SWEET, JR. v. INDIANAPOLIS JET CENTER, INC.(UC) et al

Filing 99

ENTRY REGARDING PENDING MOTIONS: Accordingly, the motion to amend 91 is GRANTED and the third amended complaint (found at docket no. 73-2) is DEEMED FILED as of the date of this Entry. In light of the filing of the third amended complaint, the Defendants' motions to dismiss the second amended complaint (dkt. nos. 64 and 66) are DENIED AS MOOT. Accordingly, the motion to strike 98 is DENIED ***SEE ENTRY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION***. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 9/28/2012. (DW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JOHN W. SWEET, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDIANAPOLIS JET CENTER, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
) CAUSE NO. 1:11-cv-843-WTL-DKL
)
)
)
)

ENTRY REGARDING PENDING MOTIONS
This cause is before the Court on several motions, each of which is addressed, in turn,
below.
Motion to Amend Complaint
In response to the Defendants’ motions to dismiss his second amended complaint, Plaintiff
John W. Sweet, Jr., has filed a motion to file a third amended complaint.1 The Defendants object
to Sweet’s motion to amend on several grounds. First, they point out that Sweet already has had
several opportunities to amend his complaint. While this is technically true, the Defendants
overreach with some of their assertions relating to this argument. First, they take Sweet to task for
filing an amended complaint in this Court that included two defendants who had been dismissed
before this case was transferred from the Western District of Texas. However, Sweet had been
granted leave to file that particular amended complaint by the Texas court prior to transfer, and
therefore it was not improper for him to file it; indeed, it would have been improper for him to file
a different amended complaint without seeking leave to do so. Similarly, while Sweet’s amended
complaint did, in fact, contain inadequate jurisdictional allegations, the fact remains that Sweet had
been granted leave to file it by the Texas court. It was this Court that ordered Sweet to file a

1

Sweet originally filed this case in the Western District of Texas. He sought and was
granted leave to amend his complaint in that court in response to motions to dismiss. His second
amended complaint was filed at the direction of this Court to correct deficiencies in his
jurisdictional allegations.

different amended complaint than the one approved by the Texas court to remedy issues that were
identified by this Court after transfer.
The Defendants also object to the fact that Sweet’s tendered third amended complaint
includes the two Defendants–Randy Keeker and Comlux the Aviation Group–who were dismissed
by the Texas court. There is nothing improper about this. While it is true that when this Court
ordered Sweet to file a second amended complaint with corrected jurisdictional allegations it also
instructed Sweet not to include the dismissed parties, that order cannot be equated with a ruling
that those parties could not be reintroduced into this case under any circumstances. The Court’s
goal was to have a second amended complaint on file that accurately reflected the state of the case
at that time and demonstrated that this court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. In other
words, Sweet had not sought leave to amend his complaint in a substantive way; rather, the Court
was ordering technical changes to his complaint.
Now, however, Sweet has moved to substantively amend his complaint. Sweet points out,
correctly, that Keeker and Comlux the Aviation Group were dismissed by the Texas court because
that court did not have personal jurisdiction over them. Because Sweet believes that this Court
does have personal jurisdiction over them, it is not improper for Sweet to seek to reinstate them as
Defendants now that the case is pending in this Court.2
The Comlux Defendants argue that it would be futile to permit Sweet to file his third
amended complaint because his claims against them still would be subject to dismissal. The Court
believes it will be more efficient to consider those arguments in the context of a motion to dismiss

2

Defendant Indianapolis Jet Center, Inc., argues that “[i]f Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
Amend is granted, Keeker will have to incur the time, inconvenience and expense of preparing a
court filing to ask this Court to once again confirm that it is not appropriate for Plaintiff to name
him as a defendant in this case.” IJC Response at 5. This argument is without merit. Keeker
moved to dismiss on the ground that he was not subject to suit in Texas. To the extent that Keeker
believes that the claims Sweet now asserts against him in this court are subject to dismissal, his
motion to dismiss will be based upon entirely new arguments; this court will not be “confirming”
anything.

2

the third amended complaint. Accordingly, the motion to amend (dkt. no. 91) is GRANTED and
the third amended complaint (found at docket no. 73-2) is DEEMED FILED as of the date of this
Entry.
Motions to Dismiss
In light of the filing of the third amended complaint, the Defendants’ motions to dismiss
the second amended complaint (dkt. nos. 64 and 66) are DENIED AS MOOT.
As noted, the Comlux Defendants have argued that the third amended complaint is subject
to dismissal for a variety of reasons. If the Comlux Defendants choose to move to dismiss the
third amended complaint, they may incorporate by reference their Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint (dkt. no. 96) rather than filing a new brief in support of
their motion to dismiss if they wish to do so.
Motion to Strike Reply
Defendant Indianapolis Jet Center, Inc., (“IJC”) has moved to strike the Plaintiff’s reply in
support of his motion to amend his complaint because it was untimely. It was, in fact, untimely
with regard to Defendant IJC, which filed its response to the motion to amend on August 14, 2012.
The reply brief was timely with regard to the Comlux Defendants, who filed their response on
August 15th. While rules and deadlines are important, the Court declines to strike the reply brief as
to IJC, as doing so would serve no practical purpose. Accordingly, the motion to strike (dkt. no.
98) is DENIED. That said, Plaintiff’s counsel is admonished that the Plaintiff already has been
extended great latitude in this case and the Court expects strict compliance with all future
deadlines.
SO ORDERED: 09/28/2012

_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Copies to all counsel of record via electronic notification

3