Robinson v. Lafayette City of et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER dismissing this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 12/28/11. (mlc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE
JOSEPH L. ROBINSON III,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF LAFAYETTE, et al.,
Defendants.
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CAUSE NO. 4:11-CV-63
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is an amended complaint filed by Joseph L.
Robinson III, a pro se prisoner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DE
#3).
For the reasons set forth below, this action is DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
BACKGROUND
Robinson filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE
#3.)
He alleges that on January 29, 2009, he was arrested in
Lafayette, Indiana, for driving on a suspended license.
later released on his own recognizance.
He was
On February 2, 2009, he
was arrested on drug charges, and was later also charged with being
an habitual offender.
He went to trial and was found guilty on
several counts, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed his
convictions on direct appeal. (Id. at 9-10.) Robinson raises claims
for
false
against
arrest,
various
unlawful
police
seizure,
officers,
and
wrongful
prosecutors,
prosecution
and
municipal
defendants, seeking $200 million in damages. (DE #3 at 5, 9-14.)
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a
prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a),
(b). The Court applies the same standard as when deciding a motion
to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE
OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6).
Lagerstrom
v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006).
To survive
dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.
Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581
F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. Nevertheless, “[a] document filed
pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,
however
inartfully
pleaded,
must
be
held
to
less
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
stringent
Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Robinson first claims that the police lacked probable cause to
arrest him on drug charges on February 2, 2009.
(DE #3 at 9-10.)
It is apparent from the face of the complaint that this claim is
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time-barred.1
Fourth
Amendment
claims
for
false
arrest
and
unlawful search or seizure accrue at the time of the violation.
See Dominguez v. Hendley, 545 F.3d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 2008). Under
applicable law, Robinson was required to bring his claim within two
years of when it accrued.
See Behavioral Inst. of Ind., LLC v.
Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2005)
(Indiana’s two-year limitations period for personal injury suits
applies to Section 1983 claims).
Robinson brought this action on
November 14, 2011, the date he tendered his original complaint to
prison officials for mailing (DE #1 at 7), which was outside the
two-year
limitations
period.
Accordingly
the
claim
must
be
dismissed.
Robinson also appears to claim that he was unlawfully held at
the jail for seven days following this arrest.
(DE# 3 at 9-10.)
Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual arrested without a
warrant is entitled to be brought before a judicial officer for a
determination of probable cause within a “reasonable” period; 48
hours is generally considered to be “reasonable,” although a longer
period may be permissible if there were legitimate reasons for the
delay.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975); Lopez v. City
of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711, 721-22 (7th Cir. 2006).
1
Although timeliness is an affirmative defense, dismissal at the
pleading stage is appropriate “when the plaintiff pleads himself out of
court by alleging facts sufficient to establish the complaint’s
tardiness.” Cancer Found., Inc. v. Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., LP , 559 F.3d
671, 674 (7th Cir. 2009).
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Robinson does not clearly allege that he was arrested without
a warrant, or that he was denied a probable cause hearing within a
reasonable period as required by Gerstein; instead, he asserts
generally that he was held for seven days “without a charge.”
(DE# 3 at 9.)
To the extent he states a plausible Fourth Amendment
claim based on a violation of Gerstein, it too is time-barred.
This claim would have accrued no later than the date of the
probable cause hearing, which was February 9, 2009. See Dominguez,
545 F.3d at 589; see also Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 966,
970 n.6 (7th Cir. 1994) (unlawful seizure ends for Fourth Amendment
purposes at the time of the Gerstein hearing).
As stated above,
Robinson initiated this action in November 2011, outside the twoyear limitations period. Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed.
Robinson
also
alleges
claims
for
malicious
prosecution,
asserting that the prosecutor improperly initiated charges against
him and the police officers offered false testimony at trial.
(DE#
3
at
12-14.)
The
prosecutor
is
entitled
to
absolute
prosecutorial immunity and cannot be sued for damages in connection
with his decision to initiate charges against Robinson.
Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (“[I]n initiating a prosecution
and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from
a civil suit for damages under § 1983.”). Similarly, a claim based
on the police officers’ testimony at trial would be barred by
witness immunity.
See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326-27
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(1983).
To the extent Robinson has any claim based on falsified or
planted evidence that survives prosecutorial and witness immunity,
the claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Robinson
cannot
bring
a
claim
that
necessarily
implies
the
invalidity of his convictions unless and until his convictions are
“reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.”
Id. at 486-7.
The complaint does not allege that
this condition has been met, and indeed Robinson acknowledges that
his convictions were recently affirmed on direct appeal. (DE #3 at
9.)
Accordingly, these claims must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this action is DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
DATED: December 28, 2011
/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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