Hoaks v. Benton County Sheriff's Department et al

Filing 46

OPINION AND ORDER: DENYING 41 MOTION for Reconsideration re 38 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment (Partial) by Defendant Benton County Sheriff's Department. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 5/14/2018. (lhc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE
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RUSSELL HOAKS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BENTON COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT, and DONALD
MUNSON, in his individual
capacity,
Defendants.

NO. 4:15-CV-18

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to for
Partial Reconsideration and Summary Judgment, filed on February
26, 2018.

(DE #41.)

For the reasons set forth below, the motion

is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On March 5, 2015, Plaintiff Russell Hoaks (“Hoaks”) filed a
complaint

against

the

Benton

(“Sheriff’s

Department”)

Munson”

“Munson”)

or

“Defendants”).

Munson

Sheriff’s Department.

and

in

Sheriff

his

was

County

Donald

individual

a

Sheriff’s
Munson

capacity

correctional

officer

Department
(“Sheriff
(together,
with

the

In 2014, both Munson and Hoaks ran for
1

sheriff on the Republican ticket in the primary election.
lost to Munson.

Hoaks

Munson went on to win the general election in

November and, on his first day in office, he terminated Hoaks.
Hoaks filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that he was
terminated in violation of the First Amendment.
On January 30, 2018, the Court entered a lengthy order
granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.

(DE #38.)

The Court dismissed the claims against

Munson based on qualified immunity.

The Section 1983 claim

against the Sheriff’s Department remains pending.

The Sheriff’s

Department filed the instant motion for reconsideration of the
Court’s decision to deny summary judgment on this claim.

The

motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
The Sheriff’s Department asks the Court to reconsider its
order denying summary judgment on the Section 1983 claim based on
Rule 60(a) and Rule (b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 60(a) provides that “[t]he court may correct a clerical
mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever
one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a).

“[A] motion under Rule 60(a) can only be

used to make the judgment or record speak the truth and cannot be
used to make it say something other than what originally was
2

pronounced.”

Carr v. Tillery, No. 07-314-DRH, 2010 WL 2132195,

at *3 (S.D. Ill. May 17, 2010) (quoting 11 Charles A. Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2854 (3d
ed. 1998 & Supp. 2009) (collecting cases)); see Brandon v. Chicago
Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 293, 295 n.2 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
dismissal . . . accurately reflected the court's intention at the
time it was entered.

Thus, the error, to the extent there was

one, was not in the transcription, but in the court's decision, a
ground for relief not contained in Rule 60(a).”).

While the

Sheriff’s Department asserts that the Court’s January 30 order
contains an error of “oversight,” the order accurately reflects
the intentions of the Court at the time it was entered.

As such,

relief under Rule 60(a) is unavailable.
Rule 60(b)(1) provides that the court may relieve a party
from an order based on “mistake.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).

Rule

60(b) “was designed to address mistakes attributable to special
circumstances and not merely to erroneous applications of law.”
Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749
(7th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
extraordinary
circumstances.”

remedy

and

is

“Rule 60(b) relief is an

granted

only

in

exceptional

Wickens v. Shell Oil Co., 620 F.3d 747, 759 (7th

Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

3

The Sheriff’s Department asks the Court to reconsider its
decision not to dismiss Hoaks’ Section 1983 claim against the
Sheriff’s Department, which is based on Monell v. Department of
Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.
Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978).

To recover under Monell, a

plaintiff must establish that (1) he suffered a deprivation of a
federal right; (2) as a result of an express municipal policy, a
widespread custom, or a deliberate act of a decision-maker with
final policymaking authority for the municipality; which (3) was
the proximate cause of his injury.
649 (7th Cir. 2014).

King v. Kramer, 763 F.3d 635,

Defendants’ original brief in support of

their motion for summary judgment argued that Hoaks could not
prevail on a Monell claim against the Sheriff’s Department based
on a policy, practice, or custom.

It also made a four-sentence

argument - without citation to any legal authority - that Hoaks’
Complaint failed to allege a claim based on policymaker liability.
(See DE #32 at 20.)1

1

Defendants’ original brief made the following policymaker argument:
Plaintiff has made no allegations in his Complaint to suggest that
he has based his claim against Benton County Sheriff’s Department
on policymaker liability. In addition to the allegation above the
only other seemingly relevant allegation in Plaintiff’s Complaint
dealing with potential Monell issues is “Munson is an elected
official and employed by Benton County as Sheriff. Munson performs
administrative and ministerial duties on behalf of Benton County.”
[DE #1 at ¶4]. This allegation does not demonstrate a Monell claim
against the Benton County Sheriff’s Department for the actions of
a policymaker. In fact, Plaintiff does not allege for purposes of
a Monell claim that Munson is, in fact, a policymaker with respect
to employment decisions. (DE #32 at 20.)

4

In response, Hoaks argued that Sheriff Munson was a decisionmaker with final policymaking authority.

As explained in the

January 30 order, “[t]he determination of whether a person has
policymaking authority is a question of state law, and is to be
decided by the court.”

(DE #38 at 29 (quoting Valentino v. Vill.

of S. Chicago Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 675 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)).

“Officials with final decisionmaking authority are

deemed policymakers for Monell purposes, and we need to look to
state law to determine the scope of such authority.”
(citations omitted).

Id. at 676

The Indiana Court of Appeals has found that

a sheriff is “a final policymaker.”
1002, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

Trout v. Bouie, 653 N.E.2d

The Court noted that, in their

reply brief, Defendants asserted that Hoaks’ Complaint did not
allege a Monell claim based on policymaker liability, without any
further argument or explanation regarding this statement.2
#38 at 30 n.1.)

(DE

The Court also noted that Defendants did not deny

that Sheriff Munson was a final decisionmaker.

(Id. at 29-30.)

Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Hoaks as the
nonmoving party, the Court determined that a genuine issue of

2

Defendants’ reply brief made the following policymaker argument:
Further, although Plaintiff proceeds to argue his Monell claim from
a policymaker perspective, it is clear that his Complaint did not
allege a Monell claim based on policymaker liability. Even if this
court would entertain such a belated claim, Sheriff Munson’s actions
did not violate the First Amendment, so there is no Monell liability
for Hoaks’ termination.
(DE #37 at 78.)

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material fact existed as to whether Sheriff Munson violated the
First Amendment when he terminated Hoaks.
Defendants

failed

to

proffer

any

(Id. at 30.)

authority

Because

supporting

their

policymaker arguments, and did not refute Hoaks’ assertion that
Sheriff

Munson

was

a

final

decisionmaker,

the

Court

denied

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Monell claim.
According to the Sheriff’s Department, the Court found that
Defendants waived their argument that Hoaks’ Complaint did not
allege a Monell claim based on policymaker liability because it
mistakenly determined that Defendants only raised this argument in
their reply brief.

While the January 30 order only references

Defendants’ reply brief, this argument in both their original and
reply

briefs

was

perfunctory

and

undeveloped.

“Perfunctory,

undeveloped arguments without discussion or citation to pertinent
legal authority are waived.”

(Id. at 30 n.1 (quoting Mahaffey v.

Ramos, 588 F.3d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 2009)).

Defendants failed

to cite any legal authority to support their policymaker argument
in either their original or reply briefs.

“[I]t is not the

obligation of this court to research and construct legal arguments
open to parties, especially when they are represented by counsel,
and we have warned that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and
arguments

that

are

unsupported

6

by

pertinent

authority,

are

waived.”

Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 557 (7th Cir. 2010)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In its motion for reconsideration, the Sheriff’s Department
develops

the

argument

that

the

Complaint

policymaker liability under Monell.

failed

to

allege

It cites Valentino v. Village

of South Chicago Heights, 575 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2009), as setting
forth an outline of the facts that must be established to prove a
policymaker

liability.

Valentino

provides

that

“the

mere

unreviewed discretion to make hiring and firing decisions does not
amount to policymaking authority.

There must be a delegation of

authority to set policy for hiring and firing, not a delegation of
only the final authority to hire and fire.”
omitted).

Id. at 676 (citations

While the Sheriff’s Department now proffers case law

to support its argument, Rule 60(b) is “not an appropriate vehicle
for addressing simple legal error, for rehashing old arguments, or
for presenting arguments that should have been raised before the
court made its decision.”

Amawi v. Walton, No. 13-CV-866-JPG-RJD,

2017 WL 6540913, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2017) (collecting
cases).3

3

The Sheriff’s Department also contends that Defendants did not address Hoaks’
argument that Sheriff Munson was a policymaker in their summary judgment
briefing because the claim was not properly pled.
It maintains that Hoaks
failed to seek evidence that Munson was a policymaker for purposes of firing in
discovery and attempts to distinguish Trout, 653 N.E.2d 1002, in which the
Indiana Court of Appeals found that a sheriff is a final policymaker. To the
extent that the Sheriff’s Department is attempting to argue that Munson is not
a policymaker for the purposes of the Monell claim, a motion for reconsideration
is not an opportunity to raise new arguments which could have been raised

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Moreover,

the

Court

Department’s argument.

is

not

persuaded

by

the

Sheriff

A Section 1983 “municipal liability claim

need not meet any heightened pleading standard, but rather must
simply set forth sufficient allegations to place the court and
defendants on notice of the gravamen of the complaint.”

Latuszkin

v. City of Chicago, 250 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted); see White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 839 (7th
Cir. 2016) (“federal courts may not apply a ‘heightened pleading
standard’—more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of
[Rule 8(a)]—in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability”
under § 1983).

Whether a complaint provides notice is determined

by looking at the complaint as a whole.

See Atkins v. City of

Chi., 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011) (the court is to read the
complaint and assess its plausibility as a whole).
In Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills, 712 F.3d 979 (7th
Cir. 2013), a former police officer brought a First Amendment
retaliation claim under Section 1983 against the village and its
police chief after the police chief fired him.

Id. at 981.

trial court dismissed the officer’s retaliation claim.
the

Seventh

Circuit

reversed

the

trial

court’s

The

On appeal,

decision

and

previously. See Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 784 n.9 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“[D]eveloping an argument for the first time in a motion to reconsider is too
late.”).
Because Defendants did not make this argument in their summary
judgment briefing, it has been waived. See id. (“[A]ny arguments . . . raised
for the first time in [a] motion to reconsider are waived.”).

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addressed whether the officer had stated a Monell claim based on
the policymaker theory of liability.

The court cited Valentino

(the case on which the Sheriff’s Department relies) for the
proposition that “the mere unreviewed discretion to make hiring
and firing decisions does not amount to policymaking authority.
There must be a delegation of authority to set policy for hiring
and firing, not a delegation of only the final authority to hire
and fire.”

Id. at 987 (quoting Valentino, 575 F.3d at 676).

The

Seventh Circuit considered the complaint and found that the officer
had “stated, albeit barely, a plausible claim that [the police
chief] had at least de facto authority to set policy for hiring
and firing” because the complaint “suggest[ed] [the police chief]
was fully in charge of the police department and that his firing
decisions were not reviewed.”

Id. at 987 (emphasis added).

“The

picture painted by the complaint . . . suggest[ed] that [the police
chief] had the unfettered discretion to hire and fire whomever he
pleased.”
Here,

Id. (emphasis added).
the

Complaint

alleges:

(1)

“Munson

is

an

elected

official and employed by Benton County as Sheriff” and “performs
administrative . . . duties on behalf of Benton County” (DE #1,
¶4); (2) “Defendants [including Sheriff Munson], acting pursuant
to a policy, practice, and/or custom, violated Hoaks’ rights as
protected by the First Amendment” (Id., ¶7); (3) “Munson made it
9

known that when he took office he planned to terminate Hoaks
employment” and “told several inmates and other members of the
public of his intent” (Id., ¶15); and (4) “Munson terminated Hoaks’
employment” on his first day in office as sheriff (Id., ¶17).
Nothing in the Complaint suggests that Sheriff Munson’s firing
decision was reviewed.

As noted above, whether a decisionmaker

is considered a “policymaker” is determined by state law, and
Indiana courts have found that a sheriff is “a final policymaker”
for

some

purposes.

Trout,

653

N.E.2d

at

1007.

Like

the

allegations in Kristofek, the Complaint alleges, albeit barely, a
plausible claim that Sheriff Munson had least de facto authority
to set policy for hiring and firing for the Sheriff’s Department.
See Wiseman v. City of Michigan City, 966 F. Supp. 2d 790, 797–98
(N.D. Ind. 2013) (finding plaintiff stated a plausible claim that
superintendent “had at least de facto authority to set policy for
hiring and firing” for the city where the complaint alleged that
superintendent had supervisory authority over plaintiff, made
personnel decisions, and caused or participated in plaintiff’s
constitutional deprivation, and that plaintiff was not re-hired).

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants’ Motion for
Partial Reconsideration and Summary Judgment (DE #41) is DENIED.

DATED:

May 14, 2018

/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

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