VISTEON CORPORATION et al v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. CO. OF PITTSBURGH, PA et al

Filing 165

DISCOVERY ORDER: National Union's motion to quash and for protective order Docket No. 125 is granted and Plaintiffs' motion to compel Docket No. 128 is denied (see Order for details). Signed by Magistrate Judge Tim A. Baker on 2/12/2013. (SWM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

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)
)
)
)
)
vs.
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NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE
)
COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA, and
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY )
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CO.,
)
Defendants.
VISTEON CORP.,
VISTEON SYSTEMS, LLC and
LOUIS HEEB,
Plaintiffs,

1:11-cv-200-RLY-TAB

DISCOVERY ORDER
The parties have moved for partial summary judgment on the choice of law issue.
[Docket Nos. 88, 92.] Defendant National Union Fire Insurance Company contends that
Michigan law should govern this insurance dispute, while Plaintiffs Visteon Corporation and
Visteon Systems contend that Indiana law governs. Despite moving for summary judgment,
Plaintiffs seek additional discovery purportedly related to the choice of law issue. For the
reasons below, National Union’s motion to quash and for protective order [Docket No. 125] is
granted and Plaintiffs’ motion to compel [Docket No. 128] is denied.
After moving for summary judgment in September 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Rule 56(d)
motion in October 2012, requesting additional discovery for the purpose of responding to
National Union’s motion for summary judgment and to support their cross motion for summary
judgment. [Docket No. 115.] On December 19, 2012, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d)
motion to conduct a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition because the request was untimely, the information
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sought was not relevant to the choice of law issue, and it was inconsistent for Plaintiffs to claim
they needed additional discovery to adequately brief the choice of law issue after they moved for
summary judgment. [Docket No. 132.] These same issues were raised in National Union’s
motion to quash and for protective order against Plaintiffs’ Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice.
Accordingly, National Union’s motion to quash and for protective order is granted.
Turning to Plaintiffs’ motion to compel, it seeks production of documents on National
Union’s privilege log and certain unredacted documents related to reinsurance and premium
calculation information. [Docket No. 128.] National Union objects to Plaintiffs’ motion on
several grounds. However, it is only necessary for the Court to discuss the relevancy objection
to show that this motion is improper. The focus of the choice of law inquiry should be the
principal location of Plaintiffs’ insured risk at the time National Union issued the policy in
question. Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Temian, 779 F. Supp. 2d 921, 924 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (“If the
principal location of the insured risk can be determined, it is given more weight than other
factors.”). The principal location is determined by identifying the state that has more insured
sites than any other. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitt. v. Standard Fusee Corp., 940 N.E.2d 810,
815–16 (Ind. 2010).
For example, National Union argues that Michigan has more manufacturing facilities,
technical centers, customer service centers, employees, and more total facilities than any other
state. [Docket No. 146 at 6.] However, Plaintiffs assert that they are “entitled to discover
whether or not Nat’l Union’s reinsurers shared Nat’l Union’s alleged understanding that the
principal location of the insured risk was Michigan.” [Docket No. 129 at 7.] But National
Union and its reinsurers’ understanding of risk is irrelevant to whether one state has more sites

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or facilities than another state. National Union is correct that this inquiry is mechanical and rests
on objective facts and not a subjective understanding of risk. The same reasoning applies to
Plaintiffs’ argument that insurance premium calculations “may be prima facie evidence as to
Nat’l Union’s understanding of the risk it underwrote in Visteon’s policies.” [Id. at 9.] It is only
relevant where the insurance premiums were paid, not the rationale for calculating the premiums.
See Temian, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 924–25. Finally, as noted in the Court’s December 19 order, it is
simply inconsistent for Plaintiffs to claim they need additional discovery to adequately brief the
choice of law issue after they moved for summary judgment. For these reasons, National
Union’s motion to quash and for protective order [Docket No. 125] is granted and Plaintiffs’
motion to compel [Docket No. 128] is denied.
DATED: 02/12/2013
_______________________________
Tim A. Baker
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana

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Copies to:
Dean R. Brackenridge
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
[e-mail]
Nicholas D. Butovich
LITCHFIELD CAVO LLP
[e-mail]
Carrie Gibson Doehrmann
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
[e-mail]
Allison Wells Gritton
SPALDING & HILMES, PC
[e-mail]
Timothy F. Jacobs
CLAUSEN MILLER, PC
[e-mail]
George M. Plews
PLEWS SHADLEY RACHER & BRAUN
[e-mail]
Peter M. Racher
PLEWS SHADLEY RACHER & BRAUN
[e-mail]
Brian Michael Reid
LITCHFIELD CAVO LLP
[e-mail]
Todd G. Relue
PLEWS SHADLEY RACHER & BRAUN
[e-mail]
Karen B. Scheidler
PLEWS SHADLEY RACHER & BRAUN
[e-mail]
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Katherine K. Schuman
PLEWS SHADLEY RACHER & BRAUN LLP
[e-mail]
Rosemary Glass Spalding
SPALDING & HILMES PC
[e-mail]
Mark W. Zimmerman
CLAUSEN MILLER PC
[e-mail]

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