Fieleke v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 21

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court hereby GRANTS the relief requested in Memorandum in Support of Complaint [DE 15] and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Martin on 8/31/18. (ksp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE
MELISSA FIELEKE,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Deputy Commissioner for Operations,
Social Security Administration,
Defendant.

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CAUSE NO.: 4:17-CV-28-JEM

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Complaint [DE 1], filed by Plaintiff on March 27, 2017,
and a Memorandum in Support of Complaint [DE 15], filed by Plaintiff on July 27, 2017. Plaintiff
requests that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge be reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. On October 10, 2017, the Commissioner filed a response, and on October 23, 2017,
Plaintiff filed a reply.
I.

Procedural Background
On December 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for benefits alleging that she became

disabled on September 1, 2012. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration.
On December 17, 2015, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Paul R. Armstrong held a video hearing
at which Plaintiff, with an attorney representative, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. On
December 24, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. The Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner.
The ALJ made the following findings under the required five-step analysis:
1.

The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security
Act on September 30, 2013.

2.

The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period
from her alleged onset date of September 1, 2012, through her date last
insured of September 30, 2013.

3.

Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe
impairments: degenerative disc disease and obesity.

4.

Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5.

Through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional
capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) where the
claimant could lift or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently,
could stand or walk for six of eight hours during the workday, and could sit
for six of eight hours during the workday.

6.

Through the date last insured, the claimant was unable to perform any past
relevant work.

7.

The claimant was 42 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age
18-49, on the date last insured.

8.

The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English.

9.

Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability
because the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has
transferable job skills.

10.

Through the date last insured, considering the claimant’s age, education,
work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant
could have performed.

11.

The claimant has not been under a disability at any time from September 1,
2012, the alleged onset date, through September 30, 2013, the date last
insured.

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner.
The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate
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Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case.
Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
II.

Standard of Review
The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of the final decision of the agency and

indicates that the Commissioner’s factual findings must be accepted as conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, a court reviewing the findings of an ALJ will reverse
only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ has applied an erroneous
legal standard. See Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence
consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gudgel v. Barnhart,
345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003)).
A court reviews the entire administrative record but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the
evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment
for that of the ALJ. See Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Clifford v. Apfel, 227
F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, the
question upon judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within the meaning
of the Social Security Act is not whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled, but whether the ALJ “uses
the correct legal standards and the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Roddy v. Astrue,
705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir.
2010); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2006); Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d
664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)). “A reversal and remand may be required, however, if the ALJ committed

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an error of law or if the ALJ based the decision on serious factual mistakes or omissions.” Beardsley
v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
At a minimum, an ALJ must articulate her analysis of the evidence in order to allow the
reviewing court to trace the path of her reasoning and to be assured that the ALJ considered the
important evidence. See Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002); Diaz v. Chater, 55
F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995); Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must
“‘build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [the] conclusion’ so that, as a reviewing
court, we may assess the validity of the agency’s final decision and afford [a claimant] meaningful
review.” Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Scott, 297 F.3d at 595)); see
also O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 618 (“An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of
evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.”); Zurawski
v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into
the reasoning behind [the] decision to deny benefits.”).
III.

Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s ability to work was not adequately

supported and not based in the evidence of record. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s opinion
is supported by substantial evidence.
Appendix 1 of the disability regulations contains a “Listing of Impairments” that the SSA
has predetermined are disabling regardless of a claimant’s age, education, or work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). The Listings first enumerate criteria necessary to establish that a claimant’s
diagnosis is based on acceptable medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(2). The remaining
criteria establish the severity the impairment much reach to be considered disabling. 20 C.F.R. §

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404.1525(c)(2). A claimant meets Listing 1.02 for major dysfunction of a joint if she has a “gross
anatomical deformity . . . and chronic joint pain and stiffness with signs of limitation of motion or
other abnormal motion of the affected joint(s), and findings on appropriate medically acceptable
imaging of joint space narrowing, bony destruction, or ankylosis of the affected joint(s).” 20 C.F.R.
Pt. 404 Subpt P., App. 1, § 1.02. To meet the severity of the listing for a hip, knee, or ankle
dysfunction, a claimant must also show “an inability to ambulate effectively.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404
Subpt P., App. 1, § 1.02(A). In order to meet Listing 1.04 for disorders of the spine, a claimant must
have a spinal disorder “resulting in compromise of a nerve root . . . or the spinal cord” and, among
other things, “inability to ambulate effectively.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt P., App. 1, § 1.04(C).
Effective ambulation requires an ability to “sustain[] a reasonable walking pace over a sufficient
distance to be able to carry out activities of daily living,” and the Listing provides examples of
ineffective ambulation including: “the inability to walk without the use of a walker, two crutches,
or two canes, the inability to walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces . . . [and]
the inability to carry out routine ambulatory activities, such as shopping.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt
P., App. 1, § 1.00(B)(2)(b).
In general, the claimant bears the burden of proving that his condition meets all the criteria
of a listing. Ribaudo v. Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2006). However, an ALJ’s listing
determination “must discuss the listing by name and offer more than a perfunctory analysis of the
listing.” Barnett, 381 F.3d at 668 (citing Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 2003);
Scott, 297 F.3d at 595-96; Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002)). However, the ALJ
failed to mention Listing 1.02 or its requirements, leaving the Court unable to determine whether
he adequately considered Plaintiff’s hip and knee disorders. In addition, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ

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misstated the requirements of Listing 1.04. The ALJ stated that “needing a ‘cane’ is not enough to
meet the criteria of 1.04, which requires a four pronged cane or walker to meet the assistive device
criteria. The record is absent any prescription of a cane prior to the date last insured.” However, the
criteria of Listing 1.04 is that the claimant is unable to ambulate effectively, and gives use of a
walker as an example of someone with an inability to ambulate effectively. Plaintiff argues that she
used a walker for ambulation during much of the time period covered by the record, and testified
that she had difficulties performing ambulatory tasks. The Listings require that “[t]he medical basis
for the use of any assistive device . . . should be documented,” but do not require a written
prescription for a cane or walker. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt P., App. 1, § 1.00(J)(4). Plaintiff points
out that her treating physician consistently documented her difficulties with gait and need for a
walker, and argues that the record is replete with evidence of difficulties with ambulation. Because
the ALJ ignored Plaintiff’s use of a walker and misstated the requirements of Listing 1.04, the Court
cannot conclude that he performed an adequate analysis of the listing. On remand, the ALJ is
directed to thoroughly consider whether Plaintiff’s impairments meet or equal Listings 1.02 and
1.04, with an accurate recitation of what those Listings require.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ made other errors in his decision. On remand, the ALJ is
directed to fully consider Plaintiff’s testimony and the entirety of the record, including adaptations
to activities of daily living, address how the combination of Plaintiff’s impairments limit her ability
to perform work-related activities, and to fully explain how the evidence in the record supports his
conclusions. See, e.g., Ross v. Barnhart, 119 F. App’x 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2004) (“‘The RFC is an
assessment of what work-related activities the claimant can perform despite her limitations.’ In
considering a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ is expected to take into consideration all relevant evidence,

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both medical and non-medical.”) (quoting Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004));
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), (a)(3); 416.1545(a)(1), (a)(3)).
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the relief requested in Memorandum

in Support of Complaint [DE 15] and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
SO ORDERED this 31st day of August, 2018.
s/ John E. Martin
MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
cc:

All counsel of record

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