GRANDBERRY v. INDIANAPOLIS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

Filing 20

Entry Dismissing Insufficient Claims and Directing Further Proceedings - Plaintiff's request to substitute the City of Indianapolis as a defendant (dkt. no. 17 ) is GRANTED. Grandberry shall have through November 22, 2011, in which to identify any claim not dismissed in Part II.C of this Entry. The date by which the defendants shall have to file their answers or other responsive pleadings to the complaint is extended until further order. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 11/2/2011.(JD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
ERIC GRANDBERRY,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
)
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, MARION COUNTY )
PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE,
)
)
Defendants.
)

1:11-cv-1290-TWP-DML

Entry Dismissing Insufficient Claims
and Directing Further Proceedings
I.
The plaintiff’s request to substitute the City of Indianapolis as a defendant in
place of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department [Dkt. 17] is granted. The
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department is terminated as a defendant. The City of
Indianapolis is added as a defendant.
II.
A.
Eric Grandberry is currently serving a sentence imposed in 49G20-0608-FA164431 for dealing in cocaine or narcotic drug. This conduct is criminalized by IND.
CODE ' 35-48-4-1.
In this civil action, Grandberry seeks a declaratory judgment finding that IND.
CODE ' 35-48-4-1 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied by the City of
Indianapolis and the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office because the provision has the
effect of “taking the citizenship, voting rights, and contract rights of plaintiff, similarly
situated black males, or other minorities who live in disproportionately lower-income

neighborhoods and reside in disproportionately democratic precincts.” Dkt. 1-1 at pp. 78. Grandberry seeks money damages and an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of §
35-48-4-1. Grandberry alleges that his conviction pursuant to § 35-48-4-1 violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause and Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.
His claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B.
Grandberry’s complaint is subject to screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A.
Pursuant to this statute, "[a] complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if
the allegations, taken as true, show that plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Jones v. Bock,
127 S. Ct. 910, 921 (2007).
To satisfy the notice-pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2), a complaint need only include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “A complaint must always . . .
allege >enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Limestone
Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2010). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). In addition, although the requirements
of notice pleading are minimal, when a plaintiff Apleads facts that show his suit is . . .
without merit, he has pleaded himself out of court.@ Tregenza v. Great American
Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1084
(1994).

C.
Grandberry challenges the constitutionality of the state law which criminalizes the
conduct for which he is currently incarcerated. This would impugn the validity of his
continued confinement. This triggers the rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). Where Asuccess in a . . . [42 U.S.C. '] 1983 damages action would implicitly
question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must first achieve
favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge
the underlying conviction or sentence.@ Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004)
(citing to Heck). A[U]nder Heck, a ' 1983 claim for damages is not cognizable (i.e. does
not accrue) if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on that claim >would necessarily imply
the invalidity of [the plaintiff's] conviction or sentence.=Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug
Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 896-97 (7th Cir. 2001)(citing Heck, 512 U.S. at
487). Heck requires the potential plaintiff to wait until his conviction is nullified before
bringing suit.@ Id.; see also Apampa v. Layng, 157 F.3d 1103, 1105 (7th Cir. 1999).
These same principles require the same disposition here. Accordingly, any claim
challenging the constitutionality of IND. CODE ' 35-48-4-1 and any claim challenging the
manner in which that statute is employed is dismissed.
As to Grandberry’s prayer for injunctive relief, he does not allege that he is
currently facing a prosecution based on IND. CODE ' 35-48-4-1. His complaint does not
show how the requested injunctive relief would benefit him. In short, he lacks standing
to seek injunctive relief as to the State of Indiana’s use of IND. CODE ' 35-48-4-1 and
that claim is dismissed.

III.
No partial final judgment shall issue at this time as to the claim(s) resolved in this
Entry.
Grandberry shall have through November 22, 2011, in which to identify any
claim not dismissed in Part II.C of this Entry.
The date by which the defendants shall have to file their answers or other
responsive pleadings to the complaint is extended until further order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

11/02/2011
Date: __________________

Distribution:
Eric Grandberry
No. 146430
Putnamville Correctional Facility
1946 West U.S. Highway 40
Greencastle, IN 46135
Jennifer Lynn Haley
[e-mail]
Justin F. Roebel
[e-mail]
Adam Clay
[e-mail]
Betsy M. Isenberg
[e-mail]

________________________
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana