THOMAS v. INDIANAPOLIS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

Filing 176

ENTRY on Supplemental Motion in Limine - Defendants' supplemental motion in limine (Dkt. 172 ) is DENIED. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 2/1/2012. (TRG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

DENNIS W. THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
OFFICER GREGORY P. BRINKER and
OFFICER MARK RAND,
Defendants.

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NO. 1:09-cv-01516-TWP-MJD

ENTRY ON SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ supplemental motion in limine (Dkt.
172). Defendants seek to exclude evidence regarding why the Marion County Prosecutor’s
Office agreed to dismiss Plaintiff’s second count of Resisting Law Enforcement by Force against
Officer Rand, other than that it was a term of his plea agreement. To bolster this argument,
Defendants attach an affidavit from the lead Deputy Prosecutor on Plaintiff’s criminal case, who
represents that “[i]n exchange for the two guilty pleas, the State of Indiana agreed to dismiss the
Resisting Law Enforcement by Force charge.” The Deputy Prosecutor also represents that “[t]he
fact the resisting by force charge was dismissed is not tantamount to an admission by the State
that [Plaintiff] did not resist” and “does not mean the State lacked sufficient evidence to prove
the charge.” Indeed, from personal experience, this Court knows and it is well-settled that
“[p]rosecutors may offer strong inducements . . . to elicit . . . guilty pleas.” United States v.
Keeter, 130 F.3d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 1997)
Plaintiff responds to Defendants’ supplemental motion with two arguments. First,
Plaintiff argues that the motion is belated and fails to comply with the timeline set out in the
Case Management Plan. (See Dkt. 45 at 5-6) (motions in limine should be filed two weeks before
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the final pretrial conference). This point is well-taken, but the Court is also cognizant that, in the
weeks prior to trial, a degree of flexibility is warranted. Technically, a motion in limine can be
requested at virtually any time, even at the trial itself.
More substantively, Plaintiff argues that “[i]f the defendants believe that [Plaintiff]
testifies inconsistent[ly] with the evidence that has been disclosed and admitted in this case, then
they can make whatever objections they believe are appropriate.” (Dkt. 174 at 3). The Court
agrees. Neither the Court nor the parties know how Plaintiff will testify when on the witness
stand. If he testifies in a manner that is inconsistent with the evidence, Defendants will be given
ample latitude to impeach him, up to and including calling the Deputy Prosecutor to testify why
exactly the second count for resisting law enforcement was dropped. (See Dkt. 175) (“if the
Court permits Plaintiff to testify as to why his second count of Resisting Law Enforcement was
dismissed, then Defendants will call [the] Deputy Prosecutor [] as an impeachment witness”).
The parties are on notice that this issue may arise during trial, and that Defendants may request
leave to add an additional witness for impeachment of Plaintiff on this narrow issue. Overall, the
Court finds that this issue is best addressed during the course of trial itself. Defendants’
supplemental motion in limine (Dkt. 172) is therefore DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 02/01/2012

________________________
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

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Distribution to:
Amy L. Cueller
THE CUELLER LAW OFFICE
[e-mail]
Beth Ann Dale
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, CORPORATION COUNSEL
[e-mail]
Andrew R. Duncan
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS & HASBROOK
[e-mail]
John F. Kautzman
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS & HASBROOK
[e-mail]
Edward J. Merchant
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS & HASBROOK
[e-mail]
John C. Ruckelshaus
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS & HASBROOK
[e-mail]
Clifford R. Whitehead
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, CORPORATION COUNSEL
[e-mail]
Alexander Phillip Will
OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL
[e-mail]

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