Doman et al v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC et al

Filing 73

OPINION AND ORDER: DENYING Defendant Foley RV's Motion to Dismiss. DE 52 ; and DENYING Defendant Heartland's Motion to Transfer. DE 47 . With transfer denied, this court will issue a separate order for a Rule 26(f) Report of Parties' Planning Meeting and set a date for a Rule 16(b) Pretrial Scheduling Conference. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion for a Rule 26(f) Conference is DENIED as unnecessary. DE 66 . Signed by Judge Cristal C Brisco on 9/25/2024. (eeb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JENNY DOMAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CASE NO. 3:23-CV-218-CCB-SJF

HEARTLAND RECREATIONAL
VEHICLES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to Forum Non Conveniens filed
by Defendant Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC (“Heartland”) [DE 47] and a Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint and Alternative Request for Transfer [DE 52] filed by Defendant
Foley RV Centers, LLC d/b/a Camping World RV Sales (“Foley RV”). Both motions allege that the
case should not have been brought in the Northern District of Indiana and request dismissal or
transfer to another district. Based on the applicable law, facts, and arguments, both Heartland’s and
Foley RV’s motions are denied, and this case will remain in the Northern District of Indiana.
I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND
On December 18, 2021, Plaintiffs Jenny and Trent Doman, a married couple, bought a new

recreational vehicle (“RV”) to use on an upcoming road trip to Utah. Plaintiffs’ RV was purchased
from Foley RV, located in Washington state, and was manufactured by Heartland, located in
Indiana. The heating systems in the RV malfunctioned that day and the next. The RV then caught
fire on the road near Dillon, Montana. The fire destroyed the RV, along with an assortment of
Plaintiffs’ other personal possessions, including their new all-terrain vehicle and their truck. As a
result, Plaintiffs filed this case alleging claims including breach of warranty under the MagnusonMoss Warranty Act, products liability, and negligence.

Heartland is an RV manufacturer located in Elkhart, Indiana. Heartland’s limited warranty
for the RV included a forum-selection clause, which conferred exclusive jurisdiction to litigate
disputes in the state of manufacture, Indiana. [DE 13-1]. Based on the text of the limited warranty,
the benefits ran to the purchaser of the RV. [DE 13-1 at 8]. Despite this forum-selection clause,
however, Heartland seeks to transfer this case to another forum, the District of Montana. [DE 47].
Heartland’s motion seeks transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) under forum non conveniens grounds,
contending that the private interest factors and the public interest factors favor transfer.
Foley RV is a Washington-based dealer of RVs, including those of several RV manufacturers
situated in Indiana. While Heartland’s motion seeking transfer to the District of Montana was
pending, Foley RV moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), alleging that
this court lacks personal jurisdiction because Foley RV does not have any locations in the State of
Indiana, nor does it engage in RV sales, service, or other business here. [DE 53 at 2-3]. Alternatively,
Foley RV argues that the matter should be transferred to the Eastern District of Washington under
the forum-selection clause found in the purchase order entered by Trent Doman and Foley RV. [DE
18-1 at 1].
II.

ANALYSIS
A.

Foley RV’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction [DE 52]

Rule 12(b)(2) allows a party to move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(2). Once a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiffs bear the burden
of proving that jurisdiction exists. Purdue Rsch. Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th
Cir. 2003). When a motion to dismiss is decided without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff “need
only make out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citation omitted). But “once
the defendant has submitted affidavits or other evidence in opposition to the exercise of jurisdiction,
the plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and submit affirmative evidence supporting the exercise

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of jurisdiction.” Id. at 783. The court must take all well-pleaded facts in the amended complaint as
true and resolve any factual disputes in the plaintiffs’ favor. Id. Reasonable inferences must also be
drawn in the plaintiffs’ favor. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A.,
Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2017).
Plaintiffs’ operative amended complaint brings claims under both the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act and Indiana state law. [DE 35]. Thus, the court’s subject matter jurisdiction rests on a
federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In a case
involving federal question jurisdiction, “a federal court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant
if either federal law or the law of the state in which the court sits authorizes service of process to
that defendant.” Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Houston Metroplex, P.A., 623
F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2010). The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act does not authorize nationwide
service of process. See be2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 F.3d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 2011); Advanced Tactical Ordnance
Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir. 2024). Thus, the court turns to
Indiana law. A federal court sitting in Indiana may exercise jurisdiction over the defendants only if
authorized both by Indiana law and by the United States Constitution. Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys.,
LLC, 751 F.3d at 800 (citing to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.117, 124
(2014)). Personal jurisdiction is governed by Indiana’s long-arm statute, which extends personal
jurisdiction to the outer limits of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ind. Trial
Rule 4.4(A); Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 2004).
When deciding whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process
Clause, the court considers the defendant’s relationship to the forum state. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Ct. of Cal., San Francisco City, 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017). Personal jurisdiction exists when a
defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state so much so that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Walden v. Fiore, 571

3

U.S. 277, 283-84 (2014) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal
quotation omitted).
Two types of personal jurisdiction exist, general and specific. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 582
U.S. at 262. Establishing general jurisdiction is a “high bar” requiring that a defendant’s affiliation
with a forum be so constant and pervasive that the defendant is considered “at home” in that forum.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. at 136; Beehler v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. 16 C 8525, 2017 WL
11884056, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 2017). Specific jurisdiction requires that the suit arises from
defendant’s contacts with the forum. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 582 U.S. at 262. Thus, for this Court to
have jurisdiction over Foley RV, it must find either that Foley RV’s affiliation with Indiana is so
constant and pervasive that it is deemed at home in Indiana, or that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit arises from
Foley RV’s contacts with Indiana. Foley RV contends that neither general nor specific jurisdiction
exists, while Plaintiffs contend that both do.
1.

General Personal Jurisdiction

A corporate defendant is “essentially at home” if it is incorporated in the forum state or has
a principal place of business within the state. Kipp v. Ski Enter. Corp. of Wis., 783 F.3d 695, 698 (7th
Cir. 2015). The same inquiry is used to determine whether an LLC defendant is “at home.” See
Duncanson v. Wine & Canvas IP Holdings LLC, No. 1:16-cv-00788-SEB-DML, 2017 WL 6994541, at
*2 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 20, 2017)(observing that “the Supreme Court in Daimler suggested that an LLC’s
state of formation and principal place of business are the salient inquiries in determining where an
LLC is subject to general personal jurisdiction”). A defendant is also considered to be “at home” in
the forum state if its activities within the state are constant and pervasive. See Daimler AG, 571 U.S.
at 137.
Foley RV reports that it is a Minnesota limited liability company formed in Minnesota with
its principal place of business in Illinois—suggesting that it is not “at home” in Indiana. [See DE 8].

4

In response, Plaintiffs explain that one of Foley RV’s 26 members resides in Indiana. [DE 60 at 8].
While the citizenship of an LLC’s members impacts the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, it is not one of
the “salient inquiries” for general personal jurisdiction. Duncanson, 2017 WL 6994541, at *2. Next,
Foley RV also contends that its activities in Indiana are not so constant and pervasive as to render it
at home in Indiana, relying on BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402 (2017). There, the Supreme
Court observed that, while the railroad defendant owned more than 2,000 miles of railroad tracks
and had more than 2,000 employees in the forum state, this accounted for only 6% of its total track
mileage and less than 5% of its total workforce. Id. at 406. Thus, the Supreme Court held that
general jurisdiction could not attach to the corporate railroad defendant because its activities in the
argued-for forum state were only a fraction of the total activities it conducted throughout the United
States. Id. at 405-06. Foley RV does not engage in sales or service of RVs in Indiana and does not
have any business operations in Indiana—contending that their activities are even less pervasive
than the defendant’s activities in BNFS. Based on this, the court cannot find that Plaintiffs have met
the “high bar” of establishing general personal jurisdiction. Beehler, 2017 WL 11884056, at *2.
2.

Specific Personal Jurisdiction

The court’s inquiry does not end with general personal jurisdiction, however, as the court
can still find that specific jurisdiction exists. Specific jurisdiction exists “if the defendant has
‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged
injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
472 (1985) (citing Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 744 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A., 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). The defendant must have “certain minimum contacts with
[the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quotation omitted). This ensures that a
defendant is “not haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous’, or ‘attenuated’

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contacts.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475. In sum, specific jurisdiction exists where the
requirements below are met:
(1) the defendant must have purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting business in the forum state or purposefully directed his activities at the
state; (2) the alleged injury must have arisen from the defendant’s forum-related
activities, [] and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.
Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 673 (7th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiffs rely on this court’s opinion in Meyer v. Newmary Corp., No. 3:19-CV-755 JD, 2020
WL 3256263 (N.D. Ind. June 16, 2020), to support that specific jurisdiction exists here. Like Foley
RV, the defendant in Meyer, an Arizona-based RV dealer, moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ case
brought in this district for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at *1. The Meyer court found that there
were sufficient minimum contacts between the Arizona-based RV dealership and Indiana to
establish specific jurisdiction. Id. at *1–*3. First, the court found sufficient minimum contacts by
observing that around 77 percent of the RV dealership’s current new RV inventory was purchased
from Indiana RV manufacturers. Id. at *3. The court also observed that the Arizona dealership
advertised its inventory on the co-defendant RV manufacturer’s website in Indiana and had signed
its dealership agreement with the Indiana-based RV company in Indiana. Id. The dealership also
performed warranty repairs in Arizona on behalf of RV manufacturers located in Indiana. Id.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the Arizona dealership created and maintained continuing
obligations as an authorized dealership between itself and the co-defendant RV manufacturer, and
the case arose due to their forum-related activities. Id. Plaintiffs contends that, like the defendant in
Meyer, Foley RV maintains continued connections with Heartland and other manufacturers located
in Indiana, and Plaintiffs’ case against Foley RV stems from these connections.
In response, Foley RV argues that because it does not list RVs for sale on Heartland’s
website, and because it does not complete any of its warranty repair work or RV inspections in

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Indiana, its contacts with Indiana are less than those of the Arizona-based dealer in Meyer and
insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction. Foley RV instead urges this Court to follow the decision
in Jayco Inc. v. Nat’l Indoor RV Ctrs. LLC et al., 3:17-CV-458 RLM-MGG, 2017 WL 4270201, (N.D.
Ind. September 26, 2017). There, Plaintiff Jayco Inc. (“Jayco”) filed suit against RV Dealers National
Indoor RV Centers, LLC (“NIRVC”), NIRVC-AZ, National Indoor RV Centers-GA, as well
employee Angie Morell, alleging claims of trademark infringement, unfair competition, and breach
of contract. Id. at *1. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and
improper venue. Id. at *6. Jayco opposed the motion to dismiss by referencing these defendants’
contacts to Indiana, which are like those referenced here—the defendants’ dealership agreements
with Jayco, the defendants’ purchase of inventory from Jayco, and the defendants’ completion of
warranty work for Jayco. Id. at *5. The court found that this did not suffice for specific jurisdiction
because of the nature of the suit—observing that “Jayco’s trademark, unfair competition, and breach
of contract claims don't ‘arise out of or relate to’ any of those contacts.” Id. Thus, the court found
that specific jurisdiction did not exist.
The court cannot find Foley RV’s reliance on Jayco persuasive. Here, Plaintiffs’ complaint
sufficiently alleges that Foley RV’s contacts with Indiana arise out of or relate to the instant cause of
action. What’s more, Foley RV is an authorized dealer of Heartland RVs, is listed as such on
Heartland’s website, and regularly sells RVs manufactured by Heartland to consumers. Like the
dealer in Meyer, Foley RV is authorized by Heartland to perform warranty repairs and other services
on Heartland vehicles. Foley RV also reports that 62.78 percent of its revenue derived from Indiana
manufactured RV sales. Also, Foley RV contemplated warranty repairs for Plaintiffs’ RV and would
have undertaken them if the RV had not been destroyed before Plaintiffs’ ability to make the
scheduled repair advised by Foley RV’s dealership manager.

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It is also foreseeable that Foley RV would be haled into the Northern District of Indiana,
and so the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Foley RV comports with traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. Through their complaint, Plaintiffs raise claims of breach of contract,
breach of warranty, and tort claims that arose because of the fire that consumed their new RV.
Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are directly related to the RV manufacturing process in Indiana and Foley
RV’s relationship with that manufacturer—Heartland. As Plaintiffs point out, Foley RV sells a
substantial number of new RVs manufactured by Heartland—a significant portion of which come
with a limited warranty provided by Heartland that sets jurisdiction in the place of manufacture,
Indiana. Foley RV also sells new RVs manufactured by other companies in Indiana that also come
with a limited warranty that sets jurisdiction in Indiana.
In sum, because Foley RV established a substantial and continuing relationship with RV
manufacturers in Indiana, including Heartland, and the issues in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint relate
to warranty obligations of Heartland based on an RV manufactured by Heartland that Foley RV
sold, the Court finds that Foley RV’s contacts with Indiana are enough to find specific personal
jurisdiction. Therefore, Foley RV’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) is DENIED. [DE 52].
The Court now considers both Foley RV’s alternative request to transfer to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington and Heartland’s request to transfer to the
United States District Court for the District of Montana, both of which allege forum non conveniens
grounds under 28 U.S.C § 1404(a).
B.

Motions to Transfer Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

Transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is appropriate if: (1) venue is proper in the transferor and
transferee court; (2) transfer is for the convenience of the parties and witnesses; and (3) transfer is in
the interest of justice. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 62
(2013). But a valid forum selection clause changes the calculus as to the most proper forum for

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resolving the dispute. Atlantic Marine, 571 U.S. at 63. This is because “[t]he enforcement of valid
forum-selection clauses, bargained for by the parties, protects their legitimate expectations and
furthers vital interests of the justice system.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). A valid
forum selection clause controls in all but the most exceptional cases. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,
487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988).
The court must address the applicability of two forum selection clauses, as both Plaintiffs’
purchase order with Foley RV and Heartland’s limited warranty contained such clauses. The court
must first consider their enforceability.
1.

Enforceability of the Forum Selection Clauses

Forum selection clauses are enforceable when they include mandatory language specifying
venue and the parties are bound by the agreement, including the forum selection clause. See
IAC/InterActiveCorp, 44 F.4th 635, 643 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal citation omitted). Mandatory
language in a forum selection clause specifies “that disputes under the contract ‘shall’ or ‘will’ be
litigated in a specific venue or forum.” Id.
The two-page purchase order entered into by Foley RV (identified as “the Dealer”) and
Plaintiff Trent Doman, contains a provision entitled “CHOICE OF LAW AND VENUE, FEES[,]”
which states:
Any controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or breach
thereof shall be interpreted under the laws of the state in which Dealer is located and
venue will be in the state and county in which Dealer is located or the applicable federal
court.
[DE 18-1 at 1, ¶ 14]. This forum selection clause specifies the venue and forum as the “county in
which Dealer is located or the applicable federal court[.]” Foley RV is in Spokane County in
Washington state, which sits in the United States District for the Eastern District of Washington.
Moreover, the clause also uses the phrase “will be” when defining venue. The clause is therefore
both sufficiently specific in terms of venue or location and mandatory in terms of enforceability.
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The Heartland limited warranty, entered by Heartland and Plaintiffs, states that “exclusive
jurisdiction for deciding legal disputes relating in any way to the Limited Warranties or the
recreational vehicle must be filed in the courts within the state of manufacture.” [DE 13-1 at 7, ¶ 2].
The clause specifies venue as “the courts within the state of manufacture.” Plaintiffs’ RV was
manufactured by Heartland in Indiana, where this court sits. The language “must be” in the clause
makes the forum selection clause mandatory. Thus, Heartland’s clause is also specific enough in
terms of venue or location and mandatory in terms of enforceability.
Both clauses contain enforceable, mandatory language specifying venue—even if in
competing locations. Still, Plaintiffs argue that Foley RV’s purchase order is unconscionable because
it was “hidden on the back side of the purchase agreement, in small type, with no signature line, and
was never discussed with the Plaintiffs.” [DE 60 at 15]. But “it is a fundamental principle of contract
law that a person who signs a contract is presumed to know its terms and consents to be bound by
them.” Paper Exp., Ltd. V. Pfankuch Maschinen GmbH, 972 F.2d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1992). Moreover,
in contracts containing a choice of law clause, the law designated in the choice of law clause is used
to determine the validity of the forum selection clause. IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed.
Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2008). Though Plaintiffs cite Indiana law to support their
unconscionability arguments, the purchase order mandates that it be “interpreted under the laws of
the state in which Dealer is located,” here, Washington. Washington considers forum selection
clauses to be prima facie valid, even when found in a standard form consumer contract not subject
to negotiation. Dix v. ICT Grp., Inc., 161 P.3d 1016, 1020 (Wash. 2007) (citing to Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589–95 (1991).
Plaintiffs’ arguments do not overcome this presumption of validity. First, the clause is
located on the second page of a two-page purchase order and is conspicuously preceded by an allcaps, underlined header. [DE 63 at 7-9]. The first page of the purchase order alerts to the second

10

page in several places, and language near the signature lines likewise prompts signatories to review
both sides of the agreement. [Id. at 9]. Without more, Trent Doman has not met his bar in showing
that his signature was obtained in an unconscionable manner. Thus, the court finds that both clauses
are enforceable and binding.
2.

Addressing the Competing Forum Selection Clauses

The court faces two valid and mandatory forum selection clauses supporting competing
venues. Both clauses were signed by some, but not all, the parties: the Foley RV purchase order was
entered by Plaintiffs and Foley RV, not Heartland; and Heartland’s Limited Warranty was entered by
Plaintiffs and Heartland, not Foley RV. 1 The Atlantic Marine transfer analysis did not directly address
cases where only some parties had contracted to a particular forum through a forum-selection
clause. Nor has the Seventh Circuit addressed this issue. But the Third Circuit, in In re: Howmedica
Osteonics Corp, 867 F.3d 390, 403 (3d Cir. 2017) created a framework to resolve this issue that this
court has considered twice before. See Meyer, 2020 WL 3256263, at *7; Simpson v. Thor Motor Coach,
3:19-CV-PPS-MGG, 2019 WL 2206092, at *4 (N.D. Ind. May 22, 2019). The court will accordingly
apply this framework here. The Howmedica framework is a four-step inquiry:
At the first step, the court faced with a valid forum-selection clause assumes that it
applies to the parties who agreed to it and that “pursuant to Atlantic Marine, the private
factors of the parties who have signed a forum agreement must, as [a] matter of law,
cut in favor of severance and transfer to the contracted for forum.” In re Rolls Royce
Corp., 775 F.3d 671, 681 (5th Cir. 2014). At step two, the court should consider the
private and public interests of the parties who did not sign the forum-selection
agreement. The court must “perform[ ] an independent analysis of private and public
interests relevant to non-contracting parties, just as when adjudicating a §
1404(a) transfer motion involving those parties in the absence of any forum-selection
clauses.” Howmedica, at 404 (citing Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879-80 (3d
Cir. 1995)). At step three, the court must consider severance if any procedural or
jurisdictional defects require it. “If only one severance and transfer outcome satisfies
the constraints identified at this step, then the court adopts that outcome and the
transfer inquiry ends.” Howmedica, at 404. At step four, the Court exercises its
Both agreements were signed only by Plaintiff Trent Doman. But the parties’ filings confirm that Plaintiff Jenny
Doman’s interests are aligned with her husband’s. Therefore, this Court will assume that the private and public interests
Plaintiffs put forward apply in equal force to Jenny Doman as to her husband.
1

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discretion in determining the most appropriate course of action and weighing the
public and private interests while also considering efficiencies related with avoiding
duplicative litigation. Id., at 405.
Meyer, 2020 WL 3256263, at *7.“Depending upon the outcome of the Howmedica analysis, [the
Court] could decide to retain the case in its entirety, transfer the case in its entirety, or sever
certain parties or claims in favor of another forum.” Simpson, 2019 WL 2206092, at *3.
a.

Step One: Validity of the Forum-Selection Clauses

“At the first step, the court faced with a valid forum-selection clause assumes that it applies
to the parties who agreed to it and that ‘pursuant to Atlantic Marine, the private factors of the parties
who have signed a forum agreement must, as [a] matter of law, cut in favor of severance and transfer
to the contracted for forum.’” Howmedica, 867 F.3d at 405. As explained above, both forum selection
clauses are valid and enforceable against the relevant contracting parties. Plaintiffs maintain that this
case should remain here. Heartland’s Limited Warranty likewise favors this forum, despite their
arguments seeking transfer to Montana. But Foley RV’s forum selection clause favors Washington.
b.

Step Two: Private and Public Interests

Next, “courts at Step Two should consider the private and public interests of the parties
who have not signed a forum-selection agreement.” Id. at 404 (citing In re Rolls Royce Corp., 775 F.3d
at 681).
1.

Private Interests

Both defendants are non-signatories to the other’s agreement. The defendants’ private
interests parallels the analysis under Section 1404(a) and includes a case-by-case consideration of
convenience and fairness. Meyer, 2020 WL 3256263, at *7. In evaluating the convenience element,
courts generally consider: “(1) the plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) the situs of material events; (3) the
relative ease of access to sources of proof; (4) the convenience of the witnesses; and (5) the
convenience of the parties.” Schumacher v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977 (N.D. Ind.

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2009). A litigant seeking a transfer of venue has the burden of showing that the transferee court—
here the Eastern District of Washington or the District of Montana—is “clearly more convenient
than the transferor court.” Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 220 (7th Cir. 1986); see also
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Est. of Bussell, 939 F. Supp. 646, 651 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
i.

Plaintiffs’ Choice of Forum

The court gives substantial deference to plaintiffs’ choice of forum, unless that choice is not
the plaintiffs’ home forum or if it has weak connections with the operative facts giving rise to the
litigation. Body Sci. LLC v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 2d 980, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2012); In re Nat’l Presto
Indus., Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 663–64 (7th Cir. 2003) (“unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”) Plaintiffs, domiciled in
Oregon, chose to bring this action in the Northern District of Indiana, giving their choice of forum
less weight. Still, Plaintiffs contend that they did so because their claims involve operative facts
related to the manufacturing of the RV in Indiana. The RV at issue—now destroyed—was allegedly
designed, assembled, manufactured, and distributed in Indiana by Heartland. Heartland, however,
argues that Plaintiffs’ claims involve operative facts from Montana, where the RV caught fire. Foley
RV further argues that the nucleus of operative facts giving rise to Foley RV’s role in this lawsuit
arose in Washington, where the RV was purchased. Neither defendant argues that the Northern
District of Indiana has weak connections with the operative facts of this case—making further
analysis of the situs of material factors critical.
ii.

Situs of Material Facts

“Material events are those that give rise to the cause of action.” Aldridge v. Forest River, Inc.,
436 F. Supp. 2d 959, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citing Von Holdt v. Husky Injection Molding Sys., Ltd., 887 F.
Supp. 185, 188–89 (N.D. Ill.1995)). The RV was allegedly designed, assembled, manufactured, and
distributed in Indiana. Here, Plaintiffs allege both breach of warranty claims and products liability

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claims. The primary material location for products liability claims is likely the place of manufacture
or design of the product at issue, which is Indiana. See Von Holdt, 887 F. Supp. at 188–89. But the
RV was purchased in Washington state and caught fire in Montana—favoring the other proposed
forums. Still, Plaintiffs maintain that neither a view of the Foley RV dealership, or of the Heartland
factory where the RV was built, or of the highway where the RV caught fire, would aid a jury in
understanding the testimony in the case. Moreover, the design and manufacture of the RV could be
implicated in analyzing Plaintiffs’ warranty claims, making Indiana a situs of at least some material
events for that claim as well. Thus, while this inquiry does not clearly favor any forum—at most, it
may slightly favor Indiana.
iii.

Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof

Though the situs of material events does not clearly favor any of the proposed forums,
Plaintiffs contend that the sources of proof factor favors this forum based on the location of the
documents relevant to the RV’s manufacture by Heartland, including production, pre-sale
inspection, and build records. [DE 60 at 21]. Plaintiffs add that the RV is no longer in Montana, as it
has been disposed of by Plaintiffs’ insurance company. [Id.]. Still, Heartland contends that other
evidence that would need to be obtained via subpoena from non-parties is in Montana. Finally,
despite seeking transfer to the Eastern District of Washington, Foley RV concedes that many
witnesses from Heartland are likely domiciled in Indiana where the manufacturing plants are located.
[DE 56 at 10].
iv.

Convenience of the Parties

Under this factor, the court considers the parties’ residences and their abilities to bear the
expense of trial in a particular forum. Coll. Craft Cos., Ltd. v. Perry, 889 F. Supp. 1052, 1056 (N.D. Ill.
1995). Courts should avoid transfer when it merely shifts inconvenience from one party to another
without sufficient cause. Rsch. Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 979 (7th

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Cir. 2010). Here, this case involves parties from Oregon, Washington, and Indiana. Transferring the
case from Indiana to Washington or Montana simply shifts the inconvenience from Foley RV to
Plaintiffs and Heartland. This is true for the Oregon-based Plaintiffs, even though they live closer to
Washington than to Indiana, because they had agreed to litigate any dispute with Heartland in
Indiana and wish for their case to remain here. Plaintiffs also argue that, due to personal medical
issues surrounding their young daughter, this court is the most convenient forum. [DE 60 at 20].
Plaintiffs also argue that transfer to the Eastern District of Washington would be emotionally
troubling for them and concerning for their daughter’s safety. Foley RV argues that the parties’
convenience is split, but that the forum most convenient for it is the Eastern District of
Washington, because that is the location of the dealership where Plaintiffs bought the RV. Foley RV
also argues that Plaintiffs’ alleged difficulties with the Eastern District of Washington are not
onerous enough to deprive Plaintiffs of their day in court. [DE 53 at 17]. Heartland explicitly
disclaimed its own convenience when seeking transfer to the District of Montana. [DE 48 at 4].
v.

Convenience of Witnesses

Finally, the last factor—the convenience of witnesses—is often considered the most
important factor in the convenience analysis, and courts consider everything from the number of
witnesses to their willingness to appear. Omnisource Corp. v. Sims Bros., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-89, 2008 WL
2756345, at *6 (N.D. Ind. July 14, 2008). Yet “[c]ourts typically presume that witnesses who are
parties’ employees and paid experts will appear voluntarily and therefore are less concerned about
the burden that appearing at trial might impose on them.” Abbott Labs. v. Church & Dwight, Inc., No.
07 C 3428, 2007 WL 3120007, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2007). Plaintiffs indicate that key witnesses
will be Foley RV sales and service representatives and Heartland representatives in Indiana and that
any additional testimony involving Montana witnesses could be conducted via Zoom. [DE 56 at 10].
Plaintiffs also argue that it would be more expensive to compel testimony from Heartland witnesses

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through subpoena if the court granted transfer to the Eastern District of Washington. In contrast,
Heartland argues that concerns about witness testimony are greatest regarding the witnesses in
Montana, thereby warranting transfer to the District of Montana. [DE 48 at 5]. Foley RV argues that
because witnesses to the sale and maintenance of the RV are in the Eastern District of Washington,
that is the most convenient forum for the witnesses.
In total, the private interest factors do not establish that any one forum is clearly more
convenient than another. See Coffey, 796 F.2d at 220.
2.

Public Interests

Public interests relative to transfer are reflected through an assessment of the interest of
justice, which focuses on the efficient administration of the courts. Research Automation, 626 F.3d at
978. Factors that are relevant to this analysis include: (1) the speediness of trial in either jurisdiction;
(2) each court’s familiarity with the relevant law; and (3) each location’s relationship to the
controversy. Id.
Plaintiffs state that there is no evidence that transfer of the case to the Eastern District of
Washington would alleviate any difficulties flowing from court congestion. Plaintiffs also maintain
that Indiana has a greater interest in the outcome of the litigation and that this court is more at
home with litigating RV cases because of the high concentration of RV manufacturers here. [DE 60
at 23]. Foley RV concedes that the statistics of resolution of matters within the Northern District of
Indiana and Eastern District of Washington are nearly identical, but notes that the average
disposition time of matters in the Eastern District of Washington is shorter than that of the
Northern District of Indiana by 2.9 months. [DE 63 at 12]. Foley RV also acknowledges that the
Northern District of Indiana has some interest in this matter based on the products liability and
warranty claims alleged against Heartland, a citizen of Indiana, and that the public factors support
the lawsuit remaining in Indiana. [Id.] On the other hand, Heartland argues that the District of

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Montana would be more efficient than the Northern District of Indiana because of the court’s less
congested docket. Heartland also maintains that familiarity with the law is neutral because Plaintiffs’
case does not bring legal issues that are particularly novel or complex. [DE 48 at 6]. But this
argument fails to consider that Indiana has an interest in litigation involving products manufactured
by and warranties issued by companies incorporated here. Additionally, Indiana has an interest in
litigation regarding its own corporations as well as those doing business with its corporations—and
Foley RV, through its business relationship with Heartland, does some business here. Simpson, No.
3:19-CV-33-PPS-MGG, 2019 WL 2206092, at *6 (N.D. Ind. May 22, 2019). Thus, the court finds
that public interest favors the case remaining here.
c.

Step Three: Severance Issues

Severance of claims or parties might be warranted “to preserve federal diversity jurisdiction;
to cure personal jurisdiction, venue, or joinder defects; or to allow for subsequent impleader.”
Howmedica., 867 F.3d at 404. Severance may also be impossible in other situations, “such as when a
party is indispensable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b).” Id. (citing Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas
Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 572–73 (2004); Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 421–
22 (3d Cir. 2010)).
Plaintiffs argue that severance is unwarranted because their claims against defendants arise
from a common nucleus of operative facts. Foley RV relies on its arguments that this court lacks
personal jurisdiction to support severance. But this court has already found that it has specific
personal jurisdiction over Foley RV, so transfer or severance is not required to cure that defect. No
party has alleged the need to allow for subsequent impleader. Maintaining Plaintiffs’ claims against
both defendants in one case avoids the risk of conflicting rulings, preserves judicial resources, and
prevents witnesses from needing to travel and appear in two courts on opposite ends of the country.
Thus, severance is unwarranted on Foley RV’s behalf under the Howmedica framework.

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d. Step Four: Weight of Public and Private Interests
The balance of the Howmedica factors weigh against transfer from this forum. Plaintiffs
chose the Northern District of Indiana, which, while may not be their home forum, does not have
weak connections to the operative facts giving rise to this litigation. Transfer to another forum only
shifts the inconvenience from one party to two parties. The private interests do not clearly favor any
proposed forum, but the public interests favor the case staying here. Severance is also unwarranted
and instead would result in burdensome, likely duplicative, litigation. Thus, the case should remain in
this court.
III.

CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the court DENIES Defendant Foley RV’s

Motion to Dismiss. [DE 52]. The court further DENIES Defendant Heartland’s Motion to
Transfer. [DE 47]. With transfer denied, this court will issue a separate order for a Rule 26(f) Report
of Parties’ Planning Meeting and set a date for a Rule 16(b) Pretrial Scheduling Conference.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Rule 26(f) Conference is DENIED as unnecessary. [DE 66].
SO ORDERED on September 25, 2024.

/s/ Cristal C. Brisco
CRISTAL C. BRISCO, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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