YEFTICH et al v. Navistar, Inc. et al
Filing
98
ORDER - granting 85 Motion for Summary Judgment. Final judgment shall issue accordingly. *** SEE ORDER ***. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 7/24/2012. (CKM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
ROBERT YEFTICH, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NAVISTAR, INC., d/b/a NAVISTAR
INTERNATIONAL TRUCK AND
ENGINE CORP., and INDIANAPOLIS
CASTING CORP.,
Defendants.
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1:09-cv-1045-SEB-DKL
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This cause is now before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
[Docket No. 85], filed on September 15, 2011, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 56.1. Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendants,
their former employers, alleging that Defendants denied their rights under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1140. For the reasons
detailed in this entry, we GRANT Defendants’ Motion.
Factual Background
Defendants, Navistar, Inc., d/b/a Navistar International Truck and Engine Corp.
and Indianapolis Casting Corp. (collectively, “Navistar”), formerly operated an engine
plant in Indianapolis, Indiana. From approximately 2003 through 2009, the only
manufacturing work performed at that location was the production of medium-duty diesel
engines for Ford Motor Company (“Ford”). Plaintiffs, forty-three former employees of
Defendant, all worked at the Indianapolis plant and/or the adjacent foundry.
Throughout their employment with Navistar, Plaintiffs were represented for
purposes of collective bargaining by the International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (the “UAW”) and its
affiliated Local Unions No. 98 and 226 (collectively, the “Union”). While employed, all
Plaintiffs were participants in various employee benefit plans governed by ERISA,
including a health care plan, retirement plan, 401K plan, profit sharing plan, education
reimbursement plan, and family life insurance plan.
In January 2009, Defendants announced that Ford was terminating its engine
production agreement with Navistar, thereby eliminating all of the production work being
performed at the Indianapolis plant, and that, as a result of this loss of business, Navistar
intended to cease engine production operations at the engine plant on July 31, 2009.
Consistent with Defendants’ January 2009 announcement, all engine production and
assembly work at the Indianapolis plant subsequently ceased on or about that date.
According to Defendants, following the cessation of production at the Indianapolis plant,
the engine manufacturing work that was performed there simply ended; it was not
transferred to a different Navistar facility or subcontracted out to other companies.
Plaintiffs allege, however, that at some point after the plant closed Defendants transferred
the work to another Navistar plant in Hunstville, Alabama, where it was performed by
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non-union workers. Pls.’ Ans. to Interrog.
Prior to the cessation of production, Navistar and the Union commenced
bargaining as to the effects of the cessation on the bargaining unit employees, ultimately
entering into an agreement entitled “UAW Closing Agreement: Indianapolis Engine Plant
(the “Cessation Agreement”). The Cessation Agreement provided for all of the
bargaining unit employees who worked at the Indianapolis plant to be placed on layoff
when production ceased. Pursuant to the Cessation Agreement, employees had various
options upon the elimination of their positions, including enhanced pension benefits in the
form of early retirement options as well as the opportunity to be placed on Navistar’s
“Master Recall List,” meaning that they could potentially be recalled from layoff to
placement at other Navistar facilities. Laid off employees were also given the option of
accepting a Master Recall List buyout, whereby they would receive a payment of $7,500
in exchange for their agreement to relinquish their right to be recalled to other Navistar
plants. Employees who accepted the buyout retained their “local” recall rights, meaning
that they would still be eligible to be recalled to the Indianapolis plant in the event that
engine production ever resumed at that location.
The parties dispute the employment status of Plaintiffs at the time engine
production at the Indianapolis plant ceased. According to Defendants, as of July 31,
2009, eighteen Plaintiffs had already ended their employment with Navistar for reasons
unrelated to the cessation of production; after production was terminated, twelve other
Plaintiffs voluntarily resigned or retired between August 2, 2009 and February 1, 2011;
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two Plaintiffs accepted employment with Defendant at other locations; and eleven
Plaintiffs currently remain on layoff. Plaintiffs, however, contend that no one left
voluntarily; instead, they were all forced either to resign or retire or to remain on layoff.
Legal Analysis
I.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is “no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Disputes concerning material facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding whether genuine issues of material
fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party
and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See id. at 255.
However, neither the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties,” id. at 247, nor the existence of “some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), will
defeat a motion for summary judgment. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Illinois, Inc.,
209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000).
The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of
the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
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The party seeking summary judgment on a claim on which the non-moving party bears
the burden of proof at trial may discharge its burden by showing an absence of evidence
to support the non-moving party’s case. Id. at 325.
Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits, nor is it a vehicle
for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th
Cir. 1994). Thus, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the
non-movant, if genuine doubts remain and a reasonable fact-finder could find for the
party opposing the motion, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Shields Enter., Inc.
v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992); Wolf v. City of Fitchburg,
870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989). But if it is clear that a plaintiff will be unable to
satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish her case, summary judgment is not
only appropriate, but mandated. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Ziliak v. AstraZeneca LP,
324 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 2003). Further, a failure to prove one essential element
“necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
II.
Discussion
Section 510 of ERISA makes it “unlawful for any person to discharge, fine,
suspend, expel, discipline or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for
exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit
plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Under § 510, a plaintiff must “show that the reason he was
terminated was to interfere with his rights under ERISA.” Fairchild v. Forma Scientific,
Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 576 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 141 F.3d
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290 (7th Cir. 1998)). In other words, “[t]he employer must have the specific intent to
deprive an employee of his plan rights.” Isbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 418 F.3d 788, 796
(7th Cir. 2005) (citing 141 F.3d at 295).
Here, Plaintiffs have failed to come forward with any evidence of an unlawful
intent sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. In fact, in their brief in
opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiffs “adopt as undisputed” almost all of the facts
asserted in Defendants’ brief in support, including Defendants’ assertion that Navistar’s
decision to cease engine production operations at the Indianapolis plant “was based solely
on Ford’s decision to cancel its agreement to purchase the only product being
manufactured at the [plant] – Ford diesel engines. The cessation of engine production
was not motivated in any way by an intent to interfere with and/or avoid obligations
related to the Plaintiffs’ rights to ERISA plan benefits.” Defs.’ Mem. at 5, SOF ¶ 9; see
Pls.’ Resp. at 3 (adopting as undisputed Defs.’ SOF ¶ 9). Because Plaintiffs cannot
establish an entitlement to recover on their claims without evidence to show that
Defendants specifically intended to interfere with their benefits, these admissions are fatal
to their case.
Even if Plaintiffs had not made such admissions, their lawsuit still could not
survive summary judgment. Although Plaintiffs assert that they “have evidence such as
... documents, testimony, and grievances” that establish unlawful interference with their
ERISA rights, they have entirely failed to identify such evidence in response to
Defendants’ motion. It is well-established under Seventh Circuit law that summary
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judgment is the “‘put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, where a party must show what
evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.’” Steen
v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese
Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005)). Here, Plaintiffs have offered nothing more
than conclusory and unsupported assertions in the form of responses to Defendants’
interrogatories and requests to admit, which in addition have not even been filed by all
Plaintiffs. Such deficiencies defeat any attempt to forestall summary judgment.
III.
Conclusion
Having failed to come forward with evidence to establish the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact as to an element on which they bear the burden of proof at
trial, Plaintiffs cannot survive summary judgment. Accordingly, we GRANT Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. Final judgment shall issue accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
07/24/2012
Date: ___________________________
_______________________________
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
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Copies to:
Michael C. Kendall
KENDALL LAW OFFICE
mckatlaw@aol.com
Thomas J. Posey
FRANCZEK RADELET P.C.
tjp@franczek.com
Robert Anthony Prather
BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
tony.prather@btlaw.com
David P. Radelet
FRANCZEK SULLIVAN P.C.
dpr@franczek.com
W. Russell Sipes
THE SIPES LAW FIRM
sipeslaw@aol.com
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