Fye v. Smiley et al

Filing 6

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court GRANTS the pla until 1/31/2025, to file an amended complaint and CAUTIONS him that if he does not file an amended complaint by the deadline, this case is subject to dismissal without further notice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Signed by Judge Cristal C Brisco on 1/6/2024. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(mrm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
TRENTON DAVON FYE,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-835-CCB-SJF

SMILEY, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Trenton Davon Fye, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF 1.) In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must screen the
complaint and dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Because Fye
is proceeding without counsel, the court must give his allegations liberal construction.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Fye is a prisoner at Westville Correctional Facility (“Westville”) and an adherent
of Islam. He claims that on March 18, 2024, guards in his unit passed out Ramadan
dinner meals to Muslim inmates. He did not get one. He complained to a number of

guards but was told they were “short” and did not have a tray for him. At some point
he was offered a non-Ramadan food tray, but he refused it because it did not have the
right portions. He had to wait until around 3 a.m. on March 19 to be given a Ramadan
food tray, which by his count was 20 hours after his last meal. Based on this incident, he
sues 11 guards, high-ranking officials, and prison religious leaders, seeking $2 million
in damages and other relief.
He first claims a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Under the Eighth
Amendment, prisoners cannot be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994). In evaluating an Eighth Amendment
claim, courts conduct both an objective and a subjective inquiry. Id. The objective prong
asks whether the alleged deprivation or condition of confinement is “sufficiently
serious” so that “a prison official’s act results in the denial of the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 834. Inmates are entitled to adequate food to meet
their nutritional needs. Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006). However, the
denial of food does not automatically amount to an Eighth Amendment violation, and
instead “a court must assess the amount and duration of the deprivation.” Reed v.
McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1999).
On the subjective prong, the prisoner must allege that the defendant acted with
deliberate indifference to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “[N]egligence,
gross negligence, or even recklessness as the term is used in tort cases is not enough” to
assert an Eighth Amendment violation. Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 425–26 (7th Cir.

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2020). Instead, the inmate must allege “a culpability standard akin to criminal
recklessness.” Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 722 (7th Cir. 2021).
Fye does not allege that he was denied a nutritionally adequate diet over a
period of time. Rather, he describes an incident in which he missed one meal. This is not
the type of extreme deprivation that would support an Eighth Amendment claim. See
Jaros v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2012) (inmate who “sometimes
missed the morning meal” did not state Eighth Amendment claim). Nor can the court
plausibly infer that the guards were deliberately indifferent to his right to adequate
food simply because they did not give him a Ramadan tray on this one occasion due to
a shortage. He received his Ramadan meal early the next day, and it appears guards
also offered him a non-religious food tray in the interim. He did not find this solution
acceptable, but the circumstances he describes suggest at most negligence by the
guards, not something akin to criminal recklessness. He has not alleged a plausible
Eighth Amendment claim.1
He additionally claims a violation of his First Amendment right to exercise his
religion. “The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the state from imposing a substantial
burden on a central religious belief or practice.” Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692, 696 (7th
Cir. 2013) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “A substantial burden puts
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”

1 He states that he is also suing the defendants because they “failed to protect” him, but the duty
to protect under the Eighth Amendment relates to the obligation of prison staff to prevent inmates from
being harmed by other inmates. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777 (7th Cir.
2008). Based on the factual allegations contained in the complaint, such a claim is inapplicable here.

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Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376, 379-80 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). “De minimis burdens” on the free exercise of religion are not
actionable. Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1006 n.4 (7th Cir. 1999). Additionally, prisons
may impose restrictions on the exercise of religion that are reasonably related to
legitimate penological objectives, which includes safety, security, and economic
concerns. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987).
As outlined above, Fye claims that he missed a religious meal in one instance due
to a shortage of trays. The court cannot plausibly infer that this was anything more than
a de minimis burden on his religious practice. He was not forced to eat foods that
violated his religious principles; he was simply prevented from eating dinner one time.
He has not alleged a plausible First Amendment claim.
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) offers
broader protections than the First Amendment by preventing the state from placing a
substantial burden on any aspect of one’s religious practice, regardless of whether it is
central to the religion. Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 2012). However,
RLUIPA only provides for injunctive relief against state actors and not monetary
damages. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285 (2011). Fye does not describe an ongoing
burden on his religious practice, nor does he ask for any injunctive relief related to his
meals. The only incident he describes occurred in March 2024, approximately nine
months ago. The court cannot plausibly infer from his complaint that he has an ongoing
problem with his diet that would entitle him to injunctive relief under RLUIPA. He will
not be permitted to proceed on this claim.
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He also appears to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
To assert an Equal Protection claim, a plaintiff must allege that a state actor purposely
discriminated against him on a prohibited basis, such as his race or sex. See McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987); Williams v. Dart, 967 F.3d 625, 637 (7th Cir. 2020). If the
disparate treatment is not based on a prohibited ground, it is permissible as long as it is
not irrational. Stevens v. Illinois Dept. of Transp. 210 F.3d 732, 737-738 (7th Cir. 2000). In
the prison context, “prison administrators may treat inmates differently as long as the
unequal treatment is rationally related to a legitimate penological interest.” Flynn v.
Thatcher, 819 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 2016).
Likewise, a plaintiff can state a “class-of one” Equal Protection claim by alleging
that he was “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Word v. City of Chicago, 946
F.3d 391, 395–96 (7th Cir. 2020). However, “even at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must
anticipate the burden of eliminating any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the government’s actions,” and must “provide a sufficiently
plausible basis to overcome the applicable presumption of rationality.” Walker v.
Samuels, 543 F. App’x 610, 611 (7th Cir. 2013). Additionally, class-of-one claims cannot
be used to challenge discretionary decisions that are based on “subjective,
individualized assessments.” Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 603
(2008).
Fye does not allege that prison employees intentionally discriminated against
him on some prohibited ground, such as his race or sex. Nor can the court plausibly
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infer from his allegations that guards intentionally singled him out for harsher
treatment. From what he describes, they were simply short on Ramadan food trays at
that meal and so he did not get one. At most, giving the food trays to other Muslim
inmates but not to him appears to have been a discretionary decision (in the vein of
“first come, first served”) by the guards in response to the shortage. He has not stated a
plausible Equal Protection claim based on this incident.
As an additional problem, he names a number of high-ranking officials and
religious leaders as defendants, but there is no indication from his allegations that any
of them were personally involved in denying him a dinner tray on March 18, 2024.
There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and these
individuals cannot be held liable for the wrongdoing of other prison employees simply
because of their positions. Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018); Burks v.
Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). The fact that he wrote to them later to
complain about what happened also does not provide a basis for holding them liable.
Burks, 555 F.3d at 595. Furthermore, it can be discerned from his allegations that he was
given approval from these officials to receive religious meals during Ramadan, and that
he received proper meals other than on this one occasion. He has not stated a plausible
constitutional claim against these officials.
Therefore, his complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In the interest of justice, the court will allow him an opportunity to file an amended
complaint if, after reviewing this order, he believes he can state a plausible
constitutional claim based on this incident, consistent with the allegations he has
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already made under penalty of perjury. See Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726,
738 (7th Cir. 2018); Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014, 1024 (7th Cir. 2013).
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS the plaintiff until January 31, 2025, to file an amended complaint;
and
(2) CAUTIONS him that if he does not file an amended complaint by the
deadline, this case is subject to dismissal without further notice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A.
SO ORDERED on January 6, 2025.
s/ Cristal C. Brisco
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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