MEINEKE v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION et al

Filing 55

ENTRY denying 40 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 4/22/2013. Copy Mailed. (JD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
ANTHONY R. MEINEKE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALAN FINNAN Former
Superintendent, JACK BINION Facility
Head/Designee, CHARLES A. PENFOLD
Final Reviewing Authority, sued in their
individual
and
official
capacities,
CHARLES FOX Disciplinary Hearing
Board Chairman, BRUCE LEMMON sued
in his official capacity, KEITH BUTTS
Superintendent,
Defendants.

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Case. No. 1:11-cv-01624-TWP-DKL

Entry Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Anthony Meineke’s (“Mr.
Meineke”) Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 41). The Court has considered
the motion, the Defendants’ response thereto, and Mr. Meineke’s reply.
In December of 2009, Mr. Meineke was convicted of receiving stolen property
in a prison disciplinary proceeding identified as ISR-09-11-0229. He was sanctioned
with an earned credit time deprivation of fifteen days and restitution in the amount
of $370.00. See Meineke v. Finnan, 1:10-cv-1677-LJM-MJD (S.D.Ind. Feb. 11, 2011)
(28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition summarily denied).
Through his motion for preliminary injunction, Mr. Meineke seeks an order
(1) enjoining the defendants from continuing to place a “freeze” on his inmate trust

fund account until the merits of his complaint are decided, (2) enjoining the
defendants from deducting all monies from his state pay income to pay the
restitution sanction, and (3) enjoining the defendants from violating a Department
of Correction policy permitting $5.00 to remain in his trust account at the end of
each month.
“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.” Goodman v. Illinois Dept. of Financial and Professional Regulation,
430 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). To warrant
preliminary injunctive relief, the movant must first establish that he has “(1) no
adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction
is denied and (2) some likelihood of success on the merits.” Ezell v. City of Chicago,
651 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2011).
Mr. Meineke has failed to meet the high threshold required to justify
granting a preliminary injunction. To begin, Mr. Meineke cannot show that he will
suffer irreparable harm if his motion is not granted. In fact, the restitution at issue
was paid in full and the “hold” removed as of December of 2012. His claim was moot
at the time he filed his motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs seeking
preliminary relief must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence
of an injunction.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22
(2008). There is no harm that a preliminary injunction could prevent under these
circumstances, much less irreparable harm. In addition, economic losses generally

will not support a preliminary injunction. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v.
Girl Scouts of U.S. of America, Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir. 2008).
As to the likelihood of success on the merits, Defendants argue that Mr.
Meineke’s due process claims are barred. Mr. Meineke seeks compensatory and
punitive damages for alleged constitutional violations associated with his
disciplinary proceeding. The settled law in these circumstances is that when a
prisoner makes a claim that, if successful, could shorten his term of imprisonment,
the claim must be brought as a habeas petition, not as a 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 claim. A
prisoner's § 1983 claim is not cognizable when “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . unless the
plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). This same rule applies to
“convictions” incurred in prison disciplinary proceedings. See Edwards v. Balisok,
520 U.S. 641 (1997); Walker v. Taylorville Correctional Ctr., 129 F.3d 410, 413 (7th
Cir. 1997); Lusz v. Scott, 126 F.3d 1018, 1021 (7th Cir. 1997). The sanctions imposed
as a result of the disciplinary conviction included a loss of good-time credits. Mr.
Meineke cannot recover monetary damages in this § 1983 complaint challenging his
disciplinary sanctions without first proving that the conviction has been overturned.
The court takes judicial notice of the dismissal of Mr. Meineke’s habeas petition. See
Meineke v. Finnan, 1:10-cv-1677-LJM-MJD (S.D.Ind. Feb. 11, 2011). To the extent
Mr. Meineke’s claims are barred by Heck and have not been invalidated, there is no
likelihood of success on this claim.

Even to the extent that Mr. Meineke has a constitutionally protected
property interest in his trust account funds, Mr. Meineke admits that he waived his
right to appear at the disciplinary hearing. This too weighs against any likelihood of
success.
For these reasons, Mr. Meineke’s motion for preliminary injunction (Dkt. 40)
must be DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

04/22/2013
Date: __________________
Distribution:
Anthony R. Meineke
147748
Pendleton Correctional Facility
Inmate Mail/Parcels
4490 West Reformatory Road
Pendleton, IN 46064
Electronically Registered Counsel

________________________
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana