EASLEY v. PLAINFIELD CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Filing 29

ORDER - denying 25 Motion; denying 26 Motion; denying 27 Motion; The petitioner's motion for leave to compel documents 25 , the petitioner's motion for leave to re-open, amend after dismissal based on newly discovered evidence 26 , and the petitioner's motion for leave for stay of proceedings 27 are each DENIED. The petitioner's motion for leave to re-open based on newly discovered evidence 26 shall be docketed as the habeas petition in a new civil action on the clerk's civil docket. *** SEE ENTRY ***. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 1/24/2012. cm (CKM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

KENT A. EASLEY,
Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT, Plainfield
Correctional Facility,
Respondent.

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No. 1:11-cv-280-SEB-TAB

Entry Concerning Selected Matters
For the reasons explained in this Entry, the post-judgment motions of habeas
corpus petitioner Kent Easley are each denied.
Background
This action in which Kent Easley, a state prisoner, sought a writ of habeas
corpus was dismissed on July 29, 2011. In the language of the Judgment:
Any challenge to the revocation of the petitioner’s probation on
August 8, 2008, is dismissed without prejudice. All other claims are
dismissed with prejudice.
The portion of the habeas petition which was dismissed with prejudice was Easley’s
challenge to the validity of his conviction— based on his guilty plea—to drug offenses
in the Shelby Superior Court in No. 73D01-0004-CF-000028. The court concluded
that the habeas petition showed on its face that Easley was not entitled to the relief
he sought and was therefore subject to summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4 of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States District Courts.
On December 21, 2011, Easley filed a motion for leave to re-open, amend after
dismissal based on newly discovered evidence and two ancillary motions pertaining to

the portion of the Judgment dismissing the habeas petition with prejudice. Easley’s
challenge to the revocation of his probation has been filed and docketed as No.
1:11-cv-1276-JMS-DKL.
Easley’s motion to re-open and amend seeks to renew and expand on his
challenge to the conviction in No. 73D01-0004-CF-000028. As noted above, the
habeas claim relating to the conviction, in contrast to the habeas claim relating to the
revocation of his probation, was dismissed with prejudice.
Discussion
The Motion to Re-open
The date a post-judgment motion is filed is significant. See Hope v. United
States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1142 (7th Cir. 1994). Given the timing of the motion relative to
the entry of judgment on the clerk’s docket, the motion must be treated as a motion
for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See United States v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“substantive motions to alter or amend a judgment served more than ten days after
the entry of judgment are to be evaluated under Rule 60(b).”).1
Relief from judgment under Rule 60 is warranted "only upon a showing of
extraordinary circumstances that create substantial danger that the underlying
judgment was unjust." Margoles v. Johns, 798 F.2d 1069, 1073 (7th Cir. 1986).
Under Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), a Rule 60(b) motion is a second
or successive petition if it “in substance or effect asserts or reasserts a federal basis
for relief from the petitioner's underlying conviction.” Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d
1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 2006). “Conversely, it is a ‘true’ 60(b) motion if it . . . challenges
only a procedural ruling of the habeas court which precluded a merits determination
of the habeas application.” Id., at 1215-16. Thus, when faced with a Rule 60(b) motion
filed in response to the denial of a petition for habeas relief, the district court must
first determine whether the motion “should be treated as a second or successive
habeas petition [or whether] it should be treated as a ‘true’ 60(b) motion.” Id., at
1215.
In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner may not rely on
Rule 60(b) to raise a claim in federal habeas proceedings that would otherwise be
barred as second or successive under § 2254. “[F]or purposes of [28 U.S.C.] § 2244(b)
an ‘application’ for habeas relief is a filing that contains one or more ‘claims.’” Id. at
530 (citations omitted). The Court then provided guidance as to when a Rule 60(b)
motion advances one or more “claims.” Id. at 531-32. Specifically,“[a] motion that
seeks to add a new ground for relief” advances a claim, as does a motion that “attacks
1The

current version of Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a Rule
59(e) motion to be filed within 28 days after the entry of judgment.

the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits. Id. However, “when a
Rule 60(b) motion attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a
claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas
proceedings,” courts should not construe the motion as a second or successive
petition. See id.
Easley’s motion to re-open asserts what he characterizes as proposed new
claims for relief based on newly discovered evidence. These proposed new claims are
based on alleged irregularities and errors in the state proceedings.
Gonzalez defines “claim” to include a federal habeas court’s previous
resolution of a claim on the merits. Applying this portion of Gonzalez here, it must be
concluded that Easley is advancing one or more “claims” as defined by Gonzalez.
Because of this, and because Easley is not permitted to circumvent the filing
restriction of § 2244(b), his motion to re-open must be treated as a new civil action.
The Motion to Amend
The portion of the motion to re-open and amend in which Easley seeks leave to
amend the petition for writ of habeas corpus must be denied. See Figgie Int'l, Inc. v.
Miller, 966 F.2d 1178, 1179 (7th Cir. 1992) ("It is well settled that after a final
judgment, a plaintiff may amend a complaint under Rule 15(a) only with leave of
court after a motion under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) has been made and the judgment
has been set aside or vacated.").
The Motion for Leave to Compel Documents
Easley’s motion for leave to compel documents is without merit because this
action is not being reopened. Discovery was not authorized while this action was open
and is not warranted in this post-dismissal phase. If a similar motion is appropriate
in relation to the new action to be filed pursuant to directions in this Entry, however,
Easley may file such motion, although discovery is permitted in an action for habeas
corpus relief not as a matter of course, but only upon a showing of good cause.
The Motion for Leave for Stay of Proceedings
Easley’s motion for leave for stay of proceedings seeks issuance of an order in
this case staying post-conviction proceedings in the trial court. There is neither legal
nor factual reason for the issuance of such a stay.
Conclusion
Based on the discussion in this Entry, the petitioner’s motion for leave to
compel documents [25], the petitioner’s motion for leave to re-open, amend after
dismissal based on newly discovered evidence [26], and the petitioner’s motion for
leave for stay of proceedings [27] are each denied.

For the same reasons, moreover, the petitioner’s motion for leave to re-open
based on newly discovered evidence [26] shall be docketed as the habeas petition in a
new civil action on the clerk’s civil docket. The NOS of the new action is 530, the
cause of action in the new action is 28:2254(a), and a copy of this Entry shall also be
docketed in the new civil action. The assignment of judicial officers in the new civil
action shall be by random draw. The petitioner in the new action shall be Kent Easley
and the respondent is Easley’s custodian, the Superintendent of the Plainfield
Correctional Facility.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

01/24/2012
Date: __________________
_______________________________

Distribution:
Kent Easley
DOC # 103481
Plainfield Correctional Facility
Inmate Mail/Parcels
727 Moon Road
Plainfield, IN 46168

SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana