Hill v. Warden et al

Filing 24

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court GRANTS Lydell Hill leave to proceed against Officer Doughby in her individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for starting a rumor about Hill talking to a detective about other offenders that caused him to be assaulted in late 2021, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; GRANTS Lydell Hill leave to proceed against Sergeant Williams in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for using excessive force against him on March 31, 2023, i n violation of the Eighth Amendment; DISMISSES all other claims; DISMISSES Complex Director Sonningberg, Officer Eichols, Officer Kennedy, Officer Flakes, Officer Bergonson, Captain Lewis, Sergeant Brown, Major Cornett, Warden of Westville Correction al Facility, Assistant Warden Ghan, Captain Ripple, and Westville Correctional Facility; DIRECTS the clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful mean s to locate and serve process on) Officer Doughby and Sergeant Williams at the Indiana Department of Correction, with a copy of this order and the amended complaint (ECF 8 ); ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the full name, date of birth, and last known home address of any defendant who does not waive service, if it has such information; and ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Officer Doughby and Sergeant Williams to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 1/2/2025. (ash)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
LYDELL HILL,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAUSE NO. 3:23-CV-509-JD-SJF

WARDEN, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Lydell Hill, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended complaint against
fourteen defendants based on events he alleges occurred at the Westville Correctional
Facility. ECF 8. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In this case, Hill filed a 27-page amended complaint containing allegations that
are in the realm of “fantastic” or “delusional.” ECF 8. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 328 (1989); Gladney v. Pendleton Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 773, 774 (7th Cir. 2002). He
alleges that, in late 2021, an inmate housed at Westville, and members of his family
began to plot against him to kill him or keep him in prison. Id. at 1, 22. To this end, Hill

asserts the inmate put a device in the computer speakers in his cell that recorded his
activities and allowed him to eavesdrop on Hill, scan Hill’s mind, and create statements
using Hill’s voice. Id. at 9, 14, 22, 26. Hill states the device was like a “mind reading
machine” because all he had to do was listen to the speakers in his cell and statements
using his voice were automatically created by the device. Id. at 15, 22. The inmate used
the device to watch Hill in his cell, stalk Hill’s family, and send the prosecutor’s office
false information about Hill. Id. at 22, 24. The inmate also used the device to persuade
Hill’s family to commit bad acts, spread rumors about Hill being a confidential
informant, and create statements where Hill admitted his guilt. Id. at 2, 8, 9.
Hill contends the inmate had access to information about his family members
and told stories about them using his voice. Id. at 9, 24. Hill would also hear the voices
of his first love, cousin, brother, ex-fiancé, and mother through his computer speakers.
Id. at 14. The voices told him to do certain things and made statements about him. Id.
When he heard the voices, he would speak out loud to the speakers saying that the
statements were false. Id. In one instance, where the speakers played throughout the
prison, he could hear his mother “crying with someone telling her to eat some dog food
or to send some money.” Id. at 15. At times, he would look into his computer speakers
and be connected with his ex-fiancé. Id. at 14. Hill asserts that after several months of
hearing the voices, the inmate’s voice “appeared in [his] speaker box” and told him the
“joke [was] on [him]” because he was creating statements with Hill’s voice, but using
his thoughts to have his sentence modification denied. Id. at 15. He reported hearing
voices to custody officers, who told him the speakers in his cell did not work. Id. at 14.
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In November or December 2021, Officer Doughby began working at Westville as
a correctional officer. ECF 8 at 4. Hill asserts that Officer Doughby was in close contact
with the inmate before she began working at Westville and the inmate persuaded her to
become a correctional officer. Id. at 22, 24. He states Officer Doughby was engaged to
the inmate, activated the recording device in his computer speakers, stalked his family,
trafficked drugs, and visited him in his dorm to keep track of him. Id. at 4, 11, 12. Hill
states that the inmate and Officer Doughby started a rumor about him talking to a
detective about other offenders. Id. at 11. Shortly thereafter, in late 2021, Hill alleges he
was assaulted by offenders with knives in their hands, who told him Officer Doughby
started a rumor about him knowing a detective. Id.
Under the Eighth Amendment, correctional officials have a constitutional duty to
protect inmates from violence. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777 (7th Cir. 2008). To
state a claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff must establish the defendant “had actual
knowledge of an impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable
refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant’s failure to prevent it.”
Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “[I]t’s common
knowledge that snitches face unique risks in prison . . ..” Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 570
(7th Cir. 2008). Prison officials may be found liable where it can be proven they knew an
inmate “faced a significant risk of harm from a ‘particular vulnerability’ and exposed
him to that risk anyway.” Wright v. Miller, 561 F. App’x 551, 555 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 915 (7th Cir. 2005)). Here, further development may show
that Hill’s belief is part of his delusional thinking, but at this stage of the case, the court
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will allow Hill to proceed against Officer Doughby on an Eighth Amendment failure to
protect claim for starting a rumor about Hill talking to a detective about other offenders
that caused him to be assaulted in late 2021.
Following the 2021 assault, Hill was moved to a protective custody dorm where
the inmate was also housed. ECF 8 at 11. After Hill was moved to the new dorm, he
alleges he was assaulted by three offenders. Id. at 11-12. Hill later met with Complex
Director Sonningberg to make him aware of his situation and was moved out of the
protective custody dorm. Id. at 12.
To the extent Hill may be asserting that Complex Director Sonningberg was
responsible for the assault, he has not alleged Sonningberg was involved in moving him
to the protective custody dorm where the assault took place. To be held liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant must have personal involvement in the alleged constitutional
violation. See Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018) (“For a defendant to be
liable under section 1983, she must be personally responsible for the alleged deprivation
of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Only persons who cause or participate in the violations are responsible.”). Because
Hill has not alleged that Complex Director Sonningberg was personally involved in
Hill’s move to the protective custody dorm, Hill may not proceed against him.
In late October 2022, Hill asserts Officer Eichols, Officer Kennedy, and Officer
Flakes took him to Westville’s internal affairs office and spread false rumors about him.
ECF 8 at 19. However, spreading false rumors without more, does not amount to a
constitutional violation. Hill may not proceed against these three defendants.
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From December 2022 through early 2023, Hill alleges that Officer Bergonson and
Officer Doughby turned on the device in his computer speakers to allow the inmate to
record activities in his cell. ECF 8 at 17. Hill states Officer Doughby told him she was in
love with the inmate, worked for the inmate, and the inmate convinced her to turn on
the device so that false statements using Hill’s voice could be created and posted on
social media. Id. at 17, 19. He states that the inmate persuaded Captain Lewis to turn on
the device. Id. at 19. However, Hill’s allegations are “fantastic” or “delusional.” See
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328; Gladney, 302 F.3d at 774. He may not proceed against Officer
Bergonson, Officer Doughby, or Captain Lewis.
Hill contends that, on March 31, 2023, Sergeant Williams assaulted him in the
recreation room because he was using the phone. ECF 8 at 19-20. He states Sergeant
Williams and another officer ran into the recreation room, slammed him to the floor,
and punched him in the face even though Sergeant Brown told him he could contact his
family during recreation time. Id. at 20.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment—including the
application of excessive force—against prisoners convicted of crimes. McCottrell v.
White, 933 F.3d 651, 662 (7th Cir. 2019). The “core requirement” of an excessive force
claim is that the defendant “used force not in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589
F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). Deference is given to prison
officials when the use of force involves security measures taken to quell a disturbance
because “significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison staff” can be involved.
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McCottrell, 933 F.3d at 663 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)). Jails are
dangerous places, and security officials are tasked with the difficult job of preserving
order and discipline among inmates. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 476 (7th Cir. 2009). It
is important that prisoners follow orders given by guards. Id. at 476-77 (citing Soto v.
Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1267 (7th Cir. 1984)). To compel compliance—especially in
situations where officers or other inmates are faced with threats, disruption, or
aggression—the use of summary physical force is often warranted. Id. at 477 (citing
Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 1993)). That is not to say, however, that such
justification exists “every time an inmate is slow to comply with an order.” Lewis, 581
F.3d at 477. Several factors guide the inquiry of whether an officer’s use of force was
legitimate or malicious, including the need for an application of force, the threat posed
to the safety of staff and inmates, the amount of force used, and the extent of the injury
suffered by the prisoner. Hendrickson, 589 F.3d at 890. Here, additional fact finding may
demonstrate that the force used against Hill was not excessive, but giving him the
benefit of the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage of the case, he has stated an
Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force against Sergeant Williams. However, he
has not stated a claim against Sergeant Brown because he has not alleged he was
personally involved in the assault. See Mitchell, 895 F.3d at 498; George, 507 F.3d at 609.
In August or September 2023, Hill asserts he asked Major Cornett to transfer him
to another prison, but his request was denied. ECF 8 at 25-26. “Prison officials have
broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage.”
Westerfer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks, brackets, and
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citations omitted). While prison officials must afford offenders their constitutional
rights, where to house an offender is the type of decision that is squarely within the
discretion of prison officials. Therefore, Hill has not stated a claim against Major
Cornett.
Hill has also sued the Warden of Westville Correctional Facility and Assistant
Warden Ghan. There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and these defendants cannot be held liable for damages simply because they oversee the
operations at the prison or within the IDOC. Mitchell, 895 F.3d at 498; Burks v. Raemisch,
555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). However, they may be held liable if they “know about
the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.” Doe v. Purdue
Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir 2019). Moreover, “[i]ndividual defendants . . . who are
responsible for setting prison policy, can be held liable for a constitutional violation if
they are aware of a systemic lapse in enforcement of a policy critical to ensuring inmate
safety yet fail to enforce that policy.” Sinn v. Lemmon, 911 F.3d 412, 423 (7th Cir. 2018).
Knowledge may reasonably be inferred when a condition is so pervasive that highranking officials were “bound to have noticed” it. Smith v. Sangamon Cty. Sherriff’s Dep’t,
715 F.3d 188, 192 (7th Cir. 2013). Hill has not alleged facts from which it can plausibly be
inferred that the Warden of Westville Correctional Facility or Assistant Warden Ghan
knew about, facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye toward any alleged
unconstitutional act Hill believes occurred at Westville. Therefore, he may not proceed
against the Warden of Westville Correctional Facility or Assistant Warden Ghan.

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Furthermore, Hill has sued Captain Ripple. However, other than listing Captain
Ripple as a defendant in the caption of his case, he never mentions him in the body of
his amended complaint. Therefore, Hill may not proceed against Captain Ripple.
As a final matter, Hill has sued Westville Correctional Facility. However, the
prison is a building, not a “person” or policy-making body that can be sued for
constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Smith v. Knox County Jail, 666 F.3d 1037,
1040 (7th Cir. 2012). Because Westville Correctional Facility is not a suable entity, Hill
may not proceed against it.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Lydell Hill leave to proceed against Officer Doughby in her
individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for starting a rumor about
Hill talking to a detective about other offenders that caused him to be assaulted in late
2021, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(2) GRANTS Lydell Hill leave to proceed against Sergeant Williams in his
individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for using excessive force
against him on March 31, 2023, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(3) DISMISSES all other claims;
(4) DISMISSES Complex Director Sonningberg, Officer Eichols, Officer Kennedy,
Officer Flakes, Officer Bergonson, Captain Lewis, Sergeant Brown, Major Cornett,
Warden of Westville Correctional Facility, Assistant Warden Ghan, Captain Ripple, and
Westville Correctional Facility;

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(5) DIRECTS the clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service
from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means to
locate and serve process on) Officer Doughby and Sergeant Williams at the Indiana
Department of Correction, with a copy of this order and the amended complaint (ECF
8);
(6) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the full name, date
of birth, and last known home address of any defendant who does not waive service, if
it has such information; and
(7) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Officer Doughby and Sergeant
Williams to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D.
Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to
proceed in this screening order.
SO ORDERED on January 2, 2025
/s/JON E. DEGUILIO
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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