Myers v. Tippecanoe County Circuit Court et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: This case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because it is frivolous. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 9/14/2016. (lhc)(cc: Plaintiff)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE
JASON TYE MYERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
TIPPECANOE COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT, et al.
Defendants.
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Cause No. 4:16-CV-068 JD
OPINION AND ORDER
Jason Tye Myers, a pro se prisoner, is attempting to sue State courts and State court judges
(including every member of the Indiana Supreme Court) based on judicial rulings made in his State
court case and appeals. He is seeking injunctive relief compelling the State courts and judges to
reopen his State court lawsuit. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits
of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
This case is clearly barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983).
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject-matter
jurisdiction when, after state proceedings have ended, a losing party in state court
files suit in federal court complaining of an injury caused by the state-court
judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment. In determining
whether a federal plaintiff seeks review of a state-court judgment, we ask whether
the injury alleged resulted from the state-court judgment itself. If it does, RookerFeldman bars the claim.
Beth-El All Nations Church v. City of Chicago, 486 F.3d 286, 292 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted). Simply put, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “precludes lower federal court jurisdiction
over claims seeking review of state court judgments or over claims ‘inextricably intertwined’ with
state court judgments.” Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000).
This is such a case. Myers brought this case because he does not believe that he should have lost
his state court case. Therefore these claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman.
Though it is usually necessary “to give pro se litigants one opportunity to amend after
dismissing a complaint[,] that’s unnecessary where, as here, it is certain from the face of the
complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted.” Carpenter v. PNC
Bank, Nat. Ass’n, No. 633 Fed. Appx. 346, 348 (7th Cir. Feb. 3, 2016) (quotation marks omitted).
See Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013) and Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588
F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where . . .
the amendment would be futile.”). Here, it is not possible for Myers to challenge his unfavorable
State court results in federal court and any amendment seeking to do so would be futile. Yet, this
is not the first time that he has brought such a case. In Myers v. Wiete, 4:15-CV-72 (N.D. Ind. filed
August 28, 2015), he also attempted to sue most of these same judges for rulings in another State
court case that he lost. In that case Chief Judge Simon explained Rooker-Feldman in his dismissal
order entered on October 22, 2015. He then re-explained Rooker-Feldman in his orders of January
20, 2016, March 28, 2016, and July 15, 2016. Nevertheless, despite having lost that case, five
motions to reconsider the dismissal of that case, and his appeal of that case to the Seventh Circuit,
Myers filed this case on September 1, 2016. Though it is unclear whether his ongoing attempts to
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sue the Justices of the Indiana Supreme Court and other State court judges is malicious, it is clear
that they are legally frivolous. For these reasons, this case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A because it is frivolous.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: September 14, 2016
/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Judge
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