Jester v. Warden

Filing 4

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court DISMISSES the habeas petition 1 because it is untimely; DENIES Ricky Wayne Jester a certificate of appealability pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11; and DIRECTS the Clerk to close this case. Signed by Judge Cristal C Brisco on 1/6/2025. (ash)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
RICKY WAYNE JESTER,
Petitioner,
v.

CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-964-CCB-SJF

WARDEN,
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Ricky Wayne Jester, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a habeas corpus petition to
challenge his conviction for murder and conspiracy to commit murder under Case No.
82C01-9704-CF-360.1 Following a jury trial, on March 5, 1998, the Vanderburgh Circuit
Court sentenced him to one hundred ten years of incarceration. Pursuant to Section
2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4, the court must dismiss the petition “[i]f it plainly appears
from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in
the district court.”
In the petition, Jester argues that he is entitled to habeas relief due to sentencing
errors and ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. The statute of
limitations for habeas petitions states as follows:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

1 Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201, the court takes judicial notice of the electronic dockets for the

Indiana courts, which are available at https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/.

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an
application created by State action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of
limitation under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
Based on review of the petition, the date on which the judgment became final is
the applicable starting point for calculating timeliness. Jester was sentenced on March 5,
1998, and his direct appeal culminated in the Indiana Supreme Court’s affirmance on
February 18, 2000. Therefore, his conviction became final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for petitioning the Supreme Court of the United States for a
writ of certiorari expired on May 18, 2000. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (petition for writs of
certiorari must filed within 90 days after entry of judgment); Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555
U.S. 113, 119 (2009) (when a State prisoner does not petition the Supreme Court of the
United States on direct appeal, his conviction becomes final when the time for filing a

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petition expires). 250 days later, on January 23, 2001, Jester initiated post-conviction
proceedings that culminated in the Vanderburgh Circuit Court’s denial of transfer on
October 13, 2009. The federal limitations period expired 115 days later on February 5,
2010. Roberts did not file the petition in this habeas case until December 3, 2024. ECF 1
at 18. Because Jester filed the petition fourteen years too late, the court finds that the
petition is untimely.
In the petition, Jester explains that he did not file a habeas petition sooner
because counsel did not make him aware of “recent federal decisions” indicating that he
was “entitled to relief.” He represents that he sought authorization to file a successive
petition in State court after the Seventh Circuit established precedent in opinions in
2023 and 2024. To start, the court observes that this explanation does not satisfy the
requirements for a later-starting limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), (C),
or (D). More specifically, Jester identifies no State-created impediment that prevented
him from filing a habeas petition, no Supreme Court decision involving a newly
recognized constitutional right, and no factual predicate he could not have discovered
by the conclusion of his direct appeal. Further, Jester’s unsuccessful efforts to pursue
successive petitions in State court did not restart the federal limitations period, nor did
they “open a new window for federal collateral review.” De Jesus v. Acevedo, 567 F.3d
941, 943 (7th Cir. 2009).
The court also considers whether Jester is entitled to equitable tolling. “[A]
petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing
his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and
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prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). Significantly, Jester
identifies no extraordinary circumstance that prevented him filing a timely habeas
petition. As detailed above, the federal limitations period expired in February 2010.
Even assuming that Jester had counsel in 2023 and 2024 and that that counsel had an
obligation to inform Jester of recent Seventh Circuit decisions, no event in the 2020s
could have prevented Jester from filing a timely petition before the limitations period
expired in February 2010. Because Jester asserts no valid excuse for the untimely nature
of the petition, the court will dismiss the petition as untimely.
Pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11, the court must consider
whether to grant or deny a certificate of appealability. To obtain a certificate of
appealability when a petition is dismissed on procedural grounds, the petitioner must
show that reasonable jurists would find it debatable (1) whether the court was correct in
its procedural ruling and (2) whether the petition states a valid claim for denial of a
constitutional right. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, there is no basis for
finding that reasonable jurists would debate the correctness of this procedural ruling or
for encouraging Jester to proceed further, and a certificate of appealability is denied.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) DISMISSES the habeas petition (ECF 1) because it is untimely;
(2) DENIES Ricky Wayne Jester a certificate of appealability pursuant to Section
2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11; and
(3) DIRECTS the clerk to close this case.
SO ORDERED on January 6, 2025.
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s/ Cristal C. Brisco
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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