Boyd v. Flexaust, Inc.

Filing 42

ORDER GRANTING 23 Defendant Flexaust Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Kiara Boyd, as "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [Defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Signed by Judge Cristal C Brisco on 9/26/2024. (eeb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
KIARA BOYD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:22-CV-908-CCB

FLEXAUST INC.,
Defendant.
ORDER
Kiara Boyd sued her former employer, Flexaust Inc., under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 19811, and Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. Ms. Boyd is an African American woman and alleges that she faced disparate
treatment and a hostile work environment because of her race, sex, and pregnancy. [DE 17.]
Flexaust seeks summary judgment on Ms. Boyd’s claims. [DE 23.]
Relevant Background
The facts below are not in dispute. Any disputed facts are either not material or will be
addressed in the substantive analysis.
Flexaust is a leading hose and ducting manufacturer that serves a range of industrial and
commercial customers. [DE 24, ¶ 1.] Flexaust has policies prohibiting all forms of discrimination
and harassment. [DE 24-1, pg. 79-82, 93-95.] These policies are described in the company’s
employee handbook. Id. The handbook also describes the procedures for reporting incidents of
discrimination and harassment. Id.

1 The elements of discrimination claims under Title VII and § 1981 are the same. Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban
Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1104 & n.1 (7th Cir. 2012); Hrobowski v. Worthington Steel Co. & Worthington Indus., Inc., 358 F.3d
473, 476 (7th Cir. 2004).

Ms. Boyd was assigned to work at Flexaust’s plant in Warsaw, Indiana while working for a
temporary staffing agency. [DE E 24. ¶¶ 15-17.] On April 26, 2021, she was hired as a full-time
industrial cleaner. Id. ¶¶ 19, 24. She reported to Todd Sautter, who is the Human Resources
Manager at Flexaust. Id. ¶ 11. Ms. Boyd’s first year with the company went well. Id. ¶¶ 15-30.
Because she performed well as an industrial cleaner, Ms. Boyd was told that she would receive an
opportunity to try a position in production when she returned from maternity leave. [DE 24-1, pg. 5,
¶ 17.]
Ms. Boyd began maternity leave on April 18, 2022, and returned in late May or early June
2022. [DE 24-1, pg. 36; DE 31-1, pg. 25.] By the time she returned to work, a new employee named
Briley Spurlock began working as an HR Specialist at Flexaust. [DE 31-1, pg. 19, ¶ 3.] Soon after Ms.
Boyd returned to work, she renewed a request to be promoted to a position in production, which
was granted. [DE 24, ¶¶ 31-32.] According to the employee handbook, employees are typically
given a 90-day introductory period to adjust to their new position unless performance issues arise
during that window. [DE 31-1, pg. 20, ¶ 4; DE 24-1, pg. 99-100.] After a few days of training, the
production supervisor decided that Ms. Boyd could not perform in the new position. [DE 24-1, pg.
6, ¶ 21.] When Mr. Sautter learned of the production supervisor’s determination, he offered Ms.
Boyd the chance to return to her industrial cleaning position. Id.
After returning to work as an industrial cleaner Mr. Sautter learned of issues with Ms. Boyd’s
performance. [DE 24-1, pg. 6, ¶ 23.] According to Mr. Sautter, Ms. Boyd did not always clean the
facility as expected and was difficult to locate at times. [DE 24-1, pg. 6, ¶¶ 24-25.] Mr. Sautter also
began receiving complaints from employees about cleanliness. [DE 24-1, pg. 6, ¶ 26.] Mr. Sautter
investigated those complaints and concluded that Ms. Boyd was no longer meeting the company’s
expectations. [DE 24-1, pg. 7, ¶ 27.] Mr. Sautter met with Ms. Boyd and gave her a cleaning schedule

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which described where and when she should clean. Id. ¶ 29. Even so, this did not lead to an
improvement in her performance. Id. ¶ 30.
Ms. Boyd was terminated from Flexaust on September 13, 2022. [DE 24-1, pg. 5, ¶ 12.] Ms.
Boyd filed a charge of discrimination with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission and the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on September 29, 2022. [DE 24-1, pg. 70.] The
EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on October 12, 2022. [DE 17-2.] Thereafter, Ms. Boyd filed the
current lawsuit.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);
see also Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
To determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the court must review the
record, construing all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003). The
court must not “sift through the evidence, pondering the nuances and inconsistencies, and decide
whom to believe.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). The court does
not have to conduct research or develop arguments for parties either. Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d
586, 590 (7th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Beavers, 756 F.3d 1044, 1059 (7th Cir. 2014)
(“Perfunctory, undeveloped arguments without discussion or citation to pertinent legal authority are
waived.” (quoting Mahaffey v. Ramos, 588 F.3d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 2009)).
“To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party cannot rest on the mere
allegations or denials contained in his pleadings, but must present sufficient evidence to show the

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existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial.” Robin v. Espo Eng’g
Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted), overruled on other grounds
by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016). “Summary judgment is not a dress
rehearsal or practice run; it is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show
what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.” Hammel
v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted); see also Goodman v.
Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010).
Analysis
I.

Ms. Boyd’s Charge
Flexaust argues that Ms. Boyd’s claims fail because the charge of discrimination that she filed

with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission and the EEOC did not address harassment. [DE 24, pg.
8-10.] A Title VII plaintiff may not “bring claims in a lawsuit that were not included in her EEOC
charge.” Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994)(citing Alexander v. Gardner–
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1019, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974)). However, “because most
EEOC charges are completed by laypersons rather than by lawyers, a Title VII plaintiff need not
allege in an EEOC charge each and every fact that combines to form the basis of each claim in her
complaint.” Id. To determine whether an EEOC charge embraces the claims in the complaint,
courts consider whether the claims in the complaint are “like or reasonably related to the allegations
of the charge and growing out of such allegations.” Id.
Flexaust contends that the charge does not allege harassment. But a closer look at the language
in the charge undermines Flexaust’s argument:
…I’ve experienced harassment, disparate treatment, and other forms of subtle
discrimination. I also can’t help but notice as I stated above. Once I returned back
from maternity leave all these issues occurred. Which made me feel as if I was
experiencing maternal-related discrimination. I believe I have been discriminated
against based on my race, color, and sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended.
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[DE 24-1, pg. 70.] The language explicitly states that she believes she faced harassment upon her
return from maternity leave. Still, Flexaust likens this case to Sitar v. Ind. DOT, 344 F.3d 720 (7th Cir.
2003). In Sitar the Plaintiff’s EEOC charge specified that the plaintiff believed she had been
retaliated against because of an earlier complaint of sex discrimination. Id. at 725. However, the
charge did not mention Sitar’s sex discrimination or sexual harassment claims. Id. The Seventh
Circuit held that her sex discrimination and sexual harassment claims were procedurally barred
because they involved a “separate set of incidents, conduct, and people” compared to her retaliation
claim. Id. at 726-727. This case differs from Sitar for two reasons. First, Ms. Boyd’s charge explicitly
states she “experienced harassment,” unlike the plaintiff in Sitar, who did not include in her charge
the theory of liability underlying her complaint. Second, the charge here encompasses the same set
of incidents that are described in the complaint. Ms. Boyd’s charge indicates that she believed she
faced harassment and discrimination based on her race, sex, and pregnancy status, upon returning
from leave. Likewise, the allegations in the complaint center on the discrimination and hostile work
environment that Ms. Boyd alleges she faced upon her return from leave. Since the presence of
harassment is an element of a hostile work environment claim, the language in the charge is broad
enough to include Ms. Boyd’s hostile work environment claim. See Scaife v. United States Dep't of
Veterans Affs., 49 F.4th 1109, 1115–16 (7th Cir. 2022). Thus, all of Ms. Boyd’s claims described in the
complaint are either explicitly described in the EEOC charge or are reasonably related to what is
described in the charge.
II.

Ms. Boyd’s Hostile Work Environment Claim
Ms. Boyd asserts that she faced a hostile work environment when she returned from

maternity leave. [DE 32, pg. 12-14.] A work environment is hostile when it is “permeated with
discriminatory ridicule, intimidation, and insult.” Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 982
(7th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). To prove a hostile work environment an employee must show
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“(1) the work environment was both subjectively and objectively offensive; (2) the harassment was
based on membership in a protected class; (3) the conduct was severe or pervasive; and (4) there is a
basis for employer liability.” Scaife v. United States Dep't of Veterans Affs., 49 F.4th 1109, 1115–16 (7th
Cir. 2022). For conduct to be actionable, the harassment “must be sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of [the] victim's employment and create [an] abusive working environment.”
Id. at 67. Flexaust argues that Ms. Boyd cannot present evidence that she faced severe or pervasive
conduct. [DE 24, pg. 10.] The Court agrees.
Flexaust has policies prohibiting all forms of discrimination and harassment. These policies
are described in the company’s employee handbook. [DE 24-1, pg. 79-82, 93-95.] The handbook
also describes the procedures employees are expected to follow if they want to report discrimination
or harassment. Id. Ms. Boyd acknowledges that she received a copy of the handbook explaining the
reporting procedures. [DE 24-1, pg. 12.] Ms. Boyd was aware of these policies yet admitted that she
never reported any issues. [DE 24-1, pg. 65-66.] Further, Ms. Boyd testified at her deposition that
she went to Mr. Sautter’s boss because she felt like Mr. Sautter was adding additional duties to her
role which amounted to harassment. [DE 24-1, pg. 38.] However, when asked to elaborate on what
she meant when she used the word “harassment,” her response did not indicate any connection to
her race, sex, or any other protected characteristic.
Harassing conduct will only amount to a hostile work environment if it is “severe or
pervasive from both a subjective and an objective point of view.” Howard v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,
989 F.3d 587, 600 (7th Cir. 2021); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998). “To be
severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment, conduct must be extreme.”
Howard, 989 F.3d at 600 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Courts are instructed to
consider the “totality of the circumstances” when determining whether conduct is severe or
pervasive which “includes (1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) how offensive a

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reasonable person would deem it to be; (3) whether it is physically threatening or humiliating
conduct as opposed to verbal abuse; (4) whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance; and (5) whether it is directed at the victim.” Id. citing Lambert v. Peri Formworks Sys.,
Inc., 723 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2013)
Ms. Boyd appears to base her hostile work environment claim on several factors. [DE 32,
pg. 13-14.] First, she points to Ms. Spurlock’s (HR Specialist) alleged tendency to follow her around
the workplace after Ms. Boyd returned from leave. Id. Second, she explains that her work
responsibilities shifted so often that she never knew what was expected of her. Id. Third, she alleges
that her supervisors blamed her for maintenance issues beyond her control. Id. Fourth, she
emphasizes that she was demoted to her previous role after working in production for only three or
four days. [DE 31-1, pg. 20. All these experiences may have been frustrating, but Ms. Boyd has not
shown that there is a genuine issue of material fact about the severity or pervasiveness of the alleged
conduct. To begin with, only one of these reasons is supported by a citation to evidence, and to
defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party cannot rest on the allegations but
must present sufficient evidence to support their case. Robin v. Espo Eng’g Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088
(7th Cir. 2000). Even if she could back up her allegations with evidence, her hostile work
environment claim would not survive summary judgment. Ms. Boyd alleged that Ms. Spurlock
regularly followed her at work, but there is no indication that this occurred so often or in a
physically threatening or humiliating way, that it could be considered objectively offensive conduct.
Although her responsibilities may have changed, there is no sign that a jury would find this
objectively offensive either. Furthermore, even if she received unwarranted blame for maintenance
issues, this is not a sign that her work environment was “permeated with discriminatory ridicule,
intimidation, and insult.” Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir. 2014)
(quotations omitted). Finally, her demotion to an industrial cleaning position does not support a

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hostile work environment claim because it was a discrete act rather than evidence of a pattern of
conduct that permeated the work environment. Ms. Boyd failed to show that there is a genuine
dispute of material fact as to her hostile work environment claim.
III.

Ms. Boyd’s Disparate Treatment Claims
Ms. Boyd alleges that she faced disparate treatment when she returned from maternity leave.

[DE 32, pg. 14.] Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII to prohibit
employment discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Ms. Boyd has not offered direct evidence of an unlawful motive
for her demotion or termination, so the Court will analyze her disparate treatment claims under the
framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d
668 (1973).
To make a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglass framework, Ms. Boyd must prove
that 1) she belongs to a protected group; 2) she met her employer’s legitimate expectations; 3) she
faced an adverse employment action; 4) and that a similarly situated employee received better
treatment. Igasaki v. Illinois Dep't of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2021). If
established, the prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. Texas Dep’t of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The
burden then shifts to the employer to describe a legitimate reason for its allegedly discriminatory
action. Id. If the employer meets this burden of production, the presumption of discrimination goes
away. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).
Then to prevail, it is up to the employee to show that the nondiscriminatory explanation for the

8

adverse action was pretextual. Id. An employee can show pretext by establishing that “(1)
Defendant's explanation had no basis in fact, or (2) the explanation was not the ‘real’ reason, or (3)
... the reason stated was insufficient to warrant the [adverse job action].” Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne,
Ind., 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Lenoir v. Roll Coater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1130, 1133 (7th
Cir.1994.)) The parties do not dispute whether Ms. Boyd belongs to a protected class, or that she
faced an adverse employment action when she was demoted and fired. [DE 24, pg. 12.] Therefore,
to determine whether Ms. Boyd can establish a prima facie case, this Court need only consider
whether Ms. Boyd designated evidence that she met Flexaust’s legitimate expectations and whether
any similarly situated employees were treated better.
a. Ms. Boyd Failed to Meet Her Employer’s Legitimate Performance
Expectations.
To support her argument that she met Flexaust’s expectations, Ms. Boyd designates evidence
that she received positive performance reviews in July 2021 and March 2022, and notes she was
granted a promotion when she returned from maternity leave. [DE 32, pg. 15; DE 31-1, pg. 27-30.]
However, her performance before returning from leave is not directly pertinent to this inquiry. To
establish a prima facie case, she must show that she met expectations at the time her employer made
the decision to demote her and then fire her. Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 689 (7th Cir.
2008) (Stating that job performance is measured “through the eyes of her supervisors” at the time of
the adverse employment action.); Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 329 (7th Cir. 2002) (“In
most cases, when a district court evaluates the question of whether an employee was meeting an
employer's legitimate employment expectations, the issue is not the employee's past performance
but ‘whether the employee was performing well at the time of [her] termination.’” (citations
omitted)). Ms. Boyd was demoted in June 2022 and fired in September 2022 but Ms. Boyd puts
forth no evidence that she was meeting Flexaust’s expectations at these times. Flexaust on the other

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hand, submitted evidence that Ms. Boyd was not meeting Flexaust’s legitimate expectations when
she was demoted and fired. [DE 24-1, pg. 4-8.]
When Ms. Boyd returned from leave, she had a chance to work in production, as she
requested. [DE 24, ¶¶ 31-32.] Mr. Sautter avers in his declaration that Ms. Boyd was removed from
this position because her supervisor in production concluded that she was unable to perform the
duties required of her. [DE 24-1, pg. 6, ¶ 21.] As previously explained, Ms. Boyd provides zero
evidence that she was meeting the expectations of her production position. Instead, Ms. Boyd seeks
to cast doubt on Flexaust’s explanation for the demotion by noting that employees are generally
given a 90-day introductory period to get settled in their new position. [DE 32, pg. 2.] While
employees are generally provided this introductory period, the employee handbook makes clear that
people may be removed from their position before the 90-day period concludes if performance
issues arise. [DE 24-1, pg. 99-100.] The handbook states that “[if] Management determines that you
are not satisfying performance expectations during, or at the end of, the initial 90 days, your
employment will be terminated at that time unless Management concludes that a specified extension
of the introductory period is appropriate.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the fact that she was
demoted during the 90-day introductory period does not demonstrate that Flexaust’s stated reason
for her demotion was pretextual.
Upon returning to her role as an industrial cleaner, Flexaust states that issues emerged which
led to her termination. Flexaust contends that Mr. Sautter ultimately fired Ms. Boyd for three
reasons. [DE 24, pg. 12; DE 24 -1, pg. 6-7, ¶¶ 23-34.] First, Mr. Sautter’s declaration provides that
Ms. Boyd “was not always cleaning the areas of the facility as expected and it was difficult to locate
her at times.” [DE 24-1, pg. 6, ¶¶ 24-25.] As an example, Mr. Sautter highlights a time where Ms.
Boyd was disciplined for taking an extended lunch break even though no such break was scheduled.
Id. Ms. Boyd concedes that she was written up for taking too long for lunch but contends that her

10

Caucasian co-workers were let off the hook for the same infraction. [DE 31-1, pg. 21, ¶ 11.]
Importantly, Ms. Boyd failed to designate any evidence that the unidentified “Caucasian co-workers”
were similarly situated, which is a necessary element to establish a prima facie case. Igasaki v. Illinois
Dep't of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2021)). Second, Mr. Sautter’s declaration
shows that he “began to receive employee complaints regarding cleanliness issues.” [DE 24-1, pg. 6,
¶ 26.] This remains largely undisputed by Ms. Boyd. In her brief, Ms. Boyd notes that she did not
“admit” that Flexaust began receiving complaints about her performance, but testified that
employees complained about the smell of the cleaning products and about the messes left by her coworkers. [DE 32, pg. 4.] While Ms. Boyd correctly points out that her testimony is not an admission
that Flexaust received complaints about her performance, this does not cast doubt on the evidence
that Mr. Sautter did receive such complaints. Even if Ms. Boyd was unaware of or disagreed with
complaints about her performance, the evidence shows that Mr. Sautter began receiving complaints
that implicated her poor performance as an industrial cleaner. [DE 24-1, pg. 6, ¶ 26.]
Third, Mr. Sautter’s declaration describes how he followed-up on the complaints he received
from employees and confirmed that Ms. Boyd “was not working up to the standards that she
previously worked.” [DE 24-1, pg. 7, ¶¶ 27-28.] For example, he notes that he observed Ms. Boyd
either mopping with water (and no cleaning agent), or with dirty water. Id. Although Ms. Boyd
disputes that she used only water while mopping, she does not contest that Flexaust raised issues
with the manner of her cleaning duties and asked her to do things in a different way. [DE 31-1, pg.
20-21, ¶9; DE 24-1, pg. 7, ¶ 28; DE 24-1, pg. 33-34; DE 31-1, pg. 11-12.] Mr. Sautter met with Ms.
Boyd and he provided her with a schedule that described where she should clean and at what time.
[DE 24-1, pg. 7, ¶ 29.] However, these efforts did not lead to improved performance. Id. ¶ 30.
The final basis for her termination was that Ms. Boyd damaged company property by using
the wrong cleaning products.[DE 24, pg. 12.] In his declaration, Mr. Sautter stated that “the

11

cleanliness issues turned into damage to Defendant’s property. Specifically, Plaintiff was utilizing the
wrong cleaning solution and the cleaning solution damaged the stainless steel in the bathrooms and
left a yellow tint on mirrors.” [DE 24-1, pg. 7, ¶ 31.] The proper inquiry into whether she was
meeting expectations requires the Court to look at her performance “through the eyes of her
supervisors.” Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 689 (7th Cir. 2008). So while Ms. Boyd may have
testified that she used proper cleaning supplies as instructed [DE 31-1, pg. 6-7], the record shows
that it was Mr. Sautter’s opinion that Ms. Boyd’s performance caused damage to company property.
To raise an issue of material fact, Ms. Boyd needed to identify some evidence that could cast doubt
on whether Mr. Sautter honestly believed that Ms. Boyd’s performance caused property damage.
Giannopoulos v. Brach & Brock Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.1997). This is because the
Court will not act as a “super-personnel department” and question whether his belief that she
damaged company property should have factored into the decision to fire her, so long as it was truly
one of the reasons. Id. at 411 (“[W]hen an employer articulates a reason for discharging the plaintiff
not forbidden by law, it is not our province to decide whether that reason was wise, fair, or even
correct, ultimately, so long as it truly was the reason for the plaintiff's termination.”)
Ms. Boyd failed to establish a prima facie case because she cannot show that she met
Flexaust’s expectations when she was demoted and fired. The evidence she relies on to show that
she met Flexaust’s expectations only described her performance before she returned from leave.
Thus, it does not show that she was meeting Flexaust’s expectations at the time of her demotion or
termination. Ms. Boyd acknowledged that it was reasonable for Flexaust to expect her to maintain
the cleanliness of its facilities and that she could be fired if she failed to do so. [DE 24-1, pg. 30-31.]
The evidence presented by Flexaust undermines any argument that she was meeting these
expectations. Mr. Sautter’s declaration shows that Ms. Boyd was not working where she was
supposed to, that she was not cleaning properly, and that he believed that her cleaning practices

12

damaged company property. This evidence not only establishes that Ms. Boyd did not meet
Flexaust’s performance expectations but also supports Flexaust’s assertion that she was fired for
legitimate reasons.
b. Ms. Boyd Failed to Show That a Similarly Situated Employee Received Better
Treatment.
Ms. Boyd has also failed to present evidence showing that a similarly situated employee was
treated more favorably than her. Whether employees are similarly situated is a “flexible, commonsense, and factual inquiry.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2012). The relevant
factors of this inquiry include “whether the employees (i) held the same job description, (ii) were
subject to the same standards, (iii) were subordinate to the same supervisor, and (iv) had comparable
experience, education, and other qualifications—provided the employer considered these latter
factors in making the personnel decision.” Warren v. Solo Cup Co., 516 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2008)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). Ms. Boyd contends that a mixed-race male named
Arlando, is similarly situated to her because he served as the industrial cleaner before she did. [DE
32, pg. 6.] Other than highlighting that they both served as industrial cleaners, Ms. Boyd did not
present evidence showing why he is similarly situated. The record is void of any evidence that their
job descriptions were the same, that they were held to the same standards, that they had the same
supervisor, or that they had comparable qualifications. Thus, she has also failed to establish the
fourth prong of the prima facie case.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, summary judgment is appropriate because “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and [Defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Accordingly, Defendant Flexaust Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 23]
is GRANTED.

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SO ORDERED.
September 26, 2024
/s/Cristal C. Brisco
CRISTAL C. BRISCO, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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