Fair Housing Center of Central Indiana Inc. et al v. Brookfield Farms Homeowners' Association

Filing 61

OPINION AND ORDER: Court DENIES 29 , 51 Motions for Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Philip P Simon on 2/8/2016. (tc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF CENTRAL
INDIANA, INC., and JENNIFER AND
BENJAMIN HENDRICKSON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BROOKFIELD FARMS HOMEOWNERS’
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant.

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4:14 CV 00058-PPS-JEM

OPINION AND ORDER
This dispute arises from a residential real estate transaction that went south after
the defendant, a homeowner’s association, informed the plaintiff sellers that the sale of
their home would violate one of the association’s restrictive covenants. Plaintiffs, both
the sellers and a non-profit organization that assists people with housing issues, claim
that the defendant’s action violates the Fair Housing Act. The parties have filed cross
motions for summary judgment. (DE’s 29 and 51.) Because there are an abundance of
fact issues still in dispute, both motions will be DENIED.
Background
The Hendricksons entered into a contract to sell their home to an organization
called the Wabash Center. The Wabash Center intended to use the home as a group
home for a group of three disabled adults. At some point, Defendant Brookfield Farms
Homeowner’s Association found out about the sale and sent the Wabash Center’s
attorney a letter stating that Wabash’s purchase of the home “is in violation of the

existing covenants.” (DE 1-2.) The covenant specifically at issue stated that each lot
“shall be a residential lot and shall be used exclusively for single family residential
purposes.” (DE 1-1 at 6.)
After catching wind of this letter, the Hendrickson’s attorney sent a letter to the
Association’s attorney informing them that their attempts to block the sale were
prohibited by Indiana law and demanding that the Association “cease all attempts to
interfere with the sale and purchase of the home by Wabash Center” and to “withdraw
its objection to such purchase in writing by letter to Wabash Center.” (DE 1-3 at 1.)
More specifically, the letter demanded that the Association “immediately: 1. issue a
written statement . . . recanting, rescinding or otherwise nullifying your letter of April
17, 2014; and 2. agree in writing to take no further actions to oppose, sabotage or
interfere with the pending sale of the 5115 Flatlake Court property to Wabash Center.”
(Id.)
Around this time, Plaintiff Fair Housing Center of Central Indiana (I’ll call it
“FHCCI” for short) got involved in the dispute. FHCCI is a non-profit advocacy
organization that seeks to ensure equal housing opportunities in Indiana. (DE 1 at 4.)
Four days after the Hendrickson’s attorney sent his letter to the Association, FHCCI
sent one of its own stating that the Association’s proposed action was unlawful both
under the Fair Housing Act and pertinent case law construing it. (DE 1-4 at 1.) FHCCI
stated that “[a]pproval of this sale could also be viewed as a reasonable accommodation
for a disability. We would appreciate your reconsideration of the interpretation of the
restrictive covenant, in light of established legal precedent, to allow the Wabash
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Center’s purchase of the home to continue.” (Id. at 2.)
About a week later, the Association’s attorney sent a letter to the Hendrickson’s
attorney stating that the Association had “resolved to refrain from legal action to block
the sale of the 5115 Flatlake Court in Lafayette, Indiana.” (DE 1-5 at 1.) But this
statement of its intent to refrain from legal action came with something of a hitch. The
Association also stated, “[b]e advised, however, that the Association has no authority to
bar individual Owners from seeking injunctive or other relief under the fee-shifting
provision recited in the Declaration, Art. VIII (A). Nor does it appear that the
Association may bar future action by any party under the ‘Delay or Failure to Enforce’
provision of the Declaration, Art. VIII (C).” (Id.) The Association further stated that the
annual meeting of the owner-members of the Association would take place the
following week. (Id.)
The Hendricksons attended that meeting, but did not speak or make any
requests of the Association at that time. (DE 45 at 6-7.) Shortly thereafter, the
Hendrickson’s deal with the Wabash Center fell through and their house went back on
the market. The Hendricksons ultimately sold their home to a different buyer in July
2014 but the sale was for $7,000 less than their agreement with Wabash.
Plaintiffs filed suit against the Association on July 10, 2014 claiming that the
Association’s actions are discriminatory in violation of the FHA. The parties have now
filed cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs seek partial summary judgment,
claiming that the Association failed to offer a reasonable accommodation under the
FHA and that the Association interfered with Plaintiffs’ exercise of their rights under
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the FHA. (DE 29-30.) Plaintiffs concede, however, that a trial would still be needed to
determine the amount of damages they suffered. The Association, on the other hand,
asks me to find that it provided a reasonable accommodation to the Hendricksons by
performing the actions requested in their letters. (DE 51-52.)
Discussion
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute about a material fact exists only “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Fair Housing Act states that it is unlawful to “discriminate in the sale or
rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter
because of a handicap of . . . a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling
after it is so sold, rented, or made available.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B). The FHA further
clarifies that “discrimination includes . . . a refusal to make reasonable accommodations
in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to
afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(3)(B).
Plaintiffs claim that the Association violated these sections of the FHA by failing
to provide Plaintiffs with a reasonable accommodation after it found that the sale would
violate the restrictive covenant barring group homes. Plaintiffs further claim that the
Association improperly interfered with the sale of the home. The Association of course
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disputes these claims and each party has now asked for summary judgment. I’ll address
each of these areas in turn.
In general, “whether an accommodation is ‘reasonable’ is a question of fact,
determined by a close examination of the particular circumstances.” Jankowski Lee &
Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Dadian v. Village of Wilmette,
269 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Whether a requested accommodation is reasonable is
highly fact-specific, and determined on a case-by-case basis by balancing the cost to the
defendant and the benefit to the plaintiff.”). “An accommodation is reasonable if it is
both efficacious and proportional to the costs to implement it,” but is unreasonable if it
is financially burdensome or “requires a fundamental alteration in the nature of the
program.” Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc., v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784
(7th Cir. 2002).
I should note at the outset that the posture of this case is a little different from
most cases dealing with a request for reasonable accommodation. Typically, a plaintiff
requests some action on the defendant’s part and the defendant refuses, claiming that
the accommodation requested was unreasonable. Here, the Hendricksons requested
what they termed as a reasonable accommodation and the Association arguably
complied with that request (though whether it actually complied will be a question for
the jury). One might be tempted here to say that ends the inquiry, as the Association
says I should. But the Seventh Circuit has found that under these circumstances, what a
plaintiff labels as “reasonable” doesn’t carry the day. It’s still up to the fact-finder to
decide whether the accommodation requested was actually reasonable.
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For example, in Jankowski, a disabled individual asked his apartment complex for
a reasonable accommodation in the form of either increasing the number of handicap
parking spaces in the parking lot, or assigning him a space closer to the building. 91
F.3d at 894. The complex responded by adding two new handicap spaces. Id. at 895.
Even so, the court found that the complex had not provided a reasonable
accommodation since even with the new parking spaces, the complex had only four
handicapped spaces for the 27 residents who had handicap stickers or tags for their
cars. Id. at 896. In other words, the plaintiff wasn’t simply stuck with what he asked for
since the ultimate question is whether the defendant has provided a reasonable
accommodation. Thus, even if the Association could prove that it complied with
Plaintiffs’ request (and the parties dispute whether that’s even the case), a jury would
still need to decide whether the course of action taken was actually reasonable.
Ultimately, there are too many factual disputes here for me to grant summary
judgment for either side. The parties paint two very different pictures of what
happened. From the Association’s perspective, after it first informed the Hendricksons
that the sale of their home to the Wabash Center would violate the restrictive covenants
preventing group homes, the Hendricksons then requested an accommodation in the
form of a written commitment from the Association not to interfere with the sale. In the
Association’s view, it complied with this request by agreeing in writing not to pursue
legal action to block the sale of the home to Wabash. Thus, the Association contends
that it has already provided Plaintiffs with a reasonable accommodation and no further
action is needed, particularly when nothing further was asked of it.
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Plaintiffs, on the other hand, dispute this view of the facts. They instead claim
that the Association’s alleged compliance with their request was less than genuine,
particularly when the Association made a point of stating it could not prevent a
homeowner from asserting a legal claim against Plaintiffs. And even more, the
Association held onto its position that the covenant was non-discriminatory in nature.
To Plaintiffs, this “accommodation” was no accommodation at all – they had sought to
avoid any legal repercussions from the sale and instead were being faced with possibly
more. And ultimately, this is the reason the Wabash Center pulled out of the deal.
Plaintiffs further argue that by asking the Association to reconsider its interpretation of
the covenant, that they were really asking for the covenant to be changed. The
Association denies any such request was ever made, and argues that if that’s really
what Plaintiffs wanted, then they needed to make that request at the annual meeting,
which they didn’t do.
The answer to whether the Association provided Plaintiffs with a reasonable
accommodation hinges on figuring out what really happened – e.g. was the
Association’s letter “complying” with the request really just a veiled threat not to
continue with the sale? Did Plaintiffs ever ask for the Association to change the
covenant? Was the accommodation originally requested even reasonable to begin with?
And sorting through what really happened here is the jury’s job. In essence, there are
too many open fact questions here for me to grant summary judgment to either side.
Further, because the question of whether the Association has provided a
reasonable accommodation must go to the jury, so too must Plaintiffs’ claim that the
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Association interfered with the sale of its home. That latter claim arises out of Section
3617 of the FHA which states that “[i]t shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten,
or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or
protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 3617. Proving an
interference claim under Section 3617 requires first proving a discrimination claim
under Section 3604 where the conduct that allegedly violated Section 3617 is the same
conduct by the same persons alleged to have violated Section 3604. South-Suburban
Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 886 (7th Cir. 1991). Since
that’s the case here and since Plaintiffs haven’t yet proven a violation of Section 3604,
this latter claim will have to go to the jury, as well.
Conclusion
For the above reasons, both the Plaintiffs’ and Defendant’s motions for summary
judgment (DE’s 29, 51) are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: February 8, 2016
s/Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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