safety of those within it. Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2003); Chavis
v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1286 (7th Cir. 1981).
Stinnett does not identify which articles of evidence he was not allowed to
review. The evidence in the administrative record consists of the conduct report, the
video recording summary, the video recording itself, and photographs of the sergeant’s
injuries. As detailed above, Stinnett received a copy of the video recording summary,
and the failure to provide him with the conduct report amounted to harmless error.
According to the video recording summary, correctional staff did not permit Stinnett to
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review the video recording because it would have allowed him “to learn the limits and
capabilities of the facility cameras,” which would have posed a risk to the safety and
security of the correctional facility. ECF 10-8. The Warden has also explained that
departmental policy does not allow inmates to possess images of their victims because
they could be used as trophies or as means of intimidation, extortion, or harassment.
ECF 11. Because correctional staff had a reasonable basis for denying Stinnett an
opportunity to review the evidence, this claim is not a basis for habeas relief.
Stinnett argues that the sanctions imposed were excessive. “A federal court will
not normally review a state sentencing determination [that] falls within the statutory
limit.” Koo v. McBride, 124 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir. 1997). According to departmental
policy, inmates found guilty of battery on staff may be sanctioned with up to the loss of
the entire balance of their earned credit time and a three-step demotion in credit class.
ECF 10-12 at 39-42. Because Stinnett’s sanctions were within the parameters set forth by
departmental policy, they are not a basis for habeas relief.
Finally, Stinnett filed a motion to subpoena two witnesses who would testify that
he did not receive paperwork prior to the hearing and that “[his] sanctions were made
known before [his] hearing.” However, the anticipated testimony would not have
altered the outcome of any of his habeas claims, As detailed above, the lack of an
opportunity to review documents did not amount to a procedural due process
violation. Further, awareness of his sanctions prior to the hearing is not relevant or
material to any of Stinnett’s habeas claims. Therefore, the motion for subpoenas is
denied.
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If Stinnett wants to appeal this decision, he does not need a certificate of
appealability because he is challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. See Evans v.
Circuit Court, 569 F.3d 665, 666 (7th Cir. 2009). However, he may not proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal because the court finds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an
appeal in this case could not be taken in good faith.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) DENIES the motion for subpoenas (ECF 19);
(2) DENIES the habeas corpus petition (ECF 2);
(3) DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment and close this case; and
(4) DENIES Jovan Stinnett leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
SO ORDERED on November 18, 2022
s/ Michael G. Gotsch, Sr.
Michael G. Gotsch, Sr.
United States Magistrate Judge

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