BAYNHAM v. MERIDIAN SERVICES CORP

Filing 97

ORDER granting Pltf's 75 Motion to Withdraw Default Admissions (see Order). Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore on 7/9/2012. (SWM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
MINNIE A. BAYNHAM,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MERIDIAN SERVICES CORP,
Defendant.

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) NO. 1:11-cv-00129-TWP-MJD
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ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW DEFAULT ADMISSIONS
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to
Withdraw Default Admissions. [Dkt. 75.]

For the reasons set

forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion will be GRANTED.
On March 6, 2012, the Court Ordered Plaintiff to respond to
Defendant’s Request for Admissions by April 5, 2012.
2.]

[Dkt. 56 at

On April 10, 2012, the Court granted in part Plaintiff’s

motion for enlargement of time and ordered Plaintiff to respond
to Defendant’s Request for Admissions by April 12, 2012.
65 at 2.]

[Dkt.

Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s Request for

Admissions until April 26, 2012.

[Dkt. 75 at 1.]

Consequently,

pursuant to Rule 36(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Defendant’s Request for Admissions were deemed
admitted for Plaintiff’s failure to timely respond.
P. 36(a)(3).

Fed. R. Civ.

By this Motion, Plaintiff seeks to withdraw those

deemed admissions.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b),

a matter admitted under this rule is conclusively
established unless the court, on motion, permits the
admission to be withdrawn or amended. Subject to Rule
16(e), the court may permit the withdrawal or amendment
if it would promote the presentation of the merits of the
action and if the court is not persuaded that it would
prejudice the requesting party in maintaining or
defending the action on the merits.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b).

Thus, the Court may permit a party to

withdraw its admission if two prongs are met.

First, the

withdrawal must promote the presentation of the merits of the
action.

Second, the party who benefits from the admission is not

prejudiced.

Banos v. City of Chicago, 398 F.3d 889, 892 (7th

Cir. 2005).

As to the second prong, “[h]aving to prove one's

case on the merits is not the type of prejudice that satisfies
Rule 36(b).

Indeed, inasmuch as allowing a party to withdraw an

admission will by its very nature always require the other party
to prove something that it otherwise would not have had to prove,
that alone cannot be sufficient prejudice to satisfy Rule 36(b).
Rather, the Defendants must show that they will be prejudiced ‘in
maintaining the action ... on the merits,’ not simply because
they will now be required to maintain the action on the merits.”
Van Hoose v. Nucor Corp., 1:06-cv-01565 WTL LJM, 2007 WL 2898697,
at *1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 13, 2007) (citing to Perez v. Miami-Dade
County, 297 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2002).
Defendant is silent on the first element of the inquiry and
the Court finds that withdrawal of the Plaintiff’s admissions
would clearly promote the resolution of this matter on its

merits.
Defendant claims it would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of
Plaintiff’s admissions (a) because Defendant relied on
Plaintiff’s admissions in preparing its reply in support of its
motion for summary judgment and (b) that “Meridian would have to
obtain additional affidavits and conduct additional depositions
in order to obtain evidence to take the place of Plaintiff’s
admissions.”

[Dkt. 76 at 2.]

The Court is unpersuaded by Defendant’s claims of prejudice.
First, the Court notes that Defendant did not even serve its
Request for Admissions, or any written discovery for that matter,
until more than a year after the case was filed and only ten days
prior to the cut-off for liability discovery, at a point when
such discovery was untimely; Defendant was only allowed to serve
such untimely discovery by Order of the Court.

[See Dkt. 56.]

Second, Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on March
15, 2012, which was twenty-eight days before Plaintiff’s response
to Defendant’s Request for Admissions were to be served.
Pursuant to Local Rule 56-1, the brief in support of Defendant’s
motion was supposed to identify the facts potentially
determinative of the motion.

S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(a)(1).

Plaintiff’s response to the Request for Admission, or any of
Defendant’s written discovery for that matter, could not have
been necessary to Defendant’s summary judgment motion, because

none of those responses were even due until four
motion was filed.

weeks after the

Finally, Defendant’s suggestion that it would

need to “additional affidavits and conduct additional depositions
in order to obtain evidence to take the place of Plaintiff’s
admissions” is equally unpersuasive in light of the fact that
liability discovery closed seven days after Plaintiff’s response
to Defendant’s Request for Admissions were due to be served.
[Dkt. 65 at 2.]
The type of prejudice required to satisfy Rule 36(b) is an
admission which induces the serving party to forbear from
conducting other discovery in reliance upon the admission.
is not the situation here.

That

If Defendant is prejudiced in any way

by the withdrawal of Plaintiff’s admissions is it due primarily
to the fact that Defendant waited until after the very last
moment to even begin to conduct discovery in this matter.
Defendant’s lack of diligence cannot serve as the basis for
establishing the necessary prejudice in this instance.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw Default Admissions,
[Dkt. 75], is hereby GRANTED and any requests deemed admitted as
a result of Plaintiff’s untimely response are hereby withdrawn.

Dated:

07/09/2012

Distribution:

Mark J. Dinsmore
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana

All Electronically Registered Counsel