CHIKURI v. ST. VINCENT NEW HOPE, INC.
Filing
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ENTRY granting Defendant's 10 Motion to Dismiss (see Entry). Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 4/15/2011. (PG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
PATIENCE N. CHIKURI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ST. VINCENT NEW HOPE, INC.,
Defendant.
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1:10-cv-1097-RLY-DML
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
On August 31, 2010, Patience N. Chikuri (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against
her former employer, St. Vincent New Hope, Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging that she was
terminated from her employment as a result of religious discrimination, in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). On
December 6, 2010, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Plaintiff
failed to state a claim for relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Based on the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.
I.
Plaintiff’s Affidavit
As a preliminary matter, Defendant argues that the court should not consider
Plaintiff’s Affidavit, which is attached to Plaintiff’s Response, because it contradicts
allegations contained in the Complaint. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court
may look to allegations made outside the complaint, “so long as those allegations are
consistent with the complaint.” Lang v. TCF Nat. Bank, 249 Fed.Appx. 464, 465 (7th
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Cir. 2007) (citing Help and Home, Inc. v. Med. Capital, L.L.C., 260 F.3d 748, 752-53 (7th
Cir. 2001)).
The Complaint states that at the time the events giving rise to this lawsuit
occurred, Plaintiff was “exploring becoming a Muslim.” (Complaint ¶ 17). Plaintiff’s
Affidavit provides that her “[t]ransition to Muslim was quick” and that it was her “new
found religion.” (Affidavit of Patience Chikuri (“Plaintiff Aff.”) ¶ 7). The Affidavit also
provides, in the following paragraph, that she “started learning Muslin [sic] but that [her]
excitement was cut short” because neither her friends or family would accept her new
found religion. (Id. ¶ 8).
The court finds that Plaintiff’s Affidavit does not contradict Plaintiff’s allegation
that she was “exploring” her religion. Although she states that Islam was her new found
religion, she also states that she was in the process of learning it, and that she does not
practice it because her friends and family do not approve. Accordingly, the court may
consider Plaintiff’s Affidavit in ruling on the present Motion to Dismiss.
II.
Factual Background
Defendant is a facility that provides services to mentally and physically disabled
clients. (Id. ¶ 8). Plaintiff began working for Defendant in January 2004. (Complaint ¶
7). As an employee of Defendant, Plaintiff’s job duties required her to provide direct
assistance to individuals living at the facility, which included taking individuals on
various errands, as well as assisting with household chores and other personal needs. (Id.
¶ 9).
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On several occasions, Plaintiff was asked by her supervisor to drive one particular
resident to church services at the Church of the Nazarene. (Id. ¶ 10). Each time
Plaintiff’s supervisor directed her to drive the resident to church, Plaintiff complained that
she was uncomfortable with the beliefs and practices of the Church of the Nazarene. (Id.
¶ 11). In addition, Plaintiff asked to be “accommodated” by being released from the duty
of driving the resident to church. (Id. ). Plaintiff’s supervisor did not approve Plaintiff’s
request. (Id. ¶ 12).
On February 10, 2008, Plaintiff’s supervisor asked Plaintiff to drive the resident to
the Church of the Nazarene, but Plaintiff refused to do so. (Id. ¶ 13). On February 12,
2008, Plaintiff was terminated from her position for failing to follow her supervisor’s
instructions. (Id. ¶ 15).
Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated based on her religious beliefs. Plaintiff
claims that she does not currently practice a particular religion, but at the time of her
termination, Plaintiff was exploring becoming a Muslim. (Id. ¶ 17). Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant engaged in religious discrimination1 and failed to accommodate her religious
beliefs, in violation of Title VII. (Id. ¶¶ 16-26).
III.
Motion to Dismiss Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits the dismissal of a claim for
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Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a claim of retaliation under Title VII. As
Defendant properly notes, the retaliation claim is more properly analyzed as part of the religious
discrimination claim because the Complaint fails to allege that Plaintiff engaged in protected
activity. (Defendant Moving Brief at 3 n.1). Plaintiff does not contest Defendant’s argument.
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“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The
purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the
complaint, not the merits of the lawsuit. Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672,
675-76 (7th Cir. 2001). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court construes the
allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all wellpleaded facts and allegations in the complaint are accepted as true. Bontkowski v. First
Nat’l Bank of Cicero, 998 F.2d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1993). A motion to dismiss should be
granted if the plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).
IV.
Discussion
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or discharge
any individual, or to otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(a)(1). Under the statute, religion includes
“all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate . . . an employee’s . . .
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business.” Id. § 2000e(j). In order to establish a claim for religious discrimination under
Title VII, Plaintiff must show that: (1) her bona fide religious practice conflicted with an
employment requirement; (2) she notified the employer of the practice; and (3) the
practice was the basis for an adverse employment action. Adams v. Retail Ventures, Inc.,
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325 Fed.Appx. 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Ilnoa of Hungary, Inc., 108
F.3d 1569, 1575 (7th Cir. 1997)). If Plaintiff establishes the elements of a prima facie
claim for religious discrimination, then “the burden is on the employer to show that a
reasonable accommodation of the religious practice was made or that any accommodation
would result in undue hardship.” Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470,
475 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 1986)).
Here, Plaintiff cannot establish the first element of her prima facie religious
discrimination claim because she does not allege a bona fide religious practice. Plaintiff
merely alleges that she was “exploring” becoming a Muslim, and that she was in the
process of learning Islam. (Complaint ¶ 17; Plaintiff Aff. ¶ 7). Moreover, Plaintiff fails
to allege a specific religious practice or belief held by her that was used as a basis for her
termination. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that the patient’s religious practices of attending the
Church of the Nazarene made Plaintiff uncomfortable. Title VII provides a cause of
action where a plaintiff’s own religious beliefs lead to an adverse employment action, but
not where another individual’s religious practices and beliefs merely make a plaintiff
uncomfortable. See Kreilkamp v. Roundy’s, Inc., 428 F.Supp.2d 903, 908 (W.D. Wis.
2006) (“[A]n employee cannot redefine . . . [an] aversion as a religious belief” (citing
Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., Inc., 330 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Even if Plaintiff had properly alleged a religious practice, the Complaint contains
no allegation that Plaintiff ever informed Defendant of her religious beliefs or practices.
In fact, Plaintiff specifically states that she kept her religious beliefs private, and did not
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openly practice Islam. (Plaintiff’s Aff. ¶¶ 7-8). Thus, because Plaintiff fails to allege the
elements of a prima facie religious discrimination claim, both her religious discrimination
claim and her failure to accommodate claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Anderson, 274 F.3d at 475 (citations omitted);
E.E.O.C., 108 F.3d at 1575.
V.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss (Docket # 10).
SO ORDERED this 15th day of April 2011.
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RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
United States District Court
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Southern District of Indiana
Electronic Copies To:
Matthew T. Black
OFFICE OF THE INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
matthew.black@atg.in.gov
Gail M. Flatow
FLATOW LAW FIRM
gail@flatowlaw.com
John Patrick Ryan Jr.
HALL RENDER KILLIAN HEATH & LYMAN
jpryan@hallrender.com
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Craig M. Williams
HALL RENDER KILLIAN HEATH & LYMAN
cwilliams@HallRender.com
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