HENSON v. BUSS et al
Filing
48
Entry Discussing Motion for Temporary Restraining Order: The plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order 36 is denied. The reasons for this ruling include the following ***SEE ENTRY FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION***. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 1/11/2012. (DW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TIMOTHY G. HENSON,
vs.
EDWIN BUSS, et al.,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
)
)
Defendants. )
No. 1:10-cv-1009-WTL-DML
Entry Discussing Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
order.
The plaintiff, a state prisoner, seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining
Requests for temporary restraining orders are governed by the same general
standards that govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See New Motor
Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977).
“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (citation omitted). An
injunction is an equitable remedy so its issuance is one which falls within the sound
discretion of the district court. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). A
court may issue a stay pending appeal or an order granting interim injunctive relief
only when the movant demonstrates: (a) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (b) that
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (c) that the
balance of equities tips in his favor; and (d) that an injunction is in the public
interest. Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008). The “movant has the
burden to show that all four factors . . . weigh in favor of the injunction.” Davis v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C.Cir. 2009).
The plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order [36] is denied. The
reasons for this ruling include the following:
1.
The concerns present in such motion are not extraordinary.
2.
There is no indication that the plaintiff has been or will be impeded in
his ability to litigate this matter in an effective manner.
3.
The relief sought by the plaintiff, in the manner sought, would be of no
significance; that is, the temporary restraining order would expire ten days after it
was issued, for that is the nature of a temporary restraining order.
4.
Process has not been issued to any of the defendants and the court has
not acquired in personam jurisdiction over any of the defendants.
5.
It has not been determined whether a legally viable claim is asserted in
the amended complaint. Thus, the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) has
not been conducted. Given the length and complexity of the complaint, this screening
step will be significant.
6.
The relief sought by the plaintiff would not be consistent with the
Supreme Court’s directions that “federal courts . . . afford appropriate deference and
flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment[.]” Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995). Where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would
require the court to interfere with the administration of a state prison, “appropriate
consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the
availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976).
The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison
officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional
institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded
wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that
are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v.
Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979). See
Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998) (“it is not the role of the
federal judiciary to scrutinize and interfere with the daily operations of a state
prison[.]”). As noted in Fox v. Rodgers, 2009 WL 891719 (E.D.Mich. 2009), any
injunction issued against prison officials dealing with the day-to-day operation of the
prison system may cause substantial harm to both public and private interests.
Routine prison operations are related to security concerns, see, e.g., Walker v.
Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977), and are matters with which the federal courts
should be reluctant to interfere. “It is not the role of the federal judiciary to scrutinize
and interfere with the daily operations of a state prison[.]”Peterson v. Shanks, 149
F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998).
7.
The plaintiff’s request is too vague and lacks the specificity required by
Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest
River Housing, Inc., 512 F.3d 412 (7th Cir. 2008). Rule 65(d) requires that a
preliminary injunction be specific in its terms and set forth in reasonable detail the
acts to be restrained. It is for this reason that an injunction requiring a party to “obey
the law” is improper. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1200-01 (11th Cir.
1999); Daniels v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1134 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[A]n
injunction which does little or nothing more than order the defendants to obey the
law is not specific enough."). This court is incapable of enforcing so broad and vague
an injunction. Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974) (finding that because "an
injunctive order prohibits conduct under threat of judicial punishment, basic fairness
requires that those enjoined receive explicit notice of precisely what conduct is
outlawed.").
8.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering a
request for preliminary injunctive relief, the court is bound by the requirement that
as a preliminary matter, it have before it an actual case or controversy. City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United
for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). As suggested by
the observation in paragraph 5 of this Entry, if the complaint fails to state a viable
claim for relief the action will have to be dismissed, see Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910,
921 (2007)(pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), "[a] complaint is subject to dismissal for
failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show that plaintiff is not
entitled to relief"), and there would be no case or controversy sufficient to support the
court’s limited jurisdiction.
9.
Additionally, a preliminary injunction involving conditions of
confinement at a prison must be “narrowly drawn, extend[ ] no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive
means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. §
3626(a)(1)(A). The motion for a temporary restraining order seeks relief of such scope
that it is unlikely this statutory command could be satisfied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
01/11/2012
Date: __________________
Distribution:
Timothy G. Henson
128238
Pendleton Correctional Facility
4490 West Reformatory Road
Pendleton, IN 46064
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?