PAUL MCMANUS v. BILL WILSON, Superintendent

Filing 92

ENTRY discussing Petition for Issuance of Certificate of Appealability - Mr. McManus' petition for a certificate of appealability (Dkt. 64 ) is GRANTED as to the Atkins claim and is in all other respects DENIED. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 10/4/2012. (TRG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
PAUL M. McMANUS,

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Petitioner,
v.
BILL WILSON, Superintendent,
Respondent.

Case No. 1:07-cv-1483-TWP-MJD

ENTRY DISCUSSING PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY
Paul McManus’ (“Mr. McManus”) petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied on
April 1, 2011. McManus v. Wilson, 2011 WL 1257969 (S.D.Ind. 2011). His motion to alter or
amend judgment was denied on March 27, 2012, and Mr. McManus has now filed a timely
notice of appeal. He seeks the issuance of a certificate of appealability (“COA”) as to four of the
claims presented in his habeas petition. (Dkt. 64.)
I. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court reviews certain principles applicable to the resolution of Mr. McManus’
habeas petition:
1. Because this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (“AEDPA”), Mr. McManus’ habeas petition could be granted only if the state court
decision on the merits of the habeas claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06
(2000).
2. A state court's factual findings are presumed to be correct and the petitioner has the
burden of rebutting them with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1).
3. “[A] decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual
determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable

in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). A state-court decision is based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented if the petitioner shows by
clear and convincing evidence that the state court's conclusion was based on factual error.
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 528 (2003).
4. “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so
long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court's
decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
5. The AEDPA's requirements demonstrate “the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against
extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary
error correction through appeal.” Id., (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5
(1979)).
6. “[A] state defendant does have a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a
fundamentally fair trial.” Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).
7. All of the foregoing, and the many principles governing the substantive challenges
presented in this and similar habeas applications, are considered against the background
that “[t]he habeas applicant has the burden of proof to show that the application of federal
law was unreasonable.” Harding v. Sternes, 380 F.3d 1034, 1043 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002)).
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. McManus cannot appeal the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless a
circuit justice or judge issues a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). “A certificate of
appealability may issue … only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating
that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims
or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327. As the Supreme Court has noted, when the district
court has rejected the petitioner's constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required for
the issuance of a COA under § 2253(c) is “straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that

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reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Mr. McManus’ request for a COA is granted as to the following claim:
A.

Mr. McManus seeks a COA as to his claim that his execution is barred by the
Eighth Amendment under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2001).
Mr. McManus claims that his execution is barred by the Eighth Amendment because he

was mentally retarded at the time of the offense. Mr. McManus first presented this claim in his
petition for post-conviction relief after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Atkins. In
Atkins, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the importance of exempting mentally
retarded defendants from execution. The post-conviction court found that Mr. McManus was
mentally retarded, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the decision of the post-conviction
court.
The Indiana Supreme Court’s reversal on this point, however, was over the dissent of
Justice Rucker and Justice Boehm. The argument of these dissenting justices was that the
majority’s decision did not give sufficient deference to the post-conviction court’s finding of
mental retardation. Although the dissenting justices’ argument has no easy component in this
federal habeas action because the majority’s view appears to include a finding of fact which this
court must accept under the circumstances, Hall v. Zenk, 2012 WL 3711879, *11 (7th Cir. Aug.
29, 2012), reasonable jurists could find this court’s resolution of the Atkins claim debatable.
Accordingly, McManus’ request for a COA is granted as to his Atkins claim. This grant
recognizes that this issue may be viewed as close call, however “[i]n death penalty cases, any
doubts as to whether the COA should issue are resolved in favor of the petitioner.” Moore v.
Quarterman, 534 F.3d 454, 460 (5th Cor. 2008).

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Mr. McManus’ request for a COA is denied as to the following claim for the reasons
noted:
B.

Mr. McManus seeks a COA as to his claim that he was forced to appear before the
jury in a drug-induced stupor in violation of Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
Mr. McManus claims that he did not receive a fair and reliable sentencing determination

because he was forced to appear before the jury in a drug-induced stupor. The Supreme Court in
Riggins emphasized the due process protection against forced medication unless there is a
medical necessity present. This Court first addressed Mr. McManus’ Riggins claim procedurally
and determined that Mr. McManus had not fairly presented a federal constitutional claim at his
direct appeal and accordingly, Mr. McManus waived this claim. McManus, 2011 WL 1257969
at *6. In addition, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the post-conviction court was correct in
concluding that Mr. McManus’ competency claims are res judicata. This Court recognized the
res judicata determination as an independent and adequate state ground that bars the claim in a
federal habeas petition unless Mr. McManus could show cause an actual prejudice or
demonstrate that failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. This Court concluded, “McManus has not done so here. McManus’ claims that he was
forced to appear before the jury in a drug-induced stupor in violation of Riggins does not support
the award of federal habeas relief.”

McManus, 2011 WL 1257969 at *6.

Under the

constitutional standard established by Riggins, Mr. McManus cannot demonstrate that
“reasonable jurists would find the court's assessment of his [Riggins] claim debatable or wrong.”
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Accordingly, his request for a COA on his claim that he appeared before
the jury in a drug-induced stupor is denied.

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C.

Mr. McManus seeks a COA as to his claim that he was not competent to stand trial
due to ingestion of medication.
This Court reviewed the competency claim and has noted the Indiana Supreme Court’s

discussion of Mr. McManus’ competency claim:
It is apparent that the trial court based its decision on continual reports from
medical professionals who maintained contact with McManus throughout the
trial. While the testimony was often equivocal, the consensus of the witnesses was
that the medications assisted McManus in participating in his trial. Without the
medications, McManus proved to be unable to cope with the stress of the
proceeding. McManus’ situation is markedly different from the defendant who
requires medication to attain competence so that the trial can begin. Before trial,
McManus was competent and participated in preparing his case. The
administration of medication appeared to manage a sudden onset of stress, rather
than to medicate a diagnosed psychosis. Reliance on psychotropic drugs during
trial is obviously to be approached with great care, and competency hearings to
evaluate the effects on a defendant’s ability to appropriately participate in his or
her defense are very important. In the case at bar, we cannot say that the trial
court’s competency determination was clearly erroneous . . . .
McManus I, 814 N.E.2d at 264.
Thus, the state trial court found, and the Indiana Supreme Court recognized and agreed, that Mr.
McManus was competent to stand trial. That determination is to be treated as a finding of fact
for federal habeas purposes. This was the conclusion reached in Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S.
111, 117 (1983) (per curiam), as cited in Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111 (1995), and
Wallace v. Ward, 191 F.3d 1235, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 1999), and similar circumstances were
discussed by Judge McKinney in Woods v. Anderson, 302 F.Supp.2d 915, 927 (S.D.Ind. 2004).
Mr. McManus has not rebutted the state court’s findings by clear and convincing evidence.
Likewise, Mr. McManus has not shown error in the trial court's determination of his competence
to stand trial with respect to the process used, with respect to the facts found (which would
require the showing of “clear and convincing evidence” as prescribed by § 2254(e)(1)), with

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respect to the standard applied, or with respect to the result reached. Thus, Mr. McManus is not
entitled to relief on this ground. McManus, 2011 WL 1257969 at *5.
The presumption of correctness that attaches to the Indiana court’s factual findings in Mr.
McManus’ federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus were not rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence. And, Mr. McManus cannot show that reasonable jurists would find this court's
assessment of his competency to stand trial claim under the AEDPA either “debatable or wrong.”
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Accordingly, Mr. McManus’ request for a COA on this claim is denied.
D.

Mr. McManus seeks a COA as to his claim that counsel’s performance during the
penalty phase violated his right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
Mr. McManus claims that his counsel failed to competently prepare for the penalty phase

of the proceedings including a failure to: (1) properly investigate records and witnesses regarding
his education; (2) identify and interview friends and family as mitigation witnesses; (3)
investigate whether Mr. McManus was mentally retarded; and (4) provide mental health experts
to make an assessment of Mr. McManus. Mr. McManus claims that these omissions resulted in
an incomplete picture as to evidence of his mental retardation, persistent ADHD, bipolar disorder
and evidence of the impact these conditions had on his life and functioning at the time of the
offense. This Court determined that the Indiana courts recognized the controlling law governing
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase and that circumstances which
would defeat AEDPA’s deference to the decisions of the state courts were not present.
Furthermore, this Court noted that “McManus has not shown by clear and convincing evidence
that the various recitations of evidence or factual findings by the Indiana state courts are not
correct.” McManus, 2011 WL 1257969 at *14.
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), the standard for judging any
claim of ineffectiveness is “whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of
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the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” This
Court specifically addressed Mr. McManus’ argument as to counsel ineffectiveness at the
penalty phase:
It has been noted that “only a clear error in applying Strickland's standard
would support a writ of habeas corpus,” Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876, 8882
(7th Cir. 1997). While such errors do occur, e,g., Brown v. Sternes, 304 F.3d 677
(7th Cir. 2002); Roche v. Davis, 291 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2002), no such error
occurred in the representation McManus received in the trial court. Accordingly,
he is not entitled to relief as to this claim.
This Court has also concluded, independent of the deference commanded
by the AEDPA to the Indiana Supreme Court’s finding of no inadequate
performance, that McManus was not prejudiced by the representation he received.
McManus, 2011 WL 1257969 at *14. Under the constitutional standard established by
Strickland, Mr. McManus cannot demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would find the court's
assessment of his ineffectiveness claims debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
Accordingly, Mr. McManus’ request for a COA on his claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is
denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained herein, Mr. McManus’ petition for a certificate of appealability
(Dkt. 64) is GRANTED as to the Atkins claim and is in all other respects DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated:

10/04/2012

________________________
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

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DISTRIBUTION:
Stephen R. Creason
[e-mail]
Kelly A. Miklos
[e-mail]
Joseph M. Cleary
[e-mail]
Marie F. Donnelly
[e-mail]

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