GEORGE v. JUNIOR ACHIEVEMENT OF CENTRAL INDIANA, INC.

Filing 123

ORDER granting 103 Motion to Dismiss to the extent that Mr. Georges claims against him for the March 2010 defamation are DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECTMATTER JURISDICTION. Additionally, within seven days, the remaining partiesmust SHOW CAUSE, if any, why the Courts jurisdictional analysis is not equally applicable to the claims against the other defendants arising from the March 2010 defamation. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 7/21/2011. (PG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
VICTOR GEORGE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JUNIOR ACHIEVEMENT OF CENTRAL INDIANA,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.

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1:10-cv-00220-JMS-MJD

ORDER
Presently before the Court is Defendant David Wilson’s Motion to Sever Claims and to
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. [Dkt. 103.] The Plaintiff, Victor George, filed
no response to the motion, and the time for doing so has expired.
This action originally began between Mr. George and Junior Achievement of Central Indiana, Inc. (“JACI”). Invoking federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Mr. George sued
JACI for retaliatory firing under the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29
U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. [Dkt. 1.] Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a plaintiff
to join as many claims as the plaintiff has against the same defendant, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 18(a), he
also asserted various state-law claims against JACI arising in connection with his January 2010
termination, including one for defamation. [Id.] Supplemental jurisdiction conferred authority
upon the Court to hear those additional claims, despite the lack of diversity of citizenship between Mr. George and JACI. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (permitting district courts that have original jurisdiction over an action to also adjudicate “claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article
III of the United States Constitution”).

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In May of this year, following his filing of a First Amended Complaint, which beefed up
the allegations against JACI, Mr. George filed a Second Amended Complaint, with leave from
the Magistrate Judge. [Dkt. 87.] The Second Amended Complaint included new non-diverse
defendants, including Mr. Wilson. [Id.] Mr. George added the new defendants because he believed that they had defamed him through comments, in March 2010, about his termination. [Id.]
The new defamation claims were, according to Mr. George’s motion to amend, eligible to
be joined in this action because they “arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences as his previously pled defamation claims against JACI.” [Dkt. 79 ¶7
(citing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 20(a)(2) (governing joinder of defendants)).] Thus the overlap of the
only federal claim, for ERISA retaliation, with the defamation claims in the Second Amended
Complaint looks like this as to Mr. Wilson:

January 2010
ERISA
Retaliation

January 2010
Defamation

March 2010
Defamation

Now that he is a party, Mr. Wilson raises two objections to his presence to this action.
First, he says that his presence as a defendant in this action does not satisfy the joinder requirements for defendants set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2). And even if joinder
were proper under the Rules, Mr. Wilson says that Congress has not conferred the Court with
supplemental jurisdiction to hear the defamation claims against him.
Because jurisdiction always constitutes a threshold question, see, e.g., Sandoval v. City of
Chicago, 560 F.3d 703, 704 (7th Cir. 2009), the Court will begin by deciding whether, as cur-

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rently joined, the Court possesses supplemental jurisdiction over the March 2010 defamation
claims against Mr. Wilson.
Given his lack of a response brief, Mr. George apparently cannot find any basis for the
Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim. Neither can the Court. Supplemental jurisdiction can only exist over “claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added). The only claim within this
Court’s original jurisdiction is an ERISA retaliation claim. As the Venn diagram above indicates, the March 2010 defamation claim is too far removed from that claim to form part of the
same “case or controversy”; the March 2010 defamation claim lacks a “common nucleus of
operative fact” with the ERISA retaliation claim, as required for supplemental jurisdiction, Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423, 424 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[J]udicial power to hear both state and federal claims exists where the federal claim has sufficient substance to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, and the state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative
facts.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the March 2010 defamation claim as to Mr. Wilson.1
Because Mr. Wilson and Mr. George do not have a diversity of citizenship, severing the
claim against Mr. Wilson would also result in a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

1

Even where supplemental jurisdiction exists, Congress has given the Court discretion to decline
to exercise it when there are “compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(4). The Court finds that such reasons exist here for declining jurisdiction. Mr. Wilson
has advised that the other person that Mr. Wilson allegedly defamed in same online postings at
issue here has a pending defamation action against Mr. Wilson in state court. Judicial economy
could be significantly furthered if the same court could manage both lawsuits arising from the
same allegedly defamatory statements. Only the state court can do so.
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Accordingly the Court GRANTS Mr. Wilson’s motion to the extent that Mr. George’s
claims against him for the March 2010 defamation are DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. Additionally, within seven days, the remaining parties
must SHOW CAUSE, if any, why the Court’s jurisdictional analysis is not equally applicable to
the claims against the other defendants arising from the March 2010 defamation.
07/21/2011
_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution via ECF only:
Michael R. Bain
HUME SMITH GEDDES GREEN & SIMMONS
[e-mail]
Beth A Barnes
HUME SMITH GEDDES GREEN & SIMMONS
[e-mail]
Edward Gerard Bielski
STEWART & IRWIN P.C.
[e-mail]
Blake J. Burgan
TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP
[e-mail]
Darren Andrew Craig
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
[e-mail]
Thomas L. Davis
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
[e-mail]
Edward O'Donnell DeLaney
DELANEY & DELANEY LLC
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[e-mail]
Kathleen Ann DeLaney
DELANEY & DELANEY LLC
[e-mail]
Randall W. Graff
KOPKA PINKUS DOLIN & EADS
[e-mail]
Christine Marie Riesner
STEWART & IRWIN
[e-mail]
Christopher S. Stake
DELANEY & DELANEY LLC
[e-mail]
Danielle Beth Tucker
TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP
[e-mail]
Heather L. Wilson
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
[e-mail]
Andrew P. Wirick
HUME SMITH GEDDES GREEN & SIMMONS
[e-mail]

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