Brown et al v. Sanders et al

Filing 3

OPINION AND ORDER this case is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 5/13/11. (csi)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE
CRAIG F. BROWN, and BB,

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Plaintiffs,
vs.
REBEKAH SANDERS, et al.,
Defendants.

NO. 4:11-CV-026

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a complaint and in forma
pauperis petition filed by Craig F. Brown, a pro se plaintiff, on
behalf of himself and his minor daughter. For the reasons set forth
below,

this

case

is

DISMISSED

pursuant

to

28

U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

BACKGROUND
Craig F. Brown brings this case against his ex-wife and the
law enforcement officers of the FBI, the Indiana State Police, the
Lafayette

Police

Department,

and

the

Newton

County

Sheriff’s

Department. In it he seeks injunctive relief to modify the child
custody decree of his minor daughter that was entered by the
Tippecanoe Superior Court. He also seeks monetary damages based on
the enforcement of that custody decree and the refusal of law
enforcement officers to respond to his requests related to his
custody arrangements.

DISCUSSION
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a
pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Nevertheless, “[n]otwithstanding any filing
fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that .
. . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous . . ..” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2).
Brown states that he is representing himself and his minor
daughter in this proceeding. Though a litigant can represent his
own interests, he may not represent others, not even his own child.
Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir.
2001). Therefore Brown may not represent his daughter in this
proceeding. Nevertheless, even if this case had been filed by a
lawyer representing both he and his daughter, it does not state a
claim for which this court can grant them any relief.
Brown is asking this Court to modify the child custody decree
that was issued by the Tippecanoe Superior Court. The authority of
federal district courts to review state court judgments and related
claims has been strictly limited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

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Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts
lack subject-matter jurisdiction when, after state
proceedings have ended, a losing party in state court
files suit in federal court complaining of an injury
caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and
rejection of that judgment. In determining whether a
federal plaintiff seeks review of a state-court judgment,
we ask whether the injury alleged resulted from the
state-court judgment itself. If it does, Rooker-Feldman
bars the claim.
Beth-El All Nations Church v. City of Chicago, 486 F.3d 286, 292
(7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Simply put, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine “precludes lower federal court jurisdiction over claims
seeking

review

of

state

court

judgments

or

over

claims

‘inextricably intertwined’ with state court judgments.” Remer v.
Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000). This
is

such

a

case.

Therefore

this

court

lacks

subject-matter

jurisdiction over this claim.
Furthermore, Brown’s claims for monetary damages are also
meritless. Law enforcement agencies do not have the authority to
modify or ignore the custody decree related to his daughter. To the
extent that Brown is alleging that the police did not respond when
he called them for other matters, that too is not a basis for civil
liability. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 749, 768
(2005).
It is clear that Brown cares very deeply for his daughter and
is concerned for her welfare. Though this court may not give him
legal advice, it is possible that he may have a claim in the
Tippecanoe Superior Court or the Court of Appeals of Indiana. But
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because this court lacks jurisdiction over the claims asserted in
this complaint, it is legally frivolous.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this case is DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

DATED:

May 13, 2011

/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

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