JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association v. Roberts

Filing 4

OPINION AND ORDER; GRANTING 3 Chase's motion to remand and for payment of just costs and any actual expenses including attorney fees; DENIES AS MOOT 2 Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis; DIRECTS Chase to submit an itemized statement of its costs and actual expenses; Case REMANDED to Cass Circuit Court. (Order and docket sheet mailed to state court clerk) Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 2/18/14. (mlc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO CHASE
FINANCE LLC,
PLAINTIFF,
VS.

MICHAEL A. ROBERTS,
DEFENDANT.

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CAUSE NO. 4:14-CV-5-RLM-PRC

OPINION and ORDER
In Cass Circuit Court cause number 09C01-1101-MF-00003, plaintiff
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, successor by merger to Chase
Home Finance LLC, recovered a judgment and decree of foreclosure against the
owner of real property located at 1465 North State Road 17, Logansport, IN
46947. Chase purchased the property at the Sheriff’s Sale, then filed a writ of
assistance to evict defendant Michael A. Roberts, who claims he is a tenant of
the premises. Mr. Roberts removed the state action to the Northern District of
Indiana and filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis in the District
Court. He claims the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-22, §§ 701-704, 123 Stat. 1632, 1660-1662 (2009) amended by Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1484, 124 Stat. 1376, 2204 (2010), preempts state law, creates a
private cause of action, and that a federal forum for state-law unlawful detainer
actions won’t disturb the balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), Chase moves to remand the case to state
court and for payment of just costs and actual expenses, including attorney
fees, incurred as a result of improper removal.
Mr. Roberts argues that Chase was required to assert a cause of action
under the PTFA to evict a residential tenant of a foreclosed landlord, but Chase
artfully pleaded its complaint to avoid the Act. A defendant can remove a state
court civil action to federal district court on the basis of federal question if the
suit asserts a claim or right arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441. “The presence or absence of
federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’
which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is
presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). A plaintiff “may avoid federal
jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law” in the complaint, Id., but can’t
avoid removal by failing to plead necessary federal questions. Rivet v. Regions
Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998). When Congress intended for a
federal law to replace or preempt a state law claim, “[a]rtful pleading on the
part of a plaintiff to disguise federal claims by cleverly dressing them in the
clothing of state-law theories will not succeed in keeping the case in state
court,” and the defendant may remove such claims. Franciscan Skemp
Healthcare, Inc. v. Central States Joint Bd. Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 538
F.3d 594, 596-597 (7th Cir. 2008). In Wescom Credit Union v. Dudley, No. CV
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10-8203 GAF (SSx), 2010 WL 4916578, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010), the
court found that the PFTA doesn’t create a federal cause of action that replaces
state-law unlawful detainer actions, so the Act doesn’t preempt state law.
Mr. Roberts disagrees, and contends that a private, federal right of action
exists under the PTFA. He cites Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), and argues
that he is one of the class for whose benefit the Act was enacted, the language
of the Act, the legislative history, and the lack of any other specified
enforcement mechanism indicate that the legislature intended to create a
remedy, a cause of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the Act,
and while evictions are traditionally relegated to state law, Congress intended
to break tradition. Chase cites several cases in the Ninth Circuit and one from
the Northern District of Illinois in which courts have determined that the PTFA
doesn’t create a private cause of action. The courts found that nothing in the
text of the statute explicitly creates a private cause of action and nothing in the
legislative history, statutory language, or statutory context indicates that
Congress intended to create a private cause of action. Falk v. Perez, No. 12 CV
1384, 2013 WL 5230632, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2013) (citing Logan v. U.S.
Bank National Ass’n, 722 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2013)); Martin v. LaSalle
Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. 10CV1775 BTM(BGS), 2011 WL 9583, at *1 (S.D. Cal.
Jan. 3, 2011); Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., No. 09-06096 PVT, 2010
WL 2179885, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2010). Mr. Roberts offers no new or
different evidence regarding the text and legislative history of the Act, so the
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court declines to find that a private cause of action exists under the PTFA or
that the Act preempts state law.
Alternatively, Mr. Roberts claims the court has federal question
jurisdiction pursuant to Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g &
Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005), because the PTFA is essential to the claims and
a federal forum won’t disturb the balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities. As Mr. Roberts himself admits, however, state law traditionally
controls evictions. Regardless, the PTFA isn’t essential to Chase’s claims
against Mr. Roberts. The Act offers certain protections to bona fide tenants
when the federally-related mortgaged property that they lease is foreclosed
upon. Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §
702, 123 Stat 1632, 1660-1661 (2009). The mortgagor under the contract,
however, isn’t a bona fide tenant. Id. Mr. Roberts claims that he is a bona fide
tenant of the property. Chase contends that Mr. Roberts is the mortgagor and
the borrower whose note and mortgage were the basis for the foreclosure action
preceding the eviction. The docket sheet in Cass Circuit Court cause number
09C01-1101-MF-00003 lists Michael A. Roberts, Tina A. Roberts, and Warners
Greenhouse as defendants. The complaint on note and to foreclose mortgage
was filed on December 27, 2010. On November 14, 2012, default judgment was
entered against Michael Roberts. As the mortgagor, Mr. Roberts isn’t a bona
fide tenant protected by the PTFA. Chase’s claims don’t raise a federal issue,
and Chase properly asserted its claims in state court.
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Chase claims that Mr. Roberts removed the case to federal court in order
to delay and increase the cost of the proceedings. Consequently, Chase seeks
attorney fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which allows for recovery of “just
costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of
the removal” in an order remanding the case. As the mortgagor, Mr. Roberts
likely couldn’t have sincerely believed he was also a tenant, or renter of the
property, protected by the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act. Neither party
explains the timeline of events in the underlying state court action. Chase
referred to, but didn’t submit, the related state court documents. The court
was able to glean from Mr. Roberts’ removal notice and the public docket sheet
in the underlying case that the property was sold back to Chase on January
16, 2013, and the first writ of assistance was entered in April 2013, but later
withdrawn. A second writ of assistance was entered on January 9, 2014, and
the Cass County Sheriff’s Department sent a letter dated January 14, 2014,
directing Mr. Roberts to vacate the property within a week. Mr. Roberts filed
the notice of removal a few days later. The timing of the removal suggests that
it was a delay tactic. But the facts the court was able to gather don’t show that
Mr. Roberts was clearly trying to delay the proceedings or increase the
litigation

costs.

Regardless,

under

§

1447(c),

prevailing

parties

are

presumptively entitled to recover the attorney fees incurred in defending
against removal, Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407, 411 (7th Cir.

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2000), and Chase is entitled to its costs and other expenses, including attorney
fees.
For the foregoing reasons, the court lacks jurisdiction over the
underlying state court action. Accordingly, the court GRANTS Chase’s motion
to remand and for payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including
attorney fees (Doc. No. 3), DIRECTS Chase to submit an itemized statement of
its costs and actual expenses, and DENIES as moot Mr. Roberts’ application to
proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2).
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: February 18, 2014

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge
United States District Court

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