COLEMAN v. CURRY et al

Filing 77

ENTRY DISCUSSING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Mr. Coleman has not identified a genuine issue of material fact as to his claims in this case, and the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Mr. Coleman's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 55 ) is DENIED and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 62 ) is GRANTED. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 9/16/2013. Copy Mailed. (JD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

WAYDE COLEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
TERRY CURRY Marion County Prosecutor’s
Office, Final Policy Maker, in his official
capacity, administrative and investigative
capacity,
REBECCA MEYER, in her administrative,
investigative capacity and not official capacity,
PAUL R CIESIELSKI official capacity as
Chief of Police Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department (IMPD),
DENNY RANDALL JASON IMPD, D9879,
in his individual and investigative capacity,
JUDGE RUEBEN B. HILL Criminal Court
Rm 18, in his official capacity for injunctive,
declarative relief and consequential relief that
the court deems applicable,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:11-cv-01256-TWP-DKL

ENTRY DISCUSSING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiff, Wayde Coleman (“Mr. Coleman”), was arrested on October 21, 2010. Months later the
charges were dropped and Mr. Coleman filed this civil rights action against five defendants1 for
their role in arresting and prosecuting him for battery on a minor and criminal confinement.
These defendants include arresting officer Randall Jason Denny (“Officer Denny”), Chief of

1

In his Complaint, Mr. Coleman includes the City of Indianapolis as the real party in interest in the caption but there
are no viable claims alleged against the City of Indianapolis and it is apparent from the Second Amended Complaint
and subsequent filings that while the City of Indianapolis may have an interest in this action, it is not a defendant.
The Clerk is directed to terminate the City of Indianapolis as a defendant in this action.

Police of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) Paul R. Ciesielski (“Chief
Ciesielski”), Marion County Prosecutor Terry Curry (“Prosecutor Curry”), Deputy Prosecutor
Rebecca Meyer (“Deputy Prosecutor Meyer”), and Judge Rueben B. Hill (“Judge Hill”)
(collectively, the “Defendants”). Mr. Coleman’s claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. For the reasons explained in this Entry, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Dkt. 62) is GRANTED and Mr. Coleman’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 55) is
DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are pertinent to the pending motions.
On October 21, 2010, Officer Denny responded to a non-emergency report of a battery
near 10th Street and Cumberland Road in Indianapolis, Indiana. See Dkt. 64-1 Affidavit of
Randall Jason Denny. When Officer Denny arrived at the scene, the parents of S.R., a minor,
reported an assault on the S.R. by Wayde Coleman, who lives across the street.2
Officer Denny interviewed S.R. and his parents regarding the occurrence. S.R. stated that
Mr. Coleman had placed him in a hold and refused to release him.3 Officer Denny observed and
photographed marks on the skin of S.R., which appeared consistent with S.R’s account of events.
A third party, S.R.’s minor cousin witnessed the occurrence and corroborated S.R.’s version of
events to Officer Denny as well.4

2

Mr. Coleman states in his response that the initial 9-1-1 call was made by Brandy Whitley, the aunt of S.R. Mr.
Coleman states that she did not witness the incident. However, the identity of the individual who called 9-1-1 is not
a material fact.
3

Mr. Coleman refers the Court to Exhibit H attached to his motion for summary judgment. Exhibit H is a document
titled Supplemental Discovery Statement, dated March 28, [2011]. In that statement, the S.R. minimizes the
altercation with Mr. Coleman. That statement, however, is irrelevant to what Officer Denny knew or was told at the
time of Mr. Coleman’s arrest. See Dkt 57-8.
4

Mr. Coleman attempts to dispute this fact by providing an excerpt from the deposition of Officer Denny taken in
the course of Mr. Coleman’s state criminal case. Apparently, the deposition is intended to show that the third party

2

Officer Denny then interviewed Mr. Coleman in front of his residence. Mr. Coleman told
Officer Denny that the witnesses at the scene were lying. Mr. Coleman did not deny placing the
S.R. in a wrestling hold, but indicated he was just “playing around”. Mr. Coleman’s daughter
also witnessed the occurrence and stated that Mr. Coleman had placed the S.R. in a hold against
the S.R.’s apparent will. The arresting officer, Officer Denny did not personally witness the
alleged battery.
After interviewing S.R., S.R.’s family, Mr. Coleman, and all witnesses to the occurrence,
Officer Denny called and spoke with an IMPD district detective regarding what he had learned at
the scene.5 With the IMPD detective’s input, Officer Denny determined that probable cause
existed to arrest Mr. Coleman for battery and criminal confinement.6 Detective Smiley supported
Officer Denny’s conclusion that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Coleman.
Officer Denny arrested Mr. Coleman without incident, placed him in his police cruiser,
and drove him to a police transport wagon, which took him to the Arrestee Processing Center for
booking.
Deputy Prosecutor Meyer was assigned the prosecution of Mr. Coleman on behalf of the
State of Indiana. See Dkt. 64-2, Affidavit of Rebecca Meyer.

Deputy Prosecutor Meyer

referenced was really the S.R’s cousin and that their stories were inconsistent. However, that is not at all what the
excerpt reveals. Instead, Officer Denny testified that there were not inconsistencies or different versions of events
offered by S.R. and his cousin. The alternate version of events was offered by Mr. Coleman himself. Dkt. 70 at p. 3.
5

Mr. Coleman admits that Officer Denny spoke with him on the scene but argues that he failed to include his
statements in the probable cause affidavit. This argument is not consistent with the deposition excerpt provided by
Mr. Coleman in support of his assertion. The excerpt reflects that Mr. Coleman’s position was included in the
probable cause affidavit; that is: “Officer Denny spoke to Wayde which is Wayde Coleman who stated that he
wrestles with the kids and [S.R] specifically quite often. He stated that they were just playing around and that [S.R.]
was crying only because Trina had said something mean to him during the altercation.” Dkt. 70 at p. 6. Thus, it
appears that Mr. Coleman’s side of the story was included. Apparently, Mr. Coleman believes that Officer Denny
should have reported in the probable cause affidavit Mr. Coleman’s statement that S.R., his parents and the
witnesses were lying to Officer Denny. However, recording that someone states that someone else is lying when the
reported version of events are contradictory is not required.
6

Mr. Coleman apparently attempts to dispute this fact by referencing an exchange during the criminal case
deposition of Officer Denny. But that exchange is not inconsistent with Officer Denny’s affidavit.

3

evaluated the incident in question and concluded based on her understanding of the facts that
probable cause existed to proceed on the filed charges against Mr. Coleman for Battery, a Class
A Misdemeanor, and Criminal Confinement, a Class D Felony.
On September 6-7, 2010, while being held in contempt, Mr. Coleman was denied medical
attention by the on duty nurse and several unknown guards at the arrestee processing center.
On October 22, 2010, Mr. Coleman was advised by a magistrate judge that he was
charged with battery and criminal confinement against a minor. The magistrate judge did not
allow Mr. Coleman to make a statement. The magistrate judge stated that the evidence in front
of him substantiated the arrest and he also found probable cause. Mr. Coleman was held on
$5,000.00 bail and was unable to leave the Marion County Jail.
Five months later, on or about March 28, 2011, S.R. wrote a statement regarding his
altercation with the Mr. Coleman, which minimized the occurrence7, but did not directly
contradict the version of events he previously related to Officer Denny. See Dkt 57-8. On May
2, 2011, Deputy Prosecutor Meyer met with the S.R. and his stepfather. Based on this meeting,
Deputy Prosecutor Meyer believed that they supported moving forward with the prosecution of
Mr. Coleman for battery of the minor.8 Deputy Prosecutor Meyer then communicated with S.R.
and his mother regarding the plea terms to be offered to Mr. Coleman, at which point both
individuals expressed a reticence to be involved in Mr. Coleman’s prosecution because he is the
family’s neighbor. Mr. Coleman ultimately rejected the proposed plea terms. After Mr. Coleman

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S.R. states that he and Mr. Coleman were “playing” and “wrestling” and he became embarrassed and angry when
people laughed at him.
8
Mr. Coleman disputes this fact. He references Plaintiff’s Exhibit C (Dkt 57-3), handwritten minutes from a pretrial
hearing on April 26, 2011. At the bottom of the page it states “Court hears testimony for Guardians of victim to
address victims recant – at next hearing court will address recant.” It is unclear who made this notation. The Exhibit
is described as a certified copy but there is no indication from the face of document that it is, in fact, a certified
copy, nor is the source of the handwriting clear. In any event, this notation does not create a genuine fact in dispute.

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filed the instant lawsuit naming Deputy Prosecutor Meyer, the prosecution of Mr. Coleman was
reassigned to Deputy Prosecutor Amy Butz.
Deputy Prosecutor Butz spoke with the S.R.’s mother on February 2, 2012, and explained
that Mr. Coleman had rejected all proposed plea terms, that trial was upcoming, and the
cooperation and court testimony of the S.R. and his mother would be necessary. During Deputy
Prosecutor Butz’s conversation with S.R.’s mother, the mother expressed that she and her son
were unwilling to testify at trial or otherwise participate in Mr. Coleman’s prosecution any
longer and stated that she and her son would prefer charges against Mr. Coleman be dismissed.
With the input of her supervisor, Deputy Prosecutor Butz determined that without the
cooperation and testimony of S.R., the State would likely lack sufficient evidence to prove the
Mr. Coleman’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial and therefore determined that dismissal
of the charges was the most appropriate course of action.
On February 2, 2012, the prosecutor’s office dismissed the battery and criminal
confinement charges against Mr. Coleman.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Summary judgment is appropriate where the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.’” Westra v. Credit Control of Pinellas, 409 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Rule
56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). A “material fact” is one that “might affect the
outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To survive a
motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must set forth specific, admissible

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evidence showing that there is a material issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986).
The key inquiry, then, is whether admissible evidence exists to support a plaintiff’s
claims, not the weight or credibility of that evidence, both of which are assessments reserved for
the trier of fact. See Schacht v. Wis. Dep’t of Corrections, 175 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1999).
Indeed, the existence of cross-motions for summary judgment does not necessarily mean that
there are no genuine issues of material fact. R.J. Codman Derailment Serv., Inc. v. Int’l Union of
Operating Eng.’s., 335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). Rather, the process of taking the facts in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving, first for one side and then for the other, may reveal
that neither side has enough to prevail without a trial. Id. at 648. “With cross-motions, [the
Court’s] review of the record requires that [the Court] construe all inferences in favor of the
party against whom the motion under consideration is made.” Oregon v. Arbitration Forums,
Ins., 246 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hendricks–Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d
685, 692 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Before, applying the standard set forth above to the claims in this case, it is appropriate to
address the scope of the evidence considered. Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or
genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the
record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c)(1)(A). A party
can also support a fact by showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c)(1)(B). Affidavits or declarations must be made on
personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant
is competent to testify on matters stated. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c)(4). Failure to properly support

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a fact in opposition to a movant’s factual assertion can result in the movant’s fact being
considered undisputed, and potentially the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e).
The Court need only consider the cited materials, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c)(3), and the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has “repeatedly assured the district courts that they are not
required to scour every inch of the record for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary
judgment motion before them.” Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., 325 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2003).
Furthermore, reliance on the pleadings or conclusory statements backed by inadmissible
evidence is insufficient to create an issue of material fact on summary judgment. Id. at 901.
Mr. Coleman cites to his own second amended complaint as evidence in support his
motion for summary judgment. This is problematic, but not because the second amended
complaint is “self-serving” as Defendants suggest. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly warned
against objecting to an affidavit on this basis. See Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir.
2006). “Most affidavits are self-serving, as is most testimony, and this does not permit a district
judge to denigrate a plaintiff's evidence when deciding whether a material dispute requires trial.”
Id.; Wilson v. McRae’s, Inc., 413 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Dalton v. Battaglia, 402
F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2005) (“We have repeatedly stated that the record may include a
so-called ‘self-serving’ affidavit provided that it is based on personal knowledge.”).
Because Mr. Coleman signed his second amended complaint under penalty of perjury,
this Court may treat that pleading as an affidavit and consider it as evidence. “By declaring under
penalty of perjury that the [Complaint] was true, . . . he converted the [Complaint], or rather
those factual assertions in the [Complaint] that complied with the requirements for affidavits
specified in the rule . . . into an affidavit.” Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 245, 247 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Payette v. Hoenisch, 284

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Fed. Appx. 348, 350, 2008 WL 2648917, *1 (7th Cir. 2008) (by declaring under penalty of
perjury that the complaint and response were true, the plaintiff “converted” those filings into
affidavits). However, only factual assertions which are made on personal knowledge, set out
facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to
testify on the matters stated are “affidavit material”; everything else may be disregarded. See
Ford, 90 F.3d at 247.
The problem for Mr. Coleman is that his second amended complaint is filled with legal
conclusions, legal arguments, irrelevant facts and alleged facts upon which he could not have
personal knowledge. The Seventh Circuit has warned against this practice:
The federal rules envisage the submission of evidentiary material in
response to a motion for summary judgment as a means of sharpening the issues,
so that the judge can determine just what if anything must be tried. . . . For the
plaintiff, instead of doing this, just to point to factual assertions in his verified
complaint is bound to make the identification of genuine issues of material fact
difficult, complicating the work of the judge.
Ford, 90 F.3d at 247. Accordingly, the Court reviewed the verified second amended complaint
(Dkt. 49, specifically pages 3-8) and the statement of undisputed facts (Dkt. 56, pages 3-8) and
only included those facts which are supported by admissible evidence in the background section
set forth above.
III. DISCUSSION
Mr. Coleman’s second amended complaint alleges eight counts. Count 1 alleges a
violation of Mr. Coleman’s right to be free from search and seizure and arrest except upon
probable cause. Count 2 alleges a violation of the right to be free from infamous charges except
upon proper affirmation or oath of the alleged victims. Count 3 alleges the violation of
substantive and procedural due process rights, including the right to life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness. Count 4 alleges malicious prosecution. Count 5 was omitted. Count 6 alleges false
8

imprisonment. Count 7 alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. Count 8 alleges failure
to administer medical attention. Each of Mr. Coleman’s claims is discussed below.
A.

Probable Cause to Arrest
Mr. Coleman alleges that he was arrested, charged, and prosecuted without probable

cause and falsely imprisoned. Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary judgment
because probable cause existed for Mr. Coleman’s arrest and thus Mr. Coleman cannot establish
a valid claim for false (or wrongful) arrest, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment. In
response, Mr. Coleman argues that whether probable cause existed is a material fact in dispute.
The Fourth Amendment, applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause . . . particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.” Bailey v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013). In other words, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures. To be deemed reasonable, a warrantless arrest
made in public must be supported by probable cause. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,
414–24 (1976). The Seventh Circuit recently explained:
Probable cause to arrest exists if the totality of the circumstances known to
the officer at the time of the arrest would warrant a reasonable person in believing
that the arrestee had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.
Abbott v. Sangamon County, Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013); see also
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370–71, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769
(2003). It is a practical, commonsense standard that requires only the type of fair
probability on which reasonable people act. See Florida v. Harris, ––– U.S. ––––, –
––– – ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055–56, 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013); Hanson v. Dane
County, Wis., 608 F.3d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 2010).
Based as it is on probabilities rather than hard certainties, the probablecause standard inherently allows room for reasonable mistakes. Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). Qualified
immunity affords an even greater level of protection by shielding officers from
9

“suit for damages if ‘a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest] to be
lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting]
officers possessed.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116
L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (per curiam) (second alteration in original) (quoting Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)); see also,
e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565
(2009) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727,
73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982))). In this context, qualified immunity provides shelter for
officers who have “arguable probable cause” to arrest—i.e., those officers that
reasonably but mistakenly believe they have probable cause. See Abbott, 705 F.3d
at 714–15, 723–24; Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998).
Though they may appear to be the same, the probable-cause and arguable-probablecause inquiries are different. Fleming v. Livingston County, Ill., 674 F.3d 874, 880
(7th Cir. 2012). An arrest without probable cause is a violation of a constitutional
right, whereas an arrest without arguable probable cause is a violation of a “clearly
established” constitutional right. See Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227; McComas v.
Brickley, 673 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 2012).
Gutierrez v. Kermon, -- F.3d --, 2013 WL 3481359, 3-4 (7th Cir. 2013).
There is no evidence that Officer Denny prepared the probable cause affidavit in bad faith
by knowingly “presenting false statements” as Mr. Coleman suggests. See Dkt. 70 at p. 15.
Officer Denny’s probable cause affidavit included the statements he relied upon to support his
finding of probable cause and included Mr. Coleman’s statement that he was simply wrestling
with the alleged victim and that the minor was upset because he was teased. Officer Denny did
not need to include Mr. Coleman’s statement that the alleged victim and other witnesses were
lying because it is obvious on the face of the affidavit that Officer Denny was told two
contradictory stories.
Based on the totality of the circumstances in this case, Officer Denny had probable cause
to arrest Mr. Coleman for battery and criminal confinement of the S.R. Officer Denny
interviewed S.R., witnesses to the incident, and Mr. Coleman himself before making the arrest.
The accounts of the incident given by the victim’s family and witnesses corroborated S.R.’s
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version of events. Mr. Coleman did not deny placing S.R. in a headlock, causing S.R. to sustain
skin abrasions and leading someone to call the police regarding the issue. Taken together, Officer
Denny had a sufficient foundation to conclude at the time of the arrest, that Mr. Coleman had
committed a crime. In addition, Officer Denny is entitled to qualified immunity because a
reasonable officer could have believed the arrest to be lawful, in light of clearly established law
and the information the Officer Denny possessed at the time.
The existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a § 1983 claim for false arrest.
Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006). Because there was probable
cause for arrest, the Defendants—Officer Denny in particular—are entitled to summary
judgment in their favor on the false arrest claim (Counts 1 and 6).
B.

Malicious Prosecution
Mr. Coleman argues that Defendants “tried to prosecute an innocent individual.” Dkt. 70

at p. 2. “To state a claim for malicious prosecution under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that: (1) he has satisfied the requirements of a state law cause of action for malicious
prosecution; (2) the malicious prosecution was committed by state actors; and (3) he was
deprived of liberty.” Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996). Under
Indiana law, a plaintiff must establish that: “(1) the defendant instituted or caused to be instituted
a prosecution against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant acted with malice in doing so; (3) the
prosecution was instituted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution terminated in the
plaintiff’s favor.” Zisis v. St. Joseph Twp., 979 F. Supp. 806, 813 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (citing Butt v.
McEvoy, 669 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)).
As explained above, there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Coleman and to initiate
prosecution. This fact is sufficient to defeat the claim of malicious prosecution under Indiana law

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and the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on this basis. But even if
there was not probable cause, to survive summary judgment on his claim for malicious
prosecution, Mr. Coleman would also need evidence to prove “that the officers committed some
improper act after they arrested him without probable cause.” Mr. Coleman has argued that
Officer Denny omitted in his probable cause affidavit that that Mr. Coleman told him the
witnesses were lying, however as mentioned earlier, this omission not an improper act as Mr.
Coleman’s version of events was included in the affidavit. Instead, Mr. Coleman would need to
show for example, that officers “pressured or influenced the prosecutors to indict, made knowing
misstatements to the prosecutor, testified untruthfully, or covered up exculpatory evidence.”
Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing
Sneed v. Rybicki, 146 F.3d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 1998) and Reed, 77 F.3d at 1053-54)). There is no
such evidence in this case as to any of the Defendants.
Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendants on Coleman’s
malicious prosecution claim (Counts 2 and 4).
C.

False Imprisonment
Mr. Coleman alleges false imprisonment. He explains that Officer Denny and Deputy

Prosecutor Meyer restrained him without just cause by arresting him and wrongfully trumping up
charges against him, even though they knew he was innocent.
As set forth above, the evidence in this matter establishes that probable cause existed as a
matter of law to arrest Mr. Coleman for battery and criminal confinement. Accordingly, Mr.
Coleman’s claim for false imprisonment fails. Mr. Coleman’s imprisonment was incidental to
his lawful arrest and detention for which probable cause existed. Mr. Coleman has not presented
any evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that his detention was

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unlawful. Summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on this claim (Count 3) is therefore
proper.
D.

Claims against Judge Hill
Mr. Coleman alleges that Judge Hill “misused his power,” thereby depriving him of

certain constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Dkt. 49, ¶¶ 17-23;
Dkt. 56, p. 6. This alleged misuse of power was directly related to rulings made in the course of
Mr. Coleman’s state criminal proceeding. In addition, Mr. Coleman complains that Judge Hill is
biased against pro se litigants and has chastised him for representing himself. The Defendants
seek summary judgment on the basis that Judge Hill is absolutely immune from suit for the
conduct of which Mr. Coleman complains.
Judicial officers are protected by common law immunity from suit brought on the basis of
judicial acts. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978). The immunity is overcome
only where the judge’s acts were non-judicial or were taken in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991). Neither exception applies here, as Judge
Hill clearly acted in his official capacity and had jurisdiction to act with regard to criminal
proceedings against Mr. Coleman. Mr. Coleman essentially alleges that Judge Hill violated his
civil rights because no probable cause existed for Mr. Coleman’s arrest and prosecution. (Dkt
49, ¶¶ 17-23). Judge Hill’s determination regarding the existence of probable cause (even if
erroneous) is a plainly judicial act for which he is immune. Similarly, Judge Hill’s decision to
hold Mr. Coleman in contempt of court (even if erroneous) is also a judicial act. The broad scope
of absolute judicial immunity is justified “by the long-settled understanding that the independent
and impartial exercise of judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to
potential damages liability.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993).

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Accordingly, Judge Hill is entitled to summary judgment in his favor on the claims alleged
against him.
E.

Claims against Prosecutors
Mr. Coleman claims that he was wrongfully and maliciously prosecuted for battery and

criminal confinement of S.R. (Dkt. 49, ¶¶ 28-29, 41-45). He also argues that Deputy Prosecutor
Meyer ignored facts that demonstrated that no crime was committed on October 21, 2010 by Mr.
Coleman and advised Officer Denny outside of her prosecutorial duties. The Defendants argue
that defendant prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity.
Prosecutors performing functions “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process” are entitled to absolute immunity from liability. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 430 (1976); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991). In Imbler, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the
prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.” 424 U.S. at 430. “This
immunity shields the prosecutor even if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without
probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.” Henry v. Farmer City State
Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Davis v. Zirkelback, 149 F.3d 614, 617 (7th
Cir. 1998) (prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity in evaluating evidence collected by police
and deciding to bring a judicial proceeding).
Mr. Coleman argues that Deputy Prosecutor Meyer acted outside of her prosecutorial
duties and improperly advised Officer Denny by raising objections during Mr. Coleman’s
deposition of Officer Denny. However, in objecting to questions asked of fact witness Officer
Denny in the criminal case deposition, Deputy Prosecutor Meyer was acting well within her
capacity and responsibilities as a prosecutor and attorney for the State to preserve objections to

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such questions for trial. Although in this role, Deputy Prosecutor Meyer was not entitled to
absolute immunity, there is no plausible basis to conclude the Deputy Prosecutor Meyer’s
objections during a deposition violated Mr. Coleman’s constitutional rights. Burns v. Reed, 500
U.S. 478, 494 (1991) (finding no absolute immunity for claims arising out of giving legal advice
to the police).9 The prosecutors are absolutely immune to claims arising from their evaluation of
the evidence against Mr. Coleman, their decision to pursue criminal charges against him, and
their role in deciding to dismiss charges against him, including the timing of such dismissal.
To the extent state law claims are alleged against the prosecutors they are also entitled to
summary judgment on those claims because the Indiana Tort Claims Act expressly exempts from
liability the initiation of judicial proceedings and the performance of discretionary functions.
Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(6) (2013); see Foster v. Pearcy, 387 N.E.2d 446, 449-50 (Ind. 1979). No
liability will attach to any acts reasonably within the general scope of authority granted to
prosecuting attorneys. Foster, 387 N.E.2d at 538; see also Sims v. Barnes, 689 N.E.2d 734, 73738 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). All claims alleged against the prosecutors are based on acts within the
general scope of authority granted to them (such as deciding to prosecute) and, therefore, they
are entitled to immunity and summary judgment is granted in their favor.
F.

Failure to Train
Mr. Coleman alleges that Chief Ciesielski “failed to run a bonified Police force [and]

failed to train his officers on how to prepare probable cause affidavits,” and Prosecutor Curry
allegedly failed to train his employees. Dkt. 70 at p. 2. Mr. Coleman alleges that Officer
Denny’s and Detective Smiley’s actions reflect back on Chief Ciesielski in his official capacity
for his failure to properly train officers on the meaning of ‘Probable Cause’ and how to properly
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Because no clearly established constitutional right was violated by Deputy Prosecutor Meyer during Mr.
Coleman’s deposition of Officer Denny, she is entitled to qualified immunity as to any claim arising out of that
conduct.

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fill out an affidavit to support probable cause for arrest. Mr. Coleman describes this failure to
train as a custom which is the “cause of destruction and mayhem in the homes of the citizens of
the City of Indianapolis.” Dkt. 56 at p. 4.
The Court is not persuaded. Any state law claims of negligent training, supervision,
and/or discipline are barred by the discretionary function immunity provision of the Indiana Tort
Claims Act (“ITCA”). See Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(7). Indiana courts have consistently held that
governmental entities are immune from liability as a matter of law for negligent training,
employment, supervision, and discipline of public employees and officers under the
discretionary function immunity provision of the ITCA. Lamb v. City of Bloomington, 741
N.E.2d 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Foster, 387 N.E.2d at 450 (“Clearly, the employment and
supervision of deputies and employees in governmental offices…is a discretionary function.”).
In this case, Prosecutor Curry and Chief Ciesielski are entitled to discretionary function
immunity as to any state tort claims of negligent training, supervision, and discipline. Their
decisions as to how to train and supervise employees and/or officers, as well as any decisions
regarding whether or not to discipline a deputy prosecutor or police officer for a particular act,
are entitled to immunity.
Moreover, Mr. Coleman has presented no evidence that Deputy Prosecutor Meyer,
Officer Denny, or any other party was inadequately trained or improperly supervised. Similarly,
there is no evidence that an official municipal policy existed within the Marion County
Prosecutor’s Office or the IMPD which caused a violation of Mr. Coleman’s constitutional
rights. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on any constitutional
or state law claim of negligent training, supervision, or discipline.

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G.

Failure to Administer Medical Attention
Mr. Coleman states that on September 6-7, 2011, while held in contempt he was denied

medical attention for his high blood pressure by the nurse on duty and several guards at the
arrestee processing center. Mr. Coleman states that he “believes this hidden motive was based
on the previous lawsuit filed by Mr. Coleman and some hidden vendetta against him by other
State Actors.” Dkt. 56 at p. 21. This claim must be dismissed for two reasons. First, there is no
evidence upon which a reasonable person could conclude that any of the Defendants were
personally responsible for the alleged denial of medical care. Liability in a § 1983 claim requires
personal responsibility.

Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656-57 (7th Cir. 2005).

These

Defendants cannot be held liable simply because of their supervisory positions. See West v.
Waymire, 114 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1997) (“the doctrine of respondeat superior is not
available to a plaintiff in a section 1983 suit”); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 593-94 (7th
Cir. 2009) (“Section 1983 does not establish a system of vicarious responsibility. Liability
depends on each defendant’s knowledge and actions, not on the knowledge or actions of persons
they supervise. . . . Monell’s rule [is that] that public employees are responsible for their own
misdeeds but not for anyone else’s.”) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
Second, the Defendants correctly point out that the events Mr. Coleman complains of –
insufficient medical care – occurred while he was a pretrial detainee. Thus, Defendants argue
Mr. Coleman’s status as a pre-trial detainee causes the Eighth Amendment to be inapplicable.
The Defendants are correct; it is the Fourteenth Amendment which applies to pretrial detainees.
Estate of Miller, ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984, 989 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–37 (1979)). Courts still look to Eighth Amendment case law in

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addressing the claims of pretrial detainees, given that the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause are at least as broad as those that the Eighth Amendment
affords to convicted prisoners. Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650,
664 (7th Cir. 2012)(citing cases). Mr. Coleman’s error in pleading cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment might have been overlooked if there was any evidence to support a
claim of denial of medical care, but there is not. The Defendants are therefore entitled to
summary judgment on this claim (Count 8).
H.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Mr. Coleman alleges that the Defendants intentionally and deliberately inflicted

emotional distress by maliciously prosecuting him, violating his constitutional rights, and falsely
arresting and imprisoning him. He argues that the Defendants knew or should have known that
emotional distress was the likely result of their conduct.
Indiana common law recognizes a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
where on “by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another.” Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ind. 1991). The Indiana
Supreme Court in Cullison emphasized “[i]t is the intent to harm the plaintiff emotionally which
constitutes the basis for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id.
In order to successfully prove a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Mr.
Coleman must demonstrate that the Defendants: (1) engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct
(2) which intentionally or recklessly (3) caused (4) severe emotional distress to another. Lindsey
v. DeGroot, 898 N.E.2d 1251, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
There is no evidence that any of the Defendants’ actions were outrageous in character or
that any of the Defendants acted intentionally or recklessly with the intention of causing severe

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emotional distress. There is no evidence that any of the Defendants knew Mr. Coleman or
desired to cause him harm. The fact that Mr. Coleman was arrested, charged, and initially
prosecuted on the battery and criminal confinement charges does not exceed the bounds of
decent society where probable cause existed for the arrest. Officer Denny and the other
Defendants’ acted reasonably based upon the initial statements from the witnesses. It is
unfortunate that Mr. Coleman was incarcerated for five months before S.K. and his parents
presented the affidavit and engaged in discussions with prosecutors which ultimately led to the
case being dismissed. But in light of all the circumstances, the Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law in their favor on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress (Count 7).
IV. CONCLUSION
Mr. Coleman has not identified a genuine issue of material fact as to his claims in this
case, and the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Mr. Coleman’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 55) is DENIED and Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Dkt. 62) is GRANTED. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
SO ORDERED.

09/16/2013
Date: __________________

________________________
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

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DISTRIBUTION:
Mr. Wayde Coleman
11313 Lynchburg Way
Indianapolis, Indiana 46229
Alexander Phillip Will
City of Indianapolis, Corporation Counsel
[e-mail]
Beth Ann Garrison
City of Indianapolis, Corporation Counsel
[e-mail]
Cameron G. Starnes
City of Indianapolis, Corporation Counsel
[e-mail]

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