SMITH v. SMITH et al

Filing 100

Entry Discussing Selected Matters - The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration 99 is denied. The plaintiff's petition for copy of document 97 is granted. A copy of the plaintiff's response to the motion to dismiss shall be incl uded with the plaintiff's copy of this Entry. The plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel 78 is denied. The plaintiff's motions for the issuance of subpoenas and for the advancement of funds to secure the attendance of witnesses 76 and 77 are denied. (copy to Plaintiff via US Mail). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 4/5/2012. (JKS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
ERIC D. SMITH,
v.

Plaintiff,

JENNIFER SMITH et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 1:10-cv-256-JMS-MJD

Entry Discussing Selected Matters
I.
Motions to reconsider serve a very limited purpose and are only appropriate
for those “rare” situations where the court has “patently misunderstood a party,”
has decided an issue outside the scope of adversarial presentation, has “made an
error not of reasoning but of apprehension. A further basis for a motion to
reconsider would be a controlling or significant change in the law or facts since the
submission of the issue to the Court. Such problems rarely arise and the motion to
reconsider should be equally rare.” Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales,
Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990)(citing Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan
Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.Va. 1983)). The Entry of March 8, 2012, does
not contain any ruling which is erroneous or inadequately explained. The plaintiff
has not relied on controlling or significant change in the law or facts in seeking
reconsideration of portions of that ruling. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration [99] is denied.
II.
The plaintiff’s petition for copy of document [97] is granted. A copy of the
plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss shall be included with the plaintiff’s
copy of this Entry.
III.
The plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel has been considered.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), courts are empowered only to "request"
counsel. Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989). There is
no constitutional right to an attorney in a civil proceeding. Jackson v. Kotter, 541

F.3d 688, 700 (7th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the question is not whether an attorney
would help the plaintiff’s case, but whether, given the difficulty of the case, the
plaintiff seems competent to litigate it themselves. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647,
653, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
The court finds at present, that the claims asserted by the plaintiff are not of
sufficient complexity or merit as to surpass the plaintiff’s ability to properly develop
and present them. Regardless, the plaintiff is within the spectrum of “most indigent
parties” because he has and will have a meaningful opportunity to present his
claims. He has demonstrated familiarity with his claims and the ability to present
them. Having considered the complexity of the plaintiff=s claims and his ability to
litigate his case, this is not a case in which at present it is appropriate to seek
representation for the plaintiff.
Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel [78]
is denied.
IV.
The plaintiff’s motions for the issuance of subpoenas and for
advancement of funds to secure the attendance of witnesses [76] and [77]
denied because the plaintiff has admitted that he lacks the funds to pay
attendance and mileage fees to secure the presence of witnesses and the court
no authority to either waive or advance those funds.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

04/05/2012
Date: _________________
Distribution:
Bruce Benjamin Paul
[e-mail]
Eric D. Smith
DOC #112675
Wabash Valley - CF
6908 S. Old U.S. Highway 41
P.O. Box 1111
Carlisle, IN 47838

_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

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