CAYWOOD v. ANONYMOUS HOSPITAL et al

Filing 43

ENTRY ON APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S DECISION - Court agrees, and will therefore hew to Magistrate Judge Dinsmore's thoughtful approach. Bard's Objections (Dkt. #40) are OVERRULED and the Magistrate Judge's decision is AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Marion Superior Court. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 8/9/2012.(JD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
PATRICIA CAYWOOD, individually
and as personal representative of the
Estate of James Caywood, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANONYMOUS HOSPITAL, and
CR BARD, INC., d/b/a BARD ACCESS
SYSTEMS,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:11-cv-1313-TWP-MJD

ENTRY ON APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S DECISION
This matter comes before the Court on an appeal of Magistrate Judge Dinsmore’s Order
granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. Under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act (“MMA”), a
health service provider remains anonymous in a malpractice case until the Indiana Department of
Insurance’s (“IDOI”) medical review panel renders an opinion on the claim. See Ind. Code § 3418-8-7(a)(1). On January 6, 2011, Plaintiff Patricia Caywood (“Mrs. Caywood”), a citizen of
Indiana, submitted a Proposed Complaint against Defendant Anonymous Hospital (the
“Hospital”) to the IDOI. The complaint stemmed from the death of Mrs. Caywood’s husband
from a severe anoxic brain injury. Notably, in that complaint, Mrs. Caywood revealed the
identity of the Hospital. To date, no IDOI panel has rendered an opinion; in fact, no panel has
even been selected.
On August 24, 2011, Mrs. Caywood (on behalf of herself and as her husband’s personal
representative), filed a complaint in Indiana state court alleging various claims against two
defendants: (1) products liability claims against C.R. Bard, Inc. (“Bard”), a New Jersey

corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey; and (2) medical malpractice
claims against the Hospital. On September 28, 2011, Bard timely removed the case to this Court
based on diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1441. In its Notice of
Removal, Bard wrote that there is “no legal entity known as Anonymous Hospital; accordingly,
that defendant can be disregarded for purposes of determining diversity of citizenship[.]” (Dkt.
#1 at 2-3). But therein lies the rub, because the Court now knows, unequivocally, that the
Hospital is actually an Indiana corporation with its principal place of business in Indiana, thus
destroying diversity. Citing this lack of complete diversity, Mrs. Caywood filed a Motion to
Remand.1
On April 12, 2012, Magistrate Judge Dinsmore sided with Mrs. Caywood and granted
the Motion to Remand. That decision rested on the appropriate interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §
1441(b)(1), which provides as follows: “In determining whether a civil action is removable on
the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title, the citizenship of defendants sued
under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) (emphasis added). Bard
argues that the identity of the Hospital was fictitious. Magistrate Judge Dinsmore disagreed,
explaining that “fictitious” is not synonymous with “anonymous,” and the Hospital is only the
latter. After all, “the Hospital is identifiable and has been active in this case[.]” (Dkt. #38 at 5.)
Therefore, “its identity can and must be taken into account in determining the existence of
diversity.” Id. Magistrate Judge Dinsmore noted that the Seventh Circuit has not yet squarely
ruled on this nuanced issue. Nonetheless, relying on authority from the First and the Fifth
Circuits, Magistrate Judge Dinsmore held that “since the Hospital has now unquestionably been
identified as a citizen of the same State as the Plaintiff, federal subject matter jurisdiction has

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To be clear, Mrs. Caywood attached her Proposed Complaint (the one filed with IDOI and identifying the
Hospital) to her Motion to Remand.

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been destroyed, and this Court must remand this case.” Id. at 7. Finally, Magistrate Judge
Dinsmore noted that this decision was reinforced by the age-old precept that federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction. Id.
In response, Bard has appealed Magistrate Judge Dinsmore’s ruling under Fed. R. Civ. P.
72, contending that the Hospital is fictitious, and emphasizing that the MMA “protects the
[H]ospital’s anonymity until such time as the MMA’s requirements have been met.” (Dkt. #41
at 1.) Interestingly, courts have reached different decisions about what standard of review a
district court should use when reviewing a magistrate judge’s decision remanding a case.
Compare First Union Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 229 F.3d 992, 995-97 (10th Cir. 2000) (a district
court’s review of a magistrate judge’s decision on a remand motion requires a de novo
determination) with Delta Dental of Rhode Island v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island,
942 F. Supp. 740, 746 (D.R.I. 1996) (holding motions to remand to be non-dispositive, meaning
a deferential standard of review was appropriate). The Court has not located any Seventh Circuit
authority on this point. But, in the end, this point is more academic than pragmatic. Regardless
of the operative standard of review, the Court reaches the same result.
Indeed, the Court agrees entirely with Magistrate Judge Dinsmore’s reasoning.
“Fictitious” and “anonymous” are distinct concepts, and the Hospital is the latter, not the former.
Common sense provides that when a court knows the citizenship of a given defendant, it should
not turn a blind eye to an indisputable and obvious reality. Simply put, a contrary decision
would elevate form over substance and needlessly risk wasting federal judicial resources. It is
true, as Bard emphasizes, that judges within this district have arguably reached different
decisions on this unique and vexing issue. Compare Thornburg v. Stryker Corp., 2006 WL
211952, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 27, 2006) (denying motion to remand) with Ropp v. Stryker Corp.,

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2011 WL 304770, at *3-4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2011) (remanding case). However, as Magistrate
Judge Dinsmore noted, Bard’s cases are arguably distinguishable because, here, “the issue at
hand is not one of removal . . . . [t]he proper question regards the propriety of this Court
maintaining this case in the known absence of subject matter jurisdiction.” (Dkt. #38 at 5.) The
Court agrees, and will therefore hew to Magistrate Judge Dinsmore’s thoughtful approach.
Bard’s Objections (Dkt. #40) are OVERRULED and the Magistrate Judge’s decision is
AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Marion Superior Court.

SO ORDERED.

08/09/2012

________________________
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

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DISTRIBUTION:
David J. Cooner
MCCARTER & ENGLISH, LLP
[e-mail]
Amanda C. Couture
DELANEY & DELANEY
[e-mail]
Kathleen Ann DeLaney
DELANEY & DELANEY LLC
[e-mail]
Jill M. Emerson
CLINE FARRELL CHRISTIE LEE & CARESS
[e-mail]
Kathy Ann Lee
CLINE FARRELL CHRISTIE LEE & CARESS
[e-mail], [e-mail]
Sara F. Merin
MCCARTER & ENGLISH, LLP
[e-mail]
Elizabeth Ann Schuerman
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
[e-mail]
Robert G. Weddle
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
[e-mail]

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