Scruggs v. Bridegroom et al

Filing 27

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 24 Motion for Reconsideration filed by Christopher L Scruggs as outlined. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 9/26/2024. (mrm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER L. SCRUGGS,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-200-PPS-JEM

TITIANNA MOODY, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Christopher L. Scruggs, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a motion to
reconsider the screening order on his amended complaint. [DE 24.] On August 20,
2024, I screened the complaint and allowed Scruggs to proceed on claims against
nineteen defendants as follows:
(1) Eighth Amendment claim for compensatory and punitive damages
against Supervisor English, Kitchen Worker Moody, Kitchen Worker
Perez, Lieutenant Crittendon, Lieutenant Rojo, Unit Team Manager
Cornett, Major Cornett, Captain Lewis, Captain Farley, Sergeant
Vazquez, Sergeant Miller, Sergeant Jones, Sergeant Brandon Miller, and
Warden Galipeau in their individual capacities for acting with
deliberate indifference to his dietary needs by providing him food that
is either nutritionally inadequate or inedible from March 7, 2022, to
March 4, 2024;
(2) Eighth Amendment claim for compensatory and punitive damages
against Supervisor English, Kitchen Worker Moody, Kitchen Worker
Perez Lieutenant Crittendon, Lieutenant Rojo, Unit Team Manager
Cornett, Major Cornett, Captain Lewis, Captain Farley, Sergeant
Vazquez, Sergeant Miller, Sergeant Jones, Sergeant Brandon Miller,
Warden Galipeau, Officer Thomas, Officer Smith, Officer Arnett, and

Officer Pleasant in their individual capacities for acting with deliberate
indifference to his basic dietary needs by failing to provide him with
food at appropriate intervals from July 7, 2023, to March 4, 2024;
(3) First Amendment claim for compensatory and punitive damages
against Supervisor English, Kitchen Worker Moody, and Kitchen
Worker Perez for retaliating against him for filing grievances and
lawsuits by serving him less desirable food from March 7, 2022, to
March 4, 2024; and
(4) injunctive relief claim against Warden Galipeau in his official
capacity to provide him appropriate food at appropriate intervals as
required by the First and Eighth Amendments.
[See ECF 21 at 7–8]. However, I did not allow him to proceed against Nicole
Bridegroom, Dr. Liaw, Nurse Jakeib, Nurse Schmidt, Nurse Ellis, Nurse Schilling,
and Nurse Ekeh on his claim that they engaged in forced medical treatment by
refusing to remove him from a peanut-free diet. I relied on Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210 (1990), and Knight v. Grossman, 942 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2019), reasoning that a
peanut-free diet was not medical treatment as contemplated by those cases as
correctional staff need no medical reason to provide inmates with peanut-free diets,
which stands in stark contrast to the psychiatric medications and knee surgery in
Washington and Knight. I also noted that, even if a peanut-free diet amounted to
forced medical treatment, it would not have amounted to a constitutional violation
because a diet including peanuts posed a substantial danger to Scruggs’ health due
to his severe peanut allergy.
In the motion to reconsider, Scruggs argues that I should allow him to
proceed against these medical defendants on the forced medical treatment claim,
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noting the inappropriate manner in which correctional staff and food staff prepare
and serve him food. The food service quality has no bearing on the legal question of
whether a peanut-free diet amounts to forced medical treatment contemplated in
Washington and Knight. Additionally, Scruggs has been allowed to proceed against
nineteen defendants in connection with his claims of inadequate food service.
Therefore, I decline to allow him to proceed on a claim of forced medical treatment.
Scruggs also argues that I should allow him to proceed against these medical
defendants on a claim of First Amendment retaliation, contending that they refused
to remove him from a peanut-free diet for the purpose of allowing kitchen staff to
retaliate against him for filing grievances and lawsuits concerning inappropriate
food service. To state claim of First Amendment retaliation, Scruggs must allege that
“(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a
deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3)
the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the Defendants’
decision to take the retaliatory action.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted).
[T]he burden of proof relating to causation is divided between the
parties in First Amendment tort cases. To make a prima facie showing
of causation the plaintiff must show only that the defendant’s conduct
was a sufficient condition of the plaintiff’s injury. The defendant can
rebut, but only by showing that his conduct was not a necessary
condition of the harm—the harm would have occurred anyway.
Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2011).

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The amended complaint contains no allegations that the medical defendants
were aware of the grievances and lawsuits filed against kitchen staff or that they
were aware of the inappropriate food service. A grievance attached to the complaint
indicates that Scruggs may have conveyed his belief that kitchen staff were engaging
in “food harassment,” but it offers no description as to what the harassment entailed
or how it related to the peanut-free diet. [ECF 5-1 at 36.] Additionally, the grievance
response stated, “Dr. Liaw has renewed this peanut-free diet as [Scruggs] has an
extreme allergy to peanuts. We cannot take him off the diet as this is a lifethreatening issue that can cause serious bodily injury or death.” [Id. at 37.]
Scruggs understands that his peanut-free diet allowed kitchen staff to identify
his food for purposes of retaliation, but the medical order to provide a peanut-free
diet and the refusal to remove the medical order are distinct acts from the improper
food service practices alleged by Scruggs. Medical staff expressly cited the severity
of the peanut allergy, which Scruggs does not dispute, as the reason for keeping the
peanut-free diet in place. Given the significant possibility that removing the peanutfree diet would result in serious bodily harm or death to Scruggs, I cannot plausibly
find that such a refusal “would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising
First Amendment activity in the future.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 552 (7th Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). For the same reasons, it is readily apparent that medical
staff would have refused to remove Scruggs even if Scruggs had never filed any

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grievances or lawsuits against kitchen staff or voiced any complaints regarding food
service.
To Scruggs, peanuts are effectively poison, and, at base, I cannot find that
refraining from placing poison in an inmate’s food amounts to First Amendment
retaliation or any other constitutional violation. Consequently, I decline to allow
Scruggs to proceed on a claim of First Amendment retaliation against the medical
defendants for refusing to remove him from a peanut-free diet.
For these reasons, the court DENIES the motion to reconsider [ECF 24].
SO ORDERED on September 26, 2024.
s/ Philip P. Simon
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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