AMOS v. ASTRUE

Filing 23

Decision on Judicial Review - The ALJ's decisions to discount the opinion of Mr. Amos's treating physician and to disbelieve Mr. Amos's descriptions of the limiting effects of his impairments applied the correct standards and are supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner's decision finding that Mr. Amos was not disabled is AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Debra McVicker Lynch on 3/13/2013. (TMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
LARRY AMOS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of the Social Security,
Administration,
Defendant.

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) CASE NO.: 1:11-cv-01627-DML-SEB
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Decision on Judicial Review
Plaintiff Larry Amos applied on November 20, 2007, for Disability Insurance
Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging that he has been
disabled since May 7, 2007. Acting for the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration following a hearing on March 29, 2010, an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) found that Mr. Amos is not disabled because he is capable of performing his
past relevant work as a circuit board inspector. The national Appeals Council
denied review of the ALJ’s decision, rendering the ALJ’s decision for the
Commissioner final. Mr. Amos filed this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for
review of the Commissioner’s decision. The parties consented to the magistrate
judge conducting all proceedings and ordering the entry of judgment in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.
Mr. Amos contends that the ALJ’s determination of his residual functional
capacity is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ (a) did not give

controlling weight to an opinion expressed by Mr. Amos’s treating physician; (b)
placed undue weight on Mr. Amos’s daily living activities and overstated the
physical intensity of those activities; and (c) improperly assessed the credibility of
Mr. Amos’s views of his functional limits.
For the reasons discussed below, the court finds that the ALJ’s determination
is based on a reasonable evaluation of the evidence in the record, which this court
may not disturb under the appropriate standard of review. Accordingly, the
Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
Standard for Proving Disability
To prove disability, a claimant must show that he is unable to “engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Mr. Amos is disabled if his impairments are of such severity
that he is not able to perform the work he previously engaged in and, if based on his
age, education, and work experience, he cannot engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) has
implemented these statutory standards by, in part, prescribing a five-step
sequential evaluation process for determining disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
Step one asks if the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; if he is, then he is not disabled. Step two asks whether the claimant’s

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impairments, singly or in combination, are severe; if they are not, then he is not
disabled. A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [a claimant’s]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). The
third step is an analysis of whether the claimant’s impairments, either singly or in
combination, meet or equal the criteria of any of the conditions in the Listing of
Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The Listing of
Impairments includes medical conditions defined by criteria that the SSA has predetermined are disabling, so that if a claimant meets all of the criteria for a listed
impairment or presents medical findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the
most similar listed impairment, then the claimant is presumptively disabled and
qualifies for benefits. Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 428 (7th Cir. 2002).
If the claimant’s impairments do not satisfy a listing, then his residual
functional capacity (RFC) is determined for purposes of steps four and five. RFC is
a claimant’s ability to do work on a regular and continuing basis despite his
impairment-related physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. At the
fourth step, if the claimant has the RFC to perform his past relevant work, then he
is not disabled. The fifth step asks whether there is work in the relevant economy
that the claimant can perform, based on his age, work experience, and education
(which are not considered at step four),1 and his RFC; if so, then he is not disabled.

The ALJ decided at step four that Mr. Amos is capable of performing his past
relevant work. Thus, she did not consider—and was not required to consider—Mr.
Amos’s lack of education and his illiteracy in deciding whether he is disabled. Mr.
Amos notes that his illiteracy undoubtedly will limit his job prospects and he
testified that he has not looked for a job because he believes his inability to read will
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The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). If the claimant meets that burden, then the
Commissioner has the burden at step five to show that work exists in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform, given his age,
education, work experience, and functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2);
Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004).
Standard for Review of the ALJ’s Decision
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s (or ALJ’s) factual findings is
deferential. A court must affirm if no error of law occurred and if the findings are
supported by substantial evidence. Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th
Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence means evidence that a reasonable person would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The standard demands more than a
scintilla of evidentiary support, but does not demand a preponderance of the
evidence. Wood v. Thompson, 246 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 2001). “Because the
Commissioner is responsible for weighing the evidence, resolving conflicts, and
making independent findings of fact, [a] Court may not decide the facts anew,
reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner
to decide whether a claimant is or is not disabled.” Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049,
1055 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted).

prevent his hiring. These issues, unfortunately, are irrelevant at step four. See
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (2003) (SSA determination that claimant may be
found not disabled if he is physically and mentally able to perform past work
without regard to whether that or any other work is available was reasonable
interpretation of statute and entitled to deference).
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The ALJ is required to articulate a minimal, but legitimate, justification for
her decision to accept or reject specific evidence of a disability. Scheck v. Barnhart,
357 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 2004). If an ALJ concludes that benefits should be
denied, she must have first built an accurate, logical bridge between the evidence
and her conclusion. Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2008). The ALJ
need not address every piece of evidence in her decision, but she cannot ignore a
line of evidence that detracts from the conclusions she made, and she must trace the
path of her reasoning and connect the evidence to her findings and conclusions.
Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2012); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863,
872 (7th Cir. 2000).
Analysis
I.

The ALJ’s Sequential Findings
Mr. Amos was born in April 1951, was 56 years old as of his alleged onset

date of disability, and was 59 years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision. He had
worked for about 28 years at United Technology in Huntington, Indiana, most
recently as a printed circuit board inspector, which—based on the vocational
expert’s testimony—was light and semi-skilled work as Mr. Amos actually
performed it.
At step one, the ALJ determined that Mr. Amos had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since May 2, 2007, his alleged onset date of disability.
On that date he was fired from his job because he refused to perform a task he
believed he could not do. The ALJ classified his firing as insubordination and not

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the “result of an allegedly disabling impairment,” and Mr. Amos does not challenge
that characterization. At step two, the ALJ identified degenerative disc disease and
a history of colon polyps as severe impairments but found that Mr. Amos’s benign
prostate enlargement and mental impairments of panic attacks and dysthymic
disorder were not severe. At step three, the ALJ evaluated Mr. Amos’s severe
impairments against listing 1.04 (disorders of the spine) but found that criteria
under the listing were not met. As to Mr. Amos’s residual functional capacity
(RFC), the ALJ decided that he has the RFC to perform work at a medium level of
exertion although he can stoop, and climb ramps and stairs only occasionally. She
rejected the opinion of Mr. Amos’s treating physician that Mr. Amos did not even
have the capacity to perform at a sedentary level of work. At step four, the ALJ
decided that Mr. Amos is capable of performing his past relevant work as a printed
circuit board inspector. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Mr. Amos is not disabled,
without the need to reach step five.
II.

Mr. Amos’s Assertions of Error
Mr. Amos asserts that the ALJ’s decision is erroneous because she did not

give controlling weight to the view of Dr. Gregory Spangler, a treating physician,
that Mr. Amos’s physical and mental impairments prevent even sedentary work,
and because in formulating the RFC, the ALJ placed undue weight on Mr. Amos’s
daily living activities and improperly discounted his credibility.

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III.

The ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Spangler’s opinion is supported by
substantial evidence.
The weight that an ALJ gives to medical opinions is guided by factors

described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b)(2). A medical opinion by a treating physician
or other acceptable treating medical source about the nature and severity of a
claimant’s impairments, including any mental and physical restrictions, is entitled
to “controlling weight” if it is well supported by medically acceptable techniques and
is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence. Id. § 404.1527(d)(2). Johansen
v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]reating physician’s opinion is
entitled to controlling weight only if it is not inconsistent with other substantial
evidence in the record.”). If an ALJ determines it is not entitled to controlling
weight, she weighs its value by considering the degree to which it (a) is supported
by relevant evidence and explanations; (b) considered all evidence pertinent to the
claimant’s claim; (c) is consistent with the record as a whole; and (d) is supported or
contradicted by any other factors. Id. § 404.1527(d)(3)-(6). The physician’s field of
specialty and the nature and extent of her treatment relationship with the claimant
are also considered. Id. § 404.1527(d)(1), (2), and (5).
The ALJ evaluated the opinion of Dr. Gregory Spangler, Mr. Amos’s treating
physician, in light of these factors. Dr. Spangler was Mr. Amos’s family physician.
He completed a “Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire,” stating (a) that Mr.
Amos suffers from back pain, neck pain, arm pain, panic attacks, and fatigue; (b)
that pain is present all the time, panic attacks occur 2 or 3 times per week, and (c)
that fatigue is constant. (R. 289). Among other things, Dr. Spangler opined that in
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an eight hour work day, Mr. Amos can sit only one hour at a time and four hours in
the work day, can stand 30 minutes at a time and less than two hours in the work
day, needs to walk around for 10 minutes every hour, needs an unscheduled 5-10
minute break from working two to three times every hour, and is likely to miss
more than four days of work every month because of his impairments. (R. 291-92
and 293). He also stated that Mr. Amos can never lift anything that is 10 pounds or
heavier, only rarely lift anything less than 10 pounds, and only rarely twist, stoop,
or climb. (R. 292). Also, according to Dr. Spangler, Mr. Amos has significant
limitations in repetitively reaching, handling, or fingering—that he is not capable of
grasping, turning, or twisting objects with his hands, or fine finger manipulations,
more than 25% of a work day. (R. 292-93).
The ALJ determined that Dr. Spangler’s opinion was not entitled to
controlling weight and, indeed, was not entitled to much weight at all. She
explained that Dr. Spangler apparently accepted uncritically and relied quite
heavily on Mr. Amos’s reports of his functional limits. The ALJ found that the
objective medical evidence did not support the extreme limits Dr. Spangler noted
and were even contradicted by some of Dr. Spangler’s own evaluations of Mr. Amos.
Mr. Amos’s back impairments indicated the same level of severity over time,
including both before and after his alleged onset date. Those impairments,
including those revealed by December 2006 x-rays of the lumbar spine, had not
prevented Mr. Amos from working before, and he worked up to May 2007 when he
was fired, but not “as a result of an allegedly disabling impairment.” (R. 23). Thus,

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Dr. Spangler’s views could not be squared with the actual physical activity that Mr.
Amos had performed at work on a sustained basis for years.
The ALJ also contrasted Dr. Spangler’s statement of significant limits on Mr.
Amos’s gross and fine finger manipulation abilities with the findings of the
consultative examiner who examined Mr. Amos and reported that he could “grasp,
lift, carry, and manipulate objects in both hands,” perform repeated movements
with his feet, bend and squat normally, and stand and walk normally. Even Dr.
Spangler, the ALJ noted, had described Mr. Amos after an examination in January
2010 as having normal range of motion, normal strength, good stability, and no
joint tenderness. (R. 23).
The very severe limitations on Mr. Amos’s functioning described by Dr.
Spangler were also inconsistent with Mr. Amos’s reports of his daily functioning, or
at least it was reasonable that the ALJ came to that conclusion. Mr. Amos
justifiably complains that the ALJ described his daily living activities in terms
suggestive of better functioning than Mr. Amos had described in his testimony.2
But Mr. Amos’s actual daily living activities do reflect physical abilities that detract
from the reliability of Dr. Spangler’s opinion. It was Mr. Amos who told the
consultative examiner that he can attend to his own hygiene, bathes, dresses
and grooms himself, that he cooks three to four times a week, that he helps do the
For example, the ALJ said that Mr. Amos could prepare complete meals
when Mr. Amos’s wife said he cooks meals once in a while in the crockpot or makes
simple things like instant mashed potatoes. The ALJ noted that Mr. Amos uses a
riding lawn mower, but ignored Mr. Amos’s testimony that he takes breaks while he
does so because of back pain.
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laundry, and that the only reason he does not help with housecleaning is because
he’s “too lazy.”
The ALJ also explained that the weight of Dr. Spangler’s opinion was affected
by the fact that he is not a specialist, and that Mr. Amos had not seen a back
specialist since at least 2003.3
In short, the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Spangler’s opinion was not
entitled to controlling weight, and was worthy of little weight at all, was made in
accordance with applicable SSA regulations and is supported by substantial
evidence. Ketelboeter v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If the treating
physician’s opinion is inconsistent with the consulting physician’s opinion,
internally inconsistent, or based solely on the patient’s subjective complaints, the
ALJ may discount it.”); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 416 (7th Cir. 2008)
(discounting a physician’s opinion on a matter about which he is not a specialist is
sound).
IV.

The ALJ’s assessment of Mr. Amos’s credibility is not “patently
wrong.”
An ALJ is required to consider a claimant’s statements about his symptoms

and his impairments and how they affect his daily life and ability to work, but she
is not required blindly to accept those statements. Rucker v. Chater, 92 F.3d 492,
496 (7th Cir. 1996) (ALJ not required to give full credit to every statement of pain or
Mr. Amos suggests that he had not seen a back specialist because of financial
issues. However, he had medical insurance while employed up through at least
May 2007. Thus, it was not inappropriate for the ALJ to question the credibility of
Mr. Amos’s functional limits when they apparently did not require examination or
treatment by a specialist since 2003.
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find a claimant disabled because he does not think he can work). Here, the ALJ
considered whether and the extent to which Mr. Amos’s descriptions of the limiting
effects of his impairments were worthy of credence. Her assessment of Mr. Amos’s
credibility is entitled to special deference from the court and is not a ground for
reversal and remand unless it was “patently wrong.” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668,
678 (7th Cir. 2008) (because ALJ is in best position to evaluate a claimant’s
credibility, ALJ’s credibility determination is reviewed deferentially and will not be
set aside unless it is “patently wrong”).
Social Security Regulation 96-7p describes the appropriate process for
evaluating credibility and requires an ALJ to consider a claimant’s subjective
complaints in light of the relevant objective medical evidence, as well as any other
pertinent evidence regarding the claimant’s daily activities, the severity and
intensity of the claimant’s symptoms, precipitating and aggravating factors,
medication, treatment, and other measures to relieve the person’s symptoms and
their efficacy and side-effects, and any other factors relevant to functional
limitations due to pain or other symptoms. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). It is
not necessary that the ALJ recite findings on every factor, but the ALJ must give
reasons for the weight given to the claimant’s statements so that the claimant and
subsequent reviewers have a fair sense of how the claimant’s testimony was
assessed. Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 783, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2003) (ALJ must
comply with SSR 96-7p in making a credibility determination by articulating the
reasons behind the determination).

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Here, the ALJ addressed every factor and explained that she did not accept
Mr. Amos’s assertions that pain from his back impairment, or limits because of
depression or panic attacks, prevented him from jobs requiring a medium level of
exertion or from performing his past relevant work, which required exertion at a
light level. In examining the objective medical record, the ALJ stressed again that
the medical record did not show significant deterioration over time, and Mr. Amos
had been able to perform his work: “The fact that the impairments did not prevent
the claimant from working at that time strongly suggests that it would not
currently prevent work.” (R. 23). Although Mr. Amos asserts that he obviously has
gotten worse over time and as he has aged, he does not cite to any medical evidence
documenting that deterioration or refuting the ALJ’s conclusion that the most
recent x-rays of his back were taken months before he stopped working and thus did
not reflect an impairment preventing that work. Although the ALJ described Mr.
Amos’s daily living activities in a light supportive of a higher level of functioning
than Mr. Amos described, it was not unreasonable for her to conclude that Mr.
Amos’s ability to function as a participating member of a household on a daily basis
undermined his insistence that he is not even physically capable of performing even
sedentary work, has trouble grasping or pushing or pulling things, and cannot work
for more than 15 or 20 minutes without needing a break.4 The ALJ discussed Mr.

The ALJ did not, as Mr. Amos suggests, equate his daily living activities with
medium-level, 40-hours a week work. Rather, she discussed his daily living
activities in two facets of her decision. First, she addressed whether and how his
alleged mental impairments (panic attacks and depression) interfered with or
affected daily living. (R. 20). Second, she examined them in light of and in contrast
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Amos’s medication regimen and the fact that they have been effective in controlling
his pain symptoms without limiting his functioning. She noted that although he
complained that Oxycontin did not relieve his pain, the record showed that different
medications were prescribed and he had not complained that they were ineffective.
She also noted that Mr. Amos said he used a heating pad or TENS unit two or three
times per month to relieve pain, which suggested that conservative, periodic
treatment was all that was necessary. She contrasted Mr. Amos’s complaint that
his pain prevented sleeping with the statement recorded by his doctor in the
medical records that he slept fine.
In sum, the court is unable to conclude that the ALJ’s assessment of Mr.
Amos’s credibility was patently wrong.
Conclusion
The ALJ’s decisions to discount the opinion of Mr. Amos’s treating physician
and to disbelieve Mr. Amos’s descriptions of the limiting effects of his impairments
applied the correct standards and are supported by substantial evidence. The
Commissioner’s decision finding that Mr. Amos was not disabled is AFFIRMED.
So ORDERED.
03/13/2013
Date: ____________________

____________________________________
Debra McVicker Lynch
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana

with Mr. Amos’s suggestion that his pain debilitated him from working. (R. 22-23).
The ALJ’s determination of Mr. Amos’s RFC appears to have principally relied
(though not solely) on the objective medical evidence and its relative stability over
time, with Mr. Amos’s demonstrated ability to work, and the opinion of the state
agency doctors regarding his ability to perform medium level work.
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