PETTIFORD v. DAVIS et al

Filing 74

ORDER granting Defendants 54 Motion for Summary Judgment. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue (See Order) (copy mailed). Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 7/3/2012. (MAC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
KEVIN PETTIFORD,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JENNIFER (GARZA) DAVIS,
)
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS
)
Supervisor, et al.,
)
)
Defendants. )

1:10-cv-1324-SEB-TAB

Entry Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff Kevin Pettiford alleges that the defendants, Jennifer Davis,1
Richard Little, and Chad Stewart violated his constitutional rights while he was on
house arrest. His claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pettiford alleges
he was denied medical care for a tooth abscess, denied his right to practice his
religion and denied privileges such as job search and educational opportunities. In
addition, Pettiford alleges he was denied the opportunity to shop and therefore
maintain personal hygiene and cleanliness, or to have enough food. No state law
claims are asserted.
The defendants, employees of Delaware County Community Corrections
(“Community Corrections”), deny that they violated Pettiford’s constitutional rights
and argue that the restrictions placed on Pettiford were reasonable and justified by
his repeated failure to abstain from illegal drugs and follow program rules. The
defendants seek resolution of the claims alleged against them through the entry of
summary judgment.
For the reasons explained below, the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment [54] is granted.

1

Jennifer Davis is now known as Jennifer Murray. The names Jennifer Davis and Jennifer Murray both appear in
the caption of the complaint, but these names identify the same person. For consistency, the name Jennifer Davis is
used throughout this Entry because that was her name during the relevant time period.

1

I. Standard of Review
The motion for summary judgment in this civil rights action, as with any
such motion, must be granted Aif the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A “material fact” is one that “might affect the outcome of the
suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine
only if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Id. If no reasonable
jury could find for the non-moving party, then there is no Agenuine@ dispute. Scott v.
Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always
bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its
motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of
demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Harney v.
Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 526 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing cases).
AIn evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court should draw all
reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and
should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar
summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit
in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. Irrelevant or
unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment, even when in dispute.@ Harney,
526 F.3d at 1104 (internal citations omitted). AIf the nonmoving party fails to
establish the existence of an element essential to his case, one on which he would
bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving
party.@ Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1115 (1997).
II. Statement of Material Facts
The following statement of facts is not necessarily objectively true, but as the
summary judgment standard requires, the undisputed facts and the disputed
evidence are presented in the light reasonably most favorable to Pettiford as the
non-moving party. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
150 (2000). Immaterial facts, legal arguments, statements made without citation to
the record, or statements supported by inadmissible evidence were disregarded
because Aa party’s failure to comply with summary judgment evidentiary
requirements is traditionally remedied . . . by excluding the non-conforming
submission . . . .@ Ziliak v. AstraZeneca LP, 324 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing
cases). See also Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c); Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d
757, 760 (7th Cir. 2006); and Haywood v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 323 F.3d 524,
533 (7th Cir. 2003) (inadmissible hearsay cannot be used to overcome a properly
2

supported motion for summary judgment). There is no reason to stray from the
traditional remedy in this case.
A.

Background

On August 22, 2006, Pettiford was charged with Burglary, as a Class C
Felony, and Theft, as a Class D felony, with an additional count seeking a habitual
offender enhancement. On September 1, 2006, Pettiford was charged in an
unrelated case with two counts of Burglary, as Class C felonies, and two counts of
Theft, as Class D felonies, with an additional count seeking a habitual offender
enhancement. On August 8, 2007, Pettiford pled guilty to one count of Burglary in
each case, each as a Class C felony. He was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment on
each count, with the sentences to run consecutively. Pettiford v. State, 942 N.E.2d
925 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011).
On June 25, 2009, Pettiford filed a Motion for Alternative Placement,
requesting placement with Community Corrections. The Delaware Circuit Court
No. 4 granted Pettiford’s petition for alternative placement on August 26, 2009,
allowing him to serve the remainder of his sentence by electronically-monitored
home detention. Pettiford was apprised of the requirements of home detention,
which included completing a substance abuse treatment program, abstaining from
the use of alcohol or illicit drugs, submitting to drug testing, and remaining in his
home unless authorized to leave by his case manager. Pettiford, 942 N.E.2d at 925.
An offender on home detention “is responsible for providing food, housing, clothing,
medical care, and other treatment expenses.” IND. CODE ' 35-38-2.5-9.
B.

Home Detention

Although Pettiford’s motion for alternative placement was granted August
26, 2009, he was placed on probation daily reporting until a home detention
monitoring device became available. On November 9, 2009, Pettiford began the inhome detention program authorized by IND. CODE ' 35-38-2.5-1, et seq. Pettiford
signed agreements for release of confidential information and for payment of courtapproved fees for the program, and of all Community Corrections home detention
rules, initialing each one, as required of all persons before being placed on the home
detention program. The rules were agreed to and signed by him and by Jennifer
Davis on behalf of the program.
A person on home detention is confined to their residence, which is monitored
by an electronic device which they are to wear at all times; it sends a signal to the
program office, while the client is at or near his home, but outside of that range
Community Corrections has no way to tell where the clients are or what they are
doing. Any time the client is out of the range of his home, unless he is at a place
either previously approved by his case manager, or responding to a personal
medical emergency, he would be in violation of the agreement and rules.
3

Pettiford did have a landline telephone at his home while he was on the
program, but he did not have a car. He traveled by bicycle.
Home detention clients are strictly forbidden from alcohol and drug use.
Pettiford knew that the program required complete abstinence from drugs and
alcohol. A single verified occasion of drug and alcohol use merits immediate
dismissal from the home detention program and return to the Indiana Department
of Correction. When Community Corrections does not opt to immediately petition
for revocation of home detention, drug and alcohol violations automatically result in
the revocation for thirty (30) days of all personal time, such as scheduled
appointments outside the house, for any reason. The purpose of this rule is to
prohibit (to the extent possible) the drug or alcohol abuser from intermingling with
the public where he might procure additional drugs and alcohol. The 30-day
revocation of personal time is consistent with Community Corrections’ Standard
Violations Sanctions (see dkt 58-8) and Special Time Out Guidelines. These
guidelines were developed in early 2009 for the purposes of making administration
of the rules and guidelines as uniform as possible and for giving the program
flexibility to work toward rehabilitation of clients.
C.

Pettiford’s Rule Violations

Pettiford was on the home detention program for a total of 78 days. Because
of his multiple rule violations (detailed below) Pettiford’s personal time outside of
his home was restricted.
Based on Pettiford’s rule violations, the State filed a petition to revoke
Pettiford’s home detention on January 27, 2010. A warrant was issued the same
day. On March 31, 2010, after an evidentiary hearing, the Delaware County Circuit
Court No. 4 trial court revoked Pettiford’s home detention and ordered him to serve
the rest of his sentence with the Indiana Department of Correction. Specifically, the
court found that Pettiford violated the terms of his electronically monitored home
detention by testing positive for Cocaine on January 19, 2010, January 12, 2010,
November 30, 2009, and November 16, 2009. See Original Image of Appellate Brief
of Kevin T. Pettiford (August 19, 2010), available at 2010 WL 3621467, p. 8 of 15.
Pettiford appealed the revocation of his home detention. The Indiana Court of
Appeals affirmed, finding that:
Pettiford tested positive for use of cocaine on November 9, 16, and 30,
2009, and again on January 12 and 19, 2010. The November 9 test also
revealed that he had used marijuana, and the November 16 test
revealed use of alcohol. Pettiford admitted that he had used those
substances on each occasion. On November 14, 2009, and December 9,
2009, the electronic monitoring system in Pettiford’s home registered
him as being out of range without permission.
4

Pettiford v. State, 942 N.E.2d 925 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011).2 The Indiana Court of Appeals
also found that Pettiford had been apprised of all rules including those requiring
him to remain in his home unless authorized to leave by his case manager and to
abstain from the use of alcohol or illicit drugs. It held that placement on home
detention is a matter of grace, not right and that violation of a single condition of
home detention was enough to revoke it. Id.
D.

Scheduling Guidelines

Home detention clients such as Pettiford are required to report to the
Community Corrections’ office on a weekly basis and meet with their case manager
to set out their weekly approved schedule.
Scheduling guidelines were signed by Jennifer Davis and Kevin Pettiford
prior to the beginning of Pettiford’s home detention. The scheduling guidelines
outlined the amount of personal time generally allotted outside of the home for
certain tasks. The specific guidelines relevant to this lawsuit are the following:
•

Store/Laundry: You will be allowed 3 hours per week for the purposes
of going to the store, paying bills, and doing laundry. If you are using
time for laundry it MUST BE AT A LAUNDRY MAT not at a private
home. Failure to provide proof WILL result in loss of this privilege for
at least one month.

•

Church: Regularly scheduled church services. This does not include
dinners, receptions, or other gatherings that are not conducted on a
REGULAR BASIS.

•

Personal Appointments: Appointments for such things as the doctor,

Pettiford’s disagreement with the state court findings of his rule violations is not sufficient to
create a material fact in dispute. Pettiford’s unsupported statements (why he thinks the drug tests
were wrong) will not defeat summary judgment where the evidence in the record is to the contrary.
See, e.g., Pettiford’s Direct Examination, dkt. 58-23 at p.18 (agreeing that while on home detention
he used cocaine and tested positive for cocaine on several occasions). In addition, this court will not
reconsider the state court findings to determine whether these or other violations were invalid for
some reason. The collateral estoppel effect of the prior state court proceedings is determined by
Indiana law. Best v. City of Portland, 554 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2009). “Under Indiana law,
collateral estoppel bars subsequent litigation of an issue necessarily adjudicated in a former suit if
the same issue is presented in the subsequent suit.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). A
court asked to apply collateral estoppel must “determine what the first judgment decided and then
examine how that determination bears on the second case.” Id. In Pettiford’s revocation proceeding,
which was reviewed on appeal, the trial court concluded that Pettiford violated the terms of his home
detention and these violations resulted in the revocation of his home detention. These violations
included: Pettiford’s positive drug tests of November 16, and November 30, 2009, January 12 and
January 19, 2010. These findings were affirmed on appeal and any challenge to these finding are
barred by collateral estoppel.
2

5

lawyer, haircuts, must be made in advance and written on your
schedule during your office visit. There will be NO CALL IN
CHANGES unless it is an emergency.
If personal time is lost because of a rule violation, the program client is generally
confined to his house, except for his meetings at the Community Corrections office.
On the first client schedule which Case Manager Little made out with
Pettiford on November 9, 2009, three (3) hours were allotted for “store time” on
November 14, 2012. No additional “store time” appears on Pettiford’s weekly client
schedules.
Pettiford testified that he was not without toothpaste or soap for any
extended period of time. He was out of soap for four to five days at most and out of
toothpaste for “maybe two or three days.” Pettiford Dep. at dkt. 58-20, p. 74.
Pettiford did at all times have access to both hot and cold running water. Pettiford
testified that he never ran completely out of food, although there were times when
he was down to peanut butter and jelly sandwiches.
E.

Medical Emergencies

A person on home detention can respond to a medical emergency at any time,
even if not on his or her case schedule, but the person is required to provide
verifying information afterwards to the case manager. Pettiford testified that he
understood that he had to provide documentation of a medical emergency, if he left
his home on account of one. He knew he could call an ambulance in an emergency,
and then would have to provide hospital documentation. However, at no time while
Pettiford was on home detention did he provide any sort of verifying medical
documentation to case managers for them to review.
While on home detention Pettiford developed an abscessed tooth. Pettiford
could have called a dentist about the abscess and scheduled an appointment, but
Pettiford states he did not have the money to pay a dentist. Pettiford testified that
he went to walk-in clinics in the neighborhood twice regarding the abscessed tooth
issue in December. Neither time did he get treatment, Pettiford explained, because
the clinic needed income verification and a $15 payment. Pettiford eventually
acquired $15 from his neighbor and went to the clinic for a third time with the
payment on January 26, 2010.
Pettiford states that he was sanctioned on December 22, 2009, were for going
to the clinic. The violation report, however, states that the violation was for failing
to report to the Community Corrections office as directed and for traveling to two
different locations without calling and gaining permission to do so. (dkt 58-11 at p.
3).
6

Pettiford was rearrested on the petition for revocation and booked in the
Delaware County Jail, on January 29, 2010. After he arrived at the Delaware
County Jail, he received antibiotics and the abscessed tooth was pulled a week
later.
F.

Religious Practices

A home detention client, who is not in violation of the rules with personal
time suspended, may go to regularly scheduled church services for his religious
denomination. This would not generally include meetings outside the times of
regular services.
Pettiford was permitted to attend what the case managers believed were
regular Sunday services at Bethel AME church on November 15, 22, and 29, and
December 6, 13, and 20, 2009. On these dates, Pettiford had permission to leave his
home at 10:30 a.m. and was to return by 2:00 p.m. Like other personal time
Pettiford received after his positive drug tests, these church activities were contrary
to the standard violation sanctions and special time out guidelines, but Case
Manager Little felt activities of this nature might be positive for Pettiford. Because
of his rule violations, Pettiford was not permitted personal time to attend church
from Sunday December 27, 2009, through January 31, 2010. Even regular church
attendance involves contact with unknown numbers and members of the public, and
is therefore considered personal time which is forfeited once positive drug tests are
shown, under the program rules. At his revocation hearing, Pettiford told the court
that while on home detention he managed to be “active” in church activities, and
attended them “consistently” until his violations started.
There is no restriction on religious ministers directly visiting with home
detention clients in their homes, even when they are restricted there on account of
loss of personal time under the rules. Pettiford was free to have religious personnel
such as ministers come to his home without time restrictions. Pettiford’s assistant
pastor came to his home twice during his home detention, including Christmas.
Pettiford could also communicate with his ministers by telephone. He could also
receive religious materials through the mail. No Community Corrections rule
distinguishes between any religious denomination, church, or belief. Pettiford was
never questioned about his religious beliefs or practices.
G.

Educational Opportunities and Job Search

Community Corrections does not have any documents evidencing any
agreement between Pettiford and the program regarding on-line classes at Ball
State University (BSU). For classes of any kind to have been included on Pettiford’s
schedule, it would have to have been arranged as personal time with his case
manager, to occur only during times Pettiford was not in violation of program rules.
Pettiford was given permission on November 18, 2009, to visit BSU for the purpose
7

of trying to straighten out his financial aid affairs.
Job search was put on Pettiford’s schedule on November 18, 2009, even
though Pettiford was under a personal time restriction as a result of a positive drug
test. Pettiford’s case manager told him that he wanted Pettiford to complete day
treatment before he did any other job searches.
H.

Race Discrimination

Pettiford alleges in his amended complaint that two Community Corrections’
clients named Joshua Wing and Justin Bush were treated better than he was
because they are white and he is black.
Former Community Corrections clients Joshua Wing and Justin Bush were
not home detention clients. These clients were assigned by the court to an entirely
different program, the forensic drug diversion program, which is operated under a
different state statutory scheme and has different program rules. Such forensic
drug diversion clients are monitored more closely and personally than home
detention clients, and must report to the office on a daily basis, in view of the more
strictly rehabilitative purposes of that program. A different team of case managers
supervise those clients. Neither Richard Little, Chad Stewart nor Jennifer Davis
were case managers for Wing or Bush, nor tested them for drug or alcohol use, nor
enforced program rules regarding them. Pettiford, at all times while he was under
the supervision of Community Corrections was never on the forensic drug diversion.
When asked whether any of the defendants had ever made a racial slur or
insult, Pettiford stated no, with the exception of Ms. Davis. When Pettiford asked
permission to shop for groceries Ms. Davis told him that he should have his “drug
buddies” go grocery shopping for him. Pettiford thought her reference to his “drug
buddies” was a racist comment, however she did not use an explicitly racial term
when talking to him (Pettiford dep., p. 78, ln. 20 - p. 81, ln. 23). Ms. Davis explained
that she made this comment in an attempt to get Pettiford to speak honestly about
his drug addiction.
Community Corrections Director June Kramer has never had a complaint,
nor received other information, that Richard Little, Chad Stewart, or Jennifer Davis
ever applied any program rule or guideline in a racially discriminatory manner, or
displayed any racially oriented conduct or words of any kind.
I.

Individual Defendants

Case managers, besides approving client’s weekly schedules, monitor their
client’s compliance with program rules and guidelines. Pettiford was supervised by
three cases managers during his time in the home detention program, including
defendants Richard Little, Chad Stewart and Jennifer Davis. Richard Little was off
8

work for a time in December 2009, and early January 2010, and replaced by Chad
Stewart, as acting case manager for Pettiford, and for one meeting by Jennifer
Davis.
Richard Little
Richard Little was the assigned case manager for Kevin Pettiford in
November 2009 through January 2010. During Little’s first meeting with Pettiford
on November 9, 2009, Pettiford tested positive for and admitted to using both
cocaine and THC. Little was aware that Pettiford could be immediately terminated
from the program for this violation and that a 30-day loss of personal time is
automatic for drug and alcohol use violations. However, since Pettiford had just
come on the program, and stated that he knew his drug use was a problem in his
criminal past, Little opted to try to work with him; he recommended Pettiford to
Meridian Services for substance abuse evaluation and any recommended treatment.
Little gave Pettiford unauthorized personal time on his November 2009 schedules
for the same reason, to encourage him to rehabilitate.
Little was off work in December 2009 and early January 2010, and Chad
Stewart substituted for him in weekly meetings with Pettiford in December, and
Jennifer Davis during the first week of January. Little then resumed his duties as
case manager, and conducted Pettiford’s last two weekly scheduling meetings in
January 2010. At both meetings, Pettiford tested positive for cocaine.
Any personal time which Little gave Pettiford after November 9, 2009, was
given by Little as a personal decision, and in direct contradiction of program
violation guidelines regarding positive drug tests, in Little’s personal hope of
working with Pettiford to encourage him in drug treatment.
Chad Stewart
Chad Stewart is employed as a surveillance officer of Community Corrections
and was also so employed in December 2009 when he substituted as case manager
for Kevin Pettiford when Richard Little was off work. He met with Pettiford four (4)
times to prepare his weekly schedules on December 9, December 15, December 23,
and December 28, 2009, and made notes of those conferences immediately after
each of those meetings. Throughout the time Stewart substituted as Pettiford’s case
manager, Pettiford was under automatic thirty (30) day suspension of personal time
for a positive drug test recorded by Richard Little on November 30, 2009. This
included any time outside Pettiford’s residence, for any reason. On or about
December 15, 2009, Stewart told Pettiford he could not attend a church service, due
to the fact that he had lost personal time for drug violations within the last thirty
(30) days.

9

On December 23, 2009, Pettiford did not show up for his regular
appointment; he later said he had a lawyer and doctor’s appointment but did not
verify these alleged visits afterwards by providing documentation, as he was
required to do by the program rules. Stewart gave him a rule violation for that, with
further loss of personal time for another thirty (30) days.
Jennifer Davis
During the time Pettiford was on the program, Jennifer Davis was the home
detention supervisor, working under Program Director June Kramer’s general
supervision. As supervisor of adult home detention, Ms. Davis had no regular
contact with Pettiford or involvement in the preparation of his weekly schedules.
On, January 5, 2010, Jennifer Davis substituted for case manager Richard
Little to meet with Pettiford. Pettiford requested personal time to go grocery
shopping, complete laundry and look for a job. Pettiford explained that he was
living alone, had no family to assist him and that his only means of transportation
was a bicycle. Pettiford presented a letter to Davis expressing these problems and
stating “[m]y food resources at home will soon be completely depleted.” Dkt 68-23.
Davis testified that she discussed the letter with Program Director June Kramer.
Davis and Kramer decided that Pettiford could go to stores and laundry on his way
to and from the Community Corrections office from his home. 3 Davis does not recall
any discussions with Kevin Pettiford about going to church or choir practice, or
about medical or dental needs.
After Pettiford had positive drug tests on January 12 and 19, 2010, it was
apparent to Davis that attempts to work with Pettiford on his drug issues were not
successful. Therefore, she prepared and signed the petition to remove Pettiford from
the program and send him back to the Department of Correction.
June Kramer
June Kramer is a probation officer for the forensic diversion drug Court of
Delaware County, Indiana, and the director of Community Corrections. Kramer
does not recall a conversation with anyone working for the program about Kevin
Pettiford’s medical or dental issues, religious practice issues, or educational issues.
In her position as director of Community Corrections when a supervisor comes to
Kramer with a problem regarding a client’s general personal needs, such as laundry
and shopping, she might typically suggest that it be worked in during the time the
subject was traveling to and from the Community Corrections’ office.
Kramer does not recall having such a conversation with Jennifer Davis concerning Kevin Pettiford,
however, she has reviewed Davis’ notes regarding a conversation Davis states she had with Kramer
in Davis’ computerized log regarding a conversation on January 5, 2010. Davis’ notes thereto are
consistent with the manner in which Kramer usually handles such issues. The fact that Kramer does
not remember discussing Pettiford with Davis does not create a material question of fact.
3

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III. Discussion
A.

Section 1983

Pettiford argues that even though he was on home detention and violated
program rules by using illicit drugs on multiple occasions that the defendants
violated his constitutional rights by not granting him personal time outside of his
house to shop, do laundry, attend church services and activities, meet with a lawyer
or doctor, search for a job, and take classes at BSU. Pettiford argues that these
activities are rights not privileges. Privileges, he argues should be limited to
activities such as going to the gym, lifting weights, playing basketball, watching a
movie at the theatre, bowling or picnicking. In addition, Pettiford argues because he
was permitted to attend Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings
he should have been permitted to go anywhere he wanted – Ball State, drum
practice, and unverified visits to lawyers and doctors.
In response, the defendants argue that except for his first few days on the
program in November 2009, all of Pettiford’s time outside of his home, for any
reason, was forfeited. The defendants argue that Pettiford simply seeks to fashion a
rehabilitative program for himself as if he were a free person not restricted to his
home.
Pettiford’s claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is
not itself a source of substantive rights; instead, it is a means for vindicating federal
rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (citing
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, “the first step in any
[§ 1983] claim is to identify the specific constitutional right infringed.” Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). A corollary to this rule is that without a predicate
constitutional violation one cannot make out a prima facie case pursuant to § 1983.
Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 349 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992).
As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide
substantive services for those within its border. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
317 (1982). For example, “[f]ree persons are not constitutionally entitled to liver
transplants or other costly medical care at public expense.” Johnson v. Daley, 339
F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2003). However, States have extra obligations toward
prisoners and must provide certain supplies such as food and medical care because
imprisonment takes away their ability to fend for themselves and cuts off
alternative avenues of relief. Id. at 588 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)); see also Monfils v. Taylor, 165
F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 1998). “[L]awful incarceration brings about the necessary
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system.” Domka v. Portage County, Wis. 523
F.3d 776, 780 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995)).
11

Placement in an in-home detention program under IND. CODE ' 35-38-2.5-1 et seq. is
an alternative to commitment to the Department of Correction.
With these principles in mind, each of Pettiford’s claims are discussed below.
B.

Contract Claim

Pettiford asserts that his right to shop, do laundry, attend church and church
activities, meet with a lawyer or doctor, search for a job, and take classes at BSU
arises out of what he describes is his binding contract with Community Corrections.
The defendants are entitled to summary judgment on any contract claim brought
pursuant to § 1983. Such a claim is without merit in this action because § 1983
protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not breaches of contract or
violations of state laws or departmental regulations. See Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d
752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003). In addition, Pettiford specifically disclaims any state law
claims.
C.

Conditions of Confinement Claims

Pettiford alleges that the conditions of his confinement in home detention
violated the Eighth Amendment=s proscription against the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishments. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993) (“It is
undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions
under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.”).
It is well established that “deprivations of basic human needs like food, medical
care, sanitation, and physical safety” trigger Eighth Amendment scrutiny. James v.
Milwaukee County, 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1992). However, “[t]he conditions of
imprisonment, whether of pretrial detainees or of convicted criminals, do not reach
even the threshold of constitutional concern until a showing is made of ‘genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time.’“ Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d
756 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979)).
A prisoner raising an Eighth Amendment claim against a prison official
therefore must satisfy two requirements. The first one is an objective standard:
“[T]he deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer, 114 S.
Ct. at 1977. As the Court explained in Farmer, “a prison official’s act or omission
must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id.
The second requirement is a subjective one:
a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment
for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.
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Id. at 1979. The defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to any claim
related to the conditions of Pettiford’s confinement. There simply is insufficient (no)
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that Pettiford was denied the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Pettiford was never without food or
water. There is no evidence that he missed a single meal. At all times he had a
telephone in his home from which he could have solicited assistance. He had hot
and cold running water so he could bath and wash his clothes even if for a few days
he did not have soap. No human needs were denied by defendants. Shopping is not
a human need. Second, there is no evidence that any defendant considered
Pettiford’s health at risk either because of hygiene, malnourishment or
undernourishment, or other such general condition.
D.

Medical Issue Claim

Pettiford alleges that he was denied the opportunity to seek treatment for an
abscessed tooth and back injury in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth
Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to provide medical care to inmates.
Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1230 (1997).
In order for an inmate to state a claim under ‘ 1983 for medical mistreatment or
denial of medical care, the prisoner must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Deliberate indifference exists only when an official
“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate’s health; the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (construing Estelle).
Assuming that both Pettiford’s alleged back pain and tooth abscess were
serious medical conditions Pettiford, unlike most prisoners, had the power and
responsibility to seek his own treatment. Pettiford was not entitled to free medical
care, nor were the defendants responsible for ensuring his treatment. Indiana law
provides that individuals assigned to home detention are responsible for their own
medical attention. IND. CODE ' 35-38-2.5-9. The home detention program had rules
in place to facilitate plaintiff obtaining medical attention. All Pettiford had to do
was go to a clinic or emergency room after: (1) leaving a phone message, and (2)
thereafter providing written verification from the doctor or clinic thereof, of the time
of the visit and the reason therefore. In the alternative, Pettiford could have used
his home telephone to set up an appointment to see a doctor. Pettiford could have
then presented written verification of his appointment during his Community
Corrections office visit and his case manager would have written that appointment
on his schedule. Pettiford never made an appointment with a dentist, he says,
because of a lack of funds -- but that is not an issue caused by any individual
defendant. The fact is, Pettiford sought treatment even before leaving the program
by twice going to walk-in clinics in the area; the clinic’s failure to treat him (because
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of their internal requirements for certain verifications and for a $15 fee) are, again,
not the responsibility of the defendants.
The defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all medical and dental
issues. The defendants did not violate the constitution as a result of Pettiford’s
failure to personally secure the medical care he required.
E.

Race Discrimination Claims

Pettiford alleges that he was discriminated against because of his race in
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Under Section 1983, a plaintiff
claiming a violation of the Equal Protection Clause is required to establish
intentional discrimination on the part of Defendant. Bruno v. City of Crown Point,
950 F.2d 355, 361 (7th Cir. 1991); Friedle v. City of Madison, 832 F.2d 965, 971-72
(7th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court of the United States holds that “purposeful”
discrimination is an element of a Section 1983 claim based upon racial
discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2746-7 n.1 (1993).
There is no evidence to support Pettiford’s claim of race discrimination.
Pettiford’s attempt to show that other white clients were treated more favorably is
rejected. The two comparators Wing and Bush, were not on a home detention
program like Pettiford, they were on the drug diversion program, nor were they the
responsibility (or in the knowledge) of any named defendant.
As for Pettiford’s claim about his conversation with Jennifer Davis, he
admitted in his deposition she never used racial statements or terminology. He
simply interprets her reference to Pettiford’s drug-supplying friends—“drug
buddies” as a racial reference. This is not a reasonable conclusion. It is
uncontradicted that when Davis and Pettiford had this conversation, he was getting
drugs from his friends.
F.

Religious Practice Claims/ First Amendment Claim

Pettiford alleges that the defendants infringed upon his right to practice his
religion in violation of the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b)(b)(1)(a), and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq., which confers
greater religious rights on prisoners than the free exercise clause has been
interpreted to do. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1; Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714–
17 (2005).4

The plaintiff doesn't mention RLUIPA, but is proceeding pro se and in such cases we interpret the
free exercise claim to include the statutory claim. Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2009).
4

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The defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to both statutory
claims. Claims under RFRA must be denied because RFRA was invalidated as an
enforcement vehicle against the states by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516-517 (1997)). Congress responded by enacting RLUIPA in
2000. See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 798 (7th Cir. 2008). But RLUIPA no longer
does Pettiford any good either. Damages against the defendants in their official
capacities are barred by the state’s sovereign immunity and RLUIPA does not
create a cause of action against state employees in their personal capacity. Grayson
v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 2012); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 886–89
(7th Cir. 2009). Thus, Pettiford is left with his personal-capacity damages claim
under § 1983.
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. . . .” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)
teaches that a government policy or practice violates the Establishment Clause if
(1) it has no secular purpose, (2) its primary effect advances or inhibits religion, or
(3) it fosters an excessive entanglement with religion. The Establishment Clause
also prohibits the government from favoring one religion over another without a
legitimate secular reason. See Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 881 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citing Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ., 260 F.3d 757, 759 (7th Cir.
2001); Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The First Amendment
does not allow a state to make it easier for adherents of one faith to practice their
religion than for adherents of another faith to practice their religion, unless there is
a secular justification for the difference in treatment.”)). In addition, although
prisoners enjoy rights under the free-exercise clause of the First Amendment many
decisions hold that these rights are subject to limits appropriate to the nature of
prison life. Restrictions are permissible if they are reasonably related to legitimate
penological objectives. Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592-593 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987); see also, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1987)).
In this case, the defendants did not violate either the Establishment Clause
or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The defendants had a neutral
reason for restricting Pettiford’s attendance at church services and church related
activities; specifically, Pettiford’s repeated drug use rule violations. The loss of
personal time to mingle with the public upon violation of program rules is
reasonable given that the special restrictions of Indiana home detention are
required to assure the public is not harmed by the offender. See Kopkey v. State,
743 N.E.2d 331, 337 (Ind.App. 2001), trans. denied,743 N.E.2d 331 (Ind. 2001). In
addition, the restrictions on personal time seek to prohibit (to the extent possible)
the drug or alcohol abuser from intermingling with the public where he might
procure additional drugs and alcohol.
Prior to the rule violations Pettiford was active in church activities. To attend
services again, all Pettiford had to do was be free of a violation of program rules for
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thirty (30) days. He then could have resumed going to church services where
members of the general public were present, without the security concerns that
Community Corrections legitimately and objectively held because of plaintiff’s
repeated violations.
Pettiford argues that he was not a threat to society, which he supports by
pointing out that he was allowed to mingle with (despite his drug violations) other
individuals seeking treatment specifically for drug and alcohol use in a supervised
context: at a drug addiction recovery meeting. This argument is frivolous. Pettiford
repeatedly used drugs while on home detention. It was reasonable for the
defendants to want to work with him by allowing him to seek treatment for his
addiction, but not permit him to intermingle with unidentifiable adults and children
who might attend church.
In addition, even when Pettiford was restricted to his home under 30 days
violation he had alternative means of exercising his religion. There were no
restrictions limiting religious representatives visiting his home, they could have
come in at any time without restriction or talked to Pettiford on the phone any hour
of the day. In fact, Pettiford’s assistant minister visited his home twice, including
Christmas. Pettiford was also free to accept unlimited religious materials through
the mail.
In sum, Pettiford could have attended any and all church services if he was
not using drugs. The restrictions placed on Pettiford were temporary, neutral, and
provided Pettiford with alternative means of exercising his religious beliefs. Under
these circumstances the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
the First Amendment claim.
G.

Qualified Immunity

The defendants seek qualified immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity
protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’’ Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct.
1235, 1244-1245 (2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Under the
circumstances discussed above, there was no violation of Pettiford’s constitutional
rights and therefore the defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated
were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries
concerning qualified immunity.”). Our inquiry here is at an end.
IV. Conclusion
It has been explained that “summary judgment serves as the ultimate screen
to weed out truly insubstantial lawsuits prior to trial.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 118
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S. Ct. 1584, 1598 (1998). This is a vital role in the management of court dockets, in
the delivery of justice to individual litigants, and in meeting society=s expectations
that a system of justice operate effectively. Indeed, "it is a gratuitous cruelty to
parties and their witnesses to put them through the emotional ordeal of a trial
when the outcome is foreordained" and in such cases summary judgment is
appropriate. Mason v. Continental Illinois Nat’l Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 367 (7th Cir.
1983).
Here, Pettiford has not identified a genuine issue of material fact as to his
claims and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The motion
for summary judgment [54] is therefore granted. Judgment consistent with this
Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

07/03/2012
Date: __________________
_______________________________
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

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Distribution:
Kevin Pettiford
852730
Indianapolis Re-Entry Educational Facility
401 North Randolph Street
Indianapolis, IN 46201
Michael Roy Morow
[e-mail]

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