BINION v. ZENK

Filing 5

ENTRY DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - Mr. Binion's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED and the action dismissed pursuant to Rule 4. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 3/8/2012.(JD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
BILLY BINION,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT MICHAEL ZENK,
Respondent.

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Case No. 1:11-cv-1573-TWP-DML

ENTRY DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Billy Binion (“Mr. Binion”), a state prisoner, seeks a writ of habeas corpus with respect
to a disciplinary proceeding identified as No. NCF 11-01-0128. Having considered such petition
and being duly advised, the Court finds that the petition must be denied and the action dismissed.
This conclusion rests on the following facts and circumstances:
I. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears
legally insufficient on its face.@ McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). This authority is
conferred by Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts,
which provides that upon preliminary consideration by the district court judge, "[i]f it plainly
appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its summary dismissal and
cause the petitioner to be notified." See Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 1993).
A federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(a) only if
it finds the applicant Ais in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.@ Id.

“A prisoner challenging the process he was afforded in a prison disciplinary proceeding
must meet two requirements: (1) he has a liberty or property interest that the state has interfered
with; and (2) the procedures he was afforded upon that deprivation were constitutionally
deficient.” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007).
The right to due process in this setting is important and is well-defined. Due process
requires the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited opportunity to present
evidence to an impartial decision-maker, a written statement articulating the reasons for the
disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and “some evidence in the record” to support
the finding of guilt. See Superintend., Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564, 566, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th
Cir. 2003); Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
II. FACTS
Mr. Binion previously filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (hereafter “the earlier
habeas action”) challenging this same disciplinary proceeding, identified as No. NCF 11-010128, which was docketed and decided as Binion v. Superintendent Stine, No. 1:11-cv-405TWP-TAB (S.D.Ind. August 5, 2011). A court may take judicial notice of its own records. In re
Salem, 465 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing cases). In this instance, the Court takes judicial
notice of Mr. Binion’s previous habeas action challenging No. NCF 11-01-0128.
The earlier habeas action was dismissed as moot because the administrative finding in
No. NCF 11-01-0128 was vacated and a new hearing will be conducted. This rendered the
habeas action moot, and an action which is moot must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

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The rehearing of No. NCF 11-01-0128 occurred on June 30, 2011. Mr. Binion was again
found guilty and was sanctioned. The present action was filed after Mr. Binion’s administrative
appeal was rejected.
Mr. Binion’s challenge to the rehearing is two-fold. First Mr. Binion claims that the
hearing officer did not provide an adequate written summary of the evidence relied on to support
the guilt determination and second, he argues he was denied his day in court.
The claim that Mr. Binion was not provided adequate written notice of the evidence used
in the guilt determination rests on an asserted failure to comply with an Indiana prison
regulation, it does not support relief under § 2254(a). Evans v. McBride, 94 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir.
1996).

The due process component of this subject is that written statements ensure both

administrative accountability and meaningful review. Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1287 (7th
Cir. 1981). The statement need only illuminate the evidentiary basis and reasoning behind the
decision. Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 318 (7th Cir. 1992). The report of disciplinary hearing
is appended to the habeas petition and shows that the summary of the evidence satisfies the
requirements of due process. Culbert v. Young, 834 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1987); Saenz v.
Young, 811 F.2d 1172, 1173-74 (7th Cir. 1987).
Mr. Binion next claims that the manner in which the earlier habeas action was resolved
denied him his day in court. While no hearing was held, Mr. Binion did receive through
administrative directive the relief (a rehearing) which he would have been entitled had he
prevailed in the earlier habeas action. A case does not become moot because one prefers a
particular avenue of redress. A[I]f an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes it
impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party, the appeal
must be dismissed,@ for federal courts have Ano authority to give opinions upon moot questions

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or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in
issue in the case before it.@ Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted). So it is here. Mr. Binion could gain no greater relief from
the earlier habeas action than he has already received, and prison authorities did not exceed their
authority in acting as they did. Macktal v. Chao, 286 F.3d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 2002) (A[I]t is
generally accepted that in the absence of a specific statutory limitation, an administrative agency
has the inherent authority to reconsider its decisions.@) (collecting cases). The claim of error or
irregularity in the events which caused the earlier habeas action to be dismissed as moot is
without merit.
Mr. Binion’s claims that he was denied the protections afforded by Wolff or that the
outcome of the earlier habeas action taints the rehearing of No. NCF 11-01-0128 are refuted by
habeas petition itself. "The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of the government." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in
any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceeding, or sanctions involved in the events identified
in this action, and there was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Mr.
Binion to the relief he seeks.
III. CONCUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Binion’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be
DENIED and the action dismissed pursuant to Rule 4.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.

SO ORDERED.

________________________
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

03/08/2012
Date: _________________

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DISTRIBUTION:
Billy Binion, DOC #135590
New Castle Correctional Facility
Inmate Mail/Parcels
1000 Van Nuys Road
P.O. Box A
New Castle, Indiana 47362

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