Riley v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 30

OPINION AND ORDER: The Commissioner of Social Security's final decision is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion pursuant to sentence four of 42 USC Sec. 405(g). Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 08/05/13. (ksp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
MELISSA KAY RILEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN1,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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No. 4:12-CV-42

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for review of the Commissioner
of Social Security’s decision denying Disability Insurance Benefits
and Supplemental Security Income to Plaintiff, Melissa Kay Riley.
For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to
the

Social

Security

Administration

for

further

proceedings

consistent with this opinion pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.
section 405(g).

BACKGROUND
On May 21, 2009, Melissa Kay Riley (“Riley” or “claimant”)
applied for Social Security Disability Benefits (“DIB”) under Title

1

On February 14, 2013, Carolyn W. Colvin became Acting Commissioner of
Social Security. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25, Carolyn W.
Colvin is automatically substituted as the Defendant in this suit.

II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. section 401 et seq. and
Supplemental Security Insurance (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the
Social

Security

Act,

42

U.S.C.

sections

1381

et

seq.

The

application originally indicated that Riley’s disability began on
December 15, 2006.

During the pre-hearing screening process the

onset date was amended to August 26, 2008.

(Tr. 167).

The Social Security Administration denied Riley’s initial
applications

for

reconsideration.

benefits

and

also

denied

her

claims

on

On January 27, 2011, Riley appeared with counsel

by way of video conference at an administrative hearing before
Administrative Law Judge Cynthia M. Bretthauer (“ALJ Bretthauer”).
Testimony was provided by the claimant and Margaret H. Ford (a
vocational expert).

On February 23, 2011, ALJ Bretthauer denied

the claimant’s DIB and SSI claims, finding that Riley had not been
under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act.
The claimant requested that the Appeals Council review the
ALJ’s decision and the request was denied.

Accordingly, the ALJ’s

decision became the Commissioner’s final decision.
§ 422.210(a)(2005).

See 20 C.F.R.

The claimant has initiated the instant action

for judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c).

-2-

DISCUSSION
Riley was born on June 23, 1968.
impairments:

multiple

sclerosis,

hypertension and depression.

She alleges the following

degenerative

disc

disease,

Her past relevant work includes

certified nursing assistant, housekeeper and convenience store
clerk.

The medical evidence of record is adequately summarized

by the claimant’s counsel and, in a nutshell, is as follows:
In the fall of 2006, Riley went to the emergency room twice
for severe acute onset headaches and hypertensive crises.
underwent a lumbar puncture and CT.

She

Both were normal, but an MRI

showed a large demyelinating-appearing legion in the splenium of
the

corpus

callosum

and

some

scattered

white

matter

lesions

compatible with demyelination of microvascular disease.

During

these emergency room visits, Riley was treated and released. (Tr.
312-319, 445, 491).
Due

to

daily

headaches,

Riley

saw

Dr.

Scott

Hoyer,

a

neurologist, on February 1, 2007. (Tr. 491). Dr. Hoyer noted that
the MRI results showed evidence of multiple sclerosis.

Riley told

Dr. Hoyer that her headaches were there when she awoke and that
pain medication would only dampen down the pain.
reported

that

photophobia.

at

times

(Tr.

491).

she
Dr.

had

nausea,

Hoyer’s

blurred

plan

was

Riley also
vision,
to

treat

and
the

headaches with amitriptyline and beta-blockers and get repeat MRI
scans of the brain and an MRA of the circle of Willis. (Tr. 493).

-3-

An MRI of the brain on February 16, 2007, showed white matter
lesions and a diagnosis of MS, although there was a decrease in
size of the lesions since the previous MRI. (Tr. 440).
Riley’s headaches continued, and she visited the emergency
room for headaches again in May and August of 2007. (Tr. 348-357;
457-458). A follow-up brain MRI on September 21, 2007, showed that
deep matter lesions appeared to be stable and that there were no
new lesions, but that there were areas of “increased signal.” (Tr.
339).
Dr. Hoyer’s notes from a visit on February 20, 2008, state
that Riley was not doing well and had pain in her back and legs,
but she was going back to work as a nursing assistant and was
waiting for her state test results. Riley had mild difficulty with
tandem gait but was described as clinically stable. Riley declined
to have new MRIs scheduled due to cost. (Tr. 485).

Riley’s

medications were adjusted, and Dr. Hoyer advised Riley to apply for
assistance to start Avonex for MS treatment.

(Tr. 483-85).

An April 11, 2008, MRI of the brain showed Riley had a stable
white matter lesion. (Tr. 335-336).

An MRI of the lumbar spine on

May 12, 2008, showed a small protruding disc at L4-L5 with minimal
encroachment on the anterior thecal sac. There were degenerative
changes at L5-S1 and a disc protrusion with “mild right-sided
neural foraminal stenosis and moderate to severe left-sided neural
foraminal stenosis.”

(Tr. 332).

-4-

Riley was involved in a motor vehicle accident on July 4,
2008, and received emergency room treatment.

(Tr. 323-324).

She

had an avulsion fracture of the proximal humerus left shoulder,
acute cervical strain, left hip contusion, and abdominal pain. (Tr.
325). Riley’s shoulder was immobilized and she was referred to Dr.
Peter Torok, an orthopedist, for treatment of the fracture.

Dr.

Torok saw Riley on July 10, 2010. (Tr. 559).

Riley noted some

improvement

tingling

extremity.

in

symptoms,

Dr.

but

Torok

numbness

assessed

and

“left

shoulder

in

the

traumatic

impingement” but felt Riley could return to full duty work by July
16, 2010. (Tr. 559).
Riley saw Dr. Tonia Kusumi at the Pain Care Center on October
6, 2008, for her “long history of neck and lower back pain.” (Tr.
565).

There was pain on palpation of the paraspinal muscles.

Riley and Dr. Kusumi discussed the pathology of the pain and prior
improvements

in

her

pain

following

lumbar

epidural

steroid

injections. Riley noted that, even with the steroid injections, she
continued

to

experience

radiculopathy.

Dr.

Kumsumi

added

a

prescription for Lyrica and ordered physical therapy 2-3 times per
week for four weeks. (Tr. 367-368).
Dr. Duan Pierce examined Riley on November 6, 2008. (Tr.
580).2

According to Dr. Pierce’s report, Riley was unable to bend

2

According to Riley’s counsel, this examination was performed as part
of a prior application for benefits.

-5-

over and get back up without difficult and there was tenderness to
palpation of the spine.

Riley’s straight leg raise test was

positive. She had weakness in her bilateral extremities, more on
her left (3/5) than on her right (4/5). He noted that the patient
would be able to work with limitations on standing no more than
“3-4 hours or lift more than 30 lbs.”

(Tr. 582).

Dr. Caryn Brown, a psychologist, evaluated Riley on November
13, 2008.3

Dr. Brown performed a mental status examination and

administered the Wechsler Memory Scale (3rd edition) and concluded
that overall memory functioning fell within the normal range.

Dr.

Brown diagnosed Riley with an adjustment disorder with depressed
mood and assessed a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score
of 61.4 (Tr. 586-589).
Riley also underwent a mental status exam on July 28, 2009.
Dr. Aldo Buonanno noted that Riley had difficulty performing serial
7's.

Riley’s mood was depressed and she had crying episodes.

Dr.

Buonanno diagnosed major depression and assessed a GAF of 60.5 (Tr.
592-594).
Riley saw Dr. Hoyer again on August 11, 2009, and complained

3
Riley’s counsel represents that this evaluation also took place as a
result of a prior application for benefits.
4

GAF is a scoring system for measuring an individual’s overall
functional capacity. A GAF of 61 would represent some mild symptoms or some
difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning. Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-IV-TR, 32-34 (4th ed. 2000).
5

A GAF of 60 would indicate moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in
social, occupational, or school functioning.

-6-

of muscle spasms. (Tr. 597).

In September of 2009, Dr. Dodt

ordered a cane for Riley. (Tr. 595).
Riley sought outpatient mental health treatment at the Raj
Clinic in January of 2010.
Kalapatapu evaluated Riley.

On January 11, 2010, Dr. Umamaheswara
(Tr. 711).

of motivation to complete daily tasks.

Riley complained of lack
Dr. Kalapatapu noted that

she was “anxious and depressed looking.”

His assessment was

recurrent, severe major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety
disorder.
Riley’s

Dr. Kalapatapu assessed a GAF of 50.6 (Tr. 709-711).

medications

at

that

time

included

Xanax,

Zoloft

and

Wellbutrin. (Tr. 711).
Riley began seeing Dr. Albert Lee, a neurologist, on February
4, 2010, and complained of tightness in her lower extremities and
muscle spasms in her arms.7

She noted she had involuntary shaking

of her extremities and had fallen several times.
noted gait ataxia.

Dr. Lee also

Dr. Lee recommended additional testing and

noted that “the patient has definitely changed from baseline
neurologic status.”

(Tr. 689-691).

An MRI performed on February

16, 2010, showed a stable white matter lesion in the left parietal
lobe and a new white matter lesion in the left superior frontal
lobe. (Tr. 677, 687).

6

A GAF of 50 would indicate serious symptoms or any serious impairment
in social, occupational, or school functioning.
7

Riley testified that she started seeing Dr. Lee instead of Dr. Hoyer
because she was dissatisfied with the care she received from Dr. Hoyer.

-7-

On March 2, 2010, the claimant reported to Dr. Lee that she
was having dizzy spells and was at risk for falling.

Dr. Lee

noted she might have focal motor seizures and ordered central
nervous system testing.
gait

ataxia,

history

of

His impression was multiple sclerosis,
involuntary

shaking,

lower

extremity

tightness and numbness as well as weakness, and bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome. Her medication was changed from Avonex once per
week to Rebif three times per week.

(Tr. 688, 716, 743).

Riley had a series of EEGs in March 2010. Video EEGs on March
9, 2010, and March 26, 2010, were normal.

(Tr. 695-96).

However

an ambulatory 72-hour EEG performed March 2, 2010, through March 5,
2010, noted a few sharp discharges and was considered an abnormal
EEG. (Tr. 697).
On June 29, 2010, Riley complained to Dr. Lee of right sided
neck pain that spread to the occipital area. She also complained of
dizzy spells that caused her to fall and collapse and left sided
headaches. (Tr. 692-694). Dr. Lee’s diagnostic impression included
multiple sclerosis, gait ataxia and falls, recurrent dizzy spells
and syncope, question of seizure disorder, history of involuntary
shaking, and lower extremity tightness, numbness, and weakness and
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. He noted that “[t]he patient has
flare up of symptoms and is changed from baseline neurologic
status.”

(Tr. 693).

He recommended neurophysiologic studies, a

nerve conduction study, injection therapy to the lumbar spine,

-8-

Neurontin for pain control, and further follow up in the neurology
clinic. (Tr. 694).
On September 14, 2010, Dr. Lee noted that Riley’s injection
site was getting red and inflamed.

(Tr. 730).

The next week, on

September 21, 2010, Riley was again evaluated by Dr. Lee. He noted
weakness and numbness in the legs in keeping with sciatica. He also
noted neck pain that extended into her arms and radiated to the
occipital

area

in

keeping

with

neuralgia.

He

further

noted

recurrent dizzy spells, unsteadiness, falling, and collapsing. (Tr.
726).

At

this

visit,

Dr.

Lee

performed

Infrared

Video-Electronystagmograpy (VENG) testing to rule out inner ear
dysfunction

and

noted

that

“patient

has

shown

worsening

and

progressive symptoms.” (Tr. 729). Two days later, on September 23,
2010, another video EEG was performed.

It resulted in normal

findings. (Tr. 725).
Riley attended physical therapy for her neck, shoulder, and
lower back pain from September 25, 2010, until November 10, 2010.
(Tr. 742-750).

She was discharged on November 24, 2010, after

failing to show for three appointments.
On

October

26,

2010,

Riley

“spacing out episodes” to Dr. Lee.

(Tr. 742).

reported

staring

spells

and

She further reported that her

neck pain was spreading to her shoulders and that she suffered low
back pain that radiated to her legs. (Tr. 721-724).

Dr. Lee added

a prescription for Phrenilin for headache control. (Tr. 723).

-9-

He

also recommended a new neurophysiologic study including an EEG to
look for beakthrough seizures and a nerve conduction study to look
for an underlying pinched nerve. (Tr. 723-24).

Dr. Salman Wali

performed the nerve conduction studies ordered by Dr. Lee on
November 4, 2010. (Tr. 721).

The study results were abnormal and

provided evidence of “predominantly sensory axonal peripheral
neuropathy.” (Id.).
Riley

went

to

the

emergency

room

complaining of sharp right arm pain.

on

November

1,

2010,

An x-ray of the shoulder

showed calcific suprasinatus tendinitis. (Tr. 741).
On April 26, 2011, after ALJ Bretthauer issued her decision in
this case, Riley’s counsel submitted additional information from
Dr. Lee to the Appeals Council. (Tr. 309).

Dr. Lee opined that

Riley suffered “from significant, reproducible fatigue of motor
function with sustainable muscle weakness on repetitive activity,
that has been demonstrated on physical examination, that results
from neurological dysfunction from areas in the central nervous
system

known

to

be

sclerosis process.”

pathologically

involved

in

the

multiple

Dr. Lee further opined that Riley suffers flu

symptoms when she takes her Rebif and these symptoms can last up to
1 ½ days following an injection.

Dr. Lee indicated Riley would

miss about 6 ½ days of work per month.

(Tr. 309).

Riley testified that she has completed the eleventh grade and
has not received a GED.

She lives in an apartment with her three

-10-

sons.

Her last job was as a certified nurse’s assistant.

She

testified that her employer made special accommodations for her by
assigning her to a patient that needed very minimal care, but there
came a point where she could not perform even that job.

She

further testified that she cannot work as a home companion because
she is unstable on her feet and is uncertain she could perform her
duties in an emergency.

She additionally claimed problems with

memory and stress would interfere with her work.

When asked why

she could not perform a simple job that did not require a lot of
memory and where she could stand and sit whenever she needed, Riley
indicated that she is “really weak.”

Riley’s medication was

changed to Rebif because the Avonex was not helping,

but Rebif is

taken three times per week and causes her to feel “really sick.”
When she last worked, she was on Avonex instead of Rebif.
With regard to the physical therapy ordered for her back,
Riley testified that she attended physical therapy briefly but that
it made the pain worse so she stopped going.

She also had

injections for her back but they helped with the pain for only a
brief time.

When asked to describe her pain, Riley indicated

that she has pain across her lower back that goes down her left
leg.

She described the pain as shooting at times.

feet get numb.

She has burning pain between her shoulder blades.

Her arms are weak.
legs.

Her legs and

She has muscle spasms in both her arms and

Riley uses patches, heat, and rubbing for pain. At the time

-11-

of the hearing, Riley was taking muscle relaxants and Neurontin for
pain.

She was not seeing a pain management doctor but was waiting

to see Dr. Casumi.

Dr. Casumi had previously refused to see Riley

due to missed appointments, but Riley hoped the doctor would again
see her as a patient.
Riley also testified that she sees her psychiatrist, Dr.
Kalapatapu, about once a month for both therapy and medication
management.

She cries almost daily and sometimes does not leave

her room for days.
Riley testified that she can walk about a block before
stopping, stand 20 minutes if she can move back and forth, and sit
20 to 30 minutes.

She uses a cane.

granddaughter who weights 19 pounds.

Riley cannot lift her

On an average day, she wakes

up around 6:00 a.m. and, after her boys go to school, she starts
cleaning.
breaks.

She cleans throughout the day because she must take
If she has an appointment she goes to it.

help with the cooking, dishes, and laundry.

Her children

She is able to bathe

and dress herself. She gets groceries but takes her kids with her.
Dr. Hoyer recommended exercise, but she gets very little exercise
other than walking to the city bus and cleaning her house.
as

hobbies,

Riley

likes

to

read

and

spend

granddaughter, although she does not babysit her.

-12-

time

As far

with

her

Review of Commissioner’s Decision
This Court has authority to review the Commissioner’s decision
to deny social security benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

“The

findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”
Id.

Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a decision.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).

In determining

whether substantial evidence exists, the Court shall examine the
record in its entirety but shall not substitute its own opinion for
the ALJ’s by reconsidering the facts or re-weighing evidence. Jens
v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003).

With that in mind,

however, this Court reviews the ALJ’s findings of law de novo and
if the ALJ makes an error of law, the Court may reverse without
regard

to

findings.

the

volume

of

evidence

in

support

of

the

factual

White v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1999).

As a threshold matter, for a claimant to be eligible for DIB
or SSI benefits under the Social Security Act, the claimant must
establish that she is disabled. To qualify as being disabled, the
claimant must be unable “to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or has lasted
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve months.”

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382(a)(1).

-13-

To

determine

whether

a

claimant

has

satisfied

this

statutory

definition, the ALJ performs a five step evaluation:
Step 1:

Is the claimant performing substantial gainful activity:
If yes, the claim is disallowed; if no, the inquiry
proceeds to step 2.

Step 2:

Is the claimant’s impairment or combination of
impairments “severe” and expected to last at least twelve
months? If not, the claim is disallowed; if yes, the
inquiry proceeds to step 3.

Step 3:

Does the claimant have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or equals the severity of an
impairment in the SSA’s Listing of Impairments, as
described in 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P, App. 1? If yes,
then claimant is automatically disabled; if not, then the
inquiry proceeds to step 4.

Step 4:

Is the claimant able to perform his past relevant work?
If yes, the claim is denied; if no, the inquiry proceeds
to step 5, where the burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner.

Step 5:

Is the claimant able to perform any other work within his
residual functional capacity in the national economy: If
yes, the claim is denied; if no, the claimant is
disabled.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) and 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); see
also Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1994).
In this case, the ALJ found that Riley suffered from severe
mental and physical impairments that significantly affected her
ability to work.

The ALJ further found that Riley did not meet or

medically equal one of the listed impairments, and could not
perform her past relevant work, but nonetheless retained the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a limited range of
sedentary work as follows:

-14-

sedentary
work
as
defined
in
20
CFR
404.1567(a)
and
416.967(a),
except
the
claimant is: unable to lift/carry more than 10
pounds frequently and 5 pounds occasionally;
unable to stand and/or walk for more than 2
hours in an 8-hour workday; able to sit for 6
to 8 hours in an 8-hour workday; unable to
stoop, crawl, climb, crouch, kneel or balance
more
than
occasionally;
must
avoid
concentrated exposure to extreme heat; and
cannot perform more than simple, unskilled
work.
(Tr. 54).
After considering Riley’s age, education, work experience and
RFC, the ALJ relied upon the testimony of a vocational expert and
concluded that Riley was not disabled and not entitled to DIB or
SSI because she retained the capacity to perform a significant
number of jobs despite her functional limitations.

(Tr. 55).

Thus, Riley’s claim failed at step 5 of the evaluation process.
Riley believes that the ALJ committed several errors requiring
reversal.

Credibility
Riley argues that the ALJ improperly discredited her testimony
in violation of SSR 96-7p by relying on meaningless boilerplate
language without elaborating on which facts, if any, undermined her
credibility.

The Commissioner disagrees.

Because the ALJ is best positioned to judge a claimant’s
truthfulness,

this

Court

will

overturn

determination only if it is patently wrong.
-15-

an

ALJ’s

credibility

Skarbek v. Barnhart,

390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2004).

However, when a claimant

produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the ALJ may
not

ignore

subjective

complaints

unsupported by objective evidence.

solely

because

they

are

Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d

737, 745-47 (7th Cir. 2005); Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470,
474 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872
(7th Cir. 2000)).

“In assessing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ

must consider subjective complaints of pain if the claimant can
establish a medically determined impairment that could reasonably
be expected to produce the pain.”

Indoranto, 374 F.3d at 474

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.15.29, SSR 96-7p; Clifford, 227 F.3d at
871).
Further, “the ALJ cannot reject a claimant’s testimony about
limitations on [his] daily activities solely by stating that such
testimony is unsupported by the medical evidence.”

Id.

Instead,

the ALJ must make a credibility determination that is supported by
record evidence and sufficiently specific to make clear to the
claimant, and to any subsequent reviewers, the weight given to the
claimant’s statements and the reasons for the weight.

Lopez v.

Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539-40 (7th Cir. 2003).
In evaluating the credibility of statements supporting a
Social

Security

application,

requirements of SSR 96-7p.
42 (7th Cir. 2002).

an

ALJ

must

comply

with

the

Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 941-

This ruling requires ALJs to articulate

-16-

“specific reasons” behind credibility evaluations; the ALJ cannot
merely

state

that

“the

individual’s

allegations

have

been

considered” or that “the allegations are (or are not) credible.”
SSR 96-7p. Furthermore, the ALJ must consider specific factors when
assessing the credibility of an individual’s statement including:
1.

The individual’s daily activities;

2.

The
location,
duration,
frequency,
and
intensity of the individual’s pain or other
symptoms;

3.

Factors that precipitate and aggravate the
symptoms;

4.

The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side
effects of any medication the individual takes
or has taken to alleviate pain or other
symptoms;

5.

Treatment,
other
than
medication,
the
individual receives or has received for relief
of pain or other symptoms;

6.

Any
measures
other
than
treatment
the
individual uses or has used to relieve pain or
other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her
back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every
hour, or sleeping on a board); and

7.

Any other factors concerning the individual’s
functional limitations and restrictions due to
pain or other symptoms.

SSR 96-7p; Golembiewski, 322 F.3d 912, 915-16 (7th Cir. 2003).
Here, ALJ Bretthauer determined that “the claimant’s medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some
of

the

alleged

symptoms;

however,

the

claimant’s

statements

concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of

-17-

these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent
with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” (Tr. 55).
Nearly identical language was criticized by the Seventh Circuit in
Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2012).
criticism will not be repeated here.

That

The boilerplate language

utilized by ALJ Bretthauer is unhelpful at best, and by itself,
such language is inadequate to support a credibility finding.

See

Richison v. Astrue, No. 11-2274, 2012 WL 377674 (7th Cir. 2012).
Where boilerplate language such as that utilized by the ALJ is
accompanied by additional reasons, a credibility determination need
not be disturbed.

Id.

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s

opinion contains more that mere boilerplate language in support of
her credibility determination.

According to the Commissioner, the

ALJ has offered several reasons for her credibility determination.
The Commissioner directs this Court to the record at pages 49-54.
This is essentially the entire substantive opinion of the ALJ prior
to her credibility determination, but this Court’s review cannot
produce a single reference to credibility other than that provided
the ALJ’s statement of the legal standard to be applied and in the
boilerplate referenced above.

Certainly, there are facts included

which the ALJ could have utilized in supporting her credibility
determination, but the ALJ did not make the necessary connections.
See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009)(where an
ALJ failed to analyze the factors set forth in SSR 96-7p, the ALJ

-18-

did not build a logical bridge between the evidence and his
conclusion that the claimant’s testimony was not credible). Because
the ALJ failed to build a logical bridge between the evidence and
her determination that the claimant’s testimony was not credible,
remand is required.

Riley’s Remaining Arguments
Having found remand necessary on the basis of the ALJ’s
credibility determination, this Court finds no compelling reason to
address Riley’s remaining arguments in detail.

This Court has

considered Riley’s request that this Court award benefits rather
than remand the case for additional proceedings but finds remand
more appropriate here. On remand, the ALJ is instructed to utilize
the proper onset date, August 26, 2008.

Furthermore, the ALJ

should consider all of the evidence in the record, including Dr.
Lee’s report from April of 2011, and, if necessary, give the
parties the opportunity to expand the record so that the ALJ may
build a logical bridge between the evidence and her conclusions.
Because Dr. Lee’s report has a direct bearing on the ALJ’s analysis
at step 3, the ALJ will need to consider and address whether this
report

requires

an

updated

medical

opinion

as

to

medical

equivalence under SSR 96-6p or necessitates any change in her step
3 analysis.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for
proceedings consistent with this opinion pursuant to sentence four
of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g).

DATED: August 05, 2013

/s/ Rudy Lozano, Judge
United States District Court

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