Scott v. Indiana Developmental Training Center of Lafayette LLC

Filing 22

OPINION AND ORDER: Court DENIES 18 Motion to Dismiss. A previous version of the same 6 motion is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 9/25/2018. (tc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE
DARNEATRYCE J. SCOTT,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
INDIANA DEVELOPMENTAL
)
TRAINING CENTER OF LAFAYETTE )
LLC d/b/a T.C. HARRIS SCHOOL,
)
)
Defendant.
)

No. 4:17 CV 81

OPINION and ORDER
In her amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against
during and improperly terminated from her employment with defendant, Indiana
Developmental Training Center of Lafayette LLC (doing business as T.C. Harris School)
in May 2017. (DE # 14.) Specifically, plaintiff articulates several claims against
defendant: race and age discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 et seq. (“Title VII”), whistleblower protection under Ind. Code § 22-53-3, and retaliatory discharge under Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 252
(1973).
Defendant has moved to dismiss all claims against it under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (DE
# 38.) In this motion, defendant attacks each claim for plaintiff’s failure to allege certain
additional facts relating to the specifics of the claim. These arguments are unfounded,
and some are premature. Under the liberal notice-pleading requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To
satisfy Rule 8(a), “the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Further, the Seventh Circuit has clearly and specifically stated that a plaintiff
alleging employment discrimination “may allege these claims quite generally.” Tamayo
v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). In Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d
400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010), the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s discrimination
complaint satisfied Rule 8 because it identified the type of discrimination the plaintiff
thought occurred (racial), by whom (a bank), and when (in connection with her efforts
to obtain a home equity loan). Id. at 405. According to the Seventh Circuit, “[t]his was
all that was needed to put in the complaint.” Id. Under Swanson, a plaintiff alleging
discrimination need only allege “how, in the plaintiff’s mind at least, the dots should be
connected.” Id. at 405.
In this case, plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to satisfy Rule 8 and Swanson.
Specifically, plaintiff has alleged that she was discriminated against and ultimately
terminated on the basis of her race, age, and status as whistleblower by defendant in
May 2017. This was “all that was needed to put in the complaint.” Swanson, 614 F.3d at
405. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss (DE # 18) is DENIED. A previous
version of the same motion (DE # 6) is DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED.
Date: September 25, 2018
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT