ALKHALIDI et al v. BUSS et al

Filing 143

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: The Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 119) is GRANTED, and the Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a summary judgment motion (Dkt. No. 142) is DENIED AS MOOT. See Entry for details. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 3/19/2015. (SWM) Modified on 3/19/2015 (SWM).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
ABDULLAH ALKHALIDI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EDWIN BUSS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Cause No. 1:11-cv-609-WTL-TAB

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This cause is before the Court on the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt.
No. 119). The motion is fully briefed, and the Court, being duly advised, GRANTS the motion,
for the reasons set forth below. In light of this ruling, the Court DENIES AS MOOT the
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 142).
I.

STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment is appropriate “if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court
accepts as true the admissible evidence presented by the non-moving party and draws all
reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir.
2009). However, “[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on
its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a
genuine issue of material fact that requires trial.” Id. Finally, the non-moving party bears the
burden of specifically identifying the relevant evidence of record, and “the court is not required

to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Ritchie v.
Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001).
II.

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff Abdullah
Aklhalidi, the non-moving party, are as follow. 1
In May 1999, Alkhalidi was arrested and charged with several crimes, including murder,
and he was detained at the St. Joseph County Jail in South Bend, Indiana, pending his trial. In
2000, Alkhalidi was convicted of murder, robbery, and theft, and he was sentenced to sixty-five
years in prison. Prior to his transfer to the Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”), St.
Joseph County officials notified the IDOC as follows:
For the first several months of his stay in this facility he was cooperative[,] and we
experienced very little behavior out of this inmate.
In January of this year[,] this inmate attacked one of our officers in what was
believed to be a failed escape attempt . . . . Inmate Alkhalidi attacked the officer
with the help of another inmate, however[,] this inmate was the one who broke the
officer[’]s jaw during the altercation.
In February of this year, while assigned to our segregation block from the above
incident, Alkhalidi attacked another inmate simply due to his unwillingness to share
his two[-]man cell with another inmate.
Use extreme caution when dealing with this inmate, he seems to be constantly
sizing up the officers and watching for any weakness in security procedures. Inmate
Alkhalidi has extensive martial arts training and quite obviously has no problem
with hurting an officer, or another inmate for that matter.
Dkt. No. 121-1 at 12.

1

The Court notes that Alkhalidi has not presented much in the way of facts through either
his complaint or his response to the subject motion. His arguments are general, and he does not
dispute the disciplinary charges alleged against him by the IDOC.
2

In December 2005, while at the Indiana State Prison (“ISP”), 2 Alkhalidi was
recommended for “department-wide administrative segregation.” 3 The following is noted in the
request:
[O]ffender Alkhalidi is currently housed on our administrative segregation unit. In
December 2005[,] information was referred to staff of a possible escape attempt
being compiled by the above offender. This escape attempt was to include hurting
staff and taking a uniform and walking through the main entrance of the facility.
With this information relayed[,] a shakedown was directed and resulted in the
finding of several ounces of tobacco and marijuana along with other paraphernalia.
...
Through investigation[,] it was discovered this offender[’]s involvement in
drug/tobacco sales was and is extensive at the [ISP]. . . .
With the current investigation and high security strains[,] we feel his placement in
long-term segregation would be appropriate.
Id. at 35.
As of March 2006, the ISP had not received a decision from the IDOC’s Central Office
regarding Alkhalidi’s designation, and on March 8, 2006, a second recommendation for
department-wide administrative segregation was sent. On March 28, 2006, the Central Office
approved the recommendation, and Alkhalidi was transferred to the SCU at the WVCF.

2

It is not clear from the record where Alkhalidi was incarcerated and whether he was
held in administrative segregation at any time between 2000 and 2005.
3

According to the IDOC, “administrative segregation” is now referred to as
“administrative restrictive status housing.” The Court, however, will continue to refer to it as
administrative segregation. If an inmate is assigned to administrative segregation, he is housed in
the administrative segregation unit of that prison. However, those assigned to “department-wide
administrative segregation” are housed in the Secured Control Unit (“SCU”), also referred to as
the Secured Housing Unit (“SHU”), at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (“WVCF”) or
the Westville Control Unit (“WCU”) at the Westville Correctional Facility (“WCF”). Both the
SCU and the WCU are considered “supermax” sections of the prisons. “Supermax facilities are
maximum-security prisons with highly restriction conditions, designed to segregate the most
dangerous prisoners from the general prison population.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213
(2005).
3

On August 1, 2006, Alkhalidi appealed his designation. On September 1, 2006, the IDOC
upheld the assignment and advised Alkhalidi that “for a number of reasons, [his] presence in
general population constitutes a threat to the safety, security and orderly operation of the
facility.” Id. at 40. It also noted that Alkhalidi’s designation would “be reviewed every thirty
days by the Unit Management Team.” Id.
In 2006, Alkhalidi’s motion for post-conviction relief was granted, and a new trial was
ordered. As a result, Alkhalidi was transferred from the IDOC to the St. Joseph County Jail, and
he was held there pending his retrial. In April 2008, Alkhalidi was once again convicted of
murder, robbery, and theft. This time, he was sentenced to fifty-five years in prison. Alkhalidi
was transferred back to the IDOC in May 2008, and in July 2008, he was once again
recommended for department-wide administrative segregation. The recommendation noted, in
part, that during Alkhalidi’s prior period of incarceration, he had been found guilty of possessing
cigarettes, money, and drugs. Id. at 43. At that time, a psychiatrist also opined that Alkhalidi did
not suffer from an AXIS 1 diagnosis or a serious mental illness. On August 5, 2008, the
recommendation was approved, and he was transferred to the WCU at the WCF. Alkhalidi
appealed his classification in March 2009, but staff determined that his housing assignment
“continue[d] to be appropriate.” Id. at 45.
On April 6, 2009, two cell phones were found in a package addressed to Alkhalidi. The
package was marked “Legal Mail” and the phones were located in a hollowed-out book. During
a subsequent search of Alkhalidi’s cell, officers found a hollowed-out bar of soup hidden inside a
soap wrapper. The hollowed-out portion of the soap was the same size as the cell phone.
Alkhalidi was later found guilty of attempting to engage in trafficking.

4

In February 2010, Alkhalidi appealed his assignment to administrative segregation. The
following month, prison staff notified him that the assignment “continue[d] to be appropriate.”
Id. at 52.
After one year at the WCU, in March 2010, Aklhalidi was transferred to the SCU at the
WVCF so that he did not “become familiar with any facility[’s] layout, schedule, etc.” Id. at 53.
A hearing was held at that time, and his placement was deemed appropriate. Alkhalidi appealed
the assignment in April 2010. On April 16, 2010, he was notified that his appeal was denied, but
he was instructed to contact his Unit Team staff member “to request a full [administrative
segregation] review with the Unit Management Team.” Id. at 55. Thereafter, classification
hearings were held in April 2010 and May 2010, but his classification was affirmed on both
occasions. Alkhalidi appealed his designation again in June 2010, August 2010, September 2010,
and November 2010, but those appeals were also denied.
In January 2011, a detailed review of Alkhalidi’s assignment was performed, and his case
manager recommended that he remain in administrative segregation. The reviewer also noted
that
[a]lthough not confirmed, inmate Alkhalidi is a radical ritualistic individual. He has
committed murder [and] he contends he fought in [the] Iraqi War. While
incarcerated[,] he’s trafficked [and] been in possession of drugs. . . . In August
2010, Alkhalidi admitted he had purchased a cell phone from another inmate for
$1,000. He admitted receiving the cell phone, but not making full payment. He then
ask[ed] for a facility transfer based on being in debt. This all occurred while
Alkhalidi was in the SCU. Alkhalidi is not appropriate for general population.
Id. at 67.

5

Another detailed review was performed in June 2011. At that time, his case manager
added that Alkhalidi’s “crime [was] more severe than scored. . . . [H]is victim was found
beheaded.” Id. at 69. 4 His assignment was ultimately affirmed.
On November 22, 2011, Alkhalidi was found guilty of the unauthorized use or possession
of an electronic device.
A detailed review and a hearing were conducted in January 2012. No changes were made
to Alkhalidi’s housing assignment, and his case manager noted as follows:
When I try to conduct [business] with this offender, he finds any reason to argue.
He does not want to respect and follow rules and regulations. He does not listen to
instruction; rather, argues. He then gets mad if he doesn’t get his way. Most times,
if he had paid attention to instruction and followed the instruction, he would have
gotten what he wanted. I believe this offender has the propensity to be dangerous.
Id. at 72. The case manager also noted that his “recent serious conduct” and his “unruly
behaviors” favored keeping him in administrative segregation. Alkhalidi appealed his
designation later that month, and on February 13, 2012, his appeal was denied.
On August 18, 2012, Alkhalidi assaulted three correctional officers while being escorted
from the outside recreation pad to his cell. “He was found guilty by the Conduct Adjustment
Board of three Class A-117 Assault on Staff” charges. Id. at 77.
On August 23, 2012, Alkhalidi threw feces at a correctional officer. He was found guilty
of a Class A-102 Battery with Bodily Fluid charge by the Conduct Adjustment Board.

4

An investigator hired by Alkhalidi’s defense attorneys, however, states that the victim
was shot; he was not beheaded. Alkhalidi’s appellate record, which the Court takes judicial
notice of, also indicates that the victim suffered a gunshot wound and was partially burned.
While this added reason for keeping Alkhalidi in administrative segregation does not appear to
have support in the record, the IDOC has identified a number of other reasons that Alkhalidi has
remained in administrative segregation.
6

That same day, Alkhalidi attempted to head-butt a correctional officer. When officers
secured him against a wall, he attempted to stomp on and kick at the officers. He was found
guilty of a Class A-111/117 Assault of Staff charge by the Conduct Adjustment Board. Days
later, he was recommended for department-wide disciplinary segregation (which is different than
administrative segregation). 5 That designation was approved on September 21, 2012, and he was
transferred back to the WCU.
On August 9, 2013, Alkhalidi requested placement in the Actions, Consequences and
Treatment Program (“ACT”) offered by the IDOC. “[A]n offender who signs up for and is
assigned to ACT becomes an Administrative Segregation offender, with the running of
disciplinary time stopped during successful participation in the Act.” Dkt. No. 121-8 at ¶ 7. “If
ACT is successfully completed, the disciplinary time is considered served.” Id. at ¶ 8. “If the
offender is removed from the ACT program, the disciplinary time is restarted at the point where
it was stopped on assignment to the ACT Program, and the offender must complete the
disciplinary time that was held in abeyance for the ACT Program.” Id. at ¶ 9. As of October
2014, Alkhalidi had completed phases I through IV of the ACT Program. At that time, he was in
the process of being transferred to the New Castle Correctional Facility (“NCCF”) to complete
Phase V. The IDOC’s website indicates that Alkhalidi has since been transferred to the NCCF.

5

“[A] person changed with misconduct may be confined or separated from the general
population of [a] facility . . . for a reasonable period of time if his continued presence in the
general population poses a serious threat to himself, others, property, or the security of the
facility or program.” I.C. § 11-11-5-6. According to Alkhalidi, however, those assigned to
administrative segregation are housed in the same block as those assigned to disciplinary
segregation.
7

III.

DISCUSSION

Initially pro se, Alkhalidi attempted to file a class action lawsuit against a number of
prison officials on March 28, 2011. 6 At that time, Alkhalidi was housed in the SCU at the
WVCF. Alkhalidi alleged in his complaint that the Defendants were responsible for his
placement in administrative segregation, and his “indefinite” assignment to administrative
segregation is a violation of the Eighth Amendment and his due process rights. 7 Alkhalidi argues
that the IDOC’s process for assigning inmates to and keeping inmates under administrative
segregation violates the constitution. In this regard,
Alkhalidi alleges . . . that he was denied notice and an opportunity to respond to his
classification to administrative segregation. . . . He . . . alleges that such placement
was made intentionally in violation of his due process rights and that he suffered
undue hardship as a result. . . . He also alleges that the defendants acted maliciously.
Alkhalidi’s Resp. at 3. Alkhalidi further claims that he “has never been given a straight answer as
to why he is on administrative segregation,” Id. at 4, and “the reasons given [by the prison staff
for his assignment to administrative segregation] were vague, non-responsive and/or nonspecific.” Id. at 5. 8 Had he been confronted with the various allegations against him, Alkhalidi
argues that “he could have refuted them.” Id. at 6.

6

Alkhalidi’s complaint appeared to be filed on behalf of himself and several other
plaintiffs. For several reasons, the Court dismissed the claims asserted by anyone other than
Alkhalidi, but allowed his individual claims to proceed. Dkt. No. 24.
7

The Defendants argue in their reply brief that Alkhalidi did not allege any due
process/adequate notice violations in his complaint. The Court, however, notes that pro se
complaints are to be liberally construed, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A
document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, . . . and a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”)
(citations and quotation marks omitted), and finds that Alkhalidi sufficiently alleged a due
process violation in his complaint. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1-1 at ¶ 28.
8

Alkhalidi also argues that he is assigned to administrative segregation because he is
from Iraq and prison staff believe him to be a terrorist or part of a “sleeper cell.” Interestingly,
8

In response, the Defendants argue that “Alkhalidi’s due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment were not violated” because “Alkhalidi’s placement in department-wide
administrative segregation was reviewed every thirty days,” and “[t]hat is all that is required
under the Constitution after assignment.” Defs.’ Br. at 11-12. At the very least, the Defendants
argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
A. Statute of Limitations
As an initial matter, the Court will address the Defendants’ argument concerning the
statute of limitations. The Defendants argue that “this case is about [Alkhalidi’s] assignment to
administrative segregation [after] August 2008 (after retrial)”; it is not about Alkhalidi’s initial
assignment to administrative segregation in 2005/2006. Defs.’ Br. at 18. They cite the two-year
statute of limitations to support their argument. Alkhalidi argues, however, that under the
continuing violations doctrine, any claims related to his original assignment to administrative
segregation are fair game. He maintains that, upon his return to the IDOC, he was automatically
placed on administrative segregation because of his prior classification. Thus, there was a
continuing violation that extended the statute of limitations. The Court does not agree with
Alkhalidi. When Alkhalidi returned to the custody of the IDOC in 2008, a new recommendation
for department-wide administrative segregation was submitted to and approved by the Central
Office. He was not referred to administrative segregation only because he was previously
assigned administrative segregation. Although his new classification was based on events that
occurred during his prior period of incarceration, it was a new classification and thus a new

Alkhalidi was noted as an “Iraqi terrorist” on what Alkhalidi purports to be a prison “Movement
Sheet.” See Dkt. No. 132-4. The authenticity of the document, however, is unclear and the
reasons for Alkhalidi’s placement in administrative segregation are documented throughout the
IDOC records.
9

triggering event for purposes of the two-year statute of limitations. See Brademas v. Indiana
Hous. Fin. Auth., 354 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.”).
B. Due Process Claim
Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 11-10-1-7(a), an offender may be involuntarily
segregated from the general population if the IDOC finds that “segregation is necessary for the
offender’s own physical safety or the physical safety of others.” The foregoing statute is restated
in different terms in IDOC Policy # 02-01-111, entitled “The Use and Operation of Adult
Offender Administrative Segregation,” and Appendix XVI-C, entitled “Criteria/Procedure for
Placement in Department-Wide Administrative Segregation.” Those documents further provide
as follows:
[R]easons that may result in an offender’s assignment to administrative segregation
include, but are not limited to:
1.

History of assaultive behavior;

2.

Active member of a Security Threat Group who poses a threat to the safe
and orderly operation of the facility;

3.

A high escape risk;

4.

The facility’s need to contain, prevent or end a disturbance or other threat
to the orderly operation of the facility;

5.

Pending an investigation, disciplinary hearing or criminal trial;

6.

Pending transfer to another facility;

7.

A documented history of behavior that causes staff to believe that the
offender’s continued presence in the offender general population would be
detrimental to the security of the facility or the offender; or

8.

The offender is the subject of an on-going investigation and the segregation
has been approved in accordance with the administrative procedures for
Policy 02-04-101, “The Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders.”
10

Dkt. No. 121-3 at 4. The documents also provide that “[o]ffenders selected for a Departmentwide administrative segregation unit must have exhibited extraordinary security concerns, such
as seriously injuring staff or offenders, participating in a hostage situation, identified security
threat group leader, heavily involved in trafficking or having a lengthy history of serious (Class
A and/or B) conduct violations.” Dkt. No. 121-5 at 1.
The Indiana statute concerning administrative segregation also provides that the IDOC
“shall review an offender so segregated at least once every thirty (30) days to determine whether
the reason for segregation still exists.” I.C. § 11-10-1-7(b). Policy # 02-01-111 clarifies that the
thirty-day review does not include a formal hearing. Offenders in department-wide
administrative segregation, however, may request a “full review” every ninety days. If a request
is made, a classification hearing is held.
In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court held that due process
liberty interests prohibit restraints which impose an “atypical and significant hardship on an
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. Although prison inmates do
not have a constitutional right to remain in general population, see Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602,
608-09 (7th Cir. 2005), in determining whether an atypical and significant hardship exists
invoking due process, “both the duration and the conditions of the segregation must be
considered.” Marion v. Columbia Correctional Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2009). “[I]f the
conditions of segregation were significantly harsher than those in the normal prison environment,
then a year of [segregation] might count as a deprivation of liberty where a few days or even
weeks might not.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). The Seventh Circuit has ruled that “240 days
in conditions materially more onerous than ‘the ordinary incidents of prison life,’ could deprive a

11

person of a ‘liberty.’” Marion v. Radtke, 641 F.3d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Sandin, 515
U.S. at 484).
Given the nature of Alkhalidi’s confinement, which he compares to solitary confinement,
and the length of time Alkhalidi has been assigned to administrative segregation, the Court finds
that a due process liberty was and is at stake. The Court thus must consider what process is
required, and whether that process was provided to Alkhalidi.
1. Initial Assignment in 2008
When an inmate is transferred to a supermax facility, he is “entitled to informal,
nonadversarial due process.” Westefer, 682 F.3d at 684. This “requires ‘some notice’ of the
reasons for the inmate’s placement . . . and enough time to ‘prepare adequately’ for the
administrative review.” Id. (citations omitted). The review may be conducted within a reasonable
time after the transfer has occurred. Id. at 684. “Informal due process requires only that the
inmate be given an ‘opportunity to present his views,’” Id. at 685 (citations omitted); it does not
require a hearing with the inmate present. Id. “If the prison chooses to hold hearings, inmates do
not have a constitutional right to call witnesses or to require prison officials to interview
witnesses.” Id. (citations omitted). Due process also does not require “‘a written decision
describing the reasons’ for an inmate’s placement, . . . or mandate an appeal procedure.” Id. at
686 (citations omitted). All that is required is “a review of the inmate’s placement by ‘the prison
official charged with deciding whether to transfer [an inmate] to administrative segregation,’ not
a right to additional layers of review.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Court finds that Alkhalidi was provided sufficient process in 2008, when he was
assigned to department-wide administrative segregation. Before he was transferred to WCU, the
reasons for his assignment were outlined in a formal recommendation to the Central Office. Dkt.

12

No. 121-1 at 43. At that time, he had a history of injuring staff (at the St. Joseph County Jail) and
he had been found guilty of two Class A violations and one Class B violation. According to the
IDOC, he was also involved in at least two escape attempts. Alkhalidi was also examined by a
psychiatrist prior to his transfer. Even now, Alkhalidi does not dispute these allegations.
After the recommendation for department-wide administrative segregation was approved
in August 2008, Alkhalidi was instructed that he could appeal his designation, and he did so in
March 2009. He argued that he was “CCI/Job eligible,” 9 he was “clear of any conduct report
since 12-21-2005,” and he did “not meet any of the reasons/criteria or standards for admittance
to administrative segregation.” Id. at 45. His appeal was denied and his assignment was deemed
“appropriate.” In light of the foregoing case law, the Court finds that the process provided to
Alkhalidi was adequate. 10
2. Subsequent Reviews
The Supreme Court has held that “[p]rison officials must engage in some sort of periodic
review of the confinement of [inmates in administrative segregation].” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S.
9

The Court does not know what “CCI” refers to.

10

Alkhalidi cites the non-precedential case Littler v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr. Com’r, No.
3:11-cv-218, 2013 WL 1149607 (N.D. Ind. 2013), in support of his argument. In Littler, an
inmate argued that the IDOC denied him due process when they transferred him from the ISP to
the WCU. Citing Wilkinson, the court noted that
[w]hen considering whether to transfer a prisoner to a facility where conditions of
confinement constitute an atypical and significant hardship[,] due process requires:
officials to provide a brief summary of the factual basis for the classification
review and allowing the inmate a rebuttal opportunity safeguards against
the inmate's being mistaken for another or singled out for insufficient
reason.
Id. at *1. (quoting Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 226). The record in Littler is not entirely clear,
however, the court concluded that Littler was not provided adequate notice of, or an opportunity
to respond to, the reasons for his transfer to the WCU. As noted above, that is not the case here.
13

460, 477 n. 9 (1983). “This review will not necessarily require that prison officials permit the
submission of any additional evidence or statements.” Id. When a due process liberty interest is
at stake, an inmate is entitled to “some informal, non-adversarial” procedures. Westefer v. Neal,
682 F.3d 679, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2012). Informal due process under these circumstances requires a
periodic review of the placement determination at a frequency sufficient to ensure that
“administrative segregation does not become ‘a pretext for indefinite confinement.’” Id. at 686.
(quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477). The determination of the frequency of periodic review is
committed to the discretion of prison officials. Id. (quoting Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800,
803 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that 120-days between reviews satisfied due process)). In sum, “the
requirements of informal due process leave substantial discretion and flexibility in the hands of
the prison administrators.” Westefer, 682 F.3d at 685.
It is undisputed that during Alkhalidi’s assignment to administrative segregation, prison
officials have reviewed his assignment every thirty (30) days. See Dkt. No. 121-10 at 10.
Alkhalidi argues, however, that this review has been perfunctory and the reasons behind his
designation have not been adequately explained to him. However, he does not cite to any
precedent which requires any additional process, review, or explanation. 11 Alkhalidi also has an
opportunity for more formal hearings every ninety days, which appears to go beyond what is
required by the Constitution and case law. He has exercised that right on several occasions. As
noted above, prison officials must be accorded substantial discretion and flexibility in
determining the security risks presented by offenders in administrative segregation. For these
reasons, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Alkhalidi’s due process claim.

11

The Court notes that Littler deals with an initial transfer into administrative
segregation, not subsequent reviews.
14

Because there has been no violation of Alkhalidi’s due process rights, the Court need not
reach the Defendants’ additional argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Mucha v.
Village of Oak Brook, 650 F.3d 1053, 1057-58 (7th Cir. 2011) (when there is no constitutional
violation, defendants “do not require the additional protection of qualified immunity.”). 12
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No.
119) is GRANTED, and the Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a summary judgment motion
(Dkt. No. 142) is DENIED AS MOOT.
SO ORDERED: 3/19/15
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Copies to all counsel of record via electronic communication.

12

Alkhalidi argues that, while in administrative segregation, he is housed in a seven-foot
by ten-foot windowless cell, made of solid concrete walls and a half-inch solid steel door. He is
allowed one hour of recreation, and he may shower two to three times per week. He must eat and
recreate by himself, and he is not allowed any contact with any other prisoner or person. It does
not appear, however, that Alkhalidi alleged an Eighth Amendment claim related to these
conditions of his confinement in his complaint. Further, the Defendants argued in their brief that
any Eighth Amendment claim alleged by Alkhalidi is unsupported. See Defs.’ Br. at 13-16.
Alkhalidi did not respond to the Defendants’ Eighth Amendment arguments. For these reasons,
the Court has not analyzed or considered a “separate” Eighth Amendment claim related to
Alkhalidi’s allegations. See United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2003) (“It is not
the obligation of [the] court to research and construct the legal arguments open to parties,
especially when they are represented by counsel,” and “perfunctory and undeveloped arguments,
and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived.”) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
15