Pilgrim v. Superintendent

Filing 9

OPINION AND ORDER: The 3 amended petition is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 11/3/2016. (tc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
ERWIN PILGRIM,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.

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No. 4:15 CV 102

OPINION AND ORDER
Erwin Pilgrim, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding held at the Miami Correctional
Facility (MCF-15-08-0246) on September 1, 2015. (DE # 1.) There, he was found guilty of
battery with a weapon in violation of Code A-102 and sanctioned with the loss of 90
days earned credit time and a demotion in credit class by a hearing officer. (Id.) The
charge was initiated on August 18, 2015, when Custody Officer Jones wrote a conduct
report:
On August 18, 2015 I, Officer R. Jones and Sgt. C. Shaffer was assigned as
kitchen custody. We called for the DA1 food service count letter to the
production hallway to be searched and released back to their assigned
housing units. We observed offender Sosbe Brian 109346 had a swollen
eye. Upon furth[e]r observation we noticed that he was wearing two tshirts. The bottom t-shirt had blood on the collar. We then observed
offender Pilgrim Erwin 229251 approaching the hallway without a t-shirt
on. We then questioned Offender Pilgrim where his t-shirt was. Pilgrim
advised us that he did not wear a shirt to work. We then ordered Offender
Sosbe to remove his shirts, at that time we noticed that the outter [sic]
shirt had the letters “NY[.]” Offender Pilgrim[‘]s nickname is “New
York[.]” Pilgrim then admitted to us that the white shirt with the letters
“NY” was his and that Offender Sosbe asked to borrow it. We then
escorted offender Sosbe to the production hallway janitor closet and

stripped him out. We observed that offender Sosbe had several punctures
to his body, back, neck, and head. Offender Sosbe also had two swollen
eyes. We questioned Sosbe about what had happened. Offender Sosbe
advised us that he had slip[p]ed in water and fell in the walk in cooler.
Upon further questioning Offender Sosbe stated that he could not tell us
anything because he had to live here. We then escorted offender Sosbe to
the production bathroom. We then placed Offender Pilgrim in the
production janitor closet and stripped him out. During the strip search we
observed that Offender Pilgrim had what is to be believed to be blood on
his jumpsuit, and several blood stains on his white t-shirt. We questioned
Offender Pilgrim about the blood stains. Pilgrim advised us that the stains
were from the bloody t-shirt that Offender Sosbe was wearing. Offender
Pilgrim’s story seemed unfeasable [sic]. Sgt. Shaffer then placed
mechanical restraints on Offender Pilgrim and called for phase 1 yard staff
to escort him to RHU. We then talked to Offender Sosbe in the production
bathroom, but he continued to advise us that he could not say anything
due to him having to live here. Offender Sosbe was then escorted to Phase
1 medical with a report of offender [i]njury to be seen by medical. Myself
and Sgt. Shaffer searched the production walk in cooler where the
incident occurred. We were able to locate 2 black metal rods stuffed inside
a brown lunch sack.[] We also searched the trash can located outside the
offender bathroom in production and located several white paper towels
that had blood on them.
(DE # 5-1.)
On August 24, 2015, Pilgrim was formally notified of the charge and given a
copy of the conduct report. (DE # 5-2.) He pled not guilty and did not request the
assistance of a lay advocate. (Id.) He did request to call Offender Brian Sosbe as a
witness and also asked to review the video and pictures of the two black rods. (Id.)
Offender Sosbe submitted a written statement:
I had blood all over my white t-shirt and wasn’t gonna make it through
the shake down. I knew they would try to say I got in a fight and didn’t
want to get in trouble so I went around asking for a different shirt.
Offender Pilgrim said I could use his to get out just to wash it and bring it
back the next day.

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(DE # 5-4.)
Sandra Gunter also submitted a written statement:
I, Sandra Gunter, was enroute to the Production office when offender
Sosbe #109397 was entering the Food Bank. Offender Sosbe was to be
enroute down the production hallway to go back to his housing unit. I
then opened the food bank door to see offender Pilgram #229251 bare
chested with his greens around his waist. I asked him what he was doing
and he said that he borrowed a T-shirt from Sosbe and that he was giving
it back. I informed him to get out of the food bank and down the hallway.
Sgt Shaffer and Officer Jones were at the entrance of production hallway
when I got them out of the food bank. Said officers then took control of
the situation.
(DE # 5-3.)
The video was reviewed:
On 09/01/2015 I (J. Prater) reviewed the DVR[.] [T]he DVR of the Food
Service Area dated 08/18/2015 and the approx. time of 12:00pm to
1:00pm. This review was requested by offender Pilgrim, Erwin 229251 at
his screening on 08/24/2015 for case MCF 15-08-0246. Due to the position
of the cameras the incident that takes place can[]not be seen.
(DE # 5-5.)
A disciplinary hearing was conducted on September 1, 2015, where Pilgrim
stated, “The write up does not say I assaulted anyone with a weapon. I just gave him a
t-shirt” and “This incident happened well before I knew anything about it.” (DE # 5-6.)
The hearing officer noted that the pictures of the black rods were unavailable and that
“no markings a fight happened.” (Id.) Relying on the staff reports and the evidence
from the witnesses, the hearing officer found Pilgrim guilty of assault with a weapon, in
violation of Code A-102. (Id.) Pilgrim appealed to the final reviewing authority, but his
appeal was denied. (DE ## 7-7; 7-9; 7-10.)

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When prisoners lose earned time credits in a prison disciplinary hearing, they are
entitled to certain protections under the Due Process Clause: (1) advance written notice
of the charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker; (3) an
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense when
consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by
a fact finder of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974). To satisfy due process, there must also be “some
evidence” to support the hearing officer’s decision. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Pilgrim raises four issues in his petition, which can be consolidated into three: (1)
whether he received adequate notice of the charge; and; (2) whether the hearing
officer’s written report is adequate; and (3) whether the evidence supports the guilty
finding.
First, Pilgrim complains that the conduct report did not provide him with
adequate notice of the charge. The purpose of a conduct report is to inform the inmate
of the charge against him. Wolff requires advance notice of sufficient facts to inform the
accused of the behavior with which he is charged. 418 U.S. at 570. The conduct report
identifies the offense as “Assault/Battery upon another with a weapon.” The offense
code is identified as “A-102". As detailed above, the conduct report explained how the
battery was discovered, who was involved, a description of injuries to the victim, and a
summary of the statements from both Pilgrim and the victim as to what had taken

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place, the location of the blood that was discovered during the searches of both men,
and a description of the weapons found in the area. (DE 5-1.) This clearly notified
Pilgrim that he was charged with battery with a weapon.

Because the factual basis of the investigation report gave [him] all the
information he needed to defend against the . . . charge, the reviewing
authority's modification did not deprive [him] of his due process rights.
Northern v. Hanks, 326 F.3d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 2003). Thus, this is not a basis for habeas
relief.
Second, Pilgrim claims that the hearing officer’s written decision was inadequate
because it failed to explain why he was found guilty. The written statement
requirement is “not onerous,” and to satisfy due process “[t]he statement need only
illuminate the evidentiary basis and reasoning behind the decision.” Scruggs v. Jordan,
485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007). Here, the hearing officer’s report indicated that he
considered the conduct report, and the witness statements. (DE 5-6.) His statement is
not lengthy, but there is no mystery here. The hearing officer adequately identified the
evidence relied on for his decision, and it is clear that he chose to believe that all the
circumstantial evidence that Pilgrim battered the victim with a weapon over Pilgrim’s
denials. The written statement the hearing officer provided satisfied the minimal
requirements of due process, and therefore this claim is denied.
Third, Pilgrim claims that there was insufficient evidence to establish his guilt.
While Pilgrim makes much of the fact that there is no eyewitness testimony that Pilgrim
assaulted the victim, Pilgrim is merely asking this court to re-weigh the evidence. The
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relevant question is whether there is some evidence to support the finding of guilt. See
Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. This is not a high standard, and in determining the sufficiency of
the evidence, courts do not “conduct an examination of the entire record, independently
assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison
disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.”
McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). The court will overturn a guilty
finding based on insufficient evidence only if “no reasonable adjudicator could have
found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense on the basis of the evidence presented.”
Henderson v. United States Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994).
Furthermore, a hearing officer is permitted to rely on circumstantial evidence to
establish guilt. See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1992). And, even a
Conduct Report alone can be sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt.
McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786.
Pilgrim argues that he cannot be found guilty because there is no direct evidence
that he assaulted the victim. However, as explained, direct evidence is not required to
sustain a finding of guilt in a prison disciplinary hearing. Here, the circumstantial
evidence contained in the Conduct Report and witness statements is sufficient. It
reveals that Offender Sosbe was attacked and bleeding. It establishes that Pilgrim
admitted giving his shirt to Offender Sosbe, but he lied about it when he was initially
questioned. It also shows that Offender Sosbe did not rule out Pilgrim as his attacker. In
addition, blood was found on Pilgrim’s jumpsuit as well as his shirt without any

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plausible explanation. And, finally, metal rods were found in the cooler where the
attack occurred along with several bloody paper towels in a nearby trash can. Based on
that, it was not arbitrary for the hearing officer to have inferred that it was Pilgrim who
assaulted the victim. Though that is not the only possible conclusion, “[t]he Federal
Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the
one reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. The evidence here was
sufficient to have found Pilgrim guilty.
For these reasons, the amended petition (DE # 3) is DENIED and this case is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Date: November 3, 2016
s/ James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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