Fender et al v. Sailors et al

Filing 52

OPINION AND ORDER: (1) STRIKING both complaints; (2) DIRECTING the clerk to place cause number 4:14-cv-024 on a blank pro se Complaint 42 U.S.C. § 1983 form and send it to plaintiffs Wayne Fender, Donna Marie Pulous,and Heather Mock; (3) GRANTIN G plaintiffs until May 7, 2015, to submit an amended complaint; (4) CAUTIONING plaintiffs that if they do not respond by that deadline, this case will be dismissed without further notice; (5) DENYING the motion to supplement as moot; (6) DENYING the motions to dismiss as moot; and (7) DIRECTING the clerk to close the case in cause number 4:14-cv-061. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 3/31/15. (cc: Pltfs w/Forms) Associated Cases: 4:14-cv-00024-RL-JEM, 4:14-cv-00061-RL-JEM(ksp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION

WAYNE ALLEN FENDER, DONNA MARIE
PULOUS, and HEATHER MOCK,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SARAH SAILORS, SALLY HERNANDEZ,
)
ASHLEY PETERS, PATRICK MANAHAN,
)
CHRISTIAN BRAMLAGE, KURTIS FOUT, )
DCS, THE STATE OF INDIANA,
)
ABIGAIL DIENER, SAMANTHA DAGENAIS,)
and ANALEI WHITLOCK,
)
)
Defendants.
)

4:14-CV-024
(4:14-CV-061)

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on: (1) the complaint filed by
pro se plaintiffs, Wayne Fender and Donna Marie Pulous, on March
10, 2014 (cause no. 4:14-cv-024, DE #1); (2) the complaint filed by
pro se plaintiffs, Wayne Fender, Donna Marie Pulous, and Heather
Mock, on August 7, 2014 (cause no. 4:14-cv-061, DE #1); (3) the
motion to supplement, filed by pro se plaintiffs, Wayne Fender,
Donna Marie Pulous, and Heather Mock, on September 18, 2014 (cause
no. 4:14-cv-061); and (4) the motions to dismiss filed by the
various

defendants

in

both

cause

numbers

as

related

to

the

aforementioned complaints (cause no. 4:14-cv-024, DEs #23 & #34;

cause no. 4:14-cv-061, DEs #21, #26, #29, #31, #34.)

For the

reasons set forth below, the Court:
(1) STRIKES both complaints;
(2) DIRECTS the clerk to place cause number 4:14-cv-024
on a blank pro se Complaint 42 U.S.C. § 1983 form and
send it to plaintiffs Wayne Fender, Donna Marie Pulous,
and Heather Mock;
(3) GRANTS plaintiffs until May 7, 2015, to submit an
amended complaint;
(4) CAUTIONS plaintiffs that if they do not respond by
that

deadline,

this

case

will

be

dismissed

without

further notice;
(5) DENIES the motion to supplement as moot;
(6) DENIES the motions to dismiss as moot; and
(7) DIRECTS the clerk to close the case in cause number
4:14-cv-061.

BACKGROUND
Pro se plaintiffs, Wayne Fender and Donna Marie Pulous, filed
their original complaint in cause number 4:14-cv-024 on March 10,
2014.

Although written on a standard Complaint 42 U.S.C. section

1983 form, the form itself only lists the alleged causes of

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action;1 the supporting facts and “evidence” are incorporated by
reference over sixty plus additional pages.
several

defendants,

namely

the

State

of

On May 5, 2014,

Indiana,

DCS,

Sarah

Sailors, Sally Hernandez, Ashley Peters, and Judge Kurtis Fouts,
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing it was unintelligible and failed to state any claims for relief. On May 13,
2014, plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the motion to
dismiss and later filed a supplement to that response.

On August

7, 2014, pro se plaintiffs Wayne Fender and Donna Marie Pulous,
along with additional pro se plaintiff Heather Mock, filed another
complaint, this time in cause number 4:14-cv-061.

That complaint,

also written on a standard section 1983 form, added several new
defendants

to

the

list.

For

the

causes

of

action

section,

plaintiffs only stated that “we provided paperwork that gives a
clear-cut view of our evidence.” That attached paperwork spans the
course of over one-hundred and seventy pages.

Plaintiffs later

filed a motion to supplement that complaint with another sixteen
pages of single-spaced argument and “evidence.”

On August 12,

2014, defendant Patrick Manahan filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings in cause number 4:14-cv-024 for failure to state a claim,
arguing that “it is difficult to discern what the plaintiffs

1

The complaint lists defamation of character, discrimination, libel,
constitutional infringement, religious bias, perjury, filing false report, false
accusations, alternative healing bias, and family bias as supposed causes of
action.

3

believe Patrick Manahan did wrong, much less why he is a defendant
here.”
On

September

22,

2014,

defendants,

Sarah

Sailors,

Sally

Hernandez, Ashley Peters, Kurtis Fouts, DCS, and the State of
Indiana, filed a motion to consolidate the two cases pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) and Local Rule Rule 42-2. On
October

21,

2014,

the

motion

to

consolidate

was

granted

by

Magistrate Judge John E. Martin, who stated that “the cases involve
common issues of law and fact relating to the removal of a child
from the care of [plaintiffs].

Trying the cases separately would

require duplication of efforts, both on behalf of the parties and
of the Court, and might result in inconsistent results.”

Judge

Martin directed that all future filings were to be made in cause
number

4:14-cv-024

only.

Prior

to

that

time,

however,

the

following filings were made in cause number 4:14-cv-061: (1) on
September 26, 2014, defendant, Analei Whitlock, filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs’ complaint was “unintelligible”
and failed to state any valid claims; (2) on September 29, 2014,
defendants, Ashley Peters and the State of Indiana, filed a motion
to

dismiss

plaintiffs’

complaint

arguing

that

it

was

“un-

intelligible,” failed to state a claim for possible relief, and was
actually just an improper attempt to amend the original complaint
in cause number 4:14-cv-024; (3) on September 30, 2014, defendant,
Samantha Dagenais, filed a motion to dismiss or for a more definite

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statement,

arguing

that

plaintiffs’

complaint

including

the

attached “evidence” was “so lengthy and incomprehensible” that it
failed to state any “coherent or intelligible” claims; (4) also on
September 30, 2014, defendant, Abigail Diener, filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs’ complaint was “illogical,” devoid
of

any

factual

standards;

and

basis,
(5)

on

and

failed

October

6,

to

meet

2014,

federal

pleading

defendant,

Christin

Bramlage, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint and
“evidence” together were “so lengthy and incomprehensible” that
they failed to contain any “coherent or intelligible” claims.
Plaintiffs filed responses to the motions, along with several
supplements and/or status updates, some of which were stricken by
Magistrate Martin for failure to comply with the Local Rules, and
none of which shed any real light on the nature of plaintiffs’
claims.

ANALYSIS
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a
pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).

Nevertheless, “parties [must] make their

pleadings straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties need
not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.”

5

United States

ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir.
2003).

They must “be presented with sufficient clarity to avoid

requiring a district court or opposing party to forever sift
through its pages . . . .”
(7th Cir. 1990).

Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires

that complaints contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

See Vicom, Inc.

v. Harbridge Merchant Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 775-76 (7th Cir.
1994) (“A complaint that is prolix and/or confusing makes it
difficult for the defendant to file a responsive pleading and makes
it difficult for the trial court to conduct orderly litigation.”)
and Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir. 1990) (a
complaint “must be presented with clarity sufficient to avoid
requiring a district court or opposing party to forever sift
through its pages in search” of the plaintiff’s claims).

In sum,

Rule 8 requires a complaint to be presented with “intelligibility
sufficient for a court or opposing party to understand whether a
valid claim is alleged and [,] if so [,] what it is.”
F.3d

at

775.

Wordy,

redundant,

and

seemingly

Vicom, 20

interminable

complaints violate the letter and the spirit of Rule 8 and may be
dismissed with leave to refile.

Id. at 776.

complaints fail to meet these standards.

Here, plaintiffs’

Therefore the complaints

will be STRICKEN, and plaintiffs will be given time to file an
amended complaint in cause number 4:14-cv-024 only.

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The amended complaint needs to contain a short and plain
statement of what happened to plaintiffs to give rise to their
claims.

They need to state when these events occurred and clearly

explain how each defendant was involved with each claim that they
are raising against that defendant.

Additionally, the complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded
factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556).
unless

Legal conclusions can provide a complaint’s framework, but
well-pleaded

factual

allegations

move

the

claims

from

conceivable to plausible, they are insufficient to state a claim.
Id. at 680.

“[C]ourts are not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555, citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (quotation
marks omitted). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds
of

his

entitlement

to

relief

requires

more

than

labels

and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption
that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact).”

Id. (quotation marks, citations and footnote

7

omitted).

“[I]n

considering the plaintiff’s factual allegations,

courts should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the
elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.”
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009).

“[W]here the

well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it
has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
679 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Iqbal at

Thus, “a plaintiff

must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands
of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened
to her that might be redressed by the law.”

Swanson v. Citibank,

N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).
However, the plaintiffs should not resort to attaching voluminous
pages of documents or “evidence” in place of the requirements
stated above.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(1) STRIKES both complaints;
(2) DIRECTS the clerk to place cause number 4:14-cv-024
on a blank pro se Complaint 42 U.S.C. § 1983 form and
send it to plaintiffs Wayne Fender, Donna Marie Pulous,
and Heather Mock;

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(3) GRANTS plaintiffs until May 7, 2015, to submit an
amended complaint;
(4) CAUTIONS plaintiffs that if they do not respond by
that

deadline,

this

case

will

be

dismissed

without

further notice;
(5) DENIES the motion to supplement as moot;
(6) DENIES the motions to dismiss as moot; and
(7) DIRECTS the clerk to close the case in cause number
4:14-cv-061.

DATED: March 31, 2015

/s/Rudy Lozano, Judge
United States District Court

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