MCGUIRE v. RAY'S LLC et al
Filing
147
ENTRY granting Defendant's 125 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 130 Motion to Certify Class (see Entry). Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 9/30/2011. (PG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
RANDY L. HOWARD, on behalf of himself )
and all other employees similarly situated, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
RAY’S LLC,
)
Defendant.
1:08-cv-627-RLY-MJD
ENTRY DENYING CLASS CERTIFICATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
This lawsuit has been through several phases which have added and subtracted
both parties and claims. One named plaintiff, one defendant and one claim remain.
Defendant has filed a summary judgment motion with respect to the remaining claim and,
as explained in this entry, the court finds the motion to be well taken. Plaintiff’s motion
seeking class certification is untimely and without merit.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden
1
of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The non-moving party, however, may not rest on
mere allegations or denials in its pleadings, but rather “must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
A genuine issue of material fact exists if “there is sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary to the
claims before the court will not, by themselves, defeat a summary judgment motion. Id.
at 247-48. When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court
views the record and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 283 (7th Cir. 2003).
Summary judgment is also proper, indeed it is mandated, when it is clear that the
plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish his case.
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Under this scenario, “there can be no ‘genuine issue as to
any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. The
moving party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to the nonmoving
party’s failure to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of which he carried
the burden of proof. Id.
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II. Factual Background
The factual background of this dispute has been laid out in several of this court’s
previous orders, so a brief summary of the general circumstances should suffice at this
point with a discussion of specific pertinent undisputed facts included in the court’s legal
analysis.
Defendant, Ray’s, LLC (“Ray’s”), is a transportation services company which
picks up and transports trash and recyclables from residential and commercial customers
of an affiliated waste disposal and recycling company. Plaintiff, Randy Howard, worked
for Ray’s from January of 1999 through July 25, 2008, when he voluntarily left its
employ. He started working in Ray’s “yard” in the maintenance department and later
became a delivery driver in 2005 and a “roll-off” truck driver in August 2006. His work
as a driver is what is most relevant to the claim he has brought in this lawsuit.
Ray’s employees, who work in the yard, punch in and out at the time clock when
they go to lunch. Drivers and employees known as slingers, who assist the drivers by
loading the recyclables and garbage into certain types of trucks, also use the time clock to
mark the start and finish of their work days, but do not punch in and out when they take
their lunch breaks. Ray’s expects drivers and slingers to take a twenty minute unpaid
lunch break each day while out running their routes, and informs them of this at the start
of their employment by describing that policy in the checklist which new employees
3
receive and sign. Based on the twenty minute allowance for lunch, it is the policy of
Ray’s to automatically deduct those twenty minutes from each of its driver’s and slinger’s
daily time record. The time clock registers the twenty minute deduction on the
employee’s time card. Drivers and slingers are under no immediate supervision while on
route, so the honor system applies to the time taken for lunch. Each employee reviews
and signs his time card before turning it in each week to payroll. No more than twenty
minutes is deducted from an employee’s daily recorded time unless an employee reports
that he took more than that amount of time for lunch. Any discrepancies, necessary time
additions or deletions or any other problems with the amount of time reflected on an
employee’s time card are to be brought to the attention of Valerie Abernathy, the Human
Resources Manager at Ray’s, whose responsibilities include correcting any inaccuracies.
Like it did for all drivers, Ray’s deducted twenty minute lunch breaks from
Plaintiff’s daily time record during the course of his driving career and he never took
issue with that deduction until he joined this lawsuit. Backed by the affidavit testimony
of several drivers and slingers, the Plaintiff contends now that, as a matter of routine, he
and most drivers and slingers working at Ray’s would eat their lunches as they worked.
Plaintiff testified at his deposition that, the predominate reason for eating “on the run” is
“[y]ou don’t have enough time” because of the way route assignments are made.1
1
What is never made clear in the record is exactly what Plaintiff means when he says
there was insufficient time to eat lunch because of how routes were assigned at Ray’s.
(continued...)
4
Plaintiff claims he developed the routine of eating while driving as a result of what he
learned back in 1999 when he would occasionally be asked to leave the yard and work as
a slinger. On one occasion in 1999, he noted on his time card that he had not taken any
lunch on a particular day and someone at Ray’s told him that he need not put such a
notation on his time card because twenty minutes would be deducted regardless of
whether he ate lunch or not. He never again noted on his time card that he had not taken
a twenty minute lunch break, nor did he ever report working through a lunch break to
Valerie Abernathy. He freely admits that he was never told not to take a lunch break.
III. Procedural History
This lawsuit was originally filed on May 14, 2008, by one plaintiff, Joseph Craft,
who sought to recover back wages and liquidated damages from Ray’s and from one of its
officers. Craft brought the lawsuit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, seeking to utilize the “collective action”
provision of that act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which allows for notice to be given to other
similarly situated employees and former employees (in this case drivers and slingers),
1
(...continued)
Generally, the time records indicate that the amount of time he spent on routes varied
considerably day to day, generally ranging from eight to twelve hours. He mentions in his
affidavit that there were times when dispatchers reprimanded Drivers for not completing their
job duties within “the allotted time,” but nothing more in explanation is provided. There is no
evidence that Ray’s would have refused to pay Howard for the additional twenty minutes it
would have taken on any given day for him to complete a route if he had stopped for twenty
minutes to have lunch.
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allowing them to consent to or “opt-in” to the lawsuit to become plaintiffs as well. Craft
alleged in the Complaint that working through lunch breaks and attending mandatory
meetings caused him to be paid less than required by the FLSA.
On July 14, 2008, the court allowed an amended complaint to be filed. The First
Amended Complaint added three additional named plaintiffs, including the current and
sole remaining plaintiff, Randy Howard. In addition to the collective action claim under
the FLSA, the First Amended Complaint was the first iteration containing a claim under
Indiana Code § 22-2-5-1, the Indiana Wage Payment Statute, which claim was also
alleged on behalf of a class of employees and former employees who were similarly
situated. Later that same month, plaintiffs successfully moved the court for conditional
certification of the collective action, allowing notice to be provided to current and former
drivers and slingers whom plaintiffs claimed were similarly situated. In August 2008, a
Second Amended Complaint was filed which added an additional named plaintiff.
In September 2009, this court entered its order granting summary judgment in
favor of defendants on the collective action claims under the FLSA, finding that drivers
and slingers were exempted from coverage under the FLSA, instead falling under the
purview of the Motor Carrier Act (“MCA”). The MCA is a federal statute which
provides the legal framework for operating trucks in interstate commerce and plaintiffs
made no claim under the MCA. That same order granted defendants judgment on the
state law claim as well; however, due to a mistake of law, the court entered an order on
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January 14, 2010, altering its previous order and judgment to allow Plaintiff to maintain a
claim under the Indiana Wage Payment Statute against Ray’s.
Plaintiff maintains that Ray’s failure to pay him for the twenty minutes that were
deducted from his time card each day amounted to a violation of the Indiana Wage
Payment Statute, and contends that he should be allowed to pursue this statutory claim as
a class action on behalf`of other drivers and slingers who are working or have worked for
Ray’s since May of 2006. Ray’s filed its summary judgment motion on September 16,
2010 and, two weeks later, Plaintiff filed his motion seeking class certification.
IV. Analysis
A. Class Certification Motion
Plaintiff filed his Motion For Class Certification on September 23, 2010. He
seeks to have the following class certified:
All Drivers and Slingers who are currently employed by Defendant or who
voluntarily terminated their employment with Defendant from May 14,
2006 to the conclusion of this action.
In order to be found appropriate for class action treatment, a plaintiff’s claim must
be analyzed to determine whether the familiar four prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)
(“Rule 23(a)”) have been met, and then whether the claim can be categorized in
accordance with the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
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Rule 23(a) provides:
.
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
Though a district court is not prohibited from deciding the merits of a claim prior
to addressing a motion seeking class certification of that claim, typically the preferred
order is for the trial court to rule on a motion for class certification and then move
forward to consider a motion challenging the merits of the case. Weismueller v.
Kosobucki, 513 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 2008). This court finds that the Plaintiff’s class
certification motion should be denied for at least two easily identifiable reasons.
First, Plaintiff’s motion is extremely untimely. His class certification motion was
filed more than two years after the court allowed Plaintiff and other named plaintiffs, who
have since been dismissed, to first assert a state law claim in the First Amended
Complaint and also more than two years after the current Second Amended Complaint
was filed. The class certification motion also comes more than nine months after the
court altered its initial judgment to allow Plaintiff to pursue his claim for breach of the
Wage Payment Statute, and two weeks after a summary judgment motion attacking that
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claim was filed by Ray’s.
At all relevant times, this district’s Local Rule 23.1 required plaintiffs to file a
motion addressing class certification within ninety days of filing a complaint.2
Regardless of whether the court calculates the ninety day deadline starting from the date
that either of the amended complaints was filed or the date that the court altered its ruling
to allow Howard to pursue the state law claim, the class certification motion is
significantly late. Furthermore, it is not as though plaintiffs had not considered the need
to seek prompt approval of pursuing this matter on behalf of others. Promptly after filing
the First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Notice to Potential Plaintiffs
and Conditional Certification, but that motion addressed only the FLSA claim and made
no request for class action treatment of the state law claim being asserted in the First
Amended Complaint. If class certification of the state law claim was going to be sought,
it would have been logical to have pursued it at that same time. In any case, it was
necessary to pursue certification much sooner than the pending motion in order to remain
in compliance with Local Rule 23.1 and to give the court an opportunity to address the
issue prior to being presented with a ripe summary judgment motion.
Even if unnecessary delay in seeking class certification were deemed insufficient
2
Effective January 1, 2011, Local Rule 23.1 no longer requires a motion for class
certification be filed within ninety days of a complaint, leaving the deadline for the same to be
decided as part of each lawsuit’s case management plan.
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to deny class certification, Plaintiff is clearly not an adequate representative of the class.
Plaintiff testified in his deposition regarding his deep financial difficulties and the series
of lawsuits that have been brought against him by creditors and others. Although he went
through bankruptcy at one point, he testified that he forgot to list some of his debts and
had to reopen the bankruptcy to deal with some of the lawsuits against him brought by
creditors. Plaintiff would like to file for bankruptcy again, but is unable to do so because
of the recency of his last bankruptcy filing.
Howard listed only three legal matters in response to an interrogatory in this
lawsuit which sought the name, case number and jurisdiction of any civil or criminal legal
proceedings he had been involved in, yet he testified to more than double that number in
his deposition. His credibility is further eroded by his claim that he never took a lunch
break and always worked through the allotted twenty minutes. Such a blanket claim is
not only questionable on its face, but at least five other Ray’s employees, with whom
Plaintiff worked in the past and some of whom would be included in the class, have
provided affidavit testimony to the effect that they often took lunch breaks with Plaintiff
or observed him taking his lunch breaks during the course of the day.
The motivation and credibility of an individual seeking to represent absent class
members is a crucial consideration when considering that individual’s adequacy as a class
representative. Davidson v. Citizens Gas & Coke Utility, 238 F.R.D. 225, 229 (S.D.Ind.
2006). Integrity and credibility are appropriate characteristics to examine when
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determining if an individual would make an adequate representative because a lead
plaintiff will act as a fiduciary for his absent cohorts. Searcy v. eFunds Corp., 2010 WL
1337684 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 31, 2010); Kaplan v. Pomerantz, 132 F.R.D. 504, 508-510
(N.D.Ill. 1990). A class is not fairly and adequately represented if class members have
claims which conflict or are antagonistic to the representatives, and a named plaintiff with
credibility problems may be considered to have interests antagonistic to the class.
Kaplan, 132 F.R.D. at 510.
Finally, it should be noted that this order also addresses the Defendant’s summary
judgment motion and, as will be explained in the following section, the court’s
determination on that motion is unfavorable for Plaintiff. Plaintiff was an at-will
employee who impliedly accepted the terms of his employment with Ray’s by continuing
to work for the company for many years after gaining an understanding that his daily
wage did not include payment at his hourly rate for twenty minutes of time during the day
when he was expected to be taking a lunch break. He also agreed to review and sign-off
on his personal time cards to verify the total of his weekly hours. Thus, the court has
determined that Plaintiff has no basis to claim that he did not receive all wages due him
within the time period prescribed by the Wage Payment Statute. He therefore has no
claim and would not adequately represent others, if any, who might avoid a similar
disqualification. Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify a Class is denied.
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B. Summary Judgment Motion
In St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Center, Inc. v. Steele, 766 N.E.2d 699 (Ind.
2002), the Supreme Court of Indiana determined that the Indiana Wage Payment Statute
governs both the frequency and amount an employer must pay its employees. In St.
Vincent, the hospital had a written agreement as to what it was to pay an employee, Dr.
Robert Steele, based upon collections resulting from his provision of services. Id. at 700701. After a proposed regulation was issued by the Health Care Financing
Administration prohibiting physicians from referring Medicare and Medicaid patients to a
clinical laboratory in which the physician had a financial interest, the hospital began
excluding from its calculation of “collections” the monies it received from Dr. Steele’s
administration of chemotherapy and other medications to Medicare and Medicaid
patients. Id. at 701. Dr. Steele challenged the actions of the hospital and the trial court
agreed that St.Vincent had breached its contract with Dr. Steele, violated the statute, and
was required to pay a judgment for wages under the written agreement, as well as treble
damages and attorney fees pursuant to Indiana Code § 22-2-5-2. Id. The Indiana Court
of Appeals upheld the trial court, as did the Indiana Supreme Court. Id. at 702.
In deciding the St. Vincent case, the court made it clear that an employee’s wage is
the product of a mutual decision between the employee and employer, and that the Wage
Payment Statute itself does not dictate how the wage is to be calculated. Id. at 704 n. 4.
Whatever the wage agreed upon, the full amount due the employee must be paid in
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accordance with the time period the employee and employer have agreed to or within the
default statutory pay frequency requirements if no alternative arrangement was agreed to.
Id. at 704 n. 4. Chief Justice Randall Shepard, in his separate concurrence, aptly
summarized the essence of the court’s ruling:
I write separately to observe that the reason treble damages can be imposed
on the employer in this case is that the court ultimately determined that the
employer’s grounds for reducing its payments to the employee were legally
unavailing. Thus, the holding of this case is that the full amount of the
employee’s earnings were the “amount due him” under the statute. Had the
employer’s grounds for withholding a part of the employee’s wages been
upheld, then the employer would have already paid the full “amount due”
and treble damages would not be available.
Id. at 706.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff does not complain about the frequency with which he
was paid; he challenges the amount he was paid.3 Applying the Supreme Court of
Indiana’s analysis in St. Vincent, it is evident that this court must determine whether
Plaintiff was paid the “amount due him.” Or, put another way, the court must determine
whether Ray’s had a legally sound basis for its automatic deduction of twenty minutes for
lunch breaks regardless of whether Plaintiff took them. The short answer to the inquiry is
that Ray’s did pay Howard all amounts due him, because the automatic deduction of
3
Plaintiff also argues that twenty minutes was not enough time to eat lunch and that the
drivers should have been allowed at least thirty minutes. However, there is nothing in the Wage
Payment Statute that has any bearing on the time allowed an employee for lunch.
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twenty minutes for lunch breaks was part and parcel of the terms of employment agreed
to by Plaintiff.
This is not a case that mirrors the facts in St. Vincent, where an employee under a
written employment contract immediately identified what he believed to be a
miscalculation in his pay and insisted that the employer rectify the mistake. Even if we
credit Plaintiff’s recollection of the day in 1999 when he wrote on his time card that he
had not taken lunch and someone in a supervisory role told him that such a note was
useless because the twenty minutes would be deducted regardless, he never questioned
that arrangement going forward. In other words, as an at-will employee, Plaintiff agreed
to the policy as a term of, or change to, his employment agreement by continuing to work
under the policy without ever raising the issue until long after he left Ray’s employment.
Wheeler v. Balemaster, 601 N.E.2d 447, 448 (Ind.App. 1992)(at-will employee accepts
change in employment terms by continuing to work under the new terms).
Plaintiff relies heavily on Williams v. Riverside Community Corrections Corp.,
846 N.E.2d 738 (Ind.App. 2006) to support his contention that immediately after he
worked through his lunch break his entitlement to pay for those twenty minutes vested
and could not be taken away.4 Williams involved a plaintiff, Maisha Williams, who was
4
One immediate flaw in Plaintiff’s analysis is that, because there was no set time for
lunch it would be hard to know exactly when, on any given day, he had worked through his
lunch break and his entitlement to twenty minutes worth of pay accrued.
14
terminated from her job at a corrections center and thereafter brought an action for wages
and other compensation she claimed due pursuant to Indiana’s Wage Claims Statute,
Indiana Code § 22-2-9-1. Id. at 742. At the time she started her employment with the
corrections center, Williams signed an acknowledgment of her employer’s policy of
reducing the hourly wage of an employee to the federal minimum wage for the last
payroll period prior to any voluntary or involuntary termination of that employee. The
policy also dictated that there would be a forfeiture of any accrued vacation or sick time
the employee may have earned. Id. at 741-42. When she was terminated, the corrections
center issued Williams a final paycheck in compliance with its policies, reducing her
hourly wage and making no payment for Williams’s accrued vacation time. Id. at 742.
After a lengthy discussion of “present vs. deferred” compensation, the Indiana Court of
Appeals concluded that the employer did not have to pay the employee for the accrued
vacation or sick leave, but it could not reduce the plaintiff’s wage, because that wage was
earned at the pay scale the parties had agreed to and her entitlement to be paid at that
scale vested at the moment the work was performed. Id. at 752.
This court finds Williams inapplicable for several reasons. First, Williams involves
a claim under the Wage Claim Statute as opposed to the Wage Payment Statute, the
significance of which is the category of employee/plaintiff which those statutes apply to.
The Wage Claim Statute applies to involuntarily terminated employees and deals only
with the final amount due to that employee at the time of termination. See St. Vincent,
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766 N.E.2d at 704-05 (Wage Claim Statute applies to terminated employees while Wage
Payment Statute applies to current employees and those who have voluntarily left their
employment). Second, the plaintiff in Williams had not received paychecks during her
employment wherein she was paid at the minimum wage, rather she was challenging the
retroactive lowering of her wage, which reduction applied only to her final paycheck.
Of particular note should also be the Court’s statement in the Williams decision
that:
In addressing this claim, then, we must determine (1) whether Williams’
hourly wage was, indeed, a term of her employment contract and (2) if it
was a term of her contract, whether it was subject to any contractual
agreement providing for forfeiture upon involuntary termination.
Id. at 745. After determining that her hourly wage was a term of her employment, the
Court went on to specifically find that the corrections center admitted that the
acknowledgment forms it had its employees sign were not designed to be a contract. Id.
at 746. Hence, the plaintiff in Williams had done nothing to bargain away her entitlement
to her full wage for the hours she had worked during her final pay period.
Contrast those circumstances to the situation in the case at bar, where by
implication Plaintiff had agreed for years to be paid based upon the time cards he
reviewed and signed each week, including the twenty minute deduction for a lunch
allowance. The terms of an employment contract can be implied through the actions and
understandings of the parties. Argabright v. R.H. Marlin, Inc., 804 N.E.2d 1161, 1167
16
(Ind.App. 2004); Murray v. Monroe-Gregg School Dist., 585 N.E.2d 687 (Ind.App.
1992). Here, there is no question that Plaintiff understood that he would not be paid for
twenty minutes of the total time he was away from Ray’s yard and driving his routes,
because he was expected to take a twenty minute lunch break during that time away from
the yard. The fact that, while under no direct supervision he and others chose not to take
that twenty minute lunch break does not unilaterally alter that agreement. Therefore, the
second inquiry which the Court in Williams found to be a required part of the analysis,
that being a determination of whether there was any contractual agreement that would
negate the original agreement to pay a certain wage, would not result in a different
conclusion in this case. When the facts are undisputed, the existence of a contract
affecting the terms of employment is generally a question of law for the court, Orr v.
Westminster Village North, Inc., 689 N.E.2d 712, 721 (Ind. 1997), and here, there can be
no question that Plaintiff had agreed to be paid an amount each day which took into
account a deduction of the twenty minutes allowed for an unpaid lunch break.
Finally, though not a major chord upon which this court’s decision rests, Plaintiff’s
interpretation of the Williams decision and the immediate vesting of an entitlement to pay
upon an employee’s exertion of labor, regardless of any workplace policies, would lead to
untenable results in other situations as well. For example, assume a factory employee
spends part of her lunch hour picking up litter in the company parking lot or remains on
the premises after normal working hours to do the same, without any request from the
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company that she do so. Applying Plaintiff’s analysis, after voluntarily resigning from
her job she could demand to be paid her hourly wage for the time she spent laboring for
the benefit of her employer by cleaning up its property. Obviously, such a hypothetical
differs in many respects from the circumstance at hand. Nevertheless, the point made is
that an employer should be able to rely on an employee, not under its immediate
supervision, to follow the procedures or work rules adopted for lunches or breaks, without
a fear that it can be held liable for wages under the Indiana Wage Payment Statute if the
employee never informs the employer that he or she chose to work at a time when the
employer does not expect, require or desire them to do so.
It is this court’s responsibility to apply Indiana law as it believes the highest court
in the state would apply it. L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT & T Information Systems, Inc., 9
F.3d 561, 574 (7th Cir. 1993). Based on the record before it and this court’s
interpretation of the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in the St. Vincent case, as a matter
of law Plaintiff is not entitled to recover wages or liquidated damages under Indiana’s
Wage Payment Statute. Therefore, Ray’s is entitled to summary judgment on the
remaining claim of the last-named plaintiff in this lawsuit.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed in this entry, Plaintiff’s Motion To Certify Class (Docket
# 130 is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 125) is
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GRANTED. A separate judgment shall issue, accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of September 2011.
__________________________________
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF
United States District Court JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Southern District of Indiana
Electronic Copies to:
Kim F. Ebert
OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART
kim.ebert@ogletreedeakins.com
Philip J. Gibbons Jr.
GIBBONS JONES, P.C.
pgibbons@gibbonsjones.com
Andrew G. Jones
GIBBONS JONES P.C.
ajones@gibbonsjones.com
Christopher C. Murray
OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART
christopher.murray@ogletreedeakins.com
Steven F. Pockrass
OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART
steven.pockrass@ogletreedeakins.com
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