STONE v. ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE CENTER
Filing
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ENTRY granting Defendant's 55 Motion for Summary Judgment. The record presents no genuine issue of material fact on Plaintiff's FMLA claim or promissory estoppel claim. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 11/19/2012. (PG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
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vs.
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ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL AND HEALTH )
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CARE CENTER,
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Defendant.
BRANDIE D. STONE,
Plaintiff,
1:11-cv-225-RLY-DML
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Brandie Stone (“Plaintiff”), filed a two-count Complaint against her
former employer, St. Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center (the “Hospital”), alleging
that the Hospital violated the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and violated the
Indiana common law doctrine of promissory estoppel. The Hospital now moves for
summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Hospital’s Motion is
GRANTED.
I.
Factual Background
Plaintiff worked as a PRN (per diem nurse) in the Hospital’s Cardiovascular
Peripheral Vascular (“CVPV”) unit. (Deposition of Brandie Stone (“Plaintiff Dep.”) at 79). The Hospital requires PRN nurses to work one shift per month, but Plaintiff generally
worked full-time hours. (Id. at 9-10).
On February 13, 2009, Plaintiff’s minor daughter was hospitalized. (Id. at 40).
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That same day, Plaintiff informed Jane Lush (“Lush”), her supervisor, that her daughter
was “emergently hospitalized” for “an undetermined amount of time” and that Plaintiff
“needed to remove” herself from the schedule “for a few weeks.” (Id. at 41-43). Plaintiff
explained that her daughter had been given a behavioral assessment and deemed possibly
suicidal, and that she had suffered from hallucinations, nightmares, and headaches. (Id. at
43-44). Lush told Plaintiff to keep her informed and to tell her when she would be able to
return to work. (Id. at 43). Plaintiff believes that she called the Hospital around February
23, 2009 – the day her daughter was released from the hospital – and informed someone
(she cannot remember who) that she would return to work on March 16, 2009. (Id. at 4647, 80).
On February 25, 2009, Plaintiff’s daughter returned to school, and, on March 16,
2009, Plaintiff returned to work. (Id. at 46, 48). Shortly thereafter, on March 18, 2009,
Plaintiff informed Lush that her daughter’s condition had deteriorated, and that “she was
required to take leave to go home and take care of her.” (Id. at 54). Lush responded,
“you need to go home, take care of your daughter, your family comes first,” do not
“worry about your job,” and do not “worry about contacting the hospital.” (Id. at 54-55).
Following this March 18, 2009, conversation, Plaintiff did not have any further
communication with the Hospital until Lush notified her in writing on May 28, 2009, that
her employment was terminated, effective May 17, 2009, for her failure to meet her
commitment of working one shift per schedule. (Id., Ex. 8).
Plaintiff’s decision to take leave from the Hospital was not mandated by her
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daughter’s physicians; Plaintiff made the decision because she thought it was in her
daughter’s best interest. (Id. at 53). Plaintiff testified that, although her daughter was
back in school, Plaintiff was frequently called to the school to tend to her. (Id. at 51-52).
Plaintiff also picked her daughter up from school each day because she “began having
what appeared to be panic attacks on the bus.” (Id. at 49). There is no evidence in the
record that Plaintiff informed the Hospital of these facts.
The Hospital requires requests for FMLA leave be in writing. (Affidavit of Cheryl
Schaefer (“Schaefer Aff.”) ¶ 4). This policy was stated in the Hospital’s Associate
Handbook, which was accessible by associates, like Plaintiff, through the Hospital’s
intranet. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5 and Exs. A, B; Plaintiff Dep. at 98). Plaintiff neither submitted her
request for FMLA leave in writing, nor informed the Hospital of the probable duration of
her leave. (Plaintiff Dep. at 56, 58-59; Schaefer Aff. ¶ 6). Plaintiff testified that she was
“waiting on the hospital to contact [her].” (Plaintiff Dep. at 59).
This lawsuit followed.
II.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record “shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “Summary judgment is not appropriate ‘if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Payne v. Pauley, 337
F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986)). Accordingly, in resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court views
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“the evidence as a jury might, construing the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant and avoiding the temptation to decide which party’s version of the facts is
more likely true.” Id. (citing Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th
Cir. 1999)). With these principles in mind, the court now addresses the propriety of the
Hospital’s motion for summary judgment.
III.
Discussion
A.
FMLA
Under the FMLA, an eligible employee may take up to 12 weeks of leave in a oneyear period to care for a family member with a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. §
2612(a)(1). In an effort to protect an employee who exercises his or her right to leave,
the FMLA provides that an employer may not “interfere with, restrain, or deny the
exercise of or the attempt to exercise” any FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). To
prevail on an FMLA interference claim, a plaintiff must establish that: “(1) she was
eligible for the FMLA’s protections; (2) her employer was covered by the FMLA; (3) she
was entitled to take leave under the FMLA; (4) she provided sufficient notice of her
intent to take leave; and (5) her employer denied her FMLA benefits to which she was
entitled.” Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cnty., Wisc., 604 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing
Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2006)). The parties main dispute is
whether Plaintiff gave sufficient notice of her intent to take FMLA leave. The regulations
applicable to this case read:
When the need for leave is not foreseeable, an employee must comply with
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the employer’s usual and customary notice and procedural requirements for
requesting leave, absent unusual circumstances. . . . If any employee does
not comply with the employer’s usual notice and procedural requirements,
and no unusual circumstances justify the failure to comply, FMLAprotected leave may be delayed or denied.
29 C.F.R § 825.303(c). It is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to comply with the Hospital’s
usual and customary notice and procedural requirements by failing to submit her leave
request in writing, and failed to advise the Hospital of the probable duration of her leave.
See 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b) (noting that the content of an employee’s notice must include
the “anticipated duration of the absence, if known”). Moreover, Plaintiff presents no
evidence of unusual circumstances justifying her failure to comply with the Hospital’s
policy. Although Plaintiff testified that she was often called to the school to address
concerns with her daughter’s well-being, there is no evidence in the record supporting the
inference that she had absolutely no time, in a twenty-four hour day, to contact the
Hospital or to fill out the FMLA paperwork which she admits was available on the
Hospital’s intranet.
This case is analogous to Gilliam, supra. In that case, the plaintiff asked for a
Friday off to see his fiancé and newborn baby, who were located in a different city. 233
F.3d at 970. His supervisor expected he would be back to work the following Monday;
the plaintiff thought his leave was for an indefinite duration. Id. The plaintiff contacted
his supervisor the following Thursday to learn that his employment had been terminated
for violating the collective bargaining agreement’s requirement that employees notify
UPS by the beginning of their third scheduled shift of their anticipated return to work. Id.
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at 970-71. The Seventh Circuit held that, to the extent the FMLA applied, UPS did not
violate the FMLA by terminating the plaintiff for his failure to comply with the collective
bargaining agreement; i.e., UPS’ usual and customary notice and procedural requirement
for requesting leave. Id. at 971.
Similarly here, following Plaintiff’s brief conversation with Lush requesting time
off to care for her daughter, Plaintiff never attempted to contact the Hospital to inform
Lush or anyone in Human Resources of when she expected to return to work, nor did she
ever fill out the appropriate paperwork. The FMLA “does [not] authorize employees on
leave to keep their employers in the dark about when they will return from leave.”
Gilliam, 233 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2000). The Hospital’s termination of Plaintiff’s
employment for her failure to work one shift per schedule was lawful, and did not, as a
matter of law, interfere with the exercise of Plaintiff’s FMLA rights.
B.
Promissory Estoppel
Having dismissed Plaintiff’s only federal claim, the court elects to take
supplemental jurisdiction over her related state law claim for promissory estoppel. 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a).
A claim for promissory estoppel consists of five elements: (1) a promise by the
promissor; (2) made with the expectation that the promisee will rely thereon; (3) which
induces reasonable reliance by the promisee; (4) of a definite and substantial nature; and
(5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. See Brown v. Branch,
758 N.E.2d 48, 52 (Ind. 2001). A promise subject to estoppel must be unambiguous and
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of a definite nature. Sembos v. Philips Components, 376 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. 2004).
In Sembos, supra., the plaintiff’s employer, Philips Components (“Philips”),
informed him that the company was being sold to a third party, Beyerschlag Centralab
Components (“BCC”). Id. at 699. Although many jobs were lost as a result of the sale,
the plaintiff was offered a position at BCC. Id. The plaintiff told Philips he would accept
the position at BCC only if his pension benefits with BCC would be the same as they
were under Philips’ pension plan. Id. The plaintiff claimed that Philips promised him
equivalent pension benefits, or alternatively that, if BCC’s pension plan did not provide
him the same benefits, he could remain employed at Philips. Id.
After learning that BCC’s pension benefits were not as lucrative as Philips, the
plaintiff rejected the offer to work for BCC and decided to continue to work for Philips.
Id. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff was notified by email of an agreement between Philips
and BCC that allowed the plaintiff to work for BCC as a loaned employee for six months.
Id. In an email, Philips notified plaintiff of this arrangement, and informed him that if
Philips was unable to find suitable employment for him within six months or if he was
unable to find suitable employment on his own within that time period, his employment
would be terminated. Id.
After Philips terminated the plaintiff’s employment, he filed suit, alleging in
relevant part a claim for promissory estoppel. Id. at 704. The Seventh Circuit,
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interpreting Illinois law,1 affirmed the entry of summary judgment for Philips. The Court
held that the alleged promises made by Philips were “too indefinite, as a matter of law, to
constitute unambiguous promises supporting liability on the theory of promissory
estoppel” because Philips “did not promise [the plaintiff] any specific position, salary, or
other terms of employment.” Id. The Court further held that the plaintiff failed to present
any evidence of detrimental reliance on any alleged promises by Philips. Id. at 705. The
plaintiff did not claim that he would have accepted a position at BCC but for Philips’
promise of continued employment. Id. Instead, the plaintiff testified that if BCC’s
pension plan was not equivalent to the one offered by Philips, he would not accept a
position at BCC. Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff argues that she relied on Lush’s “promises” telling her
that her family came first and not to worry about her job or about contacting the Hospital.
Plaintiff’s claim falters on two grounds. First, Lush’s alleged promises were of an
indefinite and ambiguous nature. To the extent Lush told the Plaintiff that she “could
take leave” and not to “worry about her job” or contacting the Hospital, Plaintiff fails to
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Semba applied Illinois law. Because the elements of promissory estoppel under Illinois
law are virtually identical to those under Indiana law, compare Vajda v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,
624 N.E.2d 1343, 1350 (Ill. App. Ct.), app. denied, 624 N.E.2d 818 (Ill. 1993) (existence of an
unambiguous promise; reliance on that promise; reliance must be reasonable and foreseeable;
and promisee actually relies on promise), with Brown, 758 N.E.2d at 52 (see above), the court
finds that were this issue presented in an Indiana state court, Indiana would follow the reasoning
advanced in Semba. See Thomas v. H&R Block E. Enter., Inc., 630 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir.
2011) (“When addressing a question of state law while sitting in diversity, our task is to ascertain
the substantive content of state law as it either had been determined by the highest court of the
state or as it would be by the court if the present case were before it now.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
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present any evidence that Lush granted a request for a specific type of leave (leave of
absence or FMLA) for a definite period of time. Second, Plaintiff testified that she would
have taken leave regardless of Lush’s alleged representations because she “knew she was
entitled to something.” (Plaintiff Dep. at 55, 62-63). Thus, she did not take action – i.e.,
leave – in reliance on any alleged “promise.” For these reasons, the evidence does not
support a promissory estoppel claim.
IV.
Conclusion
The record presents no genuine issue of material fact on Plaintiff’s FMLA claim or
promissory estoppel claim. The Hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 55)
is therefore GRANTED.
SO ORDERED this19th day of November 2012.
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RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
United States District Court
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Southern District of Indiana
Distributed Electronically to Registered Counsel of Record.
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